RICKS COLLEGE LRC
3 1404 00 044 491 6

DATE DUE

NOV 15 1982		MAR 13 1998	
MAR 22 1983		NOV - 5 1998	
NOV 22 1983		MAR 11 2000	
NOV 07 1985			
DEC 03 1985		OCT 11 2001	
JAN 28 1986			
		APR 23 2002	
SEP 25 1986		OCT 09 2002	
MAR 21 1987			
MAR 2 1990		OCT 08 2002	
SEP 25 1990			
NOV 16 1990		NOV 04 2003	
FEB 22 1992			
APR 01 1996			
OCT 29 1998			
DEC 11 1998			

GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.S.A.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
Brigham Young University-Idaho

https://archive.org/details/memorabiliaofsoc00xeno

XENOPHON

XENOPHON'S

MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES.

WITH

ENGLISH NOTES, CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY, AND PROLEGOMENA ON SOCRATICISM, SUPPOSED LIFE OF SOCRATES, ETC.

BY CHARLES ANTHON, LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF THE GREEK AND LATIN LANGUAGES IN COLUMBIA COLLEGE, NEW YORK, AND RECTOR OF THE CLASSICAL SCHOOL.

NEW YORK:

HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS

329 & 331 PEARL STREET,

FRANKLIN SQUARE

1857.

XENOPHON'S

MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES,

WITH

ENGLISH NOTES, CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY, THE PROLEGOMENA OF KÜHNER, WIGGERS' LIFE OF SOCRATES, ETC.

BY CHARLES ANTHON, LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF THE GREEK AND LATIN LANGUAGES IN COLUMBIA COLLEGE, NEW YORK, AND RECTOR OF THE GRAMMAR SCHOOL.

NEW YORK:

HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS

329 & 331 PEARL STREET,

FRANKLIN SQUARE

1857.

Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand eight hundred and forty-eight, by

HARPER & BROTHERS,

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New York.

71 2009 435

TO THE

REV. GEORGE W. BETHUNE, D.D.,

THE ABLE THEOLOGIAN, THE ELOQUENT DIVINE, AND THE GRACEFUL AND ACCOMPLISHED SCHOLAR,

THIS WORK

Is Respectfully Inscribed,

BY ONE WHO TAKES PRIDE IN CLAIMING HIM AS AN EARLY PUPIL AND A STEADFAST FRIEND.

PREFACE.

Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates affords so excellent a course of reading for the younger students in our colleges, that its absence hitherto from the list of text-books is much to be regretted. The editor hopes that the labor which he has here bestowed upon the work may succeed in bringing it more into favor with both instructors and pupils, and in opening up to them a more familiar acquaintance with one of the most beautiful treatises of antiquity.

The text is substantially Kühner's, with such alterations, however, as appeared to the editor to be required by the interests of those for whose benefit the present work is intended. Thus, for instance, the punctuation has been entirely remodelled, and a change has been made from the German and more involved mode of pointing to one more closely analogous to our own. The decided advantage resulting from such an arrangement an experienced instructor will at once appreciate. Another deviation from Kühner consists in restoring to the text the Attic termination of the second person in σ, which rests on too sure grounds to be lightly rejected, even in prose. New readings have also been introduced wherever they seemed to bring out the meaning of the author more clearly, or to do away with some awkward and evidently erroneous construction. The great mass of the present text, however, consists in its being an

expurgated one. Every passage has either been rejected or essentially modified that in any way conflicted with our better and purer ideas of propriety and decorum, for even in the ethical treatises of the Greeks expressions and allusions will sometimes occur which it is our happier privilege to have been taught unsparingly to condemn. It is believed that the present is the only edition in which this most salutary rule has been followed, a circumstance which will not fail to recommend it to the notice of those instructors of youth who adhere strictly in this respect to the wise precept of the Roman satirist.

The notes appended to the present work contain the whole body of Kühner's valuable commentary, with such additions as the editor was enabled to make, both from numerous other commentators, and also from his own resources. In clothing Kühner's commentary in an English garb, the editor has been very materially aided by the excellent edition of the Memorabilia recently published by Dr. Hickie, and he begs leave here to return his acknowledgments for the valuable materials with which that work has supplied him. In order, however, to render the present edition still more complete than any of its predecessors, some important subsidiary matter has been appended to the volume, which will put the student into possession of the whole ground relative to the Life and Character of Socrates, and will enable him to form an unbiassed opinion for himself. These addenda are as follows: 1. The *Prolegomena of Kühner*, as far as translated by Wheeler, of Trinity College, Dublin, and which have never before appeared in this country in an English dress. 2. The *Life of Socrates, by Dr. Wiggers*, translated from the German, and which appeared from the

London press in 1840. 3. *Schleiermacher on the Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher*, translated from the German by the present Bishop of St. David's, and originally published in the *Philological Museum*. — As the opinions of Wiggers on the character and nature of the philosophy of Socrates differ materially from those of Schleiermacher, Brandis, and Ritter, it was thought advisable by the English translators of the Life of Socrates to append this essay of Schleiermacher's to his work, and we have allowed the arrangement to remain undisturbed. To the Prolegomena of Richter the editor has appended a note on the subject of the so-called demon of Socrates, in which the opinion of *Ast* on that much-disputed point is referred to as opinion which, in all likelihood, contains the most rational view of the case.

The editor will now mention the principal works to which he is indebted for valuable aid in preparing the notes appended to the present volume.

1. *Xenophon's Memorabilien. Griechisch und deutsch mit kritischen und erklärenden Anmerkungen von Raphael Kühner, &c. 2te Aufl.* Gotha, 1841, 8vo.

2. *Xenophontis Memorabilia Socratis et Oeconomicus. Recognovit et illustravit Car. Gottl. Kühnöl.* Lips. 1830, 8vo.

3. *Xenophon's Memorabilien, ed. Winiewski.* Lips. 1828, 8vo.

4. *Xenophontis Commentarii &c. ed. Schneidewin.* Lips. 1850, 8vo.

5. *Xenophontis Memorabilia ed. Kühner.* Hal. Sax. 1841, 12mo.

6. *Xenophontis Memorabilia recognovit G. H. Schäfer.* Lips. 1826, 12mo.

7. *Xenophontis Memorabilia recognovit & illustravit C. L. Kühnöl.* Hal. Sax. 1827, 12mo.

8. *Kühnöl, von Fr. Jacobs, Ue. Ausgabe.* Jena, 1828.

9. *Xenophontis Opera, ed. Dübner.* Paris, 1836, 8vo.

10. *Xenophontis Memorabilia, &c. ed. Orelli.* Zurich, 1840, 12mo.

11. *Xenophontis Libros de Memorabilibus Xenophontis &c. recognovit.* 1826.

12. *Xenophon's Vier Bücher Denkwürdigkeiten des Sokrates. Aus dem Griechischen von Johann Michael Heusse.* Winsen, 1828, 12mo.

PROLEGOMENA.

I. CONCERNING THE DESIGN AND PLAN OF THE FOLLOWING BOOKS.

The design of Xenophon in these books is to defend Socrates, his beloved instructor, from the accusations of his prosecutors, and to prove that he had been a citizen most useful to individuals and to the state. That this defence might have the greater weight, he is not contented merely to review and refute the charges brought against Socrates, but, following merely the first two chapters of the first book to this part of his subject, he then introduces Socrates, and represents him disputing with his pupils, friends, and even enemies, upon the most important topics of morality, and that part of philosophy which treats of the cultivation of human excellence.

If we except the commencement of the first book (chap. i., § 1 and 2), Xenophon rarely addresses his readers in his own person, and then only premises a few words to the discussions of Socrates, to inform us whence the discussion arose, and to render it more intelligible; or, as the close of a dissertation, he briefly draws out its fruitions, with reference to the teaching or deeds of his great instructor. Hence, while we read these books, a living representation of the philosopher arises before us; for these discourses embrace a great variety of subjects, and are addressed to men of every class and station; and an emphatic epithet bestows on the art of addressing each aright, so as to know how aptly to select and accommodate language to the hearers or inquirers or both. And hence we may clearly perceive the manifold powers of Socrates to encounter, for and in addressing men of every class, his noble natural endowments, his life and character.

Xenophon does not pretend to have taken down the sentiments and language of Socrates, the very words of Socrates. If, however, we consider the diversified style of argument in these dissertations on various subjects, we can hardly conceive a mode that Xenophon has modified his style and diction to the closest resemblance with the style and diction of his master. We may the more readily believe the language to be closely assimilated, if we consider how nearly were long intimacy and familiarity. Xenophon could never be ac-

guage with a true Socratic coloring. Hence the mild and gentle tenor which pervades all the writings of Xenophon,[1] that native and ingrained simplicity, redolent with all the graces and beauties of Atticism, while it entices the reader by its simple elegance, appears admirably adapted to depict the amiable character of Socrates, his candor, his insinuating affability in his conversation with his fellow-men. To omit other points, one example will prove how admirably Xenophon has adumbrated the peculiar character of his master. It is well known that by the Greeks of old Socrates was called ὁ εἴρων, from that irony or dissimulation by which he appeared to grant all they claimed to frivolous pretenders to philosophy, while he himself assumed the disguise of ignorance on all subjects; and this artifice he used most skillfully for the express purpose of confounding them at the close, and convincing them of their ignorance and folly.[2] In many passages, so elegantly and naively has Xenophon represented this irony, that we can not entertain a doubt that it is drawn from living nature.[3] The extraordinary affection and sincere love toward his master, manifested in these books, give them a most pleasing and grateful charm.

II. On the arrangement of the subjects in the following books.

Although Socrates spent the entire period of his life in the study of wisdom, and was the first to construct philosophy on firm and solid foundations, yet he never studied to reduce his discoveries to any art or system; but just as an occasion presented itself, he discoursed on whatever tended to a proper course of life, to reform character, and conduct to happiness; as, *e. g.*, on piety, beauty, justice, temperance, fortitude, the body politic, the duties of a state minister, the government of men, and, in fine, on all topics the knowledge of which would render men honorable and excellent, while ignorance of them would degrade men to a servile condition.[4] Hence, in the full glare of active life, and in the throng of men, he was ever found scattering his words to persons of every condition, illumining their minds with the light of his instruction, and guiding them on the path which led to happiness; and so, we must not think it strange that Xenophon did not arrange these discourses of Socrates according to any similarity of argument or subject, or do not form a scientific system from them. Those who have expec-

1. Compare *Cic., de Orat.*, ii., 14, 58; *Brut.*, xxxv., 132.
2. Compare *Cic., Brut.*, lxxxv., 292.
3. Compare i., 2, 34, *seqq.*; iii., 6, 2, *seqq.*; iv., 2.
4. Compare i., 1, 16.

as to find such an arrangement of matter in these books, were entirely ignorant of the method of treating pursued by Socrates, and of the object of these books. All of Xenophon that remained, according to the rigid rules of art, the principle of harmony, he would not only have declared from the mutilated fragments we have left us with a meagre and imperfect picture of the work, but would deem his whole vigor and power of his authorship [illegible] to have followed the phantasmagoric order of their invention than the arrangement or connection of their several parts. In the larger portion of the work it is not difficult to trace [illegible] throughout; but the first two chapters of the first book are rendered by a general defence of Socrates against the charges of his accusers; and then in the following portion the general witness to power by particular instances. The chief portion of this work [illegible] with the preceding portion; it treats the [illegible] but in such a way as that what particularly [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

edge, piety toward God, justice, temperance, and other virtues pertaining to happiness of life.

The closing chapter of the fourth book is added as an epilogue, and proves that the death of Socrates was most glorious, most happy, and most dear in the sight of heaven. The whole concludes with a brief summary of the subjects treated of in the work.

III. The Precepts of Socrates reduced to a System.

That the whole doctrine of Socrates may be placed in a clearer light, we must collect into one body the limbs, as it were, scattered throughout the book, and reduce all to some sort of system.

It is well known that the Moral Philosophy of the ancients was usually divided into three great heads.

I. Of the good, and highest good = *de bonis, et de summo bono.*

II. Of virtue = *de virtutibus.*

III. Of duties = *de officiis.*

The good (*bonum*) is defined to be "that which is produced by the efficacy of virtue," and the highest good (*summum bonum*) is "the union of all goods which spring from virtue."

Virtue (*virtus*) is a constant and perpetual power of the mind, by which power good (*bonum*) is produced.

Duty (*officium*), finally, is the rule and standard to which, in the conduct of life, virtue should conform herself.[1]

A. And now we must first consider what is the nature of that which Socrates, as set forth by Xenophon, defines to be good (*bonum*).

The Good, which should be the object of man's pursuit, is *the useful* (ὠφέλιμον, χρήσιμον, λυσιτελές, *utile*). The useful is defined to be the "end of action," or the result which we expect by action. Every thought and act of man should be *useful*, *i. e.*, should have reference to some special end. Independently, then, and in itself, nothing is good, but only becomes such by special reference to its object. The same statement is made regarding the beautiful (*pulchrum*), iii., 8, 3, 6, 7, 10; iv., 6, 9. The highest end, for which man should strain his utmost, is happiness. The good, therefore, is that which is useful to aid us in obtaining that highest end, happiness of life. The good and the beautiful, therefore, differ not from the useful. Independently and of itself, nothing is useful, nothing is good, nothing is beautiful, but only becomes so by special reference to its end severally (iii., 8, 3, 6, 7, 10; iv., 6, 9). Whence

1. Compare *Kühner, De Cic. in philosophiam meritis*, p. 225.

it follows that what is useful to some may be prejudicial to others (v. 5, 6). The highest good (common human) is happiness of life (eudaimonia) but this happiness is not promised by means of material goods, we must be prepared by reason, but only by those goods which God has required for himself by will, namely, exercise and acuteness of his natural powers, but so, by good and virtuous qualities. Brightness of life, therefore, and the exercise of virtuous qualities, are the same. The first and most important virtue required above all is the consciousness of the limits (v. 10, 6). But seeking those things which have relation to our happiness are not of themselves good, but if applied of us to an improper business or do not the proper time, may prove evils to us, we shall take especial care but we easily decide in favor and point out the present property, circumstances, guidance, and perseverance that we may see those things only as far as they may tend to happiness, not to impede our happiness (v., 2, 12). The ability, virtue, time, is most for the virtuous of all our powers, without [illegible] (v., 2, 6) (v., 2, 11). Our happiness is not good little (virtuous), but good action (virtuous acts best). "I see, though nothing to excite, whereby right spirit and for the [illegible] (virtuous), but at good fortune (virtuous), but if any one by diligent study and pious endeavors adorns with good manners, that is good action (virtuous). These men are the best and most acceptable to Heaven who rightly perform their duty with success, whether it be as agriculturists, as physicians, or in other employments." Many have performed noble, but rightly are good for nothing, and opposed by the gods (v., 2, 11, 12).

[illegible] (virtuous) [illegible] (virtuous), [illegible] (virtuous), [illegible] (virtuous),

to that which will be practically useful in life. Speculations which spring beyond the sphere of daily life, on things mysterious and concealed from the eyes of men, are useless, and withdraw us from pursuits of other things which may be practically useful (iv., 7). Under this head is mentioned the science of Dialectics, or the art of examining concerning the good, useful, and beautiful, and other points tending to happiness of life, in such a way as to find out the essential properties of things, and then define and lucidly explain them (iv., 6). Whosoever has acquired clear notions of things, no matter in what sphere of life he may be placed, will always select the best course, and, consequently, will be the more fitted to transact affairs (iv., 5, 12). Arithmetic (so far as accounts, &c.), Geometry, and Astronomy are enumerated and limited (iv., 7). All arts, in fine, which have reference to the uses of life, are clearly to be referred to the head of goods. Those arts, indeed, peculiar to handicrafts (*βαναυσικαί*), are, according to the idea of the ancients, to be excluded from among goods, since they are practiced by those who are ignorant of the good, the beautiful, or the just (iv., 2, 22), and enfeeble both body and mind (*Œcon.*, iv., 2, *seq.*). Socrates appears to have classed among the goods the more refined arts, as Painting and Statuary (iii., 10), but has not expressly informed us of their relation to his test, utility. Yet, since he has maintained that nothing is beautiful but what is useful, we may infer that these arts also he encouraged from an idea of their utility.

4. Friendship is a good of the highest value. No good is more precious, lasting, or useful than a sincere friend. He regards the interests of his friend as if they were his own; he participates with him in prosperity or adversity, and provides for his safety and property as much as for his own, nay, even to a greater degree (ii., 4). The value of a friend should be estimated from the love and tender affection with which he clings to his fellow-friend, from his zeal, benevolence, and duty in deserving well of him. That friendship may be more lasting, we should endeavor to be esteemed of the highest value by our fellow-friend. Friends should be temperate, for men given to gluttony, wantonness, sleep, inactivity, luxury, or avarice, can be of no utility to us, nay, often prove a detriment. They should be faithful and ready to perform services, and push the interests of their friend (ii., 6, 1–5). Friendship can not exist, unless between the good and honorable; for they who are useless can never gain the useful as their friends (ii., 6, 14-16). And though, since good men often desire the same goods, and hence contention may arise among them, yet their innate virtue will ap-

in strict accordance with this principle of good and excellent which is comprehended and grounded in his mind; for he who is wise, *i. e.*, who knows what is good and excellent, will always *do* what harmonizes with that good; for all things which are done virtuously, *i. e.*, temperately, justly, and bravely, are excellent and good. On the other hand, all that is done in opposition to virtue is evil and disastrous. Since the wise man knows this, not only by his mental assent will he prefer what is good and excellent to what is evil and prejudicial, but also effect the former in action. On the contrary, the unwise, seeing that they know not what may be good, not only mentally prefer the evil and prejudicial to the excellent and useful, but even effect them in action; and even when they endeavor to prefer good to evil, they will err (*i. e.*, easily they will fall into a wrong judgment in the distinction of good and evil) through ignorance. Therefore, he who knows the virtues will also practice them, but whosoever knows them not will not be able to practice them, even should he wish to do so. Since, therefore, all that is excellent is effected by virtue, it is clear that virtue is wisdom (iii., 9, 5). Theory and practice, accordingly, can not be severed. The conviction of the excellent influences us to suit our actions to it, and he who is devoid of this conviction is the fool (i., 1, 16; ii., 19; iv., 6, 10, *seq.*).

And now for the several parts of the division of Virtue.

a. Temperance (ἐγκράτεια, *Temperantia*) is called by Socrates "the foundation of virtue (ἀρετῆς κρηπίς)." This virtue is perceived in the calming and curbing the appetites and desires, so that they be obedient to right reason, and not violate the settled convictions of the intellect (i., 5; ii., 1–7, *and esp.* iv., 5). Without it we can do nothing vigorously or strenuously (i., 6, 5); we can neither benefit ourselves or others, or be welcome in the society of our friends (i., 5, 1–3). If we be ensnared by the allurements of pleasure, or overcome by weariness of toil or difficulty, we will surely fail in our duty (ii., 1, 1–7). Temperance causes us to undertake all labors with a cheerful spirit, because we follow good and useful counsel, and expect that the most ample fruits will redound to us from these toils (ii., 1, 17–19). Effeminacy and pleasure oppose the health of the body, and prevent us from providing our minds with laudable knowledge. Zeal and energy carry us through to excellent and good results. Without labor and toil, nothing noble is granted to us by the gods. In short, we can not reach true happiness unless we be temperate (ii., 1, 19, *seq.*). Temperance should be, as it were, the foundation of every action we undertake. He who ren-

...own honest advancement to pleasure, neither himself submit to the meanest slavery (iv., 5, 1–5). Intemperance, by impairing both of wisdom, and overclouding the serenity of good and evil, leaves us to ...ckon the real interest of the good and wrongs us in every opportunity (iv., 5, 6–7). Temperance, on the other hand, by placing our happiness in the regulation of desire, and preserving vacuity of mind, urges us on every occasion and ground of life, even to ...ating the good, and therefore renders us fit for the transaction of important affairs (iv., 5, 7–12).

β. Fortitude (ἀνδρία, fortitude) is the science by which we ...ount ourselves with prudence and energy in pursuing or despising affairs. This we use to be reckoned as bravery only in those dangers from ignorance of them; for we every instant and cowardly persons would be brave. But men may be considered brave who are very cautious regarding things but to be feared. Those only are brave who know the power of the danger, and in it act with constancy and energy (iv., 6, 10, 11).

γ. Justice (δικαιοσύνη, Justice) is the knowledge of the laws in force among men, and which must be obeyed. But there are two species of laws, either the written or unwritten. Of these last, are those which the body politic unanimously adopt for their common safety, resembling what are called divine things. From other observations on these laws, many other important advantages are obtained by men, but what is more than all, Concord, the strongest bulwark and foundation of happiness, and the highest good not only to individual members of a state, but to the whole community. That man whose citizens receive the greatest confidence in the faith of his word, is esteemed as perfect, and is honourable as well (iv., 6, 10–12). But, seeing that these laws should provide for the safety of the state and its citizens, observance of them is not indispensably just or well just, but only so where that safety is the object of obedience. Hence it happens that the same action, under different circumstances or regarding different men, either by whom or against whom it may be done, can be 'well just or unjust (iv., 7, 13–19).

Unwritten Laws (ἄγραφοι νόμοι) are those given to men by the divine dispensation, and exist, in the same manner, not framed through the opinion; for instance, to render parents, and as there exist regards between the parent and child, to love grandsons equal and wonderful, &c. These laws were set up divine rights to prevail from the fact that ignorance and unavoidable perturbation pardon those who violate them (iv., 6, 19, 20).

C. The Third Part of Moral Philosophy is concerning duty (*officium*). Duty is a law which must be followed by us in life's conduct; and this law should harmonize with the doctrine of the highest good. Since, then, in the doctrine of Socrates, the good is the same as the useful, it follows, that the law of duty should urge us in every proceeding to follow that line of conduct which may appear to be most useful. But since it often happens that, owing to the various nature of occasions, situations, or circumstances, the same thing may be in one case beneficial, in another prejudicial, we must use anxious care and circumspection as to what we should follow and what avoid. Thus, for instance, to speak falsehood, to deceive, to pilfer, to plunder, are forbidden by justice, yet often in war these are just, *i. e.*, useful (iv., 2, 11–17). The chief heads of duty are thus briefly enumerated in ii., 1, 23: If you desire that the gods should be propitious to you, you must worship these gods; if to be loved by friends, these friends must be benefited; to be honored by your state, you must materially serve that state. If you desire the earth to yield an abundant produce, you must cultivate the earth; to be enriched by the produce of your herds, you must take diligent care of them; if you are anxious to increase your means by war, and to become able to liberate your friends and master your enemies, not only should you learn the arts of war, but also, by constant practice, learn how to use them. Finally, if you desire to be robust in body, your body must be under the direction of your intellect, and trained to endurance of toil and labor. In proportion as the goods of human life are fleeting and transitory (iv., 2, 34), so much the more should we endeavor to require as few auxiliaries as possible to life (i., 6, 10). But, since nothing is good independently and of itself, but all things uncertain and doubtful, very frequently the intellect of man does not clearly see what line of conduct alone it should pursue. But for this our feebleness and imbecility, a most sure and unerring aid is found in Divination. The beautiful order of the universe, the whole construction of the human frame, the noble and erect stature of man, the powers of his intellect, &c., all prove that the gods exist, that they keep together by their power the extended universe, and provide for the wants and requirements of mortals. With piety and purity, therefore, should the gods be worshipped; and if we faithfully do this, we may surely be persuaded that in mysterious or doubtful matters the gods will readily enlighten man (i., 4; iv., 3).

IV. Whether the genuine doctrines of Socrates have been handed down to us by Xenophon.

Having given a sketch of the whole moral doctrines of Socrates as represented by Xenophon, we have arrived at a question fraught of extraordinary importance, namely, whether we can really find the genuine doctrines of Socrates, or be sure of Xenophon himself, whether he is honest. This question has been agitated and discussed by many persons of learned name, and in our own age has been treated with great talent and learning by Louis Dissen,[1] Fr. Schleiermacher,[2] Ch. A. Brandis,[3] H. Th. Rötscher,[4] and lately by Karl Joel.[5] These writers have pursued necessarily a different line of argument, yet all exemplify Socrates' own maxim, that the greatest doctrines of humanity have not been handed down to us in the writings of Xenophon.

[illegible] having granted that the wholly foreign character of Socrates as given by Xenophon [illegible] upon the very basis of [illegible] had to assert that, as far [illegible] of Socrates, it does not even [illegible] to us and may, and should be judged by [illegible] conception of that character by whom [illegible] would have [illegible] at his disposal. He grants, indeed, that Socrates would not have disputed with such sophists as Moral Philosophy as has been done by Plato; but it can hardly be questioned that Socrates would have thought that system [illegible] should be largely sought for and practised, including [illegible] self-knowledge [illegible] would be held by the wisest men. [illegible] have done it suppose that Socrates had [illegible] the limitation of the sensible world, [illegible] [illegible] ? This question he does not answer: "Socrates was in the [illegible] habit of holding discussions with men of every grade, and exciting them to formulate, confirm, and invigorate. For this latter purpose he made frequent use of [illegible] by setting before them [illegible] opinions of others [illegible]. When Xenophon, whose talents lay not in investigating the more subtle questions of philosophy, found these discussions, he described Socrates as he was, and as the multitude, namely, wholly as that view was [illegible]

[1] Commentatio de Philosophia Moral. Socratis et Xenophontis. Diss. Inaug. [illegible] Göttingæ, 1813.

[2] Versuch e. kritisch. Platon. [illegible] in Platon. Werke, Bd. I. p. 36, [illegible] Verhältniss [illegible] Platon's [illegible] Sokrates [illegible] Sokrates [illegible]

[3] Abhdl. Akad. 1827. I. 3. p. [illegible] 1835. II. 1. p. 31-113.

[4] Xenophon und sein Verhältniss [illegible] Philosophie. [illegible] Sokrates. Leipzig, 1842.

[5] Versuche zu Plotin's Quellen. [illegible], 1867.

sented to those whom nature formed for active business in life, not for calm speculation. He therefore has drawn a picture of a philosophy which measures all things by the standard of utility, seeing that he desired to represent Socrates as wholly averse to subtle and refined speculations, while his aim was to exhort all to a proper regulation of active life: a philosophy, however, whose system he did not clearly understand himself."

Schleiermacher also thinks that the true and correct view of the Socratic Philosophy is to be derived from the writings of Plato, not from those of Xenophon.

But since it is clearer than light that all the dogmas laid down in the dialogues of Plato have not proceeded from Socrates, Brandis adopts the authority of Aristotle as a text and standard by which to distinguish the doctrines of Socrates from those of Plato. Xenophon he considers not to have had capacity fitted to comprehend thoroughly the system of his master, and he utterly rejects his statement and authority.

Rossel examined anew the various tracts upon this subject, and arrived at the conclusion that not only should all which is stated by Aristotle, as the doctrines of Socrates, be considered as his, but also thinks that a much wider extent of subjects could be found in those passages where Plato endeavors to connect his close-drawn conclusions with the notions of his master. He judges of Xenophon even more harshly than Dissen.

Rœtscher, finally, endeavors to vindicate the faithfulness and authority of Xenophon in his statements regarding the doctrine of Socrates, and thinks that his commentaries form the purest and clearest source whence the genuine doctrine of Socrates can be drawn.

It is time, however, clearly to state what may be my own opinion regarding this subject. I acknowledge that at an earlier period of my life I was strongly in favor of that opinion regarding Xenophon's authority held by my preceptor Dissen, worthy as he was of my unceasing affection; but, the more frequent and careful has been my perusal of the Socratic books of Xenophon, the more I began to doubt the truth of the conclusions of Dissen and the others above stated; and at last was I convinced that they should be wholly rejected, and that the true and genuine doctrines of Socrates have been handed down to us by Xenophon alone. The writers above enumerated appear to me to have chiefly erred, because they did not examine the doctrine of Socrates as described by Xenophon, by itself and independently, but have compared it with the doctrines

But to proceed to our immediate subject. The moral doctrine of the Xenophontean Socrates seeks in every action what may be its especial good. The moral doctrine of the Platonic Socrates, on the other hand, sets forward the highest good in the abstract τὸ ἀγαθόν, *i. e.*, the Deity. All that the human mind can reach which is good or beautiful, that, he asserts, is the most perfect exemplar of all virtue, which we should look to and follow all our life through. Who will assert that this doctrine is not most exalted and divine? but that it is Socratic I vehemently deny. Can any art or science be found which, at its very origin, sprung forth finished and perfect in all its parts? Nay, it is natural to the matter itself, that he by whom the first foundation of Moral Philosophy was laid, should refer all science and all virtue to the standard of utility, *i. e.*, to the test regarding the end of action; and should in every action seek what might be its particular good, *i. e.*, what each thing may contribute to the obtaining of happiness of life, which happiness is life's highest end. Dissen, and the followers of his opinion regarding the Xenophontean Socrates, interpret that utility which Socrates shows should be followed in every action, as if it were perceived alone by certain advantages external to the action itself; but in this opinion they are wholly deceived; nay, that utility must be nothing else than the express end of action, or that which each looks to in action. Hence Socrates laid down that nothing can be good unless it be useful (ὠφέλιμον), *i. e.*, unless it be that which has a close connection with happiness of life, while this happiness is not placed in pleasure, but in virtues.[1] And, accordingly, Socrates is said to have usually execrated those who first in thought severed the virtuous from the useful, united and coherent as these are by nature.[2]

Besides what we have above stated as to the nature of the Moral Philosophy of Socrates, many other considerations exist against our calling in question the genuineness of the doctrine laid down by Xenophon.

And, first, Xenophon was a most attentive auditor of Socrates, and although less adapted by natural endowments for the more recondite disquisitions of philosophy, yet he excelled in so many brilliant characteristics of mind and talent, that among all the friends and companions of Socrates, none was more fitted rightly to catch the true spirit of his master's teaching and faithfully hand it down to us. We do not insist upon his candor, purity of character, sterling judgment, his acquirements in literature, the gracefulness and

1. *Plato, Alcib.*, i., p. 116, *C.* 2. *Cic., Off.*, iii., 3, 11.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

and design of both were most different. On the other hand, Xenophon, in his Commentaries, desired not to act the part of a philosopher, but to support the character of a simple narrator, and in describing the life and teaching of his master, to defend him against the accusations of his enemies. He must, accordingly, have made it his highest care religiously to preserve historical accuracy in all his statements. If we will cast an imputation of doubt upon Xenophon, we must confess that all the sources of ancient writers are impure, and the whole truth of antiquity is slippery ground.

It can not, indeed, be asserted that Xenophon has given the dialogues of Socrates in his express words unaltered, since that does not appear to have been his own intention, and in many places he states his desire to mention "what he had treasured up in memory," while he often relates discussions related to him by ear and eye witnesses. But it can not be questioned that Xenophon, enjoying the closest intimacy with his master, most diligently observed his whole life, and made himself fully acquainted with his mode of disputation, constantly reviving by memory and meditation his sentiments and arguments; nor is it at all unlikely that he set down briefly the heads of the discussions he heard from Socrates.

The very form and style of the Socratic sentiments in Xenophon are every where so moulded, that every portion presents the appearance of truth, and seems to be drawn from actual life. Moreover, the same argument is frequently handled in different and separate discourses; and if these were united together, the subject would be completed with much more clearness and accuracy. Hence we may fairly conclude that Xenophon did not unite or compound his master's discussions at his own fancy, but wrote them down as he had heard them delivered, if not in the precise words, at least preserving the sentiments and arguments.

Finally, it is no slight proof of Xenophon's authenticity that he composed this commentary to defend the life and doctrine of his preceptor against the accusations of his adversaries. To this design, what could be more abhorrent than to draw up a set of discourses from mere fiction, language which Socrates had never uttered, and to publish facts and sentiments at variance with his philosophy, known, as it was, to so many persons! Xenophon himself, too, in express terms, tells us that he relates either what he heard with his own ears, or from the lips of others.

Unless we are inclined to believe that Xenophon was so poorly endowed by nature as to be unable to comprehend a philosophy not speculative and remote from daily life, but a popular system formed

[illegible]

V. On the Dæmon of Socrates.

[illegible]

of the human intellect. Hence *τὸ δαιμόνιον* (with the article) has the same meaning as *τὸ θεῖον*, "the deity," "the divinity," as in *Mem.*, i., 4, 2: *λέξω . . ., ἃ ποτε αὐτοῦ ἤκουσα περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου διαλεγόμενον*. 10: *οὗτοι . . . . ὑπερορῶ τὸ δαιμόνιον*: and iv., 3, 14: *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἤ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, τοῦ θείου μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν, ὁρᾶται δὲ οὐδ' αὐτή. Ἃ χρὴ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταορονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον* (where it has evidently the same meaning as *τοῦ θείου* above).[1] Hence, also, the plural form *τὰ δαιμόνια* has usually the same meaning as *οἱ θεοί*, as among the Germans, *die Gottheiten* for *Götter*: thus, in *Mem.*, i., 1, 1: *οἷς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων*: and similarly in numerous passages.

And, first, let us consider the passages in Xenophon relating to this subject. See *Mem.*, i., 1, 2–5.

From that passage it clearly appears that the dæmon (*τὸ δαιμόνιον*) was a certain divine voice or intimation which Socrates mentally felt, and which either discouraged him from the performance of any act, or encouraged him in the performance of it. That this voice was divine, Socrates concluded, because it never deceived him, but always proved to be true. This certain truth regarding future things could proceed from nothing except a deity. Nor was the perception of this voice limited only to his own immediate concerns, but aided him in assisting others by his counsel. In fine, what auguries, oracles, and other external signs of the divine will were to the rest of men, his dæmon was to Socrates. Nor is there a less important passage in *Mem.*, iv., 3, 12, 13, where, by many arguments, having proved that the gods take diligent concern for the human race, he gives, as the last proof of divine providence, the fact that the gods have granted divination to man, by which future events are discovered. To this Euthydemus replies, "To you, Socrates, the gods seem to be more benign than to other mortals, since, even though not interrogated by you, they signify beforehand what it is right you should do, and what not" (in which words Euthydemus alludes to the *δαιμόνιον* of Socrates). To this Socrates replies: *ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σύ γνώσει, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς, ἕως ἂν τὰς μοιρὰς τῶν θεῶν ἰδῇς, ἀλλ' ἐξαυτῆς σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σκέπτεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς. Ἐννόει δέ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ θεοὶ οὕτως ὑποδεικνύουσιν*, &c. From this passage, it is clear that Socrates

1. Compare *Aristot., Rhet.*, ii., 23, 8.

did not consider that the freedom was given specially to himself alone, as a peculiar gift by the Deity, but was common to him with other men? Other men, indeed, did not acknowledge this freedom, simply because they had not faith in it, as we to be satisfied with perceiving by others the things corresponding, but wished to behold it visibly with their eyes. But, in order that this Deity might be found by us, we winning the gods with piety and sanctity.

Also in these passages see Mem. iv. 3. 3: ἐξ ὧν γὰρ τοὺς φίλους μισεῖ [καὶ ἔκφοβος] τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐστιν ἀγαπητόν. I do this not as a peculiar gift by the Deity, but was common to him with other men.

ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἡ, ὅταν γένηται, ἀεί μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε· καὶ ἐάν τίς μοι τῶν φίλων ἀνακοινῶται καὶ γένηται ἡ φωνή, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἀποτρέπει, καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ πράττειν· καὶ τούτων ὑμὶν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι. This extraordinary discrepancy may be removed, if with Tennemann[1] we suppose that Xenophon did not accurately distinguish between the results to which the divine voice referred, and those which Socrates himself inferred from its silence. If this voice, whenever it was heard by Socrates, was a sign of discouragement, it follows, of necessity, that as often as the voice was silent, its silence was a sign of encouragement and exhortation. In the *Apology*, also, p. 40, A., B., C., it is clear that Socrates took the silence of the dæmon as a sign of assent. And in *Phædr.*, 242, B., C.: *ἠνίκ' ἐμελλον . . . . . τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο· ἀεὶ δὲ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν*, where the words *καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον* are added as explanatory, "The Dæmon," *i. e.*, that well-known sign. Besides the above passages, we may also compare *Euthyphr.*, p. 3, B.: *Theætet.*, p. 151, A.; *Polit.*, vi, p. 496, C.; *Alcib.*, i., p. 103, A., B., p. 124, C. Those passages in the Theages, a dialogue unjustly attributed to Plato, differ from those in Xenophon and Plato, because in them such power and efficacy is attributed to the Socratic dæmon as that they who experienced the intimacy of Socrates, although they had embraced none of his doctrine, by his mere presence and propinquity advanced in virtue; yet not all, but only those whom the Deity willed should (*ἐὰν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ*). This idea of the Socratic dæmon approaches nearest to that invented at a later period, and which attributed to Socrates a sort of tutelary spirit or genius.

In Plutarch (*de Socratis Genio*) many statements are made, partly strange, partly ridiculous, but yet some sentiments here and there interspersed are admirable. In chap. x., Theocritus says, "that the dæmon was given by God to Socrates as his guide in life, to afford him light on obscure points, and knowledge in things not comprehended by human intellect, and to inspire his counsels by a certain divine spirit (*ἐπιθειάζον ταῖς αὐτοῦ προαιρέσεσι*)." But what is afterward related of the power of this dæmon is ridiculous; *e. g.*, "Socrates wished once, with some of his friends, to enter the house of Andocides, but suddenly stopped in his way, being warned by his dæmon. Having meditated in silence for a time, he then proceeded to his destination, not by the straight course, but by another

1. *Gesch. der Phil.*, pt. ii., p. 33.

litatem accommodatis, certa et vera cernit in somnis: sic castus sensus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum et ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est paratior. Hoc nimirum est illud, quod de Socrate sæpe dicitur, esse divinum quiddam, quod δαιμόνιον appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti."

It remains now, from a comparison of these passages, briefly to state our own opinion regarding this point.

From all that has been cited above, it appears most clearly that the dæmon was not considered to have any external form or appearance, nor to have been any thing externally perceptible by the senses, but to have been a more intense emotion of the mind, which Socrates called δαιμόνιον, from a persuasion that that emotion arose within him from the Deity. It is called, indeed, a divine voice, but we must understand by this a voice not heard by the bodily ears, but mentally perceived. This divine voice, which from his boyhood, as Plato states, was the lot of Socrates, and never left him during his whole life, was always heard by him as often as he was about to do any thing neither rightly nor honorably: its silence he considered to be a sign of approbation; and so this dæmon is thought by Xenophon to have had both a persuasive and dissuasive power. Not only in matters pertaining to Socrates alone, but also in those of others, in subjects of great or little importance, this voice was heard in warning; it never deceived, but always spoke the truth; and hence Socrates was convinced of its divinity. Nor did Socrates consider that divine voice to be any peculiar benefit given by God to himself alone, but to be shared also with other men: that its power could be mentally perceived by all men who worship the gods with piety and truth, and are pure and chaste. Hence it is clear that this dæmon was naught else than an emotion of the mind, by which Socrates was dissuaded from his design of performing any thing; an emotion common, indeed, to all other men, but not having the same efficacy in all, but in proportion to the purity and integrity of each, in proportion to his acuteness and vigor of intellect, to his upright thoughts and chastity of character, so the more vivid and efficacious. It should not be wondered at that this emotion of an interior power in the majority of men should be so trifling and powerless as not to be perceived at all, while in Socrates it was most vigorous and impulsive; for Socrates was imbued with the most delicate sense of honor, rare purity of character, heartfelt piety toward God, and a firm persuasion of his providential care. Endowed, moreover, with a wonderful acuteness of intellect, vigo

of mind, and deserved of judgment, he investigated the whole economy of the human mind, and gave the clearest initiation to its constitution. But this Leibnitz did not place in full relief, for only so much could not be contained within the range of human thought; for, since reason was given by God to the human race, therefore constituted a register of which what human knowledge in all things might ever could discover by the exertion of that excellent gift.

NOTE BY THE AMERICAN EDITOR

A new essay was started in 1698 in a French pleasure, Leibnitz, in relation to the System of Newton, which is not noticed by Kidwell, but which was, nevertheless, to contain the only personal explanation of this controverted question. Leibnitz wrote the letter which Newton subsequently inspected, and pointed out the passage in question, and which he considered that the philosopher, under the influence of an active mental organization and active imagination, perhaps, probably would have him be led to an internal position, although probably would in mind an erroneous one. In other words it was simply and plainly unconscious. Leibnitz affirms himself to the sentiment of some having a glimpse of the degree of mental aberration, making the remarks on this most peculiar subject. To a German relative, engaged in the transcendental speculations of his country's philosophy, and seeking and using the expressions even which the Doctor of Leibnitz has done, it may thing, or unconscious it, not to see presumed to some into duly contact with his fellow-men, and observe the various occupations and professions in which even the strongest minds are given to oblige and witness, the strongest the thinkers, the most startling the hallucinations, but that of the Prince physician will appear as curiously plausible but. The title of his work is as follows: "De Mente in Morbis, Specimen d'une explication de la théorie Physiologique a celle de l'esprit. Par F. Leibnitz, Médecin consultant de Sa Majesté des Rois de Prusse et Roumanie, et Médecin adjoint de la Prusse." Paris, 1700.

XENOPHONTIS

MEMORABILIA

SOCRATIS.

XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA

SOCRATES.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

SUMMARY.

with respect, however, to those matters the event whereof was doubtful, he always sent them to consult the gods whether these ought to be undertaken or not; whereas he thought it a kind of impiety to endeavor to ascertain from the gods what can be satisfactorily mastered by the powers of the human intellect. (§ 6–9.)

6. Still farther, though Socrates was always in public, and more or less amid crowds of men, yet no one ever saw him doing, or heard him saying, any thing impious or profane. Neither did he occupy himself, like others, with curious but unprofitable researches into the operations of nature; on the contrary, he thought that the things relating to man formed man's proper study, and that those inquiries alone deserved to be pursued by us, the results of which would tend directly to make us virtuous, and, consequently, happy. (§ 10–17.)

7. He did not, however, merely teach the lessons of morality and virtue, but exemplified them, also, in his own life and conduct; and a remarkable instance of his unbending integrity, and his regard for the sacred character of an oath, was given in the case of Thrasyllus and Erasinides, together with their colleagues, when the people wished to condemn them contrary to the laws. And his reverence for an oath arose from a deep-seated conviction that every word, every action, nay, even our most secret thoughts, lie open to the view of Deity. How, then, could the Athenians ever suffer themselves to be persuaded that such a man entertained sentiments injurious to the gods? (§ 18–20.)

1. ΠΟΛΛΑ΄ΚΙΣ *ἐθαύμασα, τίσι ποτὲ λόγοις* Ἀθηναίους *ἔπεισαν οἱ γραψάμενοι* Σωκράτην, *ὡς ἄξιος εἴη θανάτου τῇ πόλει.* Ἡ *μὲν γὰρ γραφὴ κατ' αὐτοῦ τοιάδε τις ἦν· ἀδικεῖ* Σωκράτης *οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.*

2. Πρῶτον *μὲν οὖν, ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζεν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεούς, ποίῳ ποτ' ἐχρήσαντο τεκμηρίῳ; θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν πολλάκις μὲν οἴκοι, πολλάκις δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν, καὶ μαντικῇ χρώμενος οὐκ ἀφανὴς ἦν· διετεθρύλητο γάρ, ὡς φαίη* Σωκράτης *τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστά μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν.* 3. Ὃ *δὲ οὐδὲν καινότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνοῖς τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίαις· οὗτοί τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐ τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μανευομένοις, ἀλλὰ*

μαι τευομένους, ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν· οἷον εἴ τις ἐπερωτῴη, πότερον ἐπιστάμενον ἡνιοχεῖν ἐπὶ ζεύγος λαβεῖν κρεῖττον, ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον· ἢ πότερον ἐπιστάμενον κυβερνᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν κρεῖττον λαβεῖν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον· ἢ ἃ ἐξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας, ἢ μετρήσαντας, ἢ στήσαντας εἰδέναι· τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθανομένους ἀθέμιστα ποιεῖν ἡγεῖτο· ἔφη δὲ δεῖν ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἵλεῳ σημαίνειν.

10. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκεῖνός γε ἀεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ· πρωΐ τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἤει, καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερὸς ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι· καὶ ἔλεγε μὲν ὡς τὸ πολύ, τοῖς δὲ βουλομένοις ἐξῆν ἀκούειν. 11. Οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβές, οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον, οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν, οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ἥπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔφυ, καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντιζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυεν. 12. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει, πότερά ποτε νομίσαντες ἱκανῶς ἤδη τἀνθρώπινα εἰδέναι, ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέντες, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες, ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν. 13. Ἐθαύμαζε δ', εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτων λέγειν, οὐ ταὐτὰ δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. 14. Τῶν τε γὰρ μαινομένων τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ τὰ δεινὰ δεδιέναι, τοὺς δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὐδ' ἐν ὄχλῳ δοκεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν, τοῖς δὲ οὐδ' ἐξιτητέον εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι δοκεῖν· καὶ τοὺς μὲν οὐθ' ἱερόν, οὔτε

Ἕκαστον, οὐκ ἄλλο παρ' ἄλλου οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἁπλοῦ τὰ πάντα καὶ ὅμοια γίνεσθαι· τὸν τε τοῦ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως δημιουργὸν τοῦτο μόνον ἐν ἅπασιν εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθος· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι πάντα, τοῦτο δ' οὐδέποτε τὸν αὐτὸν κατέχειν· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν πάντα γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ' ἐκ γενέσθαι τινὰ οὔτε εἰς ἀπόλλυσθαι. 12. Ἔπαθον δὲ τοῦτ' αὐτοῦ καὶ πάλαι· ἀφ', ὅτου τὰ παθήματα γινώσκειν ἤρξαντο τοῦτ', ἐξ οὗ μαθόντες, ἀφεστᾶσι τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἅπτεσθαι παύονται, οὔτε καὶ τὰ θεῖα ἱμείρεσθαι παύονται, σπουδὴ γίνεται, οἷς ἐπιτιμᾶν ἔπεστιν γίγνεται, παῦσαι, ἅπερ διδάσκουσι καὶ ἀκούσαι, καὶ ὅλως, καὶ ἄρασι, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλοτε τῶν παλαιῶν, ἢ παλαιὸν μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐπιτίμιον, ἅμα δ' οὐ πάνυ μέσον, ἢ τῶν παλαιῶν βελτίω γίγνεται. 13. Ὅμοιά μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἡμεῖς μαρτυρόμεθα πάντα εἶναι· οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἓν ἀεὶ διαλέγεται ἕκαστον, τί γάρ; ἢ ἄνθρ· τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον· τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία· τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικόν· τί ἄρχῃ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ καθ' ἑκάστων ἄλλων, ἃ τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲν ἥττον καλῶν αἰσχρῶν εἶναι, τοῖς δ' ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀνθρωπολάβοις ἀν ἔτι καὶ πολλῶν ἀπέχεται.

14. Τίνα μὲν οὖν μὴ παρῆμεν ἢ ἴσως ἐπιλείπομεν, οὐδὲν ἀναγκαῖον ἔτερα πάντα καθ' αὑτὰ παριστάντα τῶν λεγομένων· ἐκεῖ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν βίβλους, οὐ θαυμαστὸν, εἰ μὴ πάντων ἐπεθεμεθ' ἐνταῦθα. 15. Συνέλεξαν γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ἀναλογισμὸν ἔχοντα ἐκεῖνοι, ὃν ἐξ ἧς αὐτοὶ τῶν κτισμάτων ἐπιστήμης, ἐπιστήσαντες τῷ τῆς δίκης γνησίῳ· ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ καὶ ἡμῶν παρὰ τοῖς κτίσμασι ἔνεκα σημαντικῆς καὶ γίνεται τοῦτο ἐκεῖ ἐγκείσθαι φασὶ Ἕλληνες ἀποστόλοις πάντας, ἀλλ' ἐβλέπομεν ἐκεῖνοι· ἐγκείσθαι καὶ ἡμῶν καὶ τὸν ἀναλογισμὸν ἐπιστάντες· ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν ἐπιστήμης ἐγκειμένων ἢ χρησάσθαι τῷ δίκῃ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ χρήσασθαι τοῦτο ἀκολούθως· 16. Καὶ γὰρ ἀναγ-

λεῖσθαι θεοὺς ἐνόμιζεν ἀνθρώπων, οὐχ ὃν τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν· οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ μὲν εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' οὐκ εἰδέναι· Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖτο θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα, καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι, καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.

20. Θαυμάζω οὖν, ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπείσθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι Σωκράτην περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς μὴ σωφρονεῖν, τὸν ἀσεβὲς μὲν οὐδέν ποτε περὶ τοὺς θεούς, οὔτ' εἰπόντα, οὔτε πράξαντα, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ λέγοντα καὶ πράττοντα περὶ θεῶν, οἷά τις ἂν καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων εἴη τε καὶ νομίζοιτο εὐσεβέστατος.

CHAPTER II.

SUMMARY.

XENOPHON comes now to the second charge brought against Socrates by his accusers, namely, his corrupting of the young, and he disposes of it as follows:

1. Socrates, instead of being a corrupter of the young, recalled many of them from habits of impiety and wrong-doing, and from intemperate and dissolute courses of life, by inspiring them with the love of virtue, and by encouraging them to entertain the hope that by a steadfast perseverance they might make themselves virtuous and esteemed. And what he thus taught produced a much stronger impression on the minds of the young, because he himself was the purest specimen of the very virtues which he wished them to cultivate and exercise. (§ 1–8.)

2. Neither did he, as his accusers also alleged, make those who associated with him contemners of the laws, and violent and audacious in their deportment. On the contrary, the lessons of prudence and of wisdom which he continually imparted, impressed them with the conviction that, in operating on the minds of their fellow-men, advice, not violence, and persuasion, not force, were to be employed. (§ 9–11.)

3. Nor could the conduct of Alcibiades and Critias, and the harm which they both did unto the state, be regarded as the results of the teaching of Socrates; for these two did not seek his converse with the view of modeling their own lives after his, but merely in order that, by listening to his discourses, they might attain to greater ability in the art of public speaking, and greater skill in the management of public affairs. And what is more, during all the period of their intercourse with Socrates they kept down their evil and vicious propensities, and only gave these full scope after they had left the discipline of their master. (§ 12–18.) For

οὐκ ἐπήνει. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπερεσθίοντα ὑπερπονεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζε, τὸ δέ, ὅσα γ' ἡδέως ἡ ψυχὴ δέχεται, ταῦτα ἱκανῶς ἐκπονεῖν ἐδοκίμαζε· ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν ὑγιεινήν τε ἱκανῶς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἔφη. 5. Ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν θρυπτικός γε, οὐδὲ ἀλαζονικὸς ἦν, οὔτ' ἀμπεχόνῃ, οὔθ' ὑποδέσει, οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ διαίτῃ· οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐρασιχρημάτους γε τοὺς συνόντας ἐποίει· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔπαυε, τοὺς δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντας οὐκ ἐπράττετο χρήματα. 6. Τούτου δ' ἀπεχόμενος ἐνόμιζεν ἐλευθερίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τοὺς δὲ λαμβάνοντας τῆς ὁμιλίας μισθὸν ἀνδραποδιστὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀπεκάλει, διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς εἶναι διαλέγεσθαι, παρ' ὧν ἂν λάβοιεν τὸν μισθόν. 7. Ἐθαύμαζε δ', εἴ τις ἀρετὴν ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἀργύριον πράττοιτο, καὶ μὴ νομίζοι τὸ μέγιστον κέρδος ἕξειν, φίλον ἀγαθὸν κτησάμενος, ἀλλὰ φοβοῖτο, μὴ ὁ γενόμενος καλὸς κἀγαθός, τῷ τὰ μέγιστα εὐεργετήσαντι μὴ τὴν μεγίστην χάριν ἔξοι. 8. Σωκράτης δὲ ἐπηγγείλατο μὲν οὐδενὶ πώποτε τοιοῦτον οὐδέν· ἐπίστευε δὲ τῶν ξυνόντων ἑαυτῷ τοὺς ἀποδεξαμένους, ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἐδοκίμαζεν, εἰς τὸν πάντα βίον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις φίλους ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ διαφθείροι τοὺς νέους; εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια διαφθορά ἐστιν.

9. Ἀλλά, νὴ Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας, λέγων, ὡς μωρὸν εἴη, τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κυάμου καθίστασθαι, κυβερνήτῃ δὲ μηδένα θέλειν κεχρῆσθαι κναμευτῷ, μηδὲ τέκτονι, μηδ' αὐλητῇ, μηδ' ἐπ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, ἃ πολλῷ ἐλάττονας βλάβας ἁμαρτανόμενα ποιεῖ τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἁμαρτανομένων· τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστώσης πολιτείας, καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους. 10. Ἐγὼ δ' οἶμαι τοὺς φρόνησιν ἀσκοῦντας, καὶ νομίζοντας ἱκανοὺς ἔσεσθαι τὰ συμφέροντα διδάσκειν τοὺς πολίτας, ἥκιστα γίγνεσθαι βιαίους, εἰδότας ὅτι τῇ μὲν βίᾳ πρόσεισιν ἔχθραι καὶ κίνδυνοι, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πείθειν ἀκινδύνως τε καὶ μετὰ φιλίας ταὐτὰ γίγνεται· οἱ μὲν γὰρ

βιαίοντες, ἢ δρεπτόμενοι μισοῦσι, οἱ δὲ πειθόμενοι, ὡς κεχαρισμένοις χαίρουσι. πάλιν τε τῶν ἡδέων ἀπεχόμενον τὸ βιάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπιόντων ἄμεινον τὰ ποιοῦντα τιμᾶσθαι ἔοικεν. 15. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ σωφρονεῖν ὁ καὶ βιάζεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δοκῶν ἧττον ἂν μέλοι, ὃ δὲ πείθειν δυνάμενον αἱρήσει· καὶ γὰρ φίλοι ἥδιον ἂν ἀγαπῷεν τοῦτον. Καὶ φανείη ἂν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἥκιστα συμβαλλόμενος τὸν ἀποκτείνοντα τοῦτον βούλεσθαι ἢ ζῆν τὸν *θωμένῳ χρῆσθαι*;

12. Ἀλλ' ὅρα γε ὁ κατήγορος Σωκράτη ἀνάξιά γε ποιοῦντα Κριτίᾳ τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ πλεῖστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐπεῖπεῖν. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον πάντων ὀλιγαρχικώτατός τε καὶ βιαιότατος ἐγένετο, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πάντων ἀκολαστότατος καὶ ὑβριστότατος ἐδόκει. 13. Ὅτοι δή, εἰ μὲν τι κακὸν ἐκείνοις τὴν πόλιν ἐπεποίηκεν, οὐκ ἀπολογήσασθαι τῶν δι' ἐκείνους Σωκράτη κατηγορούντων αὐτόν, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον. 14. Ἐπειδὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐδόκει τὰ δεινὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσαντε τοῦτον Ἀθηναίοις, βουλόμενοι τὸ κοινὸν ἐξ ἴσου πρᾶττοντες, καὶ κοινωνοὺς ἐποιοῦντο τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. Ὡδίνουσι δὲ Σωκράτους ἐπ' ἀμφότεροις αἱ γεγενημέναι αὐτοῖς ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπιτηδειότατοι ἦσαν καὶ ἱκανώτατοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν αὐτὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελέγχειν. 15. Ταῦτα δὲ ἴσασιν, καὶ ἅτε οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες, πάντων τῶν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπιθυμήσαντες καὶ τῆς συνουσίας. ἢ ἀμέλει εἴποι τις ἂν ἡμῖν, ἐπιστάμενος τὴν ἀμαθίαν αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐμβριθέστατοι δοκοῦσι γιγνόμενοι ἐν ἀκοσμοτάτοις ἔργοις εἶναι καὶ πρᾶττειν; 16. Ἔγωμαι μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀνεξέλεγκτον αὐτὸν ἢ ὑπὸ Δίκης τῆς δίκην ἐκείνοις ἐπιφερούσης δίκην ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων ἀκούσαντα μηδὲν ἧττον τῶν πεπεγνωσκότων ὑμῶν ἀποθανεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἦλθεν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ὥστε δοκεῖν ἐπιβουλεύειν τοῖς πολίταις, ἄξιον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐπισκέψασθαι.

17. Ἴσως οὖν εἴποι τις ἂν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅτι χρῆν τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικὰ διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας, ἢ σωφρονεῖν. Ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀντιλέγω· πάντας δὲ τοὺς διδάσκοντας ὁρῶ αὐτοὺς δεικνύντας τε τοῖς μανθάνουσιν, ἥπερ αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν, ἃ διδάσκουσι, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ προσβιβάζοντας. 18. Οἶδα δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην δεικνύντα τοῖς ξυνοῦσιν ἑαυτὸν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα, καὶ διαλεγόμενον κάλλιστα περὶ ἀρετῆς, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρωπίνων. Οἶδα δὲ κἀκείνῳ σωφρονοῦντε, ἔστε Σωκράτει συνήστην, οὐ φοβουμένῳ μὴ ζημιοῖντο ἢ παίοιντο ὑπὸ Σωκράτους, ἀλλ' οἰομένῳ τότε κράτιστον εἶναι τοῦτο πράττειν.

19. Ἴσως οὖν εἴποιεν ἂν πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὁ δίκαιος ἄδικος γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ὁ σώφρων ὑβριστής, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδέν, ὧν μάθησίς ἐστιν, ὁ μαθὼν ἀνεπιστήμων ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. Ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ τούτων οὐχ οὕτω γιγνώσκω· ὁρῶ γάρ, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔργα τοὺς μὴ τὰ σώματα ἀσκοῦντας οὐ δυναμένους ποιεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τοὺς μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀσκοῦντας οὐ δυναμένους· οὔτε γὰρ, ἃ δεῖ, πράττειν, οὔτε, ὧν δεῖ, ἀπέχεσθαι δύνανται. 20. Διὸ καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς οἱ πατέρες, κἂν ὦσι σώφρονες, ὅμως ἀπὸ τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώτων εἰργουσιν, ὡς τὴν μὲν τῶν χρηστῶν ὁμιλίαν ἄσκησιν οὖσαν τῆς ἀρετῆς, τὴν δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν κατάλυσιν. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅ τε λέγων,

> Ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσι
> Συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

καὶ ὁ λέγων,

> Αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τοτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός.

21. Κἀγὼ δὲ μαρτυρῶ τούτοις· ὁρῶ γάρ, ὥσπερ τῶν ἐν μέτρῳ πεποιημένων ἐπῶν τοὺς μὴ μελετῶντας ἐπιλανθανομένους, οὕτω καὶ τῶν διδασκαλικῶν λόγων τοῖς ἀμελοῦσι λήθην ἐγγιγνομένην. Ὅταν δὲ τῶν νουθετικῶν λόγων ἐπιλάθηταί τις, ἐπιλέλησται καὶ ὧν ἡ ψυχὴ πάσχουσα τῆς σωφροσύνης ἐπεθύμει· τούτων δ' ἐπιλαθόμενον οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης ἐπιλαθέσθαι. 22. Ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ

τοὺς εἰς φιλοσοφίαν προαγομένους καὶ τοὺς εἰς ὅσους δικαιοῦσθαι ἦσαν δυνάμενοι τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐπανορθοῦσθαι καὶ τῶν μὴ δικαίων ἀπέχεσθαι· πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ χρήματα δυνάμενοι μαθεῖν, τοῦ ἔχειν ἐφιέμενοι οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῦ καὶ τὰ χρήματα κατασκευάζεσθαι, ἐκ τούτου ἀπέχεσθαι ἐκαλῶν, οὗπερ ἐκείνοις ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀπέχεσθαι. § 28. Πῶς οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα συμφέροντα προσῆν, αὐτὸς μὲ συφέρειν, καὶ ὅσους ἐποίησε πρότερον αὐτῷ ἀγαπᾶν; Πάντα μὲν οὖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἀπορρέειν, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ συμφέρειν· ἐν τῷ γὰρ αὐτὸ σωφρονεῖν συντρέφεται τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ δύνασθαι σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ταχίστῃ δεινοῦσθαί τε καὶ τῷ σώματι χαυνοῦσθαι.

31. Καὶ ἐρήτην δή καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, ὃν μὲν Σωκράτει συνόντε, ἱκανὸν εἶναι χρόνον σφοδρὰ τὰ μὴ καλὰ ἐπιθυμίαι κρατεῖν· ἐπειτα δ' ἀπολείπειν. Καὶ τοῦτό μοι φῆναι εἰ δοκοῦσιν, ἵνα σκέψωμαι ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ὀλιγωρεῖν ἐμοῦ. Ἀλκιβιάδῃ δ' οὐ δοκεῖ μοι καλὸν ἐπὶ τοῖσδε καὶ τοιούτοις γενόμενον ἀμελῆσαι δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιτρέψαι ἄλλῳ τῷ πόλιν καὶ τοὺς πολίτας ὅπως ἂν ἄριστοι ἀνθρώπων διάξουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐμοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ ἐμοῖς ἡγεῖσθαι. Ὅστις δὲ τοῦ γιγνώσκειν ἕνεκα ἐπιθυμεῖ ἐμοῦ, ἐπιτρέπω ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ἐπιθυμοῦντι· οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέπει. § 32. Τιμοκράτει δὲ συμβάντα κάκιστα καὶ ἀγνωμονέστατα μὲν ἐπὶ γυναῖκι ἐπιορκῆσαι δ' ἐπὶ τέκνοις, παρανομῆσαι δ' ἐπὶ δικαίοις, ἀφικόμενον δὲ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ τὰ τούτων ἐπιτρέψαντα, καὶ πόλιν μέντοι ἐπὶ Σωκράτους ἐπιοῦσαν τὸ ἀναμαρτητὶ ἀποθανεῖν ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ θεῷ. Εἶτα εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀληθεύεσθαι τοῖσιν Σωκράτη ἐπιτήδειον ἐποίησε, ὅτε δὲ νεκρὸν ἔφησε φίλον εἶναι Σωκράτης τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδειον ἐποίησε τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐκεῖνον φίλον εἶναι; § 33. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τά γε δίκαια οὕτω κάλλιστα· τὸν μὲν γὰρ σπουδῇ, τὸν δὲ καθαιρέσει, τὸν δὲ δίκῃ βλάπτοντα

λος ἱκανοὺς ποιήσας τοὺς μαθητάς, ἐὰν πρὸς ἄλλους ἐλθόντες χείρους φανῶσιν, αἰτίαν ἔχει τούτου; τίς δὲ πατήρ, ἐὰν ὁ παῖς αὐτοῦ συνδιατρίβων τῳ, σώφρων ᾖ, ὕστερον δὲ ἄλλῳ τῳ συγγενόμενος, πονηρὸς γένηται, τὸν πρόσθεν αἰτιᾶται; ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅσῳ ἂν παρὰ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χείρων φαίνηται, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖ τὸν πρότερον; ἀλλ' οἵ γε πατέρες αὐτοὶ συνόντες τοῖς υἱέσι, τῶν παίδων πλημμελούντων, οὐκ αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοὶ σωφρονῶσιν. 28. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην δίκαιον ἦν κρίνειν· εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐποίει τι φαῦλον, εἰκότως ἂν ἐδόκει πονηρὸς εἶναι· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς σωφρονῶν διετέλει, πῶς ἂν δικαίως τῆς οὐκ ἐνούσης αὐτῷ κακίας αἰτίαν ἔχοι;

29. Ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ μηδὲν αὐτὸς πονηρὸν ποιῶν ἐκείνους φαῦλα πράττοντας ὁρῶν ἐπῄνει, δικαίως ἂν ἐπετιμᾶτο. Κριτίαν μὲν τοίνυν αἰσθανόμενος ἐρῶντα Εὐθυδήμου, ἀπέτρεπε, φάσκων ἀνελεύθερόν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐ πρέπον ἀνδρὶ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ. 30. Τοῦ δὲ Κριτίου τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐχ ὑπακούοντος, οὐδὲ ἀποτρεπομένου, λέγεται τὸν Σωκράτην, ἄλλων τε πολλῶν παρόντων καὶ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὑϊκὸν αὐτῷ δοκοίη πάσχειν ὁ Κριτίας. 31. Ἐξ ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐμίσει τὸν Σωκράτην ὁ Κριτίας, ὥστε καί, ὅτε τῶν τριάκοντα ὢν νομοθέτης μετὰ Χαρικλέους ἐγένετο, ἀπεμνημόνευσεν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραψε, λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν, ἐπηρεάζων ἐκείνῳ, καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ὅπῃ ἐπιλάβοιτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρων αὐτῷ, καὶ διαβάλλων πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγωγε, οὔτε αὐτὸς τοῦτο πώποτε Σωκράτους ἤκουσα, οὔτ' ἄλλου φάσκοντος ἀκηκοέναι ᾐσθόμην. 32. Ἐδήλωσε δέ· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ τριάκοντα πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ οὐ τοὺς χειρίστους ἀπέκτεινον, πολλοὺς δὲ προετρέποντο ἀδικεῖν, εἶπέ που ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκοίη εἶναι, εἴ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεύς, καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν, μὴ ὁμολογοίη κακὸς βουκόλος εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἴ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως, καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους

καὶ χείρους οἱ αἰσχύνεσθαι μηδ' οἴεσθαι καιρὸν εἶναι τοῦτο ποιεῖν τῆς πόλεως. 38. Ἀναμιμνῄσκοντος δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτων καλέσαντες ὁ τε Κριτίας καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς τὸν Σωκράτη, τόν τε νόμον ἐδικαίουν αὐτὸν, καὶ τοῖς νέοις ἀπαγορεύειν μὴ διαλέγεσθαι. Ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἐπήρετο αὐτοὺς, εἰ ἐξὸν πειθαρχεῖν εἰ τὰ δίκαιόν τῶν προστεταγμένων. Τὸ δ' ἀφ' ὅτου. 39. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἔφη, πειθαρχήσω μὲν οὐδενὶ τῶν νόμων· ὅταν δὲ μή τις δίκαιον λέγων τι παρακελεύηται, τοῦτο βούλομαι σαφῶς αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν παρ' ἡμῶν. Πάντως γὰρ τῶν λόγων τούτων ἐστὲ τοῖς ὑμῖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι σοφιστής. Ἦ οὐκ οὕτω; φησὶν ὁ Χαρικλῆς. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς τῆς ἡβῆς, ἄλλοις ἴσως ἀπαγορεύσω ἃ καὶ ἡβᾶν λέγων· εἰ δὲ σὺν τοῖς μὴ ἡβῶν, δῆλον ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡβᾶν λέγων. 40. Καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς ἐρυθριάσας μᾶλλον, Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ὦ Σωκράτες, ταῦτα σοι εὐμαθέστατα ἔσται προστεταγμένα, τοῖς νέοις ὅλως μὴ διαλέγεσθαι. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἴσως τοίνυν, ἔφη, μᾶλλον ἐμοῦ ἐπιδεῖται ἢ ὑμῶν τὸ παρεγγυηθῆναι, ἐπειδὴ γέ φασιν ἐμοὶ μὲν ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς οἴκοι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς, Ἀτοπόν γοῦν, φησὶν, ἐστὶν, ἐπειδὴ βουλόμεθα μὲν ὑμῖν χρῆσθαι, οὐ κάτω ποιοῦμεν οἷόν τοι ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους. Καὶ τὸ γε τοιοῦτον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ ξυμφέρον ἐστὶν, εἴπερ τῶν ἴσων, τὰ πλείονα ἁμαρτεῖν· τοῦτο οὖν οὐ φεύξεται. Ἔτι δ' ἐπιτιθέασιν μέν μοι, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἀεὶ συνόντας ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἐᾶν, καὶ οἷσθ' ὅτι Χαρικλῆς τε καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν Κριτίας· καὶ τὰ γε τοιαῦτα, ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς. 41. Ὁ δὲ Κριτίας· Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό τοι σε ἀναγκάσεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς καὶ τῶν τριάκοντα· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐ πολὺ ἦσαν ἐπιτάττοντες διαβεβλημένοις τισὶ μὴ ξυνεῖναι. Ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγέλασεν· καὶ γὰρ ἐδόκουν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν. Καὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς, καὶ τῶν ἐπιτάττειν γε· εἰ δὲ μὴ πειθόμενον, ἔφασκε καὶ σὲ ἐλαύνειν τῆς δικ

ποιήσῃς. 38. Ἔνθα καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἀπαγγελθέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ περὶ τῶν βοῶν λόγου, ὠργίζοντο τῷ Σωκράτει. Οἷα μὲν οὖν ἡ συνουσία ἐγεγόνει Κριτίᾳ πρὸς Σωκράτην, καὶ ὡς εἶχον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, εἴρηται. 39. Φαίην δ' ἂν ἔγωγε μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν εἶναι παίδευσιν παρὰ τοῦ μὴ ἀρέσκοντος. Κριτίας δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους ὡμιλησάτην, ὃν χρόνον ὡμιλείτην αὐτῷ ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡρμηκότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως· ἔτι γὰρ Σωκράτει συνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι, ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα πράττουσι τὰ πολιτικά. 40. Λέγεται γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδην, πρὶν εἰκοσιν ἐτῶν εἶναι, Περικλεῖ, ἐπιτρόπῳ μὲν ὄντι ἑαυτοῦ, προστάτῃ δὲ τῆς πόλεως, τοιάδε διαλεχθῆναι περὶ νόμων. 41. Εἰπέ μοι, φάναι, ὦ Περίκλεις, ἔχοις ἄν με διδάξαι, τί ἐστι νόμος; Πάντως δήπου, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα. Δίδαξον δὴ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, φάναι τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην· ὡς ἔγωγ' ἀκούων τινῶν ἐπαινουμένων, ὅτι νόμιμοι ἄνδρες εἰσίν, οἰμαι μὴ ἂν δικαίως τούτου τυχεῖν τοῦ ἐπαίνου τὸν μὴ εἰδότα, τί ἐστι νόμος. 42. Ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι χαλεποῦ πράγματος ἐπιθυμεῖς, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα, βουλόμενος γνῶναι, τί ἐστι νόμος· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσίν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὸν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον, ἅ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν, καὶ ἃ μή. Πότερον δὲ τἀγαθὰ νομίσαν δεῖν ποιεῖν, ἢ τὰ κακά; Τἀγαθά, νὴ Δία, φάναι, ὦ μειράκιον, τὰ δὲ κακὰ οὔ. 43. Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ', ὥςπερ ὅπου ὀλιγαρχία ἐστίν, ὀλίγοι συνελθόντες γράψωσιν, ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν, ταῦτα τί ἐστι; Πάντα, φάναι, ὅσα ἂν τὸ κρατοῦν τῆς πόλεως βουλευσάμενον, ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν, γράψῃ, νόμος καλεῖται. Καὶ ἂν τύραννος οὖν κρατῶν τῆς πόλεως γράψῃ τοῖς πολίταις, ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα νόμος ἐστί; Καὶ ὅσα τύραννος ἄρχων, φάναι, γράφει, καὶ ταῦτα νόμος καλεῖται. 44. Βία δέ, φάναι, καὶ ἀνομία τί ἐστιν, ὦ Περίκλεις; Ἆρ' οὐχ ὅταν ὁ κρείττων τὸν ἧττω μὴ πείσας, ἀλλὰ βιασάμενος, ἀναγκάσῃ ποιεῖν, ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, φάναι τὸν Περικλέα. Καὶ ὅσα ἄρα τύραννος μὴ πείσας τοὺς πολίτας

ἀνατεθῆν τοῦτο γράψαι, ἀνηρ οὐτε ἀ. ἀλλὰ καὶ, φησὶν τὸν Πλάτωνα ἀναστῆσαι γὰρ τί, ἵνα τὸ γράφειν μὴ τοῦτο γράφει, τοῦτο εἶναι. 11. Ἵνα δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι τὸν τοῦτον μὴ τοῦτο τὸ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν γράφειν, τοῦτον ἵνα φησὶ, ἢ μὴ τοῦτο εἶναι. Πάντα γὰρ ἀναι, φησὶν τὸν Πλάτωνα, ἵνα τὸν μὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον τὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι γράφειν εἶναι τὸ, ἵνα ἀλλὰν ἢ τοῦτο εἶναι. Καὶ ἵνα ἄρα τὸ τοῦ τοῦτον κατὰ τὸν τὸ γράφειν ἔχοντα τοῦτο μὴ τοῦτο ἵνα μάλλον ἢ τοῦτο ἵν εἶη. 12. Ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄλλον τὸν Πλάτωνα, ὁ Ἀριστοκλῆς καὶ ἄλλη, τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, ἄλλον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἵνα· τοιοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ἐναντίωσιν καὶ ἀναιρεῖσθαι, οὐδ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῦ ἄλλῳ ἄλλον φαίνεσθαι. Τὸν δὲ Ἀριστοκλῆν φάναι· Εἶδε καὶ, ὁ Πλάτων, τοῦτο ἀμφίτοκον, ἵνα ἀναιτίαν ἀναιρεῖ τοῦτο ἵνα. 13. Ἵνα τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐναντίωσιν εἶναι. Διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄλλῳ ἵνα, οὔτε τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἄλλῳ ἵνα ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἐξήκοντα ἐξήκοντα· τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλῳ ἵνα τὸν, ὥσπερ ἵνα καὶ ἵνα τοιοῦτον. 14. Ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν Ξενοφάνην ἵν᾽ ἀναίτιον καὶ Χαιρεφῶντα, καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆν καὶ Ζήνωνα, καὶ Κλεάνθη, καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρον καὶ ἄλλα, οὐ μόνον τοιοῦτον, οὐδ᾽ ἵνα ἀναιρεῖσθαι. ἢ ἀναιρεῖ γέγονεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα, οὐδὲν τὸ οὐδὲν γεγόνασι, καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ γεγόνασι, καὶ ἀλλοῖα καὶ φύσεις καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀναιρεῖ οὐδὲν χρήσθαι· καὶ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἵν᾽ ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἵν᾽ ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἵν᾽ ἀναιρεῖσθαι.

15. Ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τὸ ἄρχειν ἀναιρεῖσθαι, τοῦ πάντων τοιοῦτον ἀναιρεῖσθαι· τοῦτον μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο ἀναιρεῖσθαι τοῦτο τὸν τοιοῦτον, φάσκον δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄλλον, τοιοῦτον τοῦτο ἀναιρεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἵνα τὸν ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἵνα τὸν ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἵνα ἀναιρεῖσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ Ἀναξίμανδρος ἀναιρεῖ τὸν μὲν ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἵνα ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἀναιρεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ἵνα ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸν τοῦτον ἀναιρεῖσθαι, ἢ μὴ αὐτὸν ἀναιρεῖσθαι· καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον

ἕνεκα πολλάκις ἐσκόπει, τί διαφέρει μανίας ἀμαθία· καὶ τοὺς μὲν μαινομένους ᾤετο συμφερόντως ἂν δεδέσθαι καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς φίλοις, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένους τὰ δέοντα, δικαίως ἂν μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων. 51. Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε, ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, οὐ μόνον τοὺς πατέρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς ἑαυτῷ συνοῦσι, λέγων, ὡς οὔτε τοὺς καμνόντας, οὔτε τοὺς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὠφελοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ ἰατροί, τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι. 52. Ἐφη δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν λέγειν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εὔνους εἶναι, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν δυνήσονται· μόνους δὲ φάσκειν αὐτὸν ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους· ἀναπείθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτόν, ὡς αὐτὸς εἴη σοφώτατός τε, καὶ ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφούς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τοὺς ἑαυτῷ συνόντας, ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν. 53. Ἐγὼ δ' αὐτὸν οἶδα μὲν καὶ περὶ πατέρων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν, καὶ περὶ φίλων ταῦτα λέγοντα· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε δή, ὅτι, τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελθούσης, ἐν ᾗ μόνῃ γίγνεται φρόνησις, τὸ σῶμα τοῦ οἰκειοτάτου ἀνθρώτου τὴν ταχίστην ἐξενέγκαντες ἀφανίζουσιν. 54. Ἔλεγε δέ, ὅτι καὶ ζῶν ἕκαστος ἑαυτοῦ, ὃ πάντων μάλιστα φιλεῖ, τοῦ σώματος ὅ τι ἂν ἀχρεῖον ᾖ καὶ ἀνωφελές, αὐτός τε ἀφαιρεῖ, καὶ ἄλλῳ παρέχει· αὐτοί τε γὰρ αὐτῶν ὄνυχάς τε, καὶ τρίχας, καὶ τύλους ἀφαιροῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ἰατροῖς παρέχουσι μετὰ πόνων τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ἀποτέμνειν καὶ ἀποκάειν, καὶ τούτου χάριν οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ μισθὸν τίνειν· καὶ τὸ σίαλον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος ἀποπτύουσιν, ὡς δύνανται πορρωτάτω, διότι ὠφελεῖ μὲν οὐδέν αὐτοὺς ἐνόν, βλάπτει δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον. 55. Ταῦτ' οὖν ἔλεγεν, οὐ τὸν μὲν πατέρα ζῶντα κατορύττειν διδάσκων, ἑαυτὸν δὲ κατατέμνειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδεικνύων, ὅτι τὸ ἄφρον ἄτιμόν ἐστι, παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἐάν τε ὑπὸ πατρός, ἐάν τε ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ, ἐάν τε ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ, τῷ οἰκεῖος εἶναι πι-

στεῖον, ἀμελῆ, ἄλλα πεφυκέναι, ὑφ' ὧν ἂν βούλῃται τυράν-
σθαι, πάντων ἀθλιώτατον εἶναι.

50. Ἆρ' οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ κατέχων καὶ τῶν ἐνδυομένων
σκοπεῖν ἐκέλευσεν τὰ πανοπλίσματα, καὶ πότερον ἀστε-
ρωμένα χρώμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κοσμιωτέρους τε
εἶναι, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι; Ποιοῦσι γάρ τι.

Ἆρα δ' αὖ[illegible]

ταῦτα δὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν, ὡς ὁ πατὴρ κοσμεῖ μᾶλλον ἂν
γυμνὸν, μᾶλλ' ἀλλοκότως ἐσκευασμένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα
πειθόμενόν σοι τῷ κόσμῳ. 51. Συκοφάντῃ δ' ἐπιβου-
λεύοντι, τὸ μὲν ἀφιέντα εἶναι ἀφέλιμον τὸ δεδεμένον καὶ
δεμένον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀφιέντα δεδεμένον τε καὶ κακῶς καὶ τὸ
μὲν ἀφελόμενον ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ διδόντα φαῦλον, τοῖς μὲν ἀφε-
λοῦσι τε τιμωρεῖν ἐφιλοσοφεῖτ' ἂν, ὅπως καὶ ὑγιαίνειν συμβήσε-
σθαι· τοὺς δὲ κακόνους, ἢ εἰ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἐπιβουλεύοιεν
ἐμοὶ συνόντες, ἀμυνεῖν ἀναπείθει. Τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀβίωτον
δὴ ἔχειν τί.

Ἆρα δ' οὖν[illegible]

51. Τὰ δὲ Ὁμήρου δὴ ὁ κατέχων πολλοῦ ἄξιόν ἐστιν λέγειν,
ἢ οὐχί;

Ὄφρα μέν ἑ βουλῇσι καὶ ἔργοισι δόλια εἰδώς
Τῷ δ' ἐμενεν[illegible]
Δαναοῖσι, οἱ οἱ θοῶς κακὸν ὦρσε δεϊδισσόμενοι.
Ἀλλ' αὖτις τε αὐτῷσι, καὶ ἄλλοισι λάβρος ἐτύχθη
Τῷ δ' ἰὼ θεὸς ἔμβαλε Τρῶας.[illegible]
Τὸν ἐκάλεσσε βίηφιν, ἀμυνέμεναί τε βάλοι.
Δαναοῖσι, δήτορας ἀρὸς, καὶ ἄλλων μᾶλλον ἑταίρων,
Ὃς οἱ φίλτατος ἦεν· ὃ δ' ἐστάθη καὶ ἀκόντισε
λίθον μιν ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἐΐσκοπον, οὐδ' ἐπ' ἄρουρα

ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι, ὡς ὁ κατέχων ἐπαινεῖ τοὺς
τοὺς ἀρίστους, καὶ τούτους[illegible] Διομήδην δ' οὐ τοῦτ'
ἔλεγε· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον ἐᾶν γ' ἂν ἔφασκε δεῖν τοιοῦτον
ἀλλ' ἐφη δεῖν τοῦτον μᾶλλον ἔπεσθαι μεθ' ἡγεμόνος ἐπιτάττον-
τος, μᾶλλ' ἐπιμελουμένου, μᾶλλ' ἀπεῖναι τῶν ἀθρόων, εἴ τι

δέοι, βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὺς, ἄλλως τ' ἐὰν πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ θρασεῖς ὦσι, πάντα τρόπον κωλύεσθαι, κἂν πάνυ πλούσιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες. 60. Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε, τἀναντία τούτων, φανερὸς ἦν καὶ δημοτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ὤν· ἐκεῖνος γάρ, πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμητὰς καὶ ἀστοὺς καὶ ξένους λαβών, οὐδένα πώποτε μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας ἐπράξατο, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως ἐπήρκει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ· ὧν τινες μικρὰ μέρη, παρ' ἐκείνου προῖκα λαβόντες, πολλοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπώλουν, καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν, ὥςπερ ἐκεῖνος, δημοτικοί· τοῖς γὰρ μὴ ἔχουσι χρήματα διδόναι οὐκ ἤθελον διαλέγεσθαι. 61. Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κόσμον τῇ πόλει παρεῖχε πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ Λίχας τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὃς ὀνομαστὸς ἐπὶ τούτῳ γέγονε. Λίχας μὲν γὰρ ταῖς γυμνοπαιδίαις τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ξένους ἐδείπνιζε· Σωκράτης δὲ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου τὰ ἑαυτοῦ δαπανῶν τὰ μέγιστα πάντας τοὺς βουλομένους ὠφέλει· βελτίους γὰρ ποιῶν τοὺς συγγιγνομένους ἀπέπεμπεν.

62. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ Σωκράτης, τοιοῦτος ὤν, ἐδόκει τιμῆς ἄξιος εἶναι τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ θανάτου. Καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους δὲ σκοπῶν ἄν τις τοῦθ' εὕροι. Κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς νόμους, ἐάν τις φανερὸς γένηται κλέπτων, ἢ λωποδυτῶν, ἢ βαλαντιοτομῶν, ἢ τοιχωρυχῶν, ἢ ἀνδραποδιζόμενος, ἢ ἱεροσυλῶν, τούτοις θανατός ἐστιν ἡ ζημία· ὧν ἐκεῖνος πάντων ἀνθρώπων πλεῖστον ἀπεῖχεν. 63. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῇ πόλει γε οὔτε πολέμου κακῶς συμβάντος, οὔτε στάσεως, οὔτε προδοσίας, οὔτε ἄλλου κακοῦ οὐδενὸς πώποτε αἴτιος ἐγένετο. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἰδίᾳ γε οὐδένα πώποτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν ἀπεστέρησεν, οὔτε κακοῖς περιέβαλεν· ἀλλ' οὐδ' αἰτίαν τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἔσχε. 64. Πῶς οὖν ἔνοχος ἂν εἴη τῇ γραφῇ; ὃς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεούς, ὡς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ γέγραπτο, φανερὸς ἦν θεραπεύων τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων· ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους, ὃ δὴ ὁ γραψάμενος αὐτὸν ἠτιᾶτο, φανερὸς ἦν τῶν συνόντων τοὺς πονηρὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχοντας τούτων μὲν παύων, τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀρε-

---

CHAPTER III.

SUMMARY.

In the two previous chapters a general survey has been given to the complex ordered system therein. The remainder of the work has the following objects in view: 1. That the general scheme may be made out, and be ascertained by particular details; and so that we may see the agency of the ancients by general or a stronger light, and 2. That the whole [illegible] may be set forth in a perfect or exact form.

In this third chapter, therefore, it is shown, as it were, [illegible] and [illegible] himself mentioned the point, but how he commended others to [illegible] them; it is, and how he himself proceeded afterwards, and [illegible] others to set to another work. [illegible]

πολλάκις γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς τὰ παρὰ τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν εἶναι κεχαρισμένα· οὔτ' ἂν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, εἰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν πονηρῶν μᾶλλον ἦν κεχαρισμένα τοῖς θεοῖς, ἢ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρηστῶν· ἀλλ ἐνόμιζε τοὺς θεοὺς ταῖς παρὰ τῶν εὐσεβεστάτων τιμαῖς μάλιστα χαίρειν. Ἐπαινέτης δ' ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπους τούτου,

Κὰδ δύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν ἱέρ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι·

καὶ πρὸς φίλους δέ, καὶ ξένους, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν καλὴν ἔφη παραίνεσιν εἶναι τὴν Κὰδ δύναμιν ἔρδειν. 4. Εἰ δέ τι δόξειεν αὐτῷ σημαίνεσθαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἧττον ἂν ἐπείσθη παρὰ τὰ σημαινόμενα ποιῆσαι, ἢ εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἔπειθεν, ὁδοῦ λαβεῖν ἡγεμόνα τυφλόν, καὶ μὴ εἰδότα τὴν ὁδόν, ἀντὶ βλέποντος καὶ εἰδότος· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ μορίαν κατηγόρει, οἵτινες παρὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν σημαινόμενα ποιοῦσί τι, φυλαττόμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδοξίαν. Αὐτὸς δὲ πάντα τἀνθρώπινα ὑπερεώρα πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ξυμβουλίαν.

5. Διαίτῃ δὲ τήν τε ψυχὴν ἐπαίδευσε καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἢ χρώμενος ἄν τις, εἰ μή τι δαιμόνιον εἴη, θαῤῥαλέως καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διάγοι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσειε τοσαύτης δαπάνης. Οὕτω γὰρ εὐτελὴς ἦν, ὥστ' οὐκ οἶδ', εἴ τις οὕτως ἂν ὀλίγα ἐργάζοιτο, ὥστε μὴ λαμβάνειν τὰ Σωκράτει ἀρκοῦντα· σίτῳ μὲν γὰρ τοσούτῳ ἐχρῆτο, ὅσον ἡδέως ἤσθιε· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένος ἦει, ὥστε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ σίτου ὄψον αὐτῷ εἶναι· ποτὸν δὲ πᾶν ἡδὺ ἦν αὐτῷ, διὰ τὸ μὴ πίνειν, εἰ μὴ διψῴη. 6. Εἰ δέ ποτε κληθεὶς ἐθελήσειεν ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἐλθεῖν, ὃ τοῖς πλείστοις ἐργωδέστατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε φυλάξασθαι τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν καιρὸν ἐμπίπλασθαι, τοῦτο ῥᾳδίως πάνυ ἐφυλάττετο· τοῖς δὲ μὴ δυναμένοις τοῦτο ποιεῖν συνεβούλευε φυλάττεσθαι τὰ πείθοντα μὴ πεινῶντας ἐσθίειν, μηδὲ διψῶντας πίνειν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λυμαινόμενα γαστέρας, καὶ κεφαλάς, καὶ ψυχάς, ταῦτ' ἔφη εἶναι. 7. Οἴεσθαι δ' ἔφη ἐπισκώπτων καὶ τὴν Κίρκην ὑς ποιεῖν, τοιούτοις πολλοῖς δειπνίζουσαν· τὸν δὲ Ὀδυσσέα Ἑρμοῦ τε

ἐπαθροίσαντες, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐγκωμιῶ ὄντα, καὶ ἀποχρῶντα τὸ ἄτερ τῶν κακῶν τοῖς γνησίοις ἑταίροις, διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενοι γενέσθαι ὑπ'.

CHAPTER IV.

SUMMARY.

[illegible]

the universe, and takes all things contained therein under its care. (§ 17.) If men, therefore, will but worship the gods in a pure and holy spirit, they will attain to a full conviction of their wisdom, their power, and their love toward the beings whom they have made. (§ 18, 19.)

1. Εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, (ὡς ἔνιοι γράφουσί τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι,) προτρέψασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, προαγαγεῖν δ' ἐπ' αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανόν· σκεψάμενοι, μὴ μόνον ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ' οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ λέγων συνημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσι, δοκιμαζόντων, εἰ ἱκανὸς ἦν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας. 2. Λέξω δὲ πρῶτον, ἅ ποτε αὐτοῦ ἤκουσα περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου διαλεγομένου πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον τὸν Μικρὸν ἐπικαλούμενον. Καταμαθὼν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὔτε θύοντα τοῖς θεοῖς, οὔτ' εὐχόμενον, οὔτε μαντικῇ χρώμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιούντων ταῦτα καταγελῶντα, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀριστόδημε, ἔστιν οὕστινας ἀνθρώπους τεθαύμακας ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. 3. Καὶ ὅς, Λέξον ἡμῖν, ἔφη, τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν. Ἐπὶ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπῶν ποιήσει Ὅμηρον ἔγωγε μάλιστα τεθαύμακα, ἐπὶ δὲ διθυράμβῳ Μελανιππίδην, ἐπὶ δὲ τραγῳδίᾳ Σοφοκλέα, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ Πολύκλειτον, ἐπὶ δὲ ζωγραφίᾳ Ζεῦξιν. 4. Πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀπεργαζόμενοι εἰδώλα ἄφρονά τε καὶ ἀκίνητα, ἀξιοθαυμαστότεροι εἶναι, ἢ οἱ ζῶα ἔμφρονά τε καὶ ἐνεργά; Πολύ, νὴ Δία, οἱ ζῶα, εἴπερ γε μὴ τύχῃ τινί, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ γνώμης ταῦτα γίγνεται. Τῶν δὲ ἀτεκμάρτως ἐχόντων, ὅτου ἕνεκά ἐστι, καὶ τῶν φανερῶς ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ὄντων, πότερα τύχης καὶ πότερα γνώμης ἔργα κρίνεις; Πρέπει μὲν τὰ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γιγνόμενα γνώμης ἔργα εἶναι. 5. Οὔκουν δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶν ἀνθρώπους, ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ προσθεῖναι αὐτοῖς δι' ὧν αἰσθάνονται ἕκαστα, ὀφθαλμοὺς μέν, ὥςθ' ὁρᾶν τὰ ὁρατά, ὦτα δέ, ὥςτ' ἀκούειν τὰ ἀκουστά; ὀσμῶν γε μήν, εἰ μὴ ῥῖνες προσετέθησαν, τί ἂν ἡμῖν ὄφελος ἦν; τίς δ' ἂν αἴσθησις ἦν γλυκέων, καὶ δριμέων, καὶ πάντων τῶν διὰ στόματος ἡδέων, εἰ μὴ γλῶττα τούτων γνώμων ἐνειργάσθη; 6. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι καὶ τόδε

μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγοῦμαι, ἢ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι. Οὔκουν, ἔφη, ὅσῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἀξιοῖ σε θεραπεύειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον καὶ τιμητέον αὐτό; 11. Εὖ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἰ νομίζοιμι θεοὺς ἀνθρώπων τι φροντίζειν, οὐκ ἂν ἀμελοίην αὐτῶν. Ἔπειτ' οὐκ οἴει φροντίζειν; οἳ πρῶτον μὲν μόνον τῶν ζώων ἄνθρωπον ὀρθὸν ἀνέστησαν· ἡ δὲ ὀρθότης καὶ προορᾶν πλέον ποιεῖ δύνασθαι, καὶ τὰ ὕπερθεν μᾶλλον θεᾶσθαι, καὶ ἧττον κακοπαθεῖν, οἷς καὶ ὄψιν, καὶ ἀκοήν, καὶ στόμα ἐνεποίησαν· ἔπειτα τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἑρπετοῖς πόδας ἔδωκαν, οἳ τὸ πορεύεσθαι μόνον παρέχουσιν· ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ χεῖρας προσέθεσαν, αἳ τὰ πλεῖστα, οἷς εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἐκείνων ἐσμέν, ἐξεργάζονται. 12. Καὶ μὴν γλῶττάν γε πάντων τῶν ζώων ἐχόντων, μόνην τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησαν οἵαν, ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχῇ ψαύουσαν τοῦ στόματος, ἀρθροῦν τε τὴν φωνήν, καὶ σημαίνειν πάντα ἀλλήλοις, ἃ βουλόμεθα; 13. Οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἤρκεσε τῷ θεῷ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ἀλλ', ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε· τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου ζώου ψυχὴ πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν, τῶν τὰ μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα συνταξάντων, ἤσθηται ὅτι εἰσί; τί δὲ φῦλον ἄλλο, ἢ ἄνθρωποι, θεοὺς θεραπεύουσι; ποία δὲ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἱκανωτέρα προφυλάττεσθαι ἢ λιμόν, ἢ δίψος, ἢ ψύχη, ἢ θάλπη, ἢ νόσοις ἐπικουρῆσαι, ἢ ῥώμην ἀσκῆσαι, ἢ πρὸς μάθησιν ἐκτονῆσαι, ἢ, ὅσα ἂν ἀκούσῃ ἢ ἴδῃ ἢ μάθῃ, ἱκανωτέρα ἐστὶ διαμεμνῆσθαι; 14. Οὐ γὰρ πάνυ σοι κατάδηλον, ὅτι παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ὥσπερ θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι βιοτεύουσι, φύσει καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ κρατιστεύοντες; Οὔτε γὰρ βοῦς ἂν ἔχων σῶμα, ἀνθρώπου δὲ γνώμην, ἐδύνατ' ἂν πράττειν, ἃ ἐβούλετο, οὔθ' ὅσα χεῖρας ἔχει, ἄφρονα δ' ἐστί, πλέον οὐδὲν ἔχει· σὺ δέ, ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πλείστου ἀξίων τετυχηκώς, οὐκ οἴει σοῦ θεοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; ἀλλ', ὅταν τι ποιήσωσι, νομιεῖς αὐτοὺς σοῦ φροντίζειν; 15. Ὅταν πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ σὺ σοὶ φῂς πέμπειν αὐτούς, συμβούλους ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν. Ὅταν δὲ Ἀθηναίοις, ἔφη, πυνθανομένοις τι διὰ

[illegible] ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦ Ἕλληνος τὰ τοιαῦτα πρεσβεύειν, οὐδ' ὅτι τοῦ Ἕλληνος ἀνθρώπου; ἀλλὰ μόνα τὰ ἐμφύτως ἐν ἑκάστῳ καταστήματα. 18. Ὅλως δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς δημιουργοῖς λέγει ἱκανός, εἰ ἐκεῖνα οἶδεν εἰ καὶ ἄλλῳ τινί, εἰ μὴ ἄλογά ἐστιν, καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐξεπιστάμενον τοῦτο μόνον οἶδεν· ἐν αἰσθάνεται; τοῦ ἕνεκα ἐστὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ παιδεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τοῦτον καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν διαπεπονῆσθαι ἐστι καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα ἔργα ἐκείνοις ἀποδεδωκέναι; 19. Ἀγαθὸς, ἔφη ἐκεῖνος, ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ τοῦ κυνὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ οἰκεῖον, ὅταν βλάπτοντας φυλάττῃ τοὺς. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἔργον τὸ τοιοῦτο, ὅταν δὲ αὐτῷ ἐμὲ ἐξῆν τιθέναι καὶ μὴ τὸ καὶ μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐπὶ πολὺ σπάνιον ἐξαιτεῖσθαι. τοῦ δὲ τοιούτου ἀρθόνιον ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἄλλο πλὴν ἐμοὶ, μηδὲ τῶν ἐμῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου καὶ τοῦ τῶν ἐν Δι. χίοντος καὶ τὸ ζῆλον ἐκεῖνον ἐμποιῆσαι· τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἄλλου φαύλων μὴ ἐκεῖνο εἶναι ἄλλο πλὴν ἐμοί. 20. Τὸν μέντοι ἔρωτα ἀνθρώπου ἐμφύτου γίγνεσθαι τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου εἶδους, καὶ χαλεπαίνειν τοῖς ἀπροσδοκήτοις, καὶ συνδιαπονεῖσθαι καταστάσεσι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦτον ἀνθρώπων ἐμφανῆ. εἰ τι καὶ ἐλλιπὲς ἐστὶ τῶν αὐξόντων ἀνθρώπων σφάλμα ἐστὶν, γεγονὸς τὸ βέλτιον, ἐν ἐμφύτοις καὶ γνωστοῖς οὖσιν, ἐφ' ἅπερ γεγόνασι καὶ τέκνα ἐκείνοις, καὶ συνεργοὶ τούτοις, καὶ ἄλλα τέκνα ἐκγονώτατα αὐτοῖς. 21. Τοιοῦτον μὲν τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ μέγα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄλλου τινὸς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔμφυτον, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ αὐτοῖς· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔμφυτον ἔστι, ἐπιμέλειαν ἐμβῆναι δὲ τοῦτο, ἐν τοιούτοις, ἄλλοις ἀλλοῖοις

CHAPTER V.

SUMMARY.

THE virtue of self-control is commended on the following grounds:

The man who is destitute of self-control can be of no use either to himself or to others (§ 1-3); neither can such a one be at all pleasing or acceptable in the intercourse of society. (§ 4.) Self-control, in fact, forms the basis of all the other virtues, and ought, therefore, to be our chief study (*ib.*), since without it we can neither attain to nor practise any thing praiseworthy. (§ 5.)

Socrates not only commended this virtue in his discourses, but exemplified it most strikingly in all his words and actions. (§ 6.)

1. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὶ κτῆμά ἐστιν, ἐπισκεψώμεθα, εἴ τι προὐβίβαζε λέγων εἰς αὐτὴν τοιάδε. Ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰ, πολέμου ἡμῖν γενομένου, βουλοίμεθα ἐλέσθαι ἄνδρα, ὑφ' οὗ μάλιστ' ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν σωζοίμεθα, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους χειροίμεθα, ἆρ' ὅντιν' ἂν αἰσθανοίμεθα ἥττω γαστρός, ἢ οἴνου, ἢ πόνου, ἢ ὕπνου, τοῦτον ἂν αἱροίμεθα; καὶ πῶς ἂν οἰηθείημεν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἢ ἡμᾶς σῶσαι, ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους κρατῆσαι; 2. Εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου γενόμενοι βουλοίμεθά τῳ ἐπιτρέψαι ἢ παῖδας ἀῤῥενας παιδεῦσαι, ἢ θυγατέρας παρθένους διαφυλάξαι, ἢ χρήματα διασῶσαι, ἆρ' ἀξιόπιστον εἰς ταῦτα ἡγησόμεθα τὸν ἀκρατῆ; δούλῳ δ' ἀκρατεῖ ἐπιτρέψαιμεν ἂν ἢ βοσκήματα, ἢ ταμιεῖα, ἢ ἔργων ἐπίστασιν; διάκονον δὲ καὶ ἀγοραστὴν τοιοῦτον ἐθελήσαιμεν ἂν προῖκα λαβεῖν; 3. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε μηδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ' ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; Καὶ γὰρ οὐχ, ὥςπερ οἱ πλεονέκται τῶν ἄλλων ἀφαιρούμενοι χρήματα ἑαυτοὺς δοκοῦσι πλουτίζειν, οὕτως ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις βλαβερός, ἑαυτῷ δ' ὠφέλιμος, ἀλλὰ κακοῦργος μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πολὺ κακουργότερος, εἴ γε κακουργότατόν ἐστι μὴ μόνον τὸν οἶκον τὸν ἑαυτοῦ φθείρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. 4. Ἐν συνουσίᾳ δὲ τίς ἂν ἡσθείη τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃν εἰδείη τῷ ὄψῳ τε καὶ τῷ οἴνῳ χαίροντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς φίλοις; ἁρά γε οὐ χρὴ πάντα ἀν

CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY.

This chapter contains the substance of three conversations between Socrates and Antiphon the sophist.

CONVERSATION FIRST. Antiphon, boasting to young Hermogenes, his pupil in philosophy, of fortune and dignity done over his fellow-men by himself, reproaches him with also no income and discomfort of his mode of life, and his taking no fee for his instructions and remarks, that the only benefit which of his lessons must be to make men how to be miserable. [§ 1-5.]

Socrates replies to this as follows:

1. He, who acquires possessions himself, is master of his own time, and acts when and what he pleases. [§ 6, 7.]

2. A man and simply that he has only some confidence in health, and more easily sustainable. Exercise also saves provisions of the wise man that of the mere animal of the rich. [§ 8-11.] But what the only true object of wishes is contentment, the offspring of wisdom and love, and the true pleasure the pleasure of a pure heart. [§ 12.]

3. What good will accrue from a knowledge of the universe, if the wise or to study, as Antiphon recommends, when known to himself only future which are only delight him, while he remains ignorant of them, but which also affect the pleasure hope of passing either. For if men acquire what they can [illegible] they will have [illegible] to be [illegible] what is [illegible] to [illegible] of [illegible] and

perceives that he is making those better with whom he associates. (§ 8, 9.)

4. That man, moreover, will be far better able to discharge the duties which he owes to his friends and his country, who is content with little, than he who can not live except in the midst of costly profusion. (§ 9.)

5. Happiness does not consist in luxury and magnificence; on the contrary, he who stands in need of the fewest things comes nearest to the divine nature. (§ 10.)

CONVERSATION SECOND. On another occasion, Antiphon having remarked that he thought Socrates a just man, indeed, but by no means a wise one in not receiving compensation for his instructions; and that by this very conduct, moreover, he himself virtually declared that what he imparted was not worth purchasing (§ 11, 12), Socrates replied as follows: He who sells his wisdom for a stipulated price, sullies and degrades wisdom; whereas he who, on seeing any one possessed of good abilities and good native principles, imbues him with the lessons of his own wisdom and makes him his friend, discharges the duty of a good citizen (§ 13); and such a one derives more true pleasure from the intercourse of good friends, and from the progress which they make under his guidance in the paths of virtue, than he could possibly receive from any pecuniary recompense. (§ 14.)

CONVERSATION THIRD. At another time, on being asked by the same person how it happened that he professed to make others able to take part in public affairs, but took no part in them himself, Socrates replied, that he who made it his study to qualify as many as possible to engage in the management of the state, proved of more real service to the state than if he merely turned his own attention to public affairs. (§ 15.)

1. Ἄξιον δ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἃ πρὸς Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν σοφιστὴν διελέχθη, μὴ παραλιπεῖν. Ὁ γὰρ Ἀντιφῶν ποτε βουλόμενος τοὺς συνουσιαστὰς αὐτοῦ παρελέσθαι, προσελθὼν τῷ Σωκράτει, παρόντων αὐτῶν, ἔλεξε τάδε· 2. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ μὲν ᾤμην τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρῆναι γίγνεσθαι, σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τἀναντία τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολελαυκέναι· ζῇς γοῦν οὕτως, ὡς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς δοῦλος ὑπὸ δεσπότῃ διαιτώμενος μείνειε, σιτία τε σιτῇ καὶ ποτὰ πίνεις τὰ φαυλότατα, καὶ ἱμάτιον ἠμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος, ἀνυποδητός τε καὶ ἀχίτων διατελεῖς. 3. Καὶ μὴν χρήματά γε οὐ λαμβάνεις, ἃ καὶ κτωμένους εὐφραίνει, καὶ κεκτημένους ἐλευθεριώτερόν τε καὶ ἥδιον ποιεῖ ζῆν. Εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων οἱ διδάσκαλοι τοὺς μαθητὰς μιμητὰς ἑαυτῶν

ἀποδιδοῖ παντί, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος τοῦ συνόντος ὠφέλιμος, καὶ μᾶλλον κοινωνίαν ἀδικίαν εἶναι. 4. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης τοιαῦτα μὲν ταῦτα εἶπε· δοκεῖ μοι ἔγωγε, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀνδρῶδες εἶναι, ὅστις τιμώμενος, εἰ μέλλει ἀποδώσειν ἃ ἔλαβεν, ἢ μὴ ἀποδώσει ἐφ' ᾧτε μὴ ἀποδοῦναι. Τὸν μὲν ἐπιτηδειότατον πάντα τε χρόνον ἕξοντα τοιοῦτον εἶναι. 5. Πότερον, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἀπιθάνους ἀγνῶτας ἀποκαλεῖν ἔστιν ἀνεγκλήτως πᾶσιν, ὑφ' ὧν δὲ μισεῖσθαι ἐπιστάμεθα, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ μὴ ἐπιστῶνται ἡμᾶς ἀνεγκλήτως διακείμενοι, ἢ δεῖ μὲ φιλεῖσθαι, ἢ τὸν εἰδότα μὲ προσέξειν ἂν ἡγεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἐχθρὸν εἶναί μου, ὅστις με λανθάνει πολεμῶν; ἢ ὡς χαλεπώτερον πολεμοῦσιν οἱ ἐκ φιλίας ἐχθροὶ γενόμενοι τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐχθρῶν, διὰ τὸ ἐπιστεύεσθαί τε καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι κάκιον; ἢ ὡς φίλον ποτέ, ἢ οὐ πολεμοῦντα; ἢ ὅπως ἐγώ; Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι ἢ μὲν ἔχθρα φίλον ἔμοιγε δόξαν ἔθετο, ἡ δὲ φιλία πάλιν ἔμοιγε καὶ μὴ πάνυ ἀνάγκη τοῦτο ποιεῖ; 6. Τὰ γε μὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων οἶσθ' ὅτι οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι φύσει καὶ θάλπους ἥττους γίγνονται καὶ ῥιγῶντες ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ ἐνδείᾳ ἐπιτιθέμενοι, ὅταν μὴ δοκῇ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τοῖς πολλοῖς καλλίστου πορισταί; ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο ἔχοι λόγον; ἢ διὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνίονται, ἢ διὰ πάλαι παρεσκευάσθαι ἐν τοιοῖς εἶναι; ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐλπίδι τοῖς πολλοῖς μὴ ἐπιδίδοσθαι, ὅτου δὲ ἐπιδίδοσθαι; 7. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οἱ φύσει ἀκόλαστοι τῷ σώματι, μαλακίζοντες τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἀπολείπουσιν ἐρασταῖς τὸ γλίσχρον τῶν ἀκολάστων, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς φιλεῖσθαι; ἢ δεῖ ἅμα μὲν ἐθέλειν τῷ σώματι διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς μαλακίζεσθαι κακοῦσθαι πάντα ἔμοιγε φαίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ μαλακίζεσθαι; 8. Τὸ δὲ μὴ δοκεῖν γαστρὶ μᾶλλον ἄνευ, καὶ λογισμὸν εἶναι τὸ ἄλλα αὐτοκρατῆ εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ὄντως ἔχειν τοιοῦτον ἕξιν ἢ αὐτὸν ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντα ὑπερφρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοιαῦτα ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι; Καὶ μὴν ταῦτά γε οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς αὐτοκρατέσιν ἀνδράσιν οἱ πρακτικώτατοι καὶ ἐπιχειρητικώτατοι ἀνεύρηνται· οἱ δὲ ἐγκρατεῖς πάντες ἐμποδιστικοὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ πράττειν, ἢ γαστρὸς, ἢ ὑπνωτικοῦ, ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου ἐφιέμενοι. 9. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντων τούτων ἐναντίως

ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅσην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτόν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι, καὶ φίλους ἀμείνους κτᾶσθαι; Ἐγὼ τοίνυν διατελῶ ταῦτα νομίζων. Ἐὰν δὲ δὴ φίλους ἢ πόλιν ὠφελεῖν δέῃ, ποτέρῳ ἡ πλείων σχολὴ τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῷ, ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν, ἢ τῷ, ὡς σὺ μακαρίζεις, διαιτωμένῳ; στρατεύοιτο δὲ πότερος ἂν ῥᾷον, ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνευ πολυτελοῦς διαίτης ζῆν, ἢ ᾧ τὸ παρὸν ἀρκοίη; ἐκπολιορκηθείη δὲ πότερος ἂν θᾶττον, ὁ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων εὑρεῖν δεόμενος, ἢ ὁ τοῖς ῥᾴστοις ἐντυγχάνειν ἀρκούντως χρώμενος; 10. Ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δέεσθαι, θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον, κράτιστον, τὸ δὲ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου.

11. Πάλιν δέ ποτε ὁ Ἀντιφῶν διαλεγόμενος τῷ Σωκράτει εἶπεν· Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγώ τοι σὲ μὲν δίκαιον νομίζω, σοφὸν δὲ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. Δοκεῖς δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο γιγνώσκειν· οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πράττει· καίτοι τό γε ἱμάτιον, ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν, ἢ ἄλλο τι, ὧν κέκτησαι, νομίζων ἀργυρίου ἄξιον εἶναι, οὐδενὶ ἂν μὴ ὅτι προῖκα δοίης, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβών. 12. Δῆλον δή, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν ᾧου τινὸς ἀξίαν εἶναι, καὶ ταύτης ἂν οὐκ ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας ἀργύριον ἐπράττου. Δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἴης, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, σοφὸς δὲ οὐκ ἄν, μηδενός γε ἄξια ἐπιστάμενος. 13. Ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν· Ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται, τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν, ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρόν, διατίθεσθαι εἶναι· ἐάν τις, ὃν ἂν γνῷ καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν· καὶ τὴν σοφίαν τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις δέ, ὃν ἂν γνῷ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα, διδάσκων ὅ τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθόν, φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἃ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν. 14. Ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὥσπερ ἄλλος τις, ἢ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ, ἢ κυνί, ἢ ὄρνιθι ἥδεται

CHAPTER VII.

SYNOPSIS.

In this chapter we are allowed to read what Socrates pointed his friends to by aside, by hints of language and manner, and almost wholly by the practice of life. His arguments employed by him with the view that he deemed to be fallacy.

The most help of knowing oneself is, in whatever capacity one may wish to succeed oneself, to be in that actually employed. For if a person be only competently acquainted with a profession and has practised only a very limited acquaintance with the manner that individual, when a vital of the many needs of his nature, will not only know his weakness of belief in, simply considered, but will have formed a notion of what is done, who have suffered themselves to be benefited and enjoyed even by him.

1. [illegible]

ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητάς; Καὶ πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι σκεύη τε καλὰ κέκτηνται, καὶ ἀκολούθους πολλοὺς περιάγονται, καὶ τούτῳ ταῦτα ποιητέον· ἔπειτα, ὅτι ἐκείνους πολλοὶ ἐπαινοῦσι, καὶ τούτῳ πολλοὺς ἐπαινέτας παρασκευαστέον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔργον γε οὐδαμοῦ ληπτέον, ἢ εὐθὺς ἐλεγχθήσεται γελοῖος ὤν, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐλητὴς κακός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀλαζών. Καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν δαπανῶν, μηδὲν δὲ ὠφελούμενος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κακοδοξῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἐπιπόνως τε, καὶ ἀλυσιτελῶς, καὶ καταγελάστως βιώσεται; 3. Ὡς δ' αὕτως, εἴ τις βούλοιτο στρατηγὸς ἀγαθός, μὴ ὤν, φαίνεσθαι, ἢ κυβερνήτης, ἐννοῶμεν, τί ἂν αὐτῷ συμβαίνοι. Ἆρ' οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μέν, ἐπιθυμῶν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἱκανὸς εἶναι ταῦτα πράττειν, μὴ δύναιτο πείθειν, ταύτῃ λυπηρόν; εἰ δὲ πείσειεν, ἔτι ἀθλιώτερον; Δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι κυβερνᾶν τε κατασταθεὶς ὁ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος, ἢ στρατηγεῖν, ἀπολέσειεν ἂν οὓς ἥκιστα βούλοιτο, καὶ αὐτὸς αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς ἀπαλλάξειεν. 4. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ πλούσιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον, καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρόν, μὴ ὄντα, δοκεῖν ἀλυσιτελὲς ἀπέφαινε· προστάττεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔφη μείζω, ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν, καὶ μὴ δυναμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν, δοκοῦντας ἱκανοὺς εἶναι, συγγνώμης οὐκ ἂν τυγχάνειν. 5. Ἀπατεῶνα δ' ἐκάλει οὐ μικρὸν μέν, εἴ τις ἀργύριον, ἢ σκεῦος παρά του πειθοῖ λαβὼν ἀποστεροίη, πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅστις μηδενὸς ἄξιος ὢν ἐξηπατήκει, πείθων, ὡς ἱκανὸς εἴη τῆς πόλεως ἡγεῖσθαι. Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει καὶ τοῦ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι ἀποτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας, τοιάδε διαλεγόμενος.

XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA

OF

SOCRATES.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

SUMMARY.

in public affairs with folly, in voluntarily taking upon themselves a laborious and annoying task (§ 17); whereupon Socrates proceeds to show him that there is a wide difference between those who labor voluntarily, and those who labor because compelled so to do: that the former may desist whenever they please, but the latter not: and that the former, moreover, undergo all labors cheerfully, both from the consciousness of doing what is right and good in itself, and from the prospect of eventually receiving a rich recompense from others. (§ 17–19). And, besides, a life of indolent enjoyment is conducive to health neither of body nor of mind, whereas active exertion, whether corporeal or intellectual, always leads to the happiest results; it being a well-established rule that the gods give nothing good unto mortals without labor and care. Socrates then shows, both by the testimony of poets (§ 20), and that of Prodicus, also, in his beautiful apologue respecting the "Choice of Hercules," that true happiness can only be obtained by a temperate and virtuous career. (§ 21–34.)

1. Ἐδοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ, καὶ ποτοῦ, καὶ ὕπνου, καὶ ῥίγους, καὶ θάλπους, καὶ πόνου. Γνοὺς δέ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, εἰ δέοι σε παιδεύειν παραλαβόντα δύο τῶν νέων, τὸν μέν, ὅπως ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἄρχειν, τὸν δέ, ὅπως μηδ' ἀντιποιήσεται ἀρχῆς, πῶς ἂν ἑκάτερον παιδεύοις; Βούλει σκοπῶμεν ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς, ὥςπερ ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων; Καὶ ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἔφη· Δοκεῖ γοῦν μοι ἡ τροφὴ ἀρχὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ζῴη γ' ἄν τις, εἰ μὴ τρέφοιτο. 2. Οὔκουν τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι σίτου ἅπτεσθαι, ὅταν ὥρα ἥκῃ, ἀμφοτέροις εἰκὸς παραγίγνεσθαι; Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. Τὸ οὖν προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ κατεπεῖγον μᾶλλον πράττειν, ἢ τῇ γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι, πότερον ἂν αὐτῶν ἐθίζοιμεν; Τὸν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν, ἔφη, νὴ Δία, παιδευόμενον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἄπρακτα γίγνηται παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ἀρχήν. Οὔκουν, ἔφη, καὶ ὅταν πιεῖν βούλωνται, τὸ δύνασθαι διψῶντα ἀνέχεσθαι τῷ αὐτῷ προσθετέον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 3. Τὸ δὲ ὕπνου ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥςτε δύνασθαι καὶ ὀψὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ πρωὶ ἀναστῆναι, καὶ ἀγρυπνῆσαι, εἴ τι δέοι, ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθείημεν; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, τῷ αὐτῷ. Τί δέ; ἔφη, τὸ ἀφροδισίων ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, ὥςτε μὴ διὰ ταῦτα κωλύεσθαι πράττειν, εἴ τι δέοι; Καὶ τοῦτο,

ἄρη τῷ αὐτῷ. Τί δέ; τὸ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους, ἀλλ' ἀκόντιστὸν ἐστιν, τοῦτο δὲ προσθῆκον; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἄρη τῷ ἄκρῳ τοιοῦτον. Τί δέ; τὸ μαθεῖν, εἰ τι ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον ἐστι μάθημα τοῦτο τὸ ἀφορᾶν τῶν ἀστρολόγων τοῦτο ἢ τοιοῦτον μάλλον τοῦτο; Ποῖ, νὴ Δί', ἄρη τῷ ἄκρῳ τοιοῦτον· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἄρχει τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων. Ἐ. εἰδέναι δ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἦττον δὲ δοκεῖ σοι εἰδέναι τῶν ἀστρολόγων ἢ τὰ ζωϊκὰ χρή; πάντων γὰρ ἄρχει τὰ μὲν τοιοῦτον δεῖσθαι, καὶ μάλα ἅπαν ἀναγκαῖον, ἅπαν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀφθόνως τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος πάντων, τὰ δὲ τοιοῦτ' ἐνδέχεται. Πάντ' μὲν οὖν, ἄρη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐστιν, οἷον εἰ τὰ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ περιττὸν τοῦτο ἄρχειν πάντων; Σοφὸς καὶ τοῦτο. Ἐ. οὐκοῦν ἄκρον καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, τρόπῳ τοῦτον τοῦ ἄρτιον εἶναι τὸν ἄρτιον; Ἆρ' οὐ μικρὸν εἰς ἐμπειρίαν τῶν ἀρτίων εἰς τὸ ἀριθμεῖν, ἢ τὸ ἐν πόσοις ἐστὶν ἑκάστοις τῶν ἀριθμῶν, καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐμβάλλειν ἀριθμοῦντα καὶ τρίκλινον μὲν ἐκκαίδεκα τῷ μαγείρῳ κακῶς τε καὶ αἰσχρῶς, ἅμα εἰς τὰ ἀναλώματα χρήσιμα, ἀλλὰ ἓξ μὲν τοῦτο συνάγειν ἀκκιζομένῳ ὄντα; Ἔστιν δοκεῖ, ἄρη. Ἐ. Τί δὲ οἶσθα μὲν τὰς ἀναγκαιοτάτας οἰκήσεις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν ἑκάστῃ, οἶσθ' τὰς τε τελευταίας καὶ τὰς χαμαιζήλους, καὶ τὰς ἔτι καὶ τὰς ἀλυσιτελεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; Καὶ τοῦτο,

μένων τάξιν. Καὶ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τό, μεγάλου ἔργου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δέοντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὧν δέονται, πορίζειν· καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν πολλά, ὧν βούλεται, ἐλλείπειν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως προεστῶτα, ἐὰν μὴ πάντα, ὅσα ἡ πόλις βούλεται, καταπράττῃ, τούτου δίκην ὑπέχειν, τοῦτο πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀφροσύνη ἐστί; 9. Καὶ γὰρ ἀξιοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τοῖς οἰκέταις, χρῆσθαι. Ἐγώ τε γὰρ ἀξιῶ τοὺς θεράποντας ἐμοὶ μὲν ἄφθονα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μηδενὸς τούτων ἅπτεσθαι· αἵ τε πόλεις οἴονται χρῆναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μὲν ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πορίζειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάντων τούτων ἀπέχεσθαι. Ἐγὼ οὖν τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἄλλοις παρέχειν, οὕτως ἂν παιδεύσας εἰς τοὺς ἀρχικοὺς καταστήσαιμι· ἐμαυτὸν τοίνυν τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν. 10. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Βούλει οὖν καὶ τοῦτο σκεψώμεθα, πότεροι ἥδιον ζῶσιν, οἱ ἄρχοντες, ἢ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τῶν ἐθνῶν, ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν, ἐν μὲν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Πέρσαι μὲν ἄρχουσιν, ἄρχονται δὲ Σύροι, καὶ Φρύγες, καὶ Λυδοί· ἐν δὲ τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, Σκύθαι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Μαιῶται δὲ ἄρχονται· ἐν δὲ τῇ Λιβύῃ, Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἄρχουσι, Λίβυες δὲ ἄρχονται. Τούτων οὖν ποτέρους ἥδιον οἴει ζῆν; ἢ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐν οἷς καὶ αὐτὸς εἶ, πότεροί σοι δοκοῦσιν ἥδιον, οἱ κρατοῦντες, ἢ οἱ κρατούμενοι, ζῆν; 11. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίστιππος, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν αὖ ἐμαυτὸν τάττω· ἀλλ' εἶναί τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς, οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει. 12. Ἀλλ' εἰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς, οὔτε διὰ δουλείας ἡ ὁδὸς αὕτη φέρει, οὕτως μηδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπων, ἴσως ἄν τι λέγοις· εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὤν, μήτε ἄρχειν ἀξιώσεις, μήτε ἄρχεσθαι, μήτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑκὼν θεραπεύσεις, οἶμαί σε ὁρᾶν, ὡς ἐπίστανται οἱ κρείττονες

τους ἥττονας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ κλέπτοντας καὶ ἀποστερεῖν δυλους χρῆσθαι. 13. Ἡ γοῦν βασιλικὴ τέχνη οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου κτητική, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτὸν ἡγεμόνα καὶ ἄρχοντα ποιοῦντος καὶ πάντα τρόπον πειρωμένου τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ μὴ βούλεσθαι ὑπηκόους ἔχειν. ἆρ' οὖν τοῦτον βούλεσθαι ἄν τινα τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄρχοντα αὑτοῦ τοῦ πολεμεῖν τῆς πόλεως; καὶ μὴν οἵ γε ἄνδρες καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ βούλονται καὶ ἐθέλουσιν ἐκ τούτων δὴ καταλαμβάνομαι συμπεραίνων. Ἀλλ' ἴσως τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάσχω ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἶμαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκόντας ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, ἅτε ἴσως τι ἀγαθὸν ἡγουμένους εἶναι. 14. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· ἴσως, ἔφη. Τοῦτο οὖν ἔστω ἡμῖν ἓν εἶδος ἄρχοντος πολιτικοῦ· τοὺς γὰρ ἑκόντας, οἷς οἱ ἀρχόμενοι ἑκόντες ἕπονται, καὶ τὸν Σόλωνα καὶ τὸν Λυκοῦργον καὶ τὸν Πεισιστρατίδην ἀνθρώπους, οἶμαι, ἔφη ἐδόκει· ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ τῶν τυράννων ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις, καὶ πάνυ ἀθύμους ὄντας, ἐπὶ τὰ κινδυνεύματα καλοῦντες ἕπεσθαι ἀναγκάζουσι, καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἐμφύτους τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους, καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς κρείττους, οἷς ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, καὶ τῶν ἑκόντων ἐλάττω ἔχοντες ἀναγκάζουσι κατακοντίζεσθαι· καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα τοῦτον κίνδυνον ἔφασαν ἀλλοκότου ἄρχοντος εἶναι. 15. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τούτων ἔχεται, ὅτι δεῖ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ἕπεσθαι ἀλλοκότους, τοῦτο μόνον ἀναγκάζειν, τὰ ἄλλα δ' ἐν πόλει μόνῃ, τῶν τοιούτων πάντων ἄνευ ὄντων, οὐδὲ μαθεῖν ἀνθρώπους οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀλλοκότους ὄντας, ἐπεὶ τά γε ἄλογα οὐκ, ἐπειδὰν ἐθισθῇ τις αὐτὰ κεκτῆσθαι, ἀλλοκότως ἔχει πρὸς τὸν κεκτημένον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡμερώτερα γίγνεται· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄλογα ἐπιστάμενοι ἡμεροῦν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιστάμενοι ἄγειν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἡδέα, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀμελοῦντες ἀγρίους ἐργάζονται· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄλογα ἐπιστάμενοι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως μὴ βλάπτωσιν ἑαυτὰ μηδὲ ἀλλήλους

λάζω, ἔφη, πᾶσι κακοῖς, ἕως ἂν δουλεύειν ἀναγκάσω
Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παι-
δευόμενοι, ἣν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τί
διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εἴ γε πεινή-
σουσι, καὶ διψήσουσι, καὶ ῥιγώσουσι, καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσι, καὶ
τἆλλα πάντα μοχθήσουσιν ἑκόντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ',
ὅ τι διαφέρει, τὸ αὐτὸ δέρμα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα μαστιγοῦ-
σθαι, ἢ ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἑκόντα ἢ
ἄκοντα πολιορκεῖσθαι, ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀφροσύνη πρόσεστι τῷ
θέλοντι τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν. 18. Τί δέ; ὦ Ἀρίστιππε,
ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῶν τοιούτων διαφέρειν τὰ
ἑκούσια τῶν ἀκουσίων, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἑκὼν πεινῶν φάγοι ἄν,
ὁπότε βούλοιτο; καὶ ὁ ἑκὼν διψῶν πίοι, καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύ-
τως· τῷ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ταῦτα πάσχοντι οὐκ ἔξεστιν, ὁπό-
ταν βούληται, παύεσθαι; ἔπειτα ὁ μὲν ἑκουσίως ταλαιπω
ρῶν ἐπ' ἀγαθῇ ἐλπίδι πονῶν εὐφραίνεται, οἷον οἱ τὰ θηρία
θηρῶντες ἐλπίδι τοῦ λήψεσθαι ἡδέως μοχθοῦσι. 19. Καὶ
τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἆθλα τῶν πόνων μικροῦ τινος ἄξιά ἐστι·
τοὺς δὲ πονοῦντας, ἵνα φίλους ἀγαθοὺς κτήσωνται, ἢ ὅπως
ἐχθροὺς χειρώσωνται, ἢ ἵνα δυνατοὶ γενόμενοι καὶ τοῖς σώ-
μασι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς, καὶ τὸν ἑαυτῶν οἶκον καλῶς οἰκῶσι,
καὶ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιῶσι, καὶ τὴν πατρίδα εὐεργετῶσι,
πῶς οὐκ οἴεσθαι χρὴ τούτους καὶ πονεῖν ἡδέως εἰς τὰ τοι-
αῦτα, καὶ ζῆν εὐφραινομένους, ἀγαμένους μὲν ἑαυτούς,
ἐπαινουμένους δὲ καὶ ζηλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων; 20.
Ἔτι δὲ αἱ μὲν ῥᾳδιουργίαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἡδοναί,
οὔτε σώματι εὐεξίαν ἱκαναί εἰσιν ἐνεργάζεσθαι, ὡς φασιν
οἱ γυμνασταί, οὔτε ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμην ἀξιόλογον οὐδεμίαν
ἐμποιοῦσιν· αἱ δὲ διὰ καρτερίας ἐπιμέλειαι τῶν καλῶν τε
κἀγαθῶν ἔργων ἐξικνεῖσθαι ποιοῦσιν, ὡς φασιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
ἄνδρες· λέγει δέ που καὶ Ἡσίοδος

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι
Ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει.
Τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
Ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐπ' αὐτήν,

Καὶ πάνυ τε σκαιὸν ἔοικε δ' εὖ ἔχειν λόγος·
Τοῖσι δὲ ἔπειτ' οὔτις, χαλεπὸς πάρ βασιλῆι.

Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐν τούτοις·

Τὸν οὐκ ἐπαινῶ τὸν ἐπὶ πάντα γλῶσσαν ἔχοντα.

Καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ δέ τόπῳ φησίν,

Ὦ κύναρ, μὴ τὸν μυθίσκον κίνει· τὸ τοὐπὶ λόγου.

21. Καὶ Πρόδικον δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστους ἐπαίνους, φησὶν αὐτὸν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Ὧδε πως λέγων, ὅτε ἔφη αὐτὸν ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἥβην ἐλθεῖν, ὅτε τὸ σῶμα τὸν ἄνδρα αἰρεῖται, ἐν ᾗ αὐτὸν ἔδει καταφανῆ γενόμενον γνώμονα δηλοῦσθαι, εἴτε τῇ δι' ἀρετῆς ὁδὸν τραπόμενον εἴτε τὴν διὰ κακίας, ἐξιόντα εἰς ἔρημον καθίσαι, ἀπορούμενον, ποτέραν τὴν ὁδὸν τράποιτο. 22. Καὶ φανῆναι αὐτῷ δύο γυναῖκας προσιούσας μεγάλας· τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν εὐπρεπῆ τε ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐλευθέριον, φύσει καλὸν ἐμφαίνουσαν τὸ μὲν σῶμα καθαρότητι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα αἰδοῖ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα σωφροσύνῃ, ἐσθῆτα δὲ λευκήν· τὴν δὲ ἑτέραν τεθραμμένην μὲν εἰς τὸ πιαίνεσθαι τε καὶ ἁπαλύνεσθαι, κεκαλλωπισμένην δὲ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα, ὥστε λευκοτέραν τε καὶ ἐρυθροτέραν τοῦ ὄντος δοκεῖν φαίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα, ὥστε ὀρθὴν ἐμφανίζειν τὴν φύσιν· εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἄγαν ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐσθῆτα δὲ, ἣ ἦν ἂν μάλιστα ὥρᾳ θαλλόντι, καταπεπτωκέναι. Ἐπὶ θοίνῃ δοκεῖν, ἐπαινουμένη δὲ καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἑαυτὴν συνιστᾶν, πολλὴν δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῆς σκιᾶς ἐπιδείκνυσθαι. 23. Τὴν δ' ἐγγύτερον αἰσθομένην τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, τὴν μὲν σφοδρὸν ἐμβλέψαι ἔσεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι φίλον βουλήσεσθαι τροσβαλέσθαι τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, καὶ εἰπεῖν· Ὅτι δέ σε, Ἡράκλεις, ἀποροῦντα, τίνα τρόπον εἰς τὸν βίον τὸν τοῦδε εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρασκευάσεσθον, ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας τε καὶ ἄμετρον τοῦτο ἔχω τε καὶ τῶν φίλων εὐδοκιμεῖν ἐπίδοσιν ἔσεσθαι, τῶν δὲ χαλεπῶν ἀπέχεσθαι εὐδοκεῖν. 24. Πρόσεισι μὲν γὰρ οὐ τελέως, οὐδὲ τραχύτητι ἐμφανεῖς, σαφῆ ἐκείνοις ἐστὶν, τὰ δὲ ἀγαθοποιὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ

ποτὸν εὕροις, ἢ τί ἂν ἰδών, ἢ τί ἀκούσας, τερφθείης, ἢ τίνων ὀσφραινόμενος, ἢ ἁπτόμενος ἡσθείης, καὶ πῶς ἂν μαλακώτατα καθεύδοις, καὶ πῶς ἂν ἀπονώτατα τούτων πάντων τυγχάνοις. 25. Ἐὰν δέ ποτε γένηταί τις ὑποψία σπάνεως, ἀφ' ὧν ἔσται ταῦτα, οὐ φόβος, μή σε ἀγάγω ἐπὶ τό, πονοῦντα καὶ ταλαιπωροῦντα τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ, ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι· ἀλλ' οἷς ἂν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτοις σὺ χρήσει, οὐδενὸς ἀπεχόμενος, ὅθεν ἂν δυνατὸν ᾖ τι κερδᾶναι· πανταχόθεν γὰρ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐμοὶ ξυνοῦσιν ἐξουσίαν ἔγωγε παρέχω. 26. Καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, Ὦ γύναι, ἔφη, ὄνομα δέ σοι τί ἐστιν; Ἡ δέ· Οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι, ἔφη, καλοῦσί με Εὐδαιμονίαν, οἱ δὲ μισοῦντές με ὑποκοριζόμενοι ὀνομάζουσί με Κακίαν. 27. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ, ἡ ἑτέρα γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα εἶπε· Καὶ ἐγὼ ἥκω πρὸς σέ, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, εἰδυῖα τοὺς γεννήσαντάς σε, καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν σὴν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καταμαθοῦσα· ἐξ ὧν ἐλπίζω, εἰ τὴν πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁδὸν τράποιο, σφόδρ' ἄν σε τῶν καλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν ἐργάτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐμὲ ἔτι πολὺ ἐντιμοτέραν, καὶ ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς διαπρεπεστέραν φανῆναι· οὐκ ἐξαπατήσω δέ σε προοιμίοις ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ', ἥπερ οἱ θεοὶ διέθεσαν, τὰ ὄντα διηγήσομαι μετ' ἀληθείας. 28. Τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν οὐδὲν ἄνευ πόνου καὶ ἐπιμελείας θεοὶ διδόασιν ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλ' εἴτε τοὺς θεοὺς ἵλεως εἶναί σοι βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεούς· εἴτε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετητέον· εἴτε ὑπό τινος πόλεως ἐπιθυμεῖς τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὠφελητέον· εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης ἀξιοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τὴν Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὖ ποιεῖν· εἴτε γῆν βούλει σοι καρποὺς ἀφθόνους φέρειν, τὴν γῆν θεραπευτέον· εἴτε ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων οἴει δεῖν πλουτίζεσθαι, τῶν βοσκημάτων ἐπιμελητέον· εἴτε διὰ πολέμου ὁρμᾷς αὔξεσθαι, καὶ βούλει δύνασθαι τούς τε φίλους ἐλευθεροῦν, καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς χειροῦσθαι, τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὐτάς τε παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον, καὶ ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀσκητέον· εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι βούλει δυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρε-

τεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα, καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἱδρῶτι. 29. Καὶ ἡ Κακία ὑπολαβοῦσα εἶπεν, ὥς φησι Πρόδικος· Ἐννοεῖς, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ὡς χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐφροσύνας ἡ γυνή σοι αὕτη διηγεῖται; ἐγὼ δὲ ῥᾳδίαν καὶ βραχεῖαν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄξω σε. Καὶ ἡ Ἀρετὴ εἶπεν· 30. Ὦ τλῆμον, τί δὲ σὺ ἀγαθὸν ἔχεις; ἢ τί ἡδὺ οἶσθα, μηδὲν τούτων ἕνεκα πράττειν ἐθέλουσα; ἥτις οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναμένεις, ἀλλά, πρὶν ἐπιθυμῆσαι, πάντων ἐμπίπλασαι, πρὶν μὲν πεινῆν ἐσθίουσα, πρὶν δὲ διψῆν πίνουσα, καὶ ἵνα μὲν ἡδέως φάγῃς, ὀψοποιοὺς μηχανωμένη, ἵνα δὲ ἡδέως πίνῃς, οἴνους τε πολυτελεῖς παρασκευάζει, καὶ τοῦ θέρους χιόνα περιθέουσα ζητεῖς· ἵνα δὲ καθυπνώσῃς ἡδέως, οὐ μόνον τὰς στρωμνὰς μαλακάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς κλίνας καὶ τὰ ὑπόβαθρα ταῖς κλίναις παρασκευάζει· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ πονεῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν, ὅ τι ποιῇς, ὕπνου ἐπιθυμεῖς. 31. Ἀθάνατος δὲ οὖσα, ἐκ θεῶν μὲν ἀπέῤῥιψαι, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν ἀτιμάζει· τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου ἑαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι. Τίς δ' ἂν σοι λεγούσῃ τι πιστεύσειε; τίς δ' ἂν δεομένῃ τινὸς ἐπαρκέσειεν; ἢ τίς ἂν εὖ φρονῶν τοῦ σοὶ θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι; οἱ νέοι μὲν ὄντες τοῖς σώμασιν ἀδύνατοί εἰσι, πρεσβύτεροι δὲ γενόμενοι, ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀνόητοι, ἀπόνως μὲν λιπαροὶ διὰ νεότητος τρεφόμενοι, ἐπιπόνως δὲ αὐχμηροὶ διὰ γήρως περῶντες, τοῖς μὲν πεπραγμένοις αἰσχυνόμενοι, τοῖς δὲ πραττομένοις βαρυνόμενοι, τὰ μὲν ἡδέα ἐν τῇ νεότητι διαδραμόντες, τὰ δὲ χαλεπὰ εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀποθέμενοι. 32. Ἐγὼ δὲ σύνειμι μὲν θεοῖς, σύνειμι δὲ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἔργον δὲ καλόν, οὔτε θεῖον οὔτε ἀνθρώπινον, χωρὶς ἐμοῦ γίγνεται· τιμῶμαι δὲ μάλιστα πάντων καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις οἷς προσήκει, ἀγαπητὴ μὲν συνεργὸς τεχνίταις, πιστὴ δὲ φύλαξ οἴκων δεσπόταις, εὐμενὴς δὲ παραστάτις οἰκέταις, ἀγαθὴ δὲ συλλήπτρια τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων, βεβαία δὲ τῶν ἐν πολέ-

μῳ σύμμαχος ἔργων, ἀρίστη δὲ φιλίας κοινωνός. 33. Ἔστι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμοῖς φίλοις ἡδεῖα μὲν καὶ ἀπράγμων σίτων καὶ ποτῶν ἀπόλαυσις ἀνέχονται γάρ, ἕως ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν αὐτῶν. Ὕπνος δὲ αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν ἡδίων, ἢ τοῖς ἀμόχθοις, καὶ οὔτε ἀπολείποντες αὐτὸν ἄχθονται, οὔτε διὰ τοῦτον μεθιᾶσι τὰ δέοντα πράττειν. Καὶ οἱ μὲν νέοι τοῖς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπαίνοις χαίρουσιν, οἱ δὲ γεραίτεροι ταῖς τῶν νέων τιμαῖς ἀγάλλονται· καὶ ἡδέως μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν πράξεων μέμνηνται, εὖ δὲ τὰς παρούσας ἥδονται πράττοντες, δι' ἐμὲ φίλοι μὲν θεοῖς ὄντες, ἀγαπητοὶ δὲ φίλοις, τίμιοι δὲ πατρίσιν· ὅταν δ' ἔλθῃ τὸ πεπρωμένον τέλος, οὐ μετὰ λήθης ἄτιμοι κεῖνται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὑμνούμενοι θάλλουσι. Τοιαῦτά σοι, ὦ παῖ τοκέων ἀγαθῶν Ἡράκλεις, ἔξεστι διαπονησαμένῳ τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτῆσθαι. 34. Οὕτω πως διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν ὑπ' Ἀρετῆς Ἡρακλέους παίδευσιν, ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειοτέροις ῥήμασιν, ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν. Σοὶ δ' οὖν ἄξιον, ὦ Ἀρίστιππε, τούτων ἐνθυμουμένῳ πειρᾶσθαί τι καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον τοῦ βίου φροντίζειν.

CHAPTER II.

SUMMARY.

THIS chapter, which contains a conversation between Socrates and his eldest son, Lamprocles, who was angry with his mother, treats of the duty of children toward their parents. The points developed in the course of it are as follows:

1. They are called ungrateful men who do not make any return for favors received when able so to do.

2. Ungrateful persons must be ranked among the unjust. (§ 1, 2.)

3. The greater the benefit received, the more unjust must he be regarded who does not make a return for it. Those benefits, however, are to be viewed as the greatest, which are bestowed upon children by their parents, and more particularly by their mothers. (§ 3–6.) Hence it clearly follows that, even though a mother be violent and harsh of temper, she ought still to be loved and reverenced by a son, since he knows that she does not act from any evil intent, but has all the while the sincerest

1. Λοιπὸν δὲ ἦν ἐπισκοπεῖν, τίνα τρόπον τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἔργων ἔχοιμεν. Εἰπὲ μοι, ἔφη, εἴ τινά σοι ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἐπιτηδείως ἔχειν ἐρωτῴην, πῶς ἂν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος. Καταμανθάνομεν οὖν τοὺς τὰ προσήκοντα τῷ ἔρωτι πράττοντας; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη· τοὺς γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐπιθυμοῦντας καὶ ἐπιτηδείως ἔχειν δοκεῖν μοι ἀναγκαῖον ἀμφοτέρους ταὐτὰ πράττειν. Οὐκοῦν δικαίως καὶ τοὺς ἀδίκως ἐπιτηδευομένους τοὺς ἀδίκους; Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη. 2. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ σωφρόνως, εἰ ἔστι τοὺς σωφρονίζεσθαι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ἡδέως ἔχειν ἀνάγκη, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους ἀνιᾶσθαι; καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν τοίνυν τοὺς μὲν φίλους ἡδέως ἔχειν, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους ἀνιᾶσθαι; Καὶ κινδυνεύει, ἔφη· καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς γε, εἰ δὲ τοὺς οἰκείους πάθοι, ἧττον ἀνιᾶσθαι ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους χαίρειν ἀναγκάζοιτο, ἡδέως ἂν ἔχοι. 3. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ σωφρονεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἆρ' οὐ καὶ ἡδέως ἂν ἔχοι ἡ ἀρετή; Συνομολογῶ. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ τοῦ μείζω ἀγαθὰ πάσχειν, μὴ ἀπολαῦσαι χάριν, τοῦτο πάσχοντος ἂν εἴη; Συνέφη καὶ τοῦτο. Τίνες οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ πόσων εἵμασιν ἂν μείζονα ἀγαθὰ παρασκευάσειαν, ἢ οἱ τοὺς γονέας; οἳ καὶ γενόμενοι ἐκ καλῶν ἔργων ἐποίησαν ἐλευθέρους, τροφῆς δὲ καὶ παιδείας ἐπιμελούμενοι τοιούτους ἀπέφηναν, οἷοι δύνασθαι· ἃ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ἔχουσι, ταῦτα πάντα τοῖς ἐκγόνοις μεταδιδόασιν· καὶ οἱ πόλιν τινὰ ἢ ἔθνος ἀγαθὸν οἰκίσαντες ἀθάνατον μνήμην ἑαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν· καὶ οἱ τοὺς μεγίστους ἀγῶνας ἀγωνισάμενοι ὑφ' ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τιμῶνται, καὶ οἱ τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις ἑαυτοὺς παραβαλόντες ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀγαθοῖς τὴν ἀθανασίαν ἔχουσιν. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ἔφη. 4. Καὶ αὖ τὰς τῶν ἀρχομένων ἕνεκα τιμωρουμένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιθυμίας ἐπεσκόπουν· φανερὰ δ' ἦν καὶ ταύτας οὔσας, ἐπὶ ἀνοίᾳ δὲ γιγνομένας τῶν τιμωρουμένων ἀδικημάτων. 5. Καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀδικήμασι τοῖς τε γονικοῖς τοῖς τε τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιτιμίοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀνδραπόδων ἐπιτιμίοις οὐδεὶς ἐπιτηδεύει· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς

[illegible] ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἐπιτιμίοις [

δύνηται πλεῖστα· ἡ δὲ γυνὴ ὑποδεξαμένη τε φέρει τὸ φορτίον τοῦτο, βαρυνομένη τε, καὶ κινδυνεύουσα περὶ τοῦ βίου, καὶ μεταδιδοῦσα τῆς τροφῆς, ᾗ καὶ αὐτὴ τρέφεται, καὶ σὺν πολλῷ πόνῳ διενέγκασα καὶ τεκοῦσα, τρέφει τε καὶ ἐπιμελεῖται, οὔτε προπεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν, οὔτε γιγνῶσκον τὸ βρέφος ὑφ' ὅτου εὖ πάσχει, οὐδὲ σημαίνειν δυνάμενον, ὅτου δεῖται, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ στοχαζομένη τά τε συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ κεχαρισμένα πειρᾶται ἐκπληροῦν, καὶ τρέφει πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς ὑπομένουσα πονεῖν, οὐκ εἰδυῖα, τίνα τούτων χάριν ἀπολήψεται. 6. Καὶ οὐκ ἀρκεῖ θρέψαι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καί, ἐπειδὰν δόξωσιν ἱκανοὶ εἶναι οἱ παῖδες μανθάνειν τι, ἃ μὲν ἂν αὐτοὶ ἔχωσιν οἱ γονεῖς ἀγαθὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον, διδάσκουσιν· ἃ δ' ἂν οἴωνται ἄλλον ἱκανώτερον εἶναι διδάξαι, πέμπουσι πρὸς τοῦτον δαπανῶντες, καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, πάντα ποιοῦντες, ὅπως οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῖς γένωνται ὡς δυνατὸν βέλτιστοι. 7. Πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ νεανίσκος ἔφη· Ἀλλά τοι, εἰ καὶ πάντα ταῦτα πεποίηκε καὶ ἄλλα τούτων πολλαπλάσια, οὐδεὶς ἂν δύναιτο αὐτῆς ἀνασχέσθαι τὴν χαλεπότητα. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· Πότερα δὲ οἶει, ἔφη, θηρίου ἀγριότητα δυσφορωτέραν εἶναι, ἢ μητρός; Ἔγωγε μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη, τῆς μητρός, τῆς γε τοιαύτης. Ἤδη πώποτε οὖν ἢ δακοῦσα κακόν τί σοι ἔδωκεν, ἢ λακτίσασα, οἷα ὑπὸ θηρίων ἤδη πολλοὶ ἔπαθον; 8. Ἀλλά, νὴ Δία, ἔφη, λέγει, ἃ οὐκ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῷ βίῳ παντὶ βούλοιτο ἀκοῦσαι. Σὺ δὲ πόσα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οἴει ταύτῃ δυσάνεκτα, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις, ἐκ παιδίου δυσκολαίνων, καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς πράγματα παρασχεῖν, πόσα δὲ λυπῆσαι κάμνων; Ἀλλ' οὐδεπώποτε αὐτήν, ἔφη, οὔτ' εἶπα, οὔτ' ἐποίησα οὐδέν, ἐφ' ᾧ ἠσχύνθη. 9. Τί δέ; οἴει, ἔφη, χαλεπώτερον εἶναί σοι ἀκούειν, ὧν αὐτὴ λέγει, ἢ τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς, ὅταν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔσχατα λέγωσιν; Ἀλλ', οἶμαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ οἴονται τῶν λεγόντων οὔτε τὸν ἐλέγχοντα ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα ζημιώσῃ, οὔτε τὸν ἀπειλοῦντα ἀπειλεῖν, ἵνα κακόν τι ποιήσῃ, ῥᾳδίως φέρουσι. Σὺ δ' εὖ εἰδώς, ὡς, ὅ τι λέγει σοι ἡ μήτηρ, οὐ μόνον οὐδὲν κακὸν νοοῦσα

λεγεις, αλλα και διαλυσειν σε οιηθηι εινατ, δια ουδενι
αλλωι, χαλκωικωι; ἡ κομιζει κακεινος την μαχαιραν σου
εινατ; του δεηι, ἐφη, ταυτα γε ουκ εινατ. 10. Και ὁ
Σωκρατης, Τουτο, ἐφη, σε τουτωι, εἰπερ τι σου εινατ,
και ὑποδηματοιν, τα ραιστα δυναται, κτασθαι; Ουκουν
ἐμοιγε τα αυτ' δοκει των ὑποδηματων μαθησεως δεισθαι
και τινος τεχνης, πολλα γαρ δηλη ἡ ὑφαντικη εἰναι ὑπο-
τεινει, και σκυτικη δοκουδιαιτα. χαλκευτικη ουκουν εἰπερ
εἰναι, ει τινατοιν μη δυναται ὑφαινε μαχαιραν, τουτωι σε ου
δυναται τεχνηι. 11. Εἰτα δε μοι, ἐφη, τινατοιν ἀλλον
τινα ουκ οἰει δυνασθαι, ἡ τουτοιναν μαθησει ανθρω-
πινων τεχνηματων μαθ' ὑπαρχει μαθ' ὑπαρχουσαν αὐτη
ὑπαρχηι, μητε ἀλλην ἀρχηι; Ναι μα Δι' ἐγωιγ', ἐφη.
12. Οιδασιν, ἐφη ὁ Σωκρατης, και τω γαιτοναι βελτιω σε
ἀρτιωναι ἐστ' αν και τω ἑαυτω, ἐαν εκεινοι δεηι και ἀγα-
θοι τε και τω γενηται σωληττεται και, ἐν τι ὑφελιμωτερ'
τεχνηι, εἰπανδ' ἐγγυασ' ἀναβηθι σοι; Ἐγγυα, ἐφη. Τι δε;
εκκλησιαστικον, ἡ σιωπαται, ἐἰ τι δεοιτο ἐπιτεχνασασθαι, σοι-
δεν αν σοι δοκειηι χρησιμ' ἡ σιβηνι γενεσθαι, ἡ και τηι
τεχνηι τουτωι εἰναιμι οἰδε δεον ἐπιμελεισθαι; Ἐγωιγε, ἐφη.
13. Εἰτα τουτων μεν ἀπαλλαττει σεαυτον. Περι δε
μαχης τηι τουτων μαλιστ' αν χαλκευοιμι νυν ἐγω σοι
μαστιγοιν; ουκ οἰδ' ὁτι και ἡ τελος ἀλλοτε μεν ὑφαινοντι
ἀλλοιωσις ὑποπιπτουσι, νυνδε ἀναξει, ἀλλα τουτωι τωι σε
κτησασθαι χρηιζει ουκ ἀναβαλλεται, ουτ' αν τις γαιτων σε
πορισειεν τουτο δεομενωι τουτωι, και ἀγαθον μαζονοιν
ουκ ἐν τηι δεομενωι τουτοιν, ὡς ουτε δι' ὁ τι δεοι τινος
ἐκαστ' ουτε ὁτωι τινι ὑφελιμον, ουκουν ἀλλο κακως και
ἀγαθως ουδεν δυνατον ἐργαζεσθαι. 14. Και τι δοκει τον
των γαιτων τελεωτατον εινατ τινων μη κτασθαι, και
ουκουν ἀπιστειν ἡ τουτ' εν τοις τον ἀφρονεστατον ὑπαρχουσιν.
15. Ἐγ ουν, ὦ ουτ' ἀν ὑποκριτηι, τουτ' ουκ ἐστιν ὁτωι
σοι γενησεται, ουτε σοι, ὁ τι ποτ' ἐστιν τηι μαστιγι, ουτε
σε και αὐτον ποιησαντες ἀγαθουν εἰναι, ουκ ἐθ' ὁμοιως ὁι
ταυτα ποιησαντες ἀν φαιλοτερ', ἡ σε τυπτησαντες.

τῶν γονέων ἀμελοῦντα πάντες ἀτιμάσωσιν, κἂν ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φίλων ἀναφανῇς· εἰ γάρ σε ὑπολάβοιεν πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς ἀχάριστον εἶναι, οὐδεὶς ἂν νομίσειεν εὖ σε ποιήσας χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι.

CHAPTER III.

SUMMARY.

SOCRATES having observed that Chærephon and Chærecrates, two brothers, with whom he was acquainted, were at variance, wished very much to reconcile them to each other, and employed for this purpose the following arguments:

1. A brother ought to be dearer to one than riches (§ 1); for the possession of riches is doubtful and uncertain, unless you have friends and companions, through whose aid you may be enabled to retain and enjoy these. (§ 2, 3.) The truest friend, moreover, is undoubtedly that one who has been given to you by nature, namely, a brother. For, in the first place, the being born of the same parents, and the being brought up under the same roof, ought to prove a powerful bond of union; and, in the next place, he who has a brother is less exposed to attacks from others than he who has none. (§ 4.)

2. This being the case, duty requires of us that, even if a brother entertain angry and hostile feelings toward us, still we must not imitate him in this, but must strive to conciliate and appease him (§ 5–9); and the true mode of conciliating will be by endeavoring to work upon his feelings through the medium of kind words and actions (§ 10–14); which course it will be the more incumbent upon you to pursue if you are the younger brother, since it is every where an established rule that the younger show respect to the elder. (§ 15–17.)

3. Brothers ought not to be in opposition to one another, but ought to live together in perfect harmony. And as, in the case of the body, two pairs of limbs, &c., such as, for example, hands, legs, feet, lend mutual aid; so no situation ought to hinder brothers who live in amity from rendering one another the most essential service. (§ 18, 19.)

1. Χαιρεφῶντα δέ ποτε καὶ Χαιρεκράτην, ἀδελφὼ μὲν ὄντε ἀλλήλοιν, ἑαυτῷ δὲ γνωρίμω, αἰσθόμενος διαφερομένω, ἰδὼν τὸν Χαιρεκράτην, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, οὐ δήπου καὶ σὺ εἷ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων, οἳ χρησιμώτερον νομίζουσι χρήματα ἢ ἀδελφούς; καὶ ταῦτα, τῶν μὲν ἀφρόνων ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ φρονίμου, καὶ τῶν μὲν βοηθείας δεομένων, τοῦ δὲ βοηθεῖν δυναμένου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῶν

μεν πλουσίους ἀναγράφονται, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους. 2. Θαυμαστὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, εἰ τοὺς μὲν ἀδίκους ζημία φίλους ἔχειν δοκεῖ, ὅτι οὐ καὶ τοὺς ἀδίκους ἀνάγκη, τοὺς δὲ πολίτας οὐχ ἡσθέντας ζημίαν ὅτι οὐ καὶ τοὺς πολίτους ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐναντίους μᾶλλον ἡγεῖσθαι. ὅτι κρείττων τῶν πολλῶν πολίτης ἀνὴρ εἷς ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν ἐστί· καὶ μόνον δυνάμενον τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἀναγκάζειν πάντα ἀναγράφειν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀδίκους τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡγεμόσιν. 3. Καὶ οὕτω μὲν εἰ δικάζοιεν δίκαια, ἅπασι συμφέρειν ἔμελλεν, καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς, ὡς ἴσμεν δίκαια δικάζοντες, τοὺς μὲν ἀδίκους ἀφελοῦντες, ὄντας δὲ πολίτας αὖ γιγνώσκοντες φίλους, τὰ δίκαια δὲ οὐ γιγνώσκοντες. 4. Καὶ μὴν περὶ φιλίας μέγα μὲν ἀνάγκη τὸ δι' ὧν αὐτὴν φίλοι, ῥητὰ δὲ τὰ ἐμοὶ τυγχάνοντα, ἀλλ' οὐ καὶ τοῖς ἀρίστοις πάσης ἀγχίστευσιν τῶν συγγενῶν τιμᾶν δεῖ νομίζειν, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι τιμῶσι τὸ μέλλον τοὺς συνεκβήσεσθαι ὄντας τῶν ἀναβλήτων, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολίταις ἐστὶν ὁρᾶν. 5. Καὶ ὁ Χαιρεφῶντος εἶπεν· Ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ μόνον οὐ τὸ ἀφέλιμον ἴσασι δι' ὃ δεῖ φίλους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ μὴ μεμφομένους ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ μόνον παρεῖναι ἑκάστοις, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀνιαρὸν καὶ ἀφέλιμον ἀπωθεῖσθαι. 6. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Πότερον δέ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶντος, μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἄνευ Χαρμίδου ζῆναι ἢ μετὰ τοῦ; ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἴσθα; Ἔστι γάρ που, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλοις ἄνευ ἄλλου μᾶλλον ἡδέως ἢ μετὰ τοῦ· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ μὲν ἐπιθυμίας ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπιθυμουμένου ἥδιστα, μετὰ δὲ ἐπιθυμίας ἀνιαρότατα. 7. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ζῆναι ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἀνεπιθύμητα μέν, ἀχθηδόνος δὲ γεμόντα, ζῶντα ἀνιαρῶς καὶ ἀθλίως, ἕτοιμα τὸν αὐτὸν μὴ ἀναπαύσασθαι ἐγκαταβάντα χρόνον; 8. Ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἔγωγε, ἔφη ὁ Χαιρεφῶντος, ἀναπαυσάμενος εἶναι ἀθλίως ἡδέως, ἀναπαυόμενος γε καὶ εἰ ἄγαν τῶν εὖ ἔχοντος, καὶ εἰ πολὺ τῶν εἰ πονοῦντος· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ λίαν καὶ ἄγαν πεφιλῆσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τὸν δὲ συνόντα καὶ ἀεὶ ἀλγοῦντα, καὶ εἰ πολὺ τῶν εἰ πονοῦντος, ἀλλ'

οὐδὲ πειράσομαι. 9. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Θαυμαστά γε λέγεις, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, εἰ κύνα μέν, εἴ σοι ἦν ἐπὶ προβάτοις ἐπιτήδειος ὤν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ποιμένας ἠσπάζετο, σοὶ δὲ προσιόντι ἐχαλέπαινεν, ἀμελήσας ἂν τοῦ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπειρῶ εὐ ποιήσας πραΰνειν αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ ἀδελφὸν φῆς μὲν μέγα ἂν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ὄντα πρὸς σὲ οἷον δεῖ, ἐπίστασθαι δὲ ὁμολογῶν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ εὖ λέγειν, οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖς ιηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως σοι ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται; 10. Καὶ ὁ Χαιρεκράτης, Δέδοικα, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἐγὼ τοσαύτην σοφίαν, ὥστε Χαιρεφῶντα ποιῆσαι πρὸς ἐμὲ οἷον δεῖ. Καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γε ποικίλον, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδὲ καινὸν δεῖ ἐπ' αὐτόν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μηχανᾶσθαι, οἷς δὲ καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασαι αὐτός, οἶομαι ἂν αὐτὸν ἁλόντα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαί σε. 11. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις, ἔφη, λέγων, εἴ τι ἤσθησαί με φίλτρον ἐπιστάμενον, ὃ ἐγὼ εἰδὼς λέληθα ἐμαυτόν. Λέγε δή μοι, ἔφη, εἴ τινα τῶν γνωρίμων βούλοιο κατεργάσασθαι, ὁπότε θύοι, καλεῖν σε ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, τί ἂν ποιοίης; Δῆλον, ὅτι κατάρχοιμι ἂν τοῦ αὐτός, ὅτε θύοιμι, καλεῖν ἐκεῖνον. 12. Εἰ δὲ βούλοιο τῶν φίλων τινὰ προτρέψασθαι, ὁπότε ἀποδημοίης, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σῶν, τί ἂν ποιοίης; Δῆλον, ὅτι πρότερος ἂν ἐγχειροίην ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐκείνου, ὁπότε ἀποδημοίη. 13. Εἰ δὲ βούλοιο ξένον ποιῆσαι ὑποδέχεσθαι σεαυτόν, ὁπότε ἔλθοις εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου, τί ἂν ποιοίης; Δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ τοῦτον πρότερος ὑποδεχοίμην ἄν, ὁπότε ἔλθοι Ἀθήναζε· καὶ εἴ γε βουλοίμην αὐτὸν προθυμεῖσθαι διαπράττειν μοι ἐφ' ἃ ἥκοιμι, δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο δέοι ἂν πρότερον αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ ποιεῖν. 14. Πάντ' ἄρα σύ γε τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις φίλτρα ἐπιστάμενος πάλαι ἀπεκρύπτου· ἢ οὐκ εἶς, ἔφη, ἄρξαι, μὴ αἰσχρὸς φανῇς, ἐὰν πρότερος τὸν ἀδελφὸν εὖ ποιῇς; καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ ἐπαίνου ἄξιος εἶναι, ὃς ἂν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει μοι Χαιρεφῶν ἡγεμονικώτερος εἶναι σοῦ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ταύτην, ἐκεῖνον ἂν ἐπειρώμην πείθειν πρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν τῷ σε φίλον ποιεῖσθαι· νῦν δέ μοι σὺ δοκεῖς ἡγούμενος

καὶ τὰ ὄπισθεν ἰδεῖν δύναιντο· ἀδελφὼ δέ, φίλω ὄντε, καὶ πολὺ διεστῶτε πράττετον ἅμα καὶ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν.

CHAPTER IV.

SUMMARY.

In this chapter, as well as in many of those that follow, the theme is Friendship. In the present chapter the value of friendship is considered:

1. Many persons are more intent upon any thing else rather than upon the acquiring and preserving of friends. (§ 1–4.)

2. And yet there is no possession more valuable, or more stable, or more directly useful than a good friend. For he takes care of the affairs and interests of another as if they were his own; he shares with him not merely prosperous, but also adverse fortune; and he provides for the safety and prosperity of another as much as, and sometimes even more than, for his own. (§ 5–7.)

1. Ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ φίλων διαλεγομένου, ἐξ ὧν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκει μάλιστ' ἄν τις ὠφελεῖσθαι πρὸς φίλων κτῆσίν τε καὶ χρείαν· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ δὴ πολλῶν ἔφη ἀκούειν, ὡς πάντων κτημάτων κράτιστον ἂν εἴη φίλος σαφὴς καὶ ἀγαθός, ἐπιμελουμένους δὲ παντὸς μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς ἢ φίλων κτήσεως. 2. Καὶ γὰρ οἰκίας, καὶ ἀγρούς, καὶ ἀνδράποδα, καὶ βοσκήματα, καὶ σκεύη κτωμένους τε ἐπιμελῶς ὁρᾶν ἔφη, καὶ τὰ ὄντα σώζειν πειρωμένους, φίλον δέ, ὃ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλούς, οὔτε ὅπως κτήσονται φροντίζοντας, οὔτε ὅπως οἱ ὄντες ἑαυτοῖς σώζωνται. 3. Ἀλλὰ καί, καμνόντων φίλων τε καὶ οἰκετῶν, ὁρᾶν τινας ἔφη τοῖς μὲν οἰκέταις καὶ ἰατροὺς εἰσάγοντας, καὶ τἆλλα πρὸς ὑγιείαν ἐπιμελῶς παρασκευάζοντας, τῶν δὲ φίλων ὀλιγωροῦντας· ἀποθανόντων τε ἀμφοτέρων, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς οἰκέταις ἀχθομένους καὶ ζημίαν ἡγουμένους, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φίλοις οὐδὲν οἰομένους ἐλαττοῦσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων οὐδὲν ἐῶντας ἀθεράπευτον, οὐδ' ἀνεπίσκεπτον, τῶν δὲ φίλων ἐπιμελείας δεομένων ἀμελοῦντας. 4. Ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὁρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κτημάτων, καὶ πάνυ πολλῶν

[illegible]

CHAPTER V.

SUMMARY

The main point touched on in the present chapter is that we should look well into ourselves, and not be in other men's pockets; we must consciously keep ourselves friends and helping us, and should also strive to live at as great ease as possible to them.

On account of the brevity of the discourse, many things are left to be understood for the reader, rather than expressly stated by Isocrates. This chapter, moreover, is by common consent of the Hellenists has hardly deserved a friend who was oppressed with poverty

1. Ἤκουσα δέ ποτε καὶ ἄλλον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὃς ἐδόκει μοι προτρέπειν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτόν, ὁπόσου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη. Ἰδὼν γάρ τινα τῶν ξυνόντων ἀμελοῦντα φίλου πενίᾳ πιεζομένου, ἤρετο Ἀντισθένη ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀμελοῦντος αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν· 2. Ἆρ', ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, εἰσί τινες ἀξίαι φίλων, ὥςπερ οἰκετῶν; Τῶν γὰρ οἰκετῶν ὁ μέν που δύο μναῖν ἄξιός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ οὐδ' ἡμιμναίου, ὁ δὲ πέντε μνῶν, ὁ δὲ καὶ δέκα· Νικίας δὲ ὁ Νικηράτου λέγεται ἐπιστάτην εἰς ταργύρια πρίασθαι τάλαντου· σκοποῦμαι δὴ τοῦτο, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα, ὥςπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων εἰσὶν ἀξίαι. 3. Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης· ἐγὼ γοῦν βουλοίμην ἂν τὸν μέν τινα φίλον μοι εἶναι μᾶλλον, ἢ δύο μνᾶς, τὸν δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἡμιμναίου προτιμησαίμην, τὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸ δέκα μνῶν ἐλοίμην ἄν, τὸν δὲ πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων καὶ πόνων πριαίμην ἂν φίλον μοι εἶναι. 4. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ γε ταῦτα τοιαῦτά ἐστι, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι ἐξετάζειν τινὰ ἑαυτόν, πόσου ἄρα τυγχάνει τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι ὡς πλείστου ἄξιος εἶναι, ἵνα ἥττον αὐτὸν οἱ φίλοι προδιδῶσιν· ἐγὼ γάρ τοι, ἔφη, πολλάκις ἀκούω τοῦ μέν, ὅτι προὔδωκεν αὑτὸν φίλος ἀνήρ, τοῦ δέ, ὅτι μνᾶν ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον εἵλετο ἀνήρ, ὃν ὤετο φίλον εἶναι. 5. Τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα σκοπῶ, μή, ὥςπερ, ὅταν τις οἰκέτην πονηρὸν πωλῇ, καὶ ἀποδίδωται τοῦ εὐρόντος, οὕτω καὶ τὸν πονηρὸν φίλον, ὅταν ἐξῇ τὸ πλεῖον τῆς ἀξίας λαβεῖν, ἐπαγωγὸν ἢ προδίδοσθαι· τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς οὔτε οἰκέτας πάνυ τι πωλουμένους ὁρῶ, οὔτε φίλους προδιδομένους.

CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY.

THE subject of friendship is continued, and the following inquiries are instituted with regard to it:

1. What kind of persons are we to choose as friends? (§ 1–5.)
2. In what way, before we make men our friends, ought we to put them

to the test, to what to ascertain whether they will make good friends or not? (§ 6-7.)

3. In what way, after a person has been ascertained to be worthy of our friendship, are we to proceed to make him our friend? (§ 8-10.)

Three questions having been answered, Aristippus makes the following remarks in addition: 1. As choosing friends, and must be guided, not by mere interested motives, but by personal excellences. (§ 10-11.) 2. Friendship most commonly arising from an admiration of what is virtuous. (§ 12.) 3. The unfortunate judgment a lovely looking (§ 13), and this lovely feeling (which is to admiration every day) so that the individual ceases to be admired. (§ 14.) 4. How the basis of true friendship is truth and virtue (§ 15-16), and hence that wisdom, and wisdom only, must lead to friendship. 5. How to secure to be so worthy and so just that many must gain friendship and wishes you to be. (§ 19.)

1. Ἐπῄνει δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ Σωκράτους φιλίαν, λέγων ἄξιον ἀνθρώπου φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιδείκνυσθαι· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖσθαι, εἰ δεομένῳ τύχοι ἀγαθοῦ, πᾶν δὲ ὑπομένειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπιστεῖν· ἔστι τιμᾶσθαι μὲν ὑφ' ἑτέρων, ἡγεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς τιμῶντας οὐδενός, καὶ ἔστιν ὑπ' ἄλλων ἐπαινεῖσθαι, ἐπαίρεσθαι δὲ μηδενί· ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ὑπηρετεῖσθαι, οἷ' ἀπὸ μηδενὸς δεόμενον δεῖσθαι δοκεῖν τῶν μὴ πάνυ τι ἀναγκαίων. Τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἄλλῳ ἔστιν ἢ Σωκράτει; Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν ὅστις καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀναπείθει; Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν ὅστις δεῖσθαι ἀναγκάζει; Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν ὅστις ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ; Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν ὅστις ἀπορεῖν

ἀνέχεται, μηδὲν φροντίζων τοῦ ἀντευεργετεῖν; Ἀνωφελὴς ἂν εἴη καὶ οὗτος· ἀλλὰ ποῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρήσομεν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι; 5. Οἶμαι μέν, ὃς τἀναντία τούτων ἐγκρατὴς μέν ἐστι τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, εὔορκος δὲ καὶ εὐξύμβολος ὢν τυγχάνει, καὶ φιλόνεικος πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας αὐτόν, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς χρωμένοις. 6. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ταῦτα δοκιμάσαιμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸ τοῦ χρῆσθαι; Τοὺς μὲν ἀνδριαντοποιούς, ἔφη, δοκιμάζομεν, οὐ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαιρόμενοι, ἀλλ' ὃν ἂν ὁρῶμεν τοὺς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντας καλῶς εἰργασμένον, τούτῳ πιστεύομεν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς εὖ ποιήσειν. 7. Καὶ ἄνδρα δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὃς ἂν τοὺς φίλους τοὺς πρόσθεν εὖ ποιῶν φαίνηται, δῆλον εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους εὐεργετήσοντα; Καὶ γὰρ ἵππους, ἔφη, ὃν ἂν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὁρῶ καλῶς χρώμενον, τοῦτον καὶ ἄλλοις οἶμαι καλῶς χρῆσθαι. 8. Εἶεν, ἔφη· ὃς δ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἄξιος φιλίας δοκῇ εἶναι, πῶς χρὴ φίλον τοῦτον ποιεῖσθαι; Πρῶτον μέν, ἔφη, τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ συμβουλεύουσιν αὐτὸν φίλον ποιεῖσθαι. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, ὃν ἂν ἡμῖν τε δοκῇ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ μὴ ἐναντιῶνται, ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, ὅπως οὗτος θηρατέος; 9. Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐ κατὰ πόδας, ὥςπερ ὁ λαγώς, οὐδ' ἁπάτῃ, ὥςπερ αἱ ὄρνιθες, οὐδὲ βίᾳ, ὥςπερ οἱ ἐχθροί· ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον ἐλεῖν ἐργῶδες· χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ δήσαντα κατέχειν, ὥςπερ δοῦλον· ἐχθροὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοι γίγνονται ταῦτα πάσχοντες. Φίλοι δὲ πῶς; ἔφη. 10. Εἶναι μέν τινάς φασιν ἐπῳδάς, ἃς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι ἐπᾴδοντες οἷς ἂν βούλωνται φίλους ἑαυτοῖς ποιοῦνται· εἶναι δὲ καὶ φίλτρα, οἷς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι πρὸς οὓς ἂν βούλωνται χρώμενοι φιλοῦνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν. 11. Πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα μάθοιμεν ἄν; Ἃ μὲν αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ, ἤκουσας Ὁμήρου, ὧν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τοιάδε τις·

Δεῦρ' ἄγε δή, πολύαιν' Ὀδυσεῦ, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν.

Ταύτην οὖν, ἔφη, τὴν ἐπῳδήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπᾴδουσαι κατεῖχον, ὥστε μὴ ἀπιέναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐπᾳσθέντας; Οὔκ· ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐπ'

πάντως ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐχθροὶ μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοι πεφυκέναι. 20. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, οὐδ' ἂν τοῖς χρηστοῖς οἱ πονηροί ποτε συναρμόσειαν εἰς φιλίαν· πῶς γὰρ οἱ τὰ πονηρὰ ποιοῦντες τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσι φίλοι γένοιντ' ἄν; Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οἱ ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε περι τοῦ πρωτεύειν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ φθονοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς μισοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, τίνες ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται, καὶ ἐν τίσιν ἀνθρώποις εὔνοια καὶ πίστις ἔσται; 21. Ἀλλ' ἔχει μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ποικίλως πως ταῦτα, ὦ Κριτόβουλε· φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικά· δέονται τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι, καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις· τὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τά τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες, ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται, καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις, καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος. 22. Ἀλλ' ὅμως διὰ τούτων πάντων ἡ φιλία διαδυομένη σ[illegible]τει τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν αἱροῦνται μὲν ἄνευ πόνου τὰ μέτρια κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον, ἢ διὰ πολέμου πάντων κυριεύειν, καὶ δύνανται πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν. 23. Δύνανται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον, τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπεχόμενοι, νομίμως κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις· δύνανται δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔριν οὐ μόνον ἀλύπως, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφερόντως ἀλλήλοις διατίθεσθαι, καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν κωλύειν εἰς τὸ μεταμελησόμενον προϊέναι· τὸν δὲ φθόνον παντάπασιν ἀφαιροῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχοντες, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων, ἑαυτῶν νομίζοντες. 24. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰκὸς τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθοὺς καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν μὴ μόνον ἀθλαβεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμους ἀλλήλοις κοινωνοὺς εἶναι; οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τιμᾶσθαί τε καὶ ἄρχειν, ἵνα ἐξουσίαν ἔχωσι χρήματά τε κλέπτειν, καὶ ἀνθρώπους βιάζεσθαι, καὶ ἡδυπαθεῖν, ἄδικοί τε καὶ πονηροὶ ἂν εἶεν, καὶ ἀδύνατοι ἄλλῳ συναρμοσαι. 25. Εἰ δέ τις, ἐν πόλει τιμᾶσθαι βουλόμενος, ὅπως αὐτός τε μὴ ἀδικῆται, καὶ

Κριτόβουλε, φίλος τινὶ βούλῃ γενέσθαι, ἐάσεις με κατειπεῖν σου πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἄγασαί τε αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖς φίλος αὐτοῦ εἶναι; Κατηγόρει, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, οὐδένα γὰρ οἶδα μισοῦντα τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας. 34. Ἐὰν δέ σου προςκατηγορήσω, ἔφη, ὅτι, διὰ τὸ ἄγασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχεις πρὸς αὐτόν, ἆρα μὴ διαβάλλεσθαι δόξεις ὑπ' ἐμοῦ; Ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι, ἔφη, ἐγγίγνεται εὔνοια, πρὸς οὓς ἂν ὑπολάβω εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχειν πρὸς ἐμέ. 35. Ταῦτα μὲν δή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν περὶ σοῦ, πρὸς οὓς ἂν βούλῃ φίλους ποιήσασθαι· ἐὰν δέ μοι ἔτι ἐξουσίαν δῷς λέγειν περὶ σοῦ, ὅτι ἐπιμελής τε τῶν φίλων εἶ, καὶ οὐδενὶ οὕτω χαίρεις ὡς φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ἐπί τε τοῖς καλοῖς ἔργοις τῶν φίλων ἀγάλλει οὐχ ἧττον, ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῶν φίλων χαίρεις οὐδὲν ἧττον, ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ, ὅπως τε ταῦτα γίγνηται τοῖς φίλοις, οὐκ ἀποκάμνεις μηχανώμενος, καὶ ὅτι ἔγνωκας ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι, νικᾶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιοῦντα, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, πάνυ ἂν οἶμαί σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναί με σύνθηρον τῶν ἀγαθῶν φίλων. 36. Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ἐμοὶ τοῦτο λέγεις, ὥςπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοὶ ὄν, ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ, περὶ ἐμοῦ λέγειν; Μὰ Δί' οὔχ, ὡς ποτε ἐγὼ Ἀσπασίας ἤκουσα· ἔφη γὰρ τὰς ἀγαθὰς προμνηστρίδας, μετὰ μὲν ἀληθείας τἀγαθὰ διαγγελλούσας, δεινὰς εἶναι συνάγειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς κηδείαν, ψευδομένας δ' οὐκ ὠφελεῖν ἐπαινούσας· τοὺς γὰρ ἐξαπατηθέντας ἅμα μισεῖν ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τὴν προμνησαμένην· ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ πεισθεὶς ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἐξεῖναί μοι περὶ σοῦ λέγειν ἐπαινοῦντι οὐδέν, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἀληθεύω. 37. Σὺ μὲν ἄρα, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, τοιοῦτός μοι φίλος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἷος, ἂν μέν τι αὐτὸς ἔχω ἐπιτήδειον εἰς τὸ φίλους κτήσασθαι, συλλαμβάνειν μοι· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις πλάσας τι εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ὠφελείᾳ. Πότερα δ' ἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, δοκῶ σοι μᾶλλον ὠφελεῖν σε τὰ ψευδῆ ἐπαινῶν, ἢ πείθων πειρᾶσθαί σε ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα γενέσθαι; 38. Εἰ δὲ μὴ φανερὸν οὕτω σοι, ἐκ τῶνδε σκέψαι· εἰ γάρ σε βουλόμενος φίλον ποιῆσαι

CHAPTER VII.

SUMMARY.

1. Καὶ μὴν τὴν δικαίαν γε καὶ νόμιμον, τὴν οὐκ ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειεν οὐδεὶς εἶναι καλήν· τοῦ δὲ ἔργου, ἀδύνατον ἐστὶ βλέπειν ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι τὸ ἔργον. Τοιαῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἐν τούτοις, ἔφη, ἀποκρίναιτο [illegible]

ἔχοντα, Ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀρίσταρχε, βαρέως φέρειν τι· χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τί σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν. 2. Καὶ ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν πολλῇ γέ εἰμι ἀπορίᾳ· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐστασίασεν ἡ πόλις, πολλῶν φυγόντων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, συνεληλύθασιν ὡς ἐμὲ καταλελειμμέναι ἀδελφαί τε, καὶ ἀδελφιδαῖ, καὶ ἀνεψιαὶ τοσαῦται, ὥστ' εἶναι ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τεσσαρεςκαίδεκα τοὺς ἐλευθέρους· λαμβάνομεν δὲ οὔτε ἐκ τῆς γῆς οὐδέν· οἱ γὰρ ἐναντίοι κρατοῦσιν αὐτῆς· οὔτε ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν· ὀλιγανθρωπία γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει γέγονε· τὰ ἐπιπλα δὲ οὐδεὶς ὠνεῖται, οὐδὲ δανείσασθαι οὐδαμόθεν ἔστιν ἀργύριον, ἀλλὰ πρότερον ἄν τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ζητῶν εὑρεῖν, ἢ δανειζόμενος λαβεῖν. Χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀπολλυμένους, ἀδύνατον δὲ τοσούτους τρέφειν ἐν τοιούτοις πράγμασιν. 3. Ἀκούσας οὖν ταῦτα ὁ Σωκράτης, Τί ποτέ ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι ὁ Κεράμων μὲν πολλοὺς τρέφων, οὐ μόνον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τούτοις τὰ ἐπιτήδεια δύναται παρέχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περι ποιεῖται τοσαῦτα, ὥστε καὶ πλουτεῖν, σὺ δὲ πολλοὺς τρέφων δέδοικας, μὴ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἅπαντες ἀπόλησθε; Ὅτι νὴ Δί', ἔφη, ὁ μὲν δούλους τρέφει, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐλευθέρους. 4. Καὶ πότερον, ἔφη, τοὺς παρὰ σοὶ ἐλευθέρους οἴει βελτίους εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς παρὰ Κεράμωνι δούλους; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἔφη, τοὺς παρὰ ἐμοὶ ἐλευθέρους. Οὔκουν, ἔφη, αἰσχρὸν τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πονηροτέρων εὐπορεῖν, σὲ δὲ πολλῷ βελτίους ἔχοντα ἐν ἀπορίαις εἶναι; Νὴ Δί', ἔφη, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τεχνίτας τρέφει, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐλευθερίως πεπαιδευμένους. 5. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, τεχνῖταί εἰσιν οἱ χρήσιμόν τι ποιεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι; Μάλιστά γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν χρήσιμά γ' ἄλφιτα; Σφόδρα γε. Τί δ' ἄρτοι; Οὐδὲν ἧττον. Τί γάρ; ἔφη, ἱμάτιά τε ἀνδρεῖα καὶ γυναικεῖα, καὶ χιτωνίσκοι, καὶ χλαμύδες, καὶ ἐξωμίδες; Σφόδρα γε, ἔφη, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα χρήσιμα. Ἔπειτα, ἔφη, οἱ παρὰ σοὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν; Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. 6. Εἶτ' οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι ἀφ' ἑνὸς μὲν τούτων, ἀλφιτοποιίας

Nausicydes οὐ μόνον ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς φίλοις πολὺ τοῦτον καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ, καὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀπόντων, ἔφη καὶ τῇ πόλει πολλῷ ἀσφαλέστερον ἐν δὲ ἀρετῇ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῷ τε πόλει πάντας ἀνεκτήσατο καὶ τῇ δικαίᾳ. Δημόνικος δὲ ὁ Καλλίου, ἀπὸ χρηματιστικῆς. Μένων δ', ἀπὸ χρηματισμοῦ. Μενέξενος δὲ οὐ πάντων, ἔφη, ἀπὸ ἐμπορικῆς ἐπιμελεῖται. Τί δέ, ἔφη, τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀνομένων ἡδέως ἀπέχονται, ἀργύριον δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ πρόσεστιν. ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει, ἔφη, ὃ ἐπιθυμοῦντα καὶ στέργειν; Τ. Ἔστιν', ἔφη, ὃ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ τι καὶ καὶ στέργειν ἀνάγκη, τοῦτο χρήσιμον ἀεὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἢ ἀνάγκη καὶ καθεύδοντα; Πότερον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμητῶν τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα ἡδέως ἂν ἴδοις, καὶ μάλιστα τὸν ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους χρήσιμον τοῦτο τοὺς ἄλλους ἀναγκαίους; Ἔστι γὰρ μὲν ἀνάγκη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμητῶν τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους ἡδέως ἂν ἰδεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τὸν ἀναγκαῖον· ἐπεὶ τοῦτο γε οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι ἐπιτήδειον εἴη τὸ μὴ ἡδέως ἂν ἰδεῖν. Τ. Τί δέ; ἔφη, ἐὰν μὲν ἀνάγκη ᾖ τὸν ἐπιτήδειον καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἰδεῖν, ἐπιτήδειον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἡγεῖ εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον; Ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιτήδειον καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαῖον τὸν μὲν ἡδέως ἂν ἰδεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἀνάγκη καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούειν, τὸν δὲ ἀνάγκη καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἀκούειν, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἡδέως ἂν ἐπιθυμεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἀνάγκη καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἐπιθυμεῖν, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἡδέως ἂν ἐθέλειν, τὸν δὲ ἀνάγκη καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντα ἐθέλειν, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἡδέως ἂν ἐπιτηδεύειν, τὸν δὲ ἀνάγκη καὶ μὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν· ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους οὐκ ἀναγκαίους ἡγεῖ εἶναι; Ἔστι γὰρ μὲν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδέως ἂν ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐπιτήδειον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἡδέως ἂν ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἐπιτήδειον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ἐθέλειν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν. Τί δέ; ἔφη, τὸν μὲν ἡδέως ἂν ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη, τὸν δὲ ἀνάγκη καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἰδεῖν, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἡγεῖ εἶναι

μεμνημένοι, τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνων χάριν ἀξήσετε, καὶ ἐκ τούτων φιλικώτερόν τε καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀλλήλοις ἕξετε. 10. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχρόν τι ἔμελλον ἐργάσασθαι, θάνατον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ προαιρετέον ἦν· νῦν δέ, ἃ μὲν δοκεῖ κάλλιστα καὶ πρεπωδέστερα γυναικὶ εἶναι, ἐπίστανται, ὡς ἔοικε· πάντες δέ, ἃ ἐπίστανται, ῥᾷστά τε, καὶ τάχιστα, καὶ κάλλιστα, καὶ ἥδιστα ἐργάζονται. Μὴ οὖν ὄκνει, ἔφη, ταῦτα εἰσηγεῖσθαι αὐταῖς, ἃ σοί τε λυσιτελήσει κἀκείναις, καί, ὡς εἰκός, ἡδέως ὑπακούσονται. 11. Ἀλλά, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος, οὕτως μοι δοκεῖς καλῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥστε πρόσθεν μὲν οὐ προσιέμην δανείσασθαι, εἰδώς, ὅτι ἀναλώσας, ὅ τι ἂν λάβω, οὐχ ἕξω ἀποδοῦναι, νῦν δέ μοι δοκῶ εἰς ἔργων ἀφορμὴν ὑπομένειν αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι.

12. Ἐκ τούτων δὲ ἐπορίσθη μὲν ἀφορμή, ἐωνήθη δὲ ἔρια· καὶ ἐργαζόμεναι μὲν ἠρίστων, ἐργασάμεναι δὲ ἐδείπνουν, ἱλαραὶ δὲ ἀντὶ σκυθρωπῶν ἦσαν· καὶ ἀντὶ ὑφορωμένων ἑαυτάς, ἡδέως ἀλλήλας ἐώρων· καὶ αἱ μὲν ὡς κηδεμόνα ἐφίλουν, ὁ δὲ ὡς ὠφελίμους ἠγάπα. Τέλος δὲ ἐλθὼν πρὸς τὸν Σωκράτην, χαίρων διηγεῖτο ταῦτά τε, καὶ ὅτι αἰτιῶνται αὐτὸν μόνον τῶν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἀργὸν ἐσθίειν. 13. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Εἶτα οὐ λέγεις αὐταῖς τὸν τοῦ κυνὸς λόγον; φασὶ γάρ, ὅτε φωνήεντα ἦν τὰ ζῶα, τὴν ὖν πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην εἰπεῖν· Θαυμαστὸν ποιεῖς, ὃς ἡμῖν μὲν ταῖς καὶ ἔριά σοι, καὶ ἄρνας, καὶ τυρὸν παρεχούσαις οὐδὲν δίδως, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἐκ τῆς γῆς λάβωμεν· τῷ δὲ κυνί, ὃς οὐδὲν τοι οὗτόν σοι παρέχει, μεταδίδως οὗπερ αὐτὸς ἔχεις σίτου. 14. Τὸν κύνα οὖν ἀκούσαντα εἰπεῖν· Ναὶ μὰ Δία· ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι ὁ καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτὰς σώζων, ὥστε μήτε ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων κλέπτεσθαι, μήτε ὑπὸ λύκων ἁρπάζεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ὑμεῖς γε, εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ προφυλάττοιμι ὑμᾶς, οὐδ' ἂν νέμεσθαι δύναισθε, φοβούμεναι μὴ ἀπόλησθε. Οὕτω δὴ λέγεται καὶ τὰ πρόβατα συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κύνα προτιμᾶσθαι. Καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐκείναις λέγε, ὅτι ἀντὶ κυνὸς εἶ φύλαξ καὶ ἐπιμελητής, καὶ διὰ σὲ οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς ἀδικούμεναι, ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἡδέως ἐργαζόμεναι ζῶσιν.

CHAPTER VIII.

SUMMARY

ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ὑταίτιον εἶναί τινι οὐ πάνυ προσίεμαι. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, Εὔθηρε, οὐ πάνυ γε ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν ἔργον, ἐφ' ᾧ οὐκ ἄν τις αἰτίαν ἔχοι· χαλεπὸν γὰρ οὕτω τι ποιῆσαι, ὥστε μηδὲν ἁμαρτεῖν, χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ ἀναμαρτήτως τι ποιήσαντα μὴ ἀγνώμονι κριτῇ περιτυχεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἷς νῦν ἐργάζεσθαι φῄς, θαυμάζω εἰ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνέγκλητον διαγίγνεσθαι. 6. Χρὴ οὖν πειρᾶσθαι τούς τε φιλαιτίους φεύγειν, καὶ τοὺς εὐγνώμονας διώκειν, καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅσα μὲν δύνασαι ποιεῖν, ὑπομένειν, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δύνασαι, φυλάττεσθαι, ὅ τι δ' ἂν πράττῃς, τούτων ὡς κάλλιστα καὶ προθυμότατα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἥκιστα μέν σε οἶμαι ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ βοήθειαν εὑρεῖν, ῥᾷστα δὲ καὶ ἀκινδυνότατα ζῆν, καὶ εἰς τὸ γῆρας διαρκέστατα.

CHAPTER IX.

SUMMARY.

CRITO, a wealthy individual, complains to Socrates of the difficulty of leading a quiet life at Athens, since he is constantly annoyed by lawsuits, brought, apparently, for no other purpose than to extort money from him. Socrates thereupon recommends him to employ the services of Archidemus, a poor man, but able and eloquent, who will protect him from informers and vexatious litigations of every kind. This advice is followed, and proves so eminently successful, that those friends of Crito, who were similarly situated with himself, requested as a favor that they also might avail themselves of the services of Archidemus.

1. Οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ Κρίτωνος ἀκούσαντα, ὡς χαλεπὸν ὁ βίος Ἀθήνησιν εἴη ἀνδρὶ βουλομένῳ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. Νῦν γάρ, ἔφη, ἐμέ τινες εἰς δίκας ἄγουσιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἀδικοῦνται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅτι νομίζουσιν, ἥδιον ἄν με ἀργύριον τελέσαι, ἢ πράγματα ἔχειν. 2. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, κύνας δὲ τρέφεις, ἵνα σοι τοὺς λύκους ἀπὸ τῶν προβάτων ἀπερύκωσι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· μᾶλλον γάρ μοι λυσιτελεῖ τρέφειν, ἢ μή. Οὐκ ἂν οὖν θρέψαις καὶ ἄνδρα, ὅστις ἐθέλοι τε καὶ δύναιτο σοῦ

τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς συνεργοῦντα πειρᾶσθαι φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἀντ' ἐκείνων; Ἐκ δὲ τούτου εἷς τε τῶν Κρίτωνος φίλων Ἀρχέδημος ἦν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων Κρίτωνος φίλων ἐτιμᾶτο.

CHAPTER X.

SUMMARY.

SOCRATES exhorts Diodorus, a wealthy Athenian, to lend aid to Hermogenes, a friend of the latter, and an upright and honest man, but laboring under poverty; for he shows him that if, when a slave runs away, we exert ourselves to recover possession of him by the offer of rewards; and if, when a slave is sick, we call in a physician, and endeavor to save his life; how much more ought we to strive to recover a friend, and to rescue him from want, seeing that a good friend is superior in value to a thousand slaves.

1. Οἶδα δὲ καὶ Διοδώρῳ αὐτὸν ἑταίρῳ ὄντι τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Διόδωρε, ἄν τις σοι τῶν οἰκετῶν ἀποδρᾷ, ἐπιμελεῖ, ὅπως ἀνακομίσῃ; 2. Καὶ ἄλλους γε νὴ Δί', ἔφη, παρακαλῶ, σῶστρα τούτου ἀνακηρύσσων. Τί γάρ; ἔφη, ἐάν τίς σοι κάμνῃ τῶν οἰκετῶν, τούτου ἐπιμελεῖ, καὶ παρακαλεῖς ἰατρούς, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθάνῃ; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Εἰ δέ τίς σοι τῶν γνωρίμων, ἔφη, πολὺ τῶν οἰκετῶν χρησιμώτερος ὤν, κινδυνεύει δι' ἔνδειαν ἀπολέσθαι, οὐκ οἴει σοι ἄξιον εἶναι ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως διασωθῇ; 3. Καὶ μὴν οἶσθά γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνώμων ἐστὶν Ἑρμογένης, αἰσχύνοιτο δ' ἄν, εἰ ὠφελούμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ, μὴ ἀντωφελοίη σε· καίτοι τὸ ὑπηρέτην ἑκόντα τε καὶ εὔνουν, καὶ παράμονον, καὶ τὸ κελευόμενον ἱκανὸν ποιεῖν, ἔχειν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τὸ κελευόμενον ἱκανὸν ὄντα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενον καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ χρήσιμον εἶναι, καὶ προνοεῖν, καὶ προβουλεύεσθαι, πολλῶν οἰκετῶν οἶμαι ἀντάξιον εἶναι. 4. Οἱ μέντοι ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι, ὅταν τὸ πολλοῦ ἄξιον μικροῦ ἐξῇ πρίασθαι, τότε φασὶ δεῖν ὠνεῖσθαι· νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰ πράγματα εὐωνοτάτους ἔστι φίλους ἀγαθοὺς κτήσασθαι. 5. Καὶ ὁ Διόδωρος, Ἀλλὰ καλῶς γε, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ κέλευ

XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA

OF

SOCRATES.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

SUMMARY.

Xenophon now proceeds to relate in what way Socrates was useful to such of his friends as aimed at any public employment, by exciting them to the attainment of that knowledge which alone could qualify them to discharge its duties properly.

And, first, the discussion turns upon the duties of a commander.

He who wishes to fill the office of a commander, must make himself well acquainted with the military art, and this is the more necessary, because, since in time of war the safety of the whole community is intrusted to the commander, either good or evil must result to the state according as he discharges his duties with ability or with unskillfulness. (§ 1–5.)

The art of arranging and marshalling an army, though of great importance in itself, forms but a small part of what is required in a commander On the contrary, he who wishes to fill such a station in a becoming manner must be possessed of many acquirements, and also of many endowments of intellect. (§ 6–11.)

1. Ὅτι δὲ τοὺς ὀρεγομένους τῶν καλῶν, ἐπιμελεῖς ὢν ὀρέγοιντο ποιῶν, ὠφέλει, νῦν τοῦτο διηγήσομαι· ἀκούσας γάρ ποτε Διοννσόδωρον εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἥκειν, ἐπαγγελλόμενον στρατηγεῖν διδάξειν, ἔλεξε πρός τινα τῶν ξυνόντων, ὃν ἠσθάνετο βουλόμενον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης ἐν τῇ πόλει τυγχάνειν· 2. Αἰσχρὸν μέντοι, ὦ νεανία, τὸν βουλόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει στρατηγεῖν, ἐξὸν τοῦτο μαθεῖν, ἀμελῆσαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὗτος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ζημιοῖτο πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἢ εἴ τις ἀνδριάντας ἐργολαβοίη, μὴ μεμαθηκὼς ἀνδριαντοποιεῖν. 3. Ὅλης γὰρ τῆς πόλεως ἐν τοῖς πολεμι-

ὁ νεανίσκος, ὅμοιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρηκας· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τούς τε πρώτους ἀρίστους δεῖ τάττειν καὶ τοὺς τελευταίους, ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τοὺς χειρίστους, ἵνα ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἄγωνται, ὑπὸ δὲ αὖ τῶν ὠθῶνται. 9. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, καὶ διαγιγνώσκειν σε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς ἐδίδαξεν· εἰ δὲ μή, τί σοι ὄφελος ὢν ἐμαθες; οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ σε ἀργύριον ἐκέλευσε πρῶτον μὲν καὶ τελευταῖον τὸ κάλλιστον τάττειν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ τὸ χείριστον, μὴ διδάξας διαγιγνώσκειν τό τε καλὸν καὶ τὸ κίβδηλον, οὐδὲν ἂν σοι ὄφελος ἦν. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἐδίδαξεν· ὥστε αὐτοὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς δέοι τούς τε ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς κρίνειν. 10. Τί οὖν οὐ σκοποῦμεν, ἔφη, πῶς ἂν αὐτῶν μὴ διαμαρτάνοιμεν; Βούλομαι, ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος. Οὔκουν, ἔφη, εἰ μὲν ἀργύριον δέοι ἁρπάζειν, τοὺς φιλαργυρωτάτους πρώτους καθιστάντες, ὀρθῶς ἂν τάττοιμεν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Τί δὲ τοὺς κινδυνεύειν μέλλοντας; ἆρα τοὺς φιλοτιμοτάτους προτακτέον; Οὗτοι γοῦν εἰσιν, ἔφη, οἱ ἕνεκα ἐπαίνου κινδυνεύειν ἐθέλοντες· οὐ τοίνυν οὗτοί γε ἄδηλοι, ἀλλ' ἐπιφανεῖς πανταχοῦ ὄντες, εὐαίρετοι ἂν εἶεν. 11. Ἀτάρ, ἔφη, πότερά σε τάττειν μόνον ἐδίδαξεν, ἢ καὶ ὅποι καὶ ὅπως χρηστέον ἑκάστῳ τῶν ταγμάτων; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν πολλά γ' ἐστί, πρὸς ἃ οὔτε τάττειν οὔτε ἄγειν ὡσαύτως προσήκει. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐ διεσαφήνιζε ταῦτα. Νὴ Δί', ἔφη, πάλιν τοίνυν ἐλθὼν ἐπανερώτα· ἦν γὰρ ἐπίστηται, καὶ μὴ ἀναιδὴς ᾖ, αἰσχυνεῖται ἀργύριον εἰληφὼς ἐνδεᾶ σε ἀποπέμψασθαι.

CHAPTER II.

SUMMARY.

A good commander should take care that his soldiers be in a healthful condition; that they be provided with all things necessary; and that their condition be bettered, in a greater or less degree, by victory over their foes. Nor does the duty of a good general consist merely in this, that he alone contend bravely against the foe, but in his leading also his whole army to victory, and in his striving in all things to procure advantages not for himself only, but for all those under his command.

1. Ἔστιν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιτρόπου ἐπιμέλεια τοιαύτη. Τὰ ἔνεκα, ἂν, τοῦτο μὲν τὰ ἐγκαλούμενα τοῦ ἐπιτροπεύοντος πατὴρ ἢ μήτηρ ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιτελεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅπως σώσει τὰ ἔκγονα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ὄντος καὶ τὰ γενήσεται ἔτι ὄντος, καὶ αὐτὸν τρέφοντος, τοῦτο ἔστιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἐπιτροπεύοντα ἐπιτελεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅπως σώσει τὰ αὐτοῦ τέκνα ἔτι ὄντος, καὶ τὰ γενήσεται ἔτι ὄντος, καὶ, ἂν ἔτι ἐπιτροπεύοντος, τοῦτο ἔστιν· ἐπιτροπεύοντος δέ, ἵνα κρατοῦντες τῶν πολλῶν κόλασιν ὦσιν· ἔστιν· 2. Ἢ τί ἕξουσι οὗτοι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, εἰπεῖν

Κασσάνδρης, ἥνπερ ἐγὼν ἐμνησάμην ἐν θυμῷ,

ἀμὲ γε ἔνα κλαυσόμεθα τὸ κρατοῦν δὲ εἷς, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἐγκαλοῦσιν πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ποτὲ τῷ ἐπιτροπεύσαντι τοῦτο αὐτὸν εἶδε; καὶ ἔστιν ἀνάγκη, οὐκ εἰ μόνον τοῦ ἔκγονα εἶναι κακῶς ἐμνημόνευσεν, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ, ὃν ἐπιτρόπευσεν, τοῦτον πάλιν ἐπιτροπεύειν αὐτὸν εἶδε; 3. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν κόλασις, εἰς ἕνα ἔκγονα κακῶς ἐπιμελήσας, ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τρόπαιον· καὶ ἐπιτρόπευσεν ὁ πατὴρ, ἵνα ἡ μὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν διδάσκοντι ᾖ· καὶ ἐπιτρόπευσεν αἰρούμενος, τοῦτον ἕνεκα, ἵνα τιμὴ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ ἡγούμενος ὦσι· 4. Διὰ οὖν τοῦ ἐπιτροπεύοντος τοῦτο τοιοῦτοι εἰσὶν οἱ ἔκγονοι αὐτοῦ ἐπιτρόπευσιν· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν μάλιστα τοῦτον βλάπτει ἡμᾶλλον, αὐτὸ μόνον τοῦ ἔκγονου. Καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπιτρόπευσιν, εἰς ἓξ ἡμᾶλλον ἐπιτροπεύσει ἄρτι, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καταλιπὼν δὲ τὰ οἰκεῖα τοιοῦτος, ὃν δὲ ἔχῃ τὸν

CHAPTER III.

SUMMARY.

The duty of a good commander of cavalry is twofold namely to secure both success and safety in battle. As regards the former he should exercise the care of those subject to his authority in the individual horsemen, but cannot refer to points just touched on this matter. § 1-3. And, again, as regards the horsemen, he will best take care of them by making them mindful that

horses readily, and by exercising them in riding, not only over level, but also over rugged ground, and by instructing them in the art of throwing the javelin from on horseback. He will also animate their courage, and, above all, will render them obedient to his authority. (§ 5–8.)

For the attainment of these ends, it will be necessary, above all things, that he show himself skilful and able in the discharge of his own duties (§ 9), and convince them that both their glory and safety depend on their obedience to his commands. (§ 10.) It will be requisite, also, for him to add the art of speaking to his other acquirements, in order that he may both animate them with the love of glory, and urge them on to the performance of actions from which advantage may accrue to both himself and the state at large. (§ 11–15.)

1. Καὶ ἱππαρχεῖν δέ τινι ἠρημένῳ οἰδά ποτε αὐτὸν τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· Ἔχοις ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ νεανία, εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν, ὅτου ἕνεκα ἐπεθύμησας ἱππαρχεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ πρῶτος τῶν ἱππέων ἐλαύνειν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἱποτοξόται τούτου γε ἀξιοῦνται, προελαύνουσι γοῦν καὶ τῶν ἱππάρχων. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ γνωσθῆναί γε, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοί γε ὑπὸ πάντων γιγνώσκονται. Ἀληθές, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις. 2. Ἀλλ' ἆρα ὅτι τὸ ἱππικὸν οἷόν τῇ πόλει βέλτιον ἂν ποιήσας παραδοῦναι, καί, εἴ τις χρεία γίγνοιτο ἱππέων, τούτων ἡγούμενος, ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἴτιος γενέσθαι τῇ πόλει; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Καὶ ἔστι γε, νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καλόν, ἐὰν δύνῃ ταῦτα ποιῆσαι. Ἡ δὲ ἀρχή που, ἐφ' ἧς ἤρησαι, ἵππων τε καὶ ἀμβατῶν ἐστιν; Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. 3. Ἴθι δὴ λέξον ἡμῖν πρῶτον τοῦτο, ὅπως διανοῇ τοὺς ἵππους βελτίους ποιῆσαι; Καὶ ὅς, Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐμὸν οἶμαι τὸ ἔργον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον δεῖν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἵππου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. 4. Ἐὰν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, παρέχωνταί σοι τοὺς ἵππους οἱ μὲν οὕτως κακόποδας, ἢ κακοσκελεῖς, ἢ ἀσθενεῖς, οἱ δὲ οὕτως ἀτρόφους, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ἀκολουθεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὕτως ἀναγώγους, ὥστε μὴ μένειν, ὅπου ἂν σὺ τάξῃς, οἱ δὲ οὕτως λακτιστάς, ὥστε μηδὲ τάξαι δυνατὸν εἶναι, τί σοι τοῦ ἱππικοῦ ὄφελος ἔσται; ἢ πῶς δυνήσει τοιούτων ἡγούμενος ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν; Καὶ ὅς, Ἀλλὰ καλῶς τε λέγεις, ἔφη, καὶ πειράσομαι τῶν ἵππων εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἐπι

μεθα, ταῦτα πάντα διὰ λόγου ἐμάθομεν. καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο καλὸν μανθάνει τις μάθημα, διὰ λόγου μανθάνει; καὶ οἱ ἄριστα διδάσκοντες, μάλιστα λόγῳ χρῶνται, καὶ οἱ τὰ σπουδαιότατα μάλιστα ἐπιστάμενοι, κάλλιστα διαλέγονται; 12. Ἦ τόδε οὐκ ἐντεθύμησαι, ὡς ὅταν γε χορὸς εἷς ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως γίγνηται, ὥςπερ ὁ εἰς Δῆλον πεμπόμενος, οὐδεὶς ἄλλοθεν οὐδαμόθεν τούτῳ ἐφάμιλλος γίγνεται, οὐδὲ εὐανδρία ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ὁμοία τῇ ἐνθάδε συνάγεται; Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. 13. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε εὐφωνίᾳ τοσοῦτον διαφέρουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν ἄλλων, οὔτε σωμάτων μεγέθει καὶ ῥώμῃ, ὅσον φιλοτιμίᾳ, ἥπερ μάλιστα παροξύνει πρὸς τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἔντιμα. Ἀληθές, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο. 14. Οὐκοῦν οἴει, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦ ἱππικοῦ τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἴ τις ἐπιμεληθείη, ὡς πολὺ ἂν καὶ τούτῳ διενέγκοιεν τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπλων τε καὶ ἵππων παρασκευῇ, καὶ εὐταξίᾳ, καὶ τῷ ἑτοίμως κινδυνεύειν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰ νομίσειαν ταῦτα ποιοῦντες ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς τεύξεσθαι; Εἰκός γε, ἔφη. 15. Μὴ τοίνυν ὄκνει, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ πειρῶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπὶ ταῦτα προτρέπειν, ἀφ' ὧν αὐτός τε ὠφεληθήσει, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται διὰ σέ. Ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία πειράσομαι, ἔφη.

CHAPTER IV.

SUMMARY.

NICOMACHIDES, who was well skilled in the military art, having complained to Socrates that the Athenians had chosen, as one of their commanders, not himself, but Antisthenes, who had never distinguished himself in warfare, and who knew nothing else save how to get money, Socrates undertakes to show unto him, that, if a person, in whatever employment he may have taken upon himself, knows well what is required for executing that employment in a proper manner, this man will make a good leader, either of a chorus, a state, or an army.

Since, then, remarks Socrates, Antisthenes is skilled in the management of his private affairs, and is, at the same time, ambitious of praise: and since he has discharged successfully the duties of a choragus, there can be no doubt but that he, although unskilled in military affairs, will nevertheless make a good commander (§ 1–5); for a choragus, and he who is skilled in managing private affairs, have very many things in common with a commander. (§ 6–12.)

σου ἀκοῦσαι, ὡς ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι ἀγαθοὶ στρατηγοὶ ἂν εἶεν. Ἴθι δή, ἔφη, ἐξετάσωμεν τὰ ἔργα ἑκατέρου αὐτῶν, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν, πότερον τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν, ἢ διαφέρει τι. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. 8. Οὐκουν, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν τοὺς ἀρχομένους κατηκόους τε καὶ εὐπειθεῖς ἑαυτοῖς παρασκευάζειν ἀμφοτέρων ἐστὶν ἔργον; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τὸ προστάττειν ἕκαστα τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πράττειν; Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τοὺς κακοὺς κολάζειν, καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, ἀμφοτέροις οἶμαι προσήκειν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 9. Τὸ δὲ τοὺς ὑπηκόους εὐμενεῖς ποιεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐ καλὸν ἀμφοτέροις; Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη. Συμμάχους δὲ καὶ βοηθοὺς προσάγεσθαι δοκεῖ σοι συμφέρειν ἀμφοτέροις, ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν ὄντων οὐκ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι προσήκει; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖς καὶ φιλοπόνους ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι προσήκει περὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα. 10. Ταῦτα μέν, ἔφη, πάντα ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μάχεσθαι οὐκέτι ἀμφοτέρων. Ἀλλ' ἐχθροῖς γέ τοι ἀμφοτέροις γίγνονται; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. Οὔκουν τὸ περιγενέσθαι τούτων ἀμφοτέροις συμφέρει; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. 11. Ἀλλ', ἐκεῖνο παρίεις, ἂν δέῃ μάχεσθαι, τί ὠφελήσει ἡ οἰκονομική; Ἐνταῦθα δήπου καὶ πλεῖστον, ἔφη· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος, εἰδώς, ὅτι οὐδὲν οὕτω λυσιτελές τε καὶ κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ μαχόμενον τοὺς πολεμίους νικᾶν, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἀλυσιτελές τε καὶ ζημιῶδες, ὡς τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι, προθύμως μὲν τὰ πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν συμφέροντα ζητήσει καὶ παρασκευάσεται, ἐπιμελῶς δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι φέροντα σκέψεται καὶ φυλάξεται, ἐνεργῶς δ', ἂν τὴν παρασκευὴν ὁρᾷ νικητικὴν οὖσαν, μαχεῖται, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ τούτων, ἐὰν ἀπαράσκευος ᾖ, φυλάξεται συνάπτειν μάχην. 12. Μὴ καταφρόνει, ἔφη, ὦ Νικομαχίδη, τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παραπλήσια ἔχει· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι οὔτε ἄνευ ἀνθρώπων οὐδετέρα γίγνεται, οὔτε δι' ἄλλων μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἴδια πράττεται, δι' ἄλλων δὲ τὰ κοινά· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν

CHAPTER V.

SUMMARY.

1. Περικλῆς δὲ ποτε, τῷ γαμοῦντι τὴν Περικλέους τοῦ, ἀνεψιὸν

ἅπερ οὐχ ἥκιστα παροξύνει κυνδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας τε καὶ πατρίδος. Οὐδὲ ἐν τούτοις Ἀθηναῖοι μεμπτοί. Καὶ μὴν προγόνων γε καλὰ ἔργα οὐκ ἔστιν οἷς μείζω καὶ πλείω ὑπάρχει, ἢ Ἀθηναίοις· ᾧ πολλοὶ ἐπαιρόμενοι προτρέπονταί τε ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ἄλκιμοι γίγνεσθαι. 4. Ταῦτα μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις πάντα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς, ὅτι, ἀφ' οὗ ἥ τε σὺν Τολμίδῃ τῶν χιλίων ἐν Λεβαδείᾳ συμφορὰ ἐγένετο, καὶ ἡ μεθ' Ἱπποκράτους ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, ἐκ τούτων τεταπείνωται μὲν ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δόξα πρὸς τοὺς Βοιωτούς, ἐπῆρται δὲ τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων φρόνημα πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε Βοιωτοὶ μέν, οἱ πρόσθεν οὐδ' ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν τολμῶντες Ἀθηναίοις ἄνευ Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων ἀντιτάττεσθαι, νῦν ἀπειλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν· Ἀθηναῖοι δέ, οἱ πρότερον, ὅτε Βοιωτοὶ μόνοι ἐγένοντο, πορθοῦντες τὴν Βοιωτίαν, φοβοῦνται, μὴ Βοιωτοὶ δηώσωσι τὴν Ἀττικήν. 5. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἀλλ' αἰσθάνομαι μέν, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα· δοκεῖ δέ μοι ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ ἄρχοντι νῦν εὐαρεστοτέρως διακεῖσθαι ἡ πόλις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ θάρσος ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ ἀπείθειαν ἐμβάλλει, ὁ δὲ φόβος προσεκτικωτέρους τε καὶ εὐπειθεστέρους, καὶ εὐτακτοτέρους ποιεῖ. 6. Τεκμήραιο δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ δήπου μηδὲν φοβῶνται, μεστοί εἰσιν ἀταξίας, ἔστ' ἂν δὲ ἢ χειμῶνα ἢ πολεμίους δείσωσιν, οὐ μόνον τὰ κελευόμενα πάντα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σιγῶσι καραδοκοῦντες τὰ προσταχθησόμενα, ὥσπερ χορευταί. 7. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Περικλῆς, εἴγε νῦν μάλιστα πειθοιντο, ὥρα ἂν εἴη λέγειν, πῶς ἂν αὐτοὺς προτρεψαίμεθα πάλιν ἀνερεθισθῆναι τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀρετῆς τε καὶ εὐκλείας, καὶ εὐδαιμονίας. 8. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ μὲν ἐβουλόμεθα χρημάτων αὐτούς, ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι εἶχον, ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, ἀποδεικνύντες αὐτοῖς ταῦτα πατρῷά τε ὄντα καὶ προσήκοντα, μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως αὐτοὺς ἐξορμῶμεν ἀντέχεσθαι τούτων· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ μετ' ἀρετῆς πρωτεύειν αὐτοὺς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι βουλόμεθα, τοῦτ' αὖ δεικτέον ἐκ παλαιοῦ μάλιστα προσῆκον

δεύοντες, ὁμοίως μὲν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρώμενοι, οὐδὲν ἂν χείρους ἐκείνων εἶεν· εἰ δ' ἐπιμελέστερον, καὶ βελτίους. 15. Λέγεις, ἔφη, πόρρω που εἶναι τῇ πόλει τὴν καλοκἀγαθίαν· πότε γὰρ οὕτως Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥςπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἢ πρεσβυτέρους αἰδέσονται; οἳ ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἄρχονται καταφρονεῖν τῶν γεραιτέρων· ἢ σωμασκήσουσιν οὕτως; οἳ οὐ μόνον αὐτοὶ εὐεξίας ἀμελοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελουμένων καταγελῶσι. 16. Πότε δὲ οὕτω πείσονται τοῖς ἄρχουσιν; οἳ καὶ ἀγάλλονται ἐπὶ τῷ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων· ἢ πότε οὕτως ὁμονοήσουσιν; οἵ γε, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ συνεργεῖν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ συμφέροντα, ἐπηρεάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ὀθνοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς μᾶλλον, ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις· μάλιστα δὲ πάντων ἐν τε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνόδοις καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς διαφέρονται, καὶ πλείστας δίκας ἀλλήλοις δικάζονται, καὶ προαιροῦνται μᾶλλον οὕτω κερδαίνειν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ἢ συνωφελοῦντες αὑτούς· τοῖς δὲ κοινοῖς ὥςπερ ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμενοι, περὶ τούτων αὖ μάχονται, καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμεσι μάλιστα χαίρουσιν. 17. Ἐξ ὧν πολλὴ μὲν ἀπειρία καὶ κακία τῇ πόλει ἐμφύεται, πολλὴ δὲ ἔχθρα καὶ μῖσος ἀλλήλων τοῖς πολίταις ἐγγίγνεται, δι' ἃ ἐγωγε μάλα φοβοῦμαι ἀεί, μή τι μεῖζον, ἢ ὥςτε φέρειν δύνασθαι, κακὸν τῇ πόλει συμβῇ. 18. Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Περίκλεις, οὕτως ἡγοῦ ἀνηκέστῳ πονηρίᾳ νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους· οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὡς εὔτακτοι μέν εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς, εὐτάκτως δ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι πείθονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις, οὐδένων δὲ καταδεέστερον ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ὑπηρετοῦσι τοῖς διδασκάλοις; 19. Τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, καὶ θαυμαστόν ἐστι, τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστῶσι, τοὺς δὲ ὁπλίτας καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς, οἳ δοκοῦσι καλοκἀγαθίᾳ προκεκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι πάντων. 20. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Ἡ δὲ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή, ὦ Περίκλεις, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δεδοκιμασμένων καθίσταται; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οἶσθα οὖν τινας, ἔφη, κάλλιον, ἢ νομιμώτερον, ἢ σεμνότερον, ἢ δικαιότερον τάς τε δίκας δικάζοντας, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα πράττοντας; Οὐ μέμφομαι,

D 1

τὰ προκείμενα τῆς χώρας ὄρη κατέχοντας, βλαβεροὺς μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι, μεγάλην δὲ προβολὴν τοῖς πολίταις τῆς χώρας κατεσκευάσθαι; Καὶ ὁ Περικλῆς, Πάντ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι. 28. Εἰ τοίνυν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀρέσκει σοι ταῦτα, ἐπιχείρει αὐτοῖς, ὦ ἄριστε· ὅ τι μὲν γὰρ ἂν τούτων καταπράξῃς, καὶ σοὶ καλὸν ἔσται, καὶ τῇ πόλει ἀγαθόν· ἐὰν δέ τι ἀδυνατῇς, οὔτε τὴν πόλιν βλάψεις, οὔτε σεαυτὸν καταισχυνεῖς.

CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY.

GLAUCO, the son of Aristo, was so strongly possessed with the desire of being a statesman, that, although not yet twenty, he was continually making orations to the people, and thereby exposing himself to ridicule. Socrates, therefore, endeavors to cure him of this delusion, and by a series of questions succeeds in convincing him that he is altogether ignorant of what appertains to the character of a true statesman; and he then shows him that, unless one be acquainted with this, he can neither prove of any advantage to the state, nor acquire any reputation for himself.

1. Γλαύκωνα δὲ τὸν Ἀρίστωνος, ὅτ' ἐπεχείρει δημηγορεῖν, ἐπιθυμῶν προστατεύειν τῆς πόλεως, οὐδέπω εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς, ὄντων ἄλλων οἰκείων τε καὶ φίλων, οὐδεὶς ἐδύνατο παῦσαι ἑλκόμενόν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος, καὶ καταγέλαστον ὄντα, Σωκράτης δέ, εὖνους ὢν αὐτῷ διά τε Χαρμίδην τὸν Γλαύκωνος, καὶ διὰ Πλάτωνα, μόνος ἔπαυσεν. 2. Ἐντυχὼν γὰρ αὐτῷ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκούειν τοιάδε λέξας κατέσχεν· Ὦ Γλαύκων, ἔφη, προστατεύειν ἡμῖν διανενόησαι τῆς πόλεως; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Νὴ Δί', ἔφη, καλὸν γάρ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις· δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι, ἐὰν τοῦτο διαπράξῃ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἔσει αὐτὸς τυγχάνειν ὅτου ἂν ἐπιθυμῇς, ἱκανὸς δὲ τοὺς φίλους ὠφελεῖν, ἐπαρεῖς δὲ τὸν πατρῷον οἶκον, αὐξήσεις δὲ τὴν πατρίδα, ὀνομαστὸς δ' ἔσει, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔπειτα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἴσως δέ, ὥ περ Θεμιστοκλῆς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὅπου δ' ἂν ᾖς, πανταχοῦ περίβλεπτος ἔσει. 3.

ἀκούσαιμι. Ἀλλὰ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐδὲ γέγραπταί μοί πω. 10. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ πολέμου συμβουλεύειν τήν γε πρώτην ἐπισχήσομεν· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν, ἀρτι ἀρχόμενος τῆς προστατείας, οὔπω ἐξήτακας. Ἀλλά τοι περί γε φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας οἶδ' ὅτι σοι μεμέληκε, καὶ οἶσθα, ὁπόσαι τε φυλακαὶ ἐπίκαιροί εἰσι καὶ ὁπόσαι μή, καὶ ὁπόσοι τε φρουροὶ ἱκανοί εἰσι καὶ ὁπόσοι μή εἰσι· καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐπικαίρους φυλακὰς συμβουλεύσειν μείζονας ποιεῖν, τὰς δὲ περιττὰς ἀφαιρεῖν. 11. Νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε, ἕνεκά γε τοῦ οὕτως αὐτὰς φυλάττεσθαι, ὥστε κλέπτεσθαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας. Ἐὰν δέ τις ἀφέλῃ γ', ἔφη, τὰς φυλακάς, οὐκ οἶει καὶ ἀρτάζειν ἐξουσίαν ἔσεσθαι τῷ βουλομένῳ; ἀτάρ, ἔφη, πότερον ἐλθὼν αὐτὸς ἐξήτακας τοῦτο, ἢ πῶς οἶσθα, ὅτι κακῶς φυλάττονται; Εἰκάζω, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὅταν μηκέτι εἰκάζωμεν, ἀλλ' ἤδη εἰδῶμεν, τότε συμβουλεύσομεν; Ἴσως, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, βέλτιον. 12. Εἰς γε μήν, ἔφη, ταρύγια οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἀφῖξαι, ὥστ' ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, διότι νῦν ἐλάττω, ἢ πρόσθεν, προσέρχεται αὐτόθεν. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἐλήλυθα, ἔφη. Καὶ γὰρ νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, λέγεται βαρὺ τὸ χωρίον εἶναι, ὥστε, ὅταν περὶ τούτου δέῃ συμβουλεύειν, αὕτη σοι ἡ πρόφασις ἀρκέσει. Σκώπτομαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων. 13. Ἀλλ' ἐκείνου γέ τοι, ἔφη, οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἠμέληκας, ἀλλ' ἔσκεψαι, καὶ πόσον χρόνον ἱκανός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τῆς χώρας γιγνόμενος σῖτος διατρέφειν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πόσου εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν προσδέεται, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτό γε λάθῃ σέ ποτε ἡ πόλις ἐνδεὴς γενομένη, ἀλλ' εἰδώς, ἔχῃς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων συμβουλεύων τῇ πόλει βοηθεῖν τε καὶ σώζειν αὐτήν. Λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, παμμέγεθες πρᾶγμα, εἴγε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεήσει. 14. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐδ' ἂν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ποτε οἶκον καλῶς τις οἰκήσειεν, εἰ μὴ πάντα μὲν εἴσεται, ὧν προσδέεται, πάντων δὲ ἐπιμελόμενος ἐκπληρώσει· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν πόλις ἐκ πλειόνων ἢ μυρίων οἰκιῶν συνέστηκε, χαλεπὸν δέ ἐστιν ἅμα τοσούτων οἴκων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐχ ἕνα, τὸν

[illegible]

CHAPTER VII.

SUMMARY.

[illegible]

talent or acquirement, by the exercise of which he may procure reputation for himself and glory for his country, ought not to allow it to remain inactive. (§ 1, 2.) And he then states how well qualified, in his opinion, Charmides is to take part in public affairs, from what he has seen of him in his conferences with the leading men of the state. (§ 3–9.)

1. Χαρμίδην δὲ τὸν Γλαύκωνος ὁρῶν ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἄνδρα ὄντα, καὶ πολλῷ δυνατώτερον τῶν τὰ πολιτικὰ τότε πραττόντων, οἰκνοῦντα δὲ προσιέναι τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Χαρμίδη, εἴ τις ἱκανὸς ὢν τοὺς στεφανίτας ἀγῶνας νικᾶν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτός τε τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι εὐδοκιμωτέραν ποιεῖν, μὴ θέλοι ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ποῖόν τινα τούτον νομίζοις ἂν τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι; Δῆλον, ὅτι, ἔφη, μαλακόν τε καὶ δειλόν. 2. Εἰ δέ τις, ἔφη, δυνατὸς ὢν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελόμενος τήν τε πολιν αὐξειν, καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τοῦτο τιμᾶσθαι, οἰκοίη δὴ τοῦτο πράττειν, οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δειλὸς νομίζοιτο; Ἴσως, ἔφη· ἀτὰρ πρὸς τί με ταῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς; Ὅτι, ἔφη, οἰμαί σε, δυνατὸν ὄντα, οἰκνεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα, ὢν ἀνάγκη σοι μετέχειν, πολίτῃ γε ὄντι. 3. Τὴν δὲ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἐν ποίῳ ἔργῳ καταμαθών, ταῦτά μου καταγιγνώσκεις; Ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἔφη. αἷς σύνει τοῖς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττουσι· καὶ γάρ, ὅταν τι ἀνακοινῶνταί σοι, ὁρῶ σε καλῶς συμβουλεύοντα, καὶ ὅταν τι ἁμαρτάνωσιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶντα. 4. Οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἰδίᾳ τε διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἀγωνίζεσθαι. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, ὅ γε ἀριθμεῖν δυνάμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐν τῷ πλήθει, ἢ μόνος ἀριθμεῖ, καὶ οἱ κατὰ μόνας ἄριστα κιθαρίζοντες, οὗτοι καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει κρατιστεύουσιν. 5. Αἰδῶ δὲ καὶ φόβον, ἔφη, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἔμφυτά τε ἀνθρώποις ὄντα, καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις ἢ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις ὁμιλίαις παριστάμενα; Καὶ σέ γε διδάξων, ἔφη, ὥρμημαι, ὅτι οὔτε τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους αἰδούμενος, οὔτε τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους φοβούμενος, ἐν τοῖς ἀφρονεστάτοις τε καὶ ἀσθενεστάτοις αἰσχύνει λέγειν. 6. Πότερον γὰρ τοὺς γναφεῖς αὐτῶν, ἢ τοὺς σκυτεῖς, ἢ τοὺς τέκτονας, ἢ τοὺς χαλκεῖς, ἢ τοὺς

CHAPTER VIII.

SUMMARY

πεπεισμένοι μάλιστα πράττοιεν τὰ δέοντα. 2. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἤρετο, εἴ τι εἰδείη ἀγαθόν, ἵνα, εἴ τι εἴποι τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἢ σιτίον, ἢ ποτόν, ἢ χρήματα, ἢ ὑγίειαν, ἢ ῥώμην, ἢ τόλμαν, δεικνύοι δὴ τοῦτο κακὸν ἐνίοτε ὄν· ὁ δὲ εἰδώς, ὅτι, ἐάν τι ἐνοχλῇ ἡμᾶς, δεόμεθα τοῦ παύσοντος, ἀπεκρίνατο, ᾗτερ καὶ ποιεῖν κράτιστον· 3. Ἆρά γε, ἔφη, ἐρωτᾷς με, εἴ τι οἶδα πυρετοῦ ἀγαθόν; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμίας; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Ἀλλὰ λιμοῦ; Οὐδὲ λιμοῦ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, εἴγ' ἐρωτᾷς με, εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν οἶδα, ὃ μηδενὸς ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὔτ' οἶδα, ἔφη, οὔτε δέομαι.

4. Πάλιν δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστίππου ἐρωτῶντος αὐτόν, εἴ τι εἰδείη καλόν; Καὶ πολλά, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, πάντα ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις; Ὡς οἷόν τε μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀνομοιότατα ἔνια. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ τῷ καλῷ ἀνόμοιον, καλὸν ἂν εἴη; Ὅτι, νὴ Δί', ἔφη, ἔστι μὲν τῷ καλῷ πρὸς δρόμον ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλος ἀνόμοιος, καλὸς πρὸς πάλην, ἔστι δὲ ἀσπίς, καλὴ πρὸς τὸ προβαλέσθαι, ὡς ἔνι ἀνομοιοτάτη τῷ ἀκοντίῳ, καλῷ πρὸς τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχὺ φέρεσθαι. 5. Οὐδὲν διαφερόντως, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνει μοι, ἢ ὅτε σε ἠρώτησα, εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν εἰδείης. Σὺ δ' οἴει, ἔφη, ἄλλο μὴν ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ καλὸν εἶναι; οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι πρὸς ταὐτὰ πάντα καλά τε κἀγαθά ἐστι; Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐ πρὸς ἄλλα μὲν ἀγαθόν, πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ καλόν ἐστιν· ἔπειτα οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καλά τε κἀγαθὰ φαίνεται, πρὸς ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, οἷς ἄνθρωποι χρῶνται, καλά τε κἀγαθὰ νομίζεται, πρὸς ἅπερ ἂν εὔχρηστα ᾖ. 6. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ κόφινος κοπροφόρος καλόν ἐστιν; Νὴ Δί', ἔφη, καὶ χρυσῆ γε ἀσπὶς αἰσχρόν, ἐάν, πρὸς τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔργα, ὁ μὲν καλῶς πεποιημένος ᾖ, ἡ δὲ κακῶς. Λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, καλά τε καὶ αἰσχρὰ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι; 7. Καὶ νὴ Δί' ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἀγαθά τε καὶ κακά· πολλάκις γὰρ τό τε λιμοῦ ἀγαθόν, πυρετοῦ κακόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ πυρετοῦ ἀγαθόν, λιμοῦ κακόν ἐστι, πολλάκις δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς δρόμον καλόν, πρὸς πάλην αἰσχρόν· τὸ δὲ πρὸς πάλην καλόν, πρὸς δρόμον

αἰσχρόν· πάντα γὰρ ἀγαθὰ μὲν καὶ καλά ἐστι, πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχῃ, κακὰ δὲ καὶ αἰσχρά, πρὸς ἃ ἂν κακῶς. 8. Καὶ οἰκίας δὲ λέγων τὰς αὐτὰς καλάς τε εἶναι καὶ χρησίμους παιδεύειν ἔμοιγ' ἐδόκει, οἵας χρὴ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι. Ἐπεσκόπει δὲ ὧδε· Ἆρά γε τὸν μέλλοντα οἰκίαν, οἵαν χρή, ἔχειν, τοῦτο δεῖ μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἡδίστη τε ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι, καὶ χρησιμωτάτη ἔσται; 9. Τούτου δὲ ὁμολογουμένου· Οὔκουν ἡδὺ μὲν θέρους ψυχεινὴν ἔχειν, ἡδὺ δὲ χειμῶνος ἀλεεινήν; Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμφαῖεν· Οὔκουν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς μεσημβρίαν βλεπούσαις οἰκίαις τοῦ μὲν χειμῶνος ὁ ἥλιος εἰς τὰς παστάδας ὑπολάμπει, τοῦ δὲ θέρους ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν στεγῶν πορευόμενος σκιὰν παρέχει; Οὔκουν εἴ γε καλῶς ἔχει ταῦτα οὕτω γίγνεσθαι, οἰκοδομεῖν δεῖ ὑψηλότερα μὲν τὰ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν, ἵνα ὁ χειμερινὸς ἥλιος μὴ ἀποκλείηται, χθαμαλώτερα δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἄρκτον, ἵνα οἱ ψυχροὶ μὴ ἐμπίπτωσιν ἄνεμοι; 10. Ὡς δὲ συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅποι πάσας ὥρας αὐτός τε ἂν ἥδιστα καταφεύγοι, καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἀσφαλέστατα τιθοῖτο, αὖτη ἂν εἰκότως ἡδίστη τε καὶ καλλίστη οἴκησις εἴη· γραφαὶ δὲ καὶ ποικιλίαι πλείονας εὐφροσύνας ἀποστεροῦσιν, ἢ παρέχουσι. Ναοῖς γε μὴν καὶ βωμοῖς χώραν ἔφη εἶναι πρεπωδεστάτην, ἥτις ἐμφανεστάτη οὖσα, ἀστιβεστάτη εἴη· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ ἰδόντας προσεύξασθαι, ἡδὺ δὲ ἁγνῶς ἔχοντας προσιέναι.

CHAPTER IX.

SUMMARY.

In this chapter are contained various Socratic definitions, namely, of fortitude, wisdom and self-control, madness, envy, idleness, command, good fortune.

1. Πάλιν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος, ἡ ἀνδρία πότερον εἴη διδακτὸν, ἢ φυσικόν; Οἶμαι μέν, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σῶμα σώματος ἰσχυρότερον πρὸς τοὺς πόνους φύεται, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ ψυχῆς ἐρρωμενεστέραν πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ φύσει γίγνεσθαι· ὁρῶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις τε καὶ ἔθεσι τρεφομένους, πολὺ δια-

φέροντας ἀλλήλων τόλμῃ. 2. Νομίζω μέντοι πᾶσαν φύσιν μαθήσει καὶ μελέτῃ πρὸς ἀνδρίαν αὔξεσθαι· δῆλον μὲν γάρ, ὅτι Σκύθαι καὶ Θρᾷκες οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειαν ἀσπίδας καὶ δόρατα λαβόντες Λακεδαιμονίοις διαμάχεσθαι· φανερὸν δέ, ὅτι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτ' ἂν Θρᾳξὶν ἐν πέλταις καὶ ἀκοντίοις, οὔτε Σκύθαις ἐν τόξοις ἐθέλοιεν ἂν διαγωνίζεσθαι. 3. Ὁρῶ δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ὁμοίως καὶ φύσει διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ πολὺ ἐπιδιδόντας· ἐκ δὲ τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι πάντας χρὴ καὶ τοὺς εὐφυεστέρους καὶ τοὺς ἀμβλυτέρους τὴν φύσιν, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἀξιόλογοι βούλωνται γενέσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ μελετᾶν.

4. Σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τα μὲν καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι, σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινεν. Προσερωτώμενος δέ, εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ποιοῦντας δὲ τἀναντία, σοφούς τε καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζοι· Οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἢ ἀσόφους τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς· πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι, προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἃ οἴονται συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν. Νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας, οὔτε σοφούς, οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι. 5. Ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, σοφίαν εἶναι· τά τε γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ πάντα, ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καί, ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἁμαρτάνειν· οὕτω καὶ τὰ καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφοὺς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καί, ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἁμαρτάνειν· ἐπεὶ οὖν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετή, σοφία ἐστί. 6. Μανίαν γε μὴν ἐναντίον μὲν ἔφη εἶναι σοφίᾳ, οὐ μέντοι γε τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζε, τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτόν, καὶ μὴ ἃ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι γιγνώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω

πειθομένους τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ, καὶ ἐν γεωργίᾳ, τοὺς κεκτημένους ἀγρούς, καὶ ἐν νόσῳ, τοὺς νοσοῦντας, καὶ ἐν σωμασκίᾳ τοὺς σωμασκοῦντας, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας, οἷς ὑπάρχει τι ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον, ἂν μὲν αὐτοὶ ἡγῶνται ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις οὐ μόνον παροῦσι πειθομένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντας μεταπεμπομένους, ὅπως ἐκείνοις πειθόμενοι τὰ δέοντα πράττωσιν· ἐν δὲ ταλασίᾳ καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐπεδείκνυεν ἀρχούσας τῶν ἀνδρῶν, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν εἰδέναι, ὅπως χρὴ ταλασιουργεῖν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδέναι. 12. Εἰ δέ τις πρὸς ταῦτα λέγοι, ὅτι τῷ τυράννῳ ἔξεστι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὀρθῶς λέγουσι, Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, ἐξείη μὴ πείθεσθαι, ἐπικειμένης γε ζημίας, ἐάν τις τῷ εὖ λέγοντι μὴ πείθηται; ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἄν τις πράγματι μὴ πείθηται τῷ εὖ λέγοντι, ἁμαρτήσεται δήπου, ἁμαρτάνων δὲ ζημιωθήσεται. 13. Εἰ δὲ φαίη τις τῷ τυράννῳ ἐξεῖναι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν εὖ φρονοῦντα, Τὸν δὲ ἀποκτείνοντα, ἔφη, τοὺς κρατίστους τῶν συμμάχων οἴει ἀζήμιον γίγνεσθαι, ἢ, ὡς ἔτυχε, ζημιοῦσθαι; πότερον γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον οἴει σώζεσθαι τὸν ταῦτα ποιοῦντα, ἢ οὕτω καὶ τάχιστ' ἂν ἀπολέσθαι; 14. Ἐρομένου δέ τινος αὐτόν, τί δοκοίη αὐτῷ κράτιστον ἀνδρὶ ἐπιτήδευμα εἶναι, ἀπεκρίνατο, Εὐπραξίαν. Ἐρομένου δὲ πάλιν, εἰ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἐπιτήδευμα νομίζοι εἶναι, Πᾶν μὲν οὖν τοὐναντίον ἔγωγ', ἔφη, τύχην καὶ πρᾶξιν ἡγοῦμαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ζητοῦντα ἐπιτυχεῖν τινι τῶν δεόντων, εὐτυχίαν οἶμαι εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μαθόντα τε καὶ μελετήσαντά τι εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐπραξίαν νομίζω, καὶ οἱ τοῦτο ἐπιτηδεύοντες δοκοῦσι μοι εὖ πράττειν. 15 Καὶ ἀρίστους δὲ καὶ θεοφιλεστάτους ἔφη εἶναι, ἐν μέν γεωργίᾳ, τοὺς τὰ γεωργικὰ εὖ πράττοντας, ἐν δ' ἰατρείᾳ, τοὺς τὰ ἰατρικά, ἐν δὲ πολιτείᾳ, τοὺς τὰ πολιτικά· τὸν δὲ μηδὲν εὖ πράττοντα, οὔτε χρήσιμον οὐδὲν ἔφη εἶναι, οὔτε θεοφιλῆ.

CHAPTER X.

SUMMARY

Socrates was also accustomed to instruct in the consideration which he held with those concerning their occupation with the best plans for procuring for himself the chief necessaries of a [virtuous] existence. [For art of procuring, for example,] is not confined to the mere accumulation of objects [for] we confine [a thing] to that [purpose] for which it seems to us to be [the] most serviceable. [A] house is the [thing] for [maintaining] and the protection of the house. [A] house is the thing for maintaining and the protection of the house. [A] house is the thing for maintaining and the protection of the house. [A] house is the thing for maintaining

ἔφη. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς τῶν φίλων ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τοῖς κακοις ομοίως σοι δοκοῦσιν ἐχειν τὰ πρόσωπα οἵ τε φροντίζοντες, καὶ οἱ μή; Μὰ Δι' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς φαιδροί, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς σκυθρωποὶ γίγνονται. Οὐκουν, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα δυνατὸν ἀπεικάζειν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. 5. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ ἐλευθέριον, καὶ τὸ ταπεινόν τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερον, καὶ τὸ σωφρονητικόν τε καὶ ὁρόνιμον, καὶ τὸ ὑβριστικόν τε καὶ ἀπειρόκαλον, καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἑστώτων καὶ κινουμένων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνει. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Οὐκουν καὶ ταῦτα μιμητά; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις ἥδιον ὁρᾶν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, δι' ὧν τὰ καλά τε κἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀγαπητὰ ἤθη φαίνεται, ἢ δι' ὧν τὰ αἰσχρά τε καὶ πονηρὰ καὶ μισητά; Πολὺ νὴ Δί', ἔφη, διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

6. Πρὸς δὲ Κλειτωνα τὸν ἀνδριαντοποιὸν εἰσελθών ποτε, καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, Ὅτι μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Κλείτων, ἀλλοίους ποιεῖς, δρομεῖς τε καὶ παλαιστάς, καὶ πύκτας, καὶ παγκρατιαστας, ὁρῶ τε καὶ οἶδα· ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὑψεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ ζωτικὸν φαίνεσθαι, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνεργάζει τοῖς ἀνδριᾶσιν; 7. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπορῶν ὁ Κλείτων οὐ ταχὺ ἀπεκρίνατο, Ἆρ', ἔφη, τοῖς τῶν ζώντων εἰδεσιν ἀπεικάζων τὸ ἔργον, ζωτικωτέρους ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι τοὺς ἀνδριάντας; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκουν τά τε ὑπὸ τῶν σχημάτων κατασπώμενα καὶ τὰ ἀνασπώμενα ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ τὰ συμπιεζόμενα, καὶ τὰ διελκόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἐντεινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀνιέμενα ἀπεικάζων, ὁμοιότερά τε τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καὶ πιθανώτερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 8. Τὸ δὲ καὶ τὰ πάθη τῶν ποιούντων τι σωμάτων ἀπομιμεῖσθαι οὐ ποιεῖ τινα τέρψιν τοῖς θεωμένοις; Εἰκὸς γοῦν, ἔφη. Οὐκουν καὶ τῶν μὲν μαχομένων ἀπειληtικὰ τὰ ὁμιατα ἀπεικαστέον, τῶν δὲ νενικηκότων εὐφραινομένων ἡ ὑψις μιμητέα; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη. Δεῖ ἄρα, ἔφη, τὸν ἀνδριαντοποιὸν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τῷ εἴδει προεικάζειν.

σωματος μη μενοντος, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν κυρτουμένου, τοτὲ δὲ ὀρθουμένου, πῶς ἂν ἀκριβεῖς θώρακες ἁρμόττοιεν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. Λέγεις, ἔφη, ἁρμόττειν οὐ τοὺς ἀκριβεῖς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ λυποῦντας ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ. Αὐτός, ἔφη, τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ πάνυ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέχει.

CHAPTER XI.

SUMMARY.

In a conversation with the hetaerist Theodota, Socrates discourses on the value of friends, and on the art of gaining and preserving them.

1. Γυναικὸς δέ ποτε οὔσης ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῆς, ᾗ ὄνομα ἦν Θεοδότη, μνησθέντος αὐτῆς τῶν παρόντων τινος, καὶ εἰπόντος, ὅτι κρεῖττον εἴη λόγου τὸ κάλλος τῆς γυναικός, καὶ ζωγράφους φήσαντος εἰσιέναι πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπεικασομένους, Ἰτέον ἂν εἴη θεασομένους, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀκούσασί γε τὸ λόγου κρεῖττόν ἐστι καταμαθεῖν. Καὶ ὁ διηγησάμενος, Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιτ', ἔφη, ἀκολουθοῦντες. 2. Οὕτω μὲν δὴ πορευθέντες πρὸς τὴν Θεοδότην, καὶ καταλαβόντες ζωγράφῳ τινὶ παρεστηκυῖαν, ἐθεάσαντο· παυσαμένου δὲ τοῦ ζωγράφου, Ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, πότερον ἡμᾶς δεῖ μᾶλλον Θεοδότη χάριν ἔχειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν τὸ κάλλος ἑαυτῆς ἐπέδειξεν, ἢ ταύτην ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἐθεασάμεθα; ἆρ' εἰ μὲν ταύτῃ ὠφελιμωτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπίδειξις, ταύτην ἡμῖν χάριν ἐκτέον, εἰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἡ θέα, ἡμᾶς ταύτῃ; 3. Εἰπόντος δέ τινος, ὅτι δίκαια λέγοι, Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, αὕτη μὲν ἡδη τε τὸν παρ' ἡμῶν ἔπαινον κερδαίνει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν εἰς πλείους διαγγείλωμεν, πλείω ὠφελήσεται. Ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰκός, ἡμᾶς μὲν θεραπεύειν, ταύτην δὲ θεραπεύεσθαι. Καὶ ἡ Θεοδότη, Νὴ Δί', ἔφη, εἰ τοίνυν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἐμὲ ἂν δέοι ὑμῖν τῆς θέας χάριν ἔχειν. 4. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁρῶν αὐτήν τε πολυτελῶς κεκοσμημένην, καὶ μητέρα παροῦσαν αὐτῇ ἐν ἐσθῆτι καὶ θεραπείᾳ οὐ τῇ τυχούσῃ, καὶ θεραπαίνας πολλὰς καὶ εὐειδεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας ἠμελημένως ἐχούσας, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν οἰκίαν ἀφθόνως κα-

τοιοῦτοι τοίνυν. Εἰπὲ οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Θεόδοτε, ἆρα σοι φίλοι, ὅτι ἔσμεν; ἔφη. Ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε οὐκέτι τοιοῦτοι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Οὐδὲ μὲν δὴ Ἀλλὰ μὴ χαλεπαίνετε τοῖς φίλοις, ἔφη. Πῶς ἂν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτο γένοιτο; Ἐὰν νῦν, ἔφη, αὐτοὶ μὲν γένησθε, οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὄντες οἷοι καὶ ἔμπροσθεν ἦτε. 5. Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη, ὦ Θεόδοτε, καλὸν γε τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ πολλῷ κρεῖττον ἢ ἀργύριον καὶ χρυσίον, φίλους ἀγαθοὺς κεκτῆσθαι. Ἀνήρ, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον τῇ τῆς ἀνεμώνης, ἐὰν τὸ σὸν αὐτῶν μόνον ποιῇς, ἀπολεῖς. Καὶ αὐτὴ τι σοφή; 6. Πολὺ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐμοῦ τοῦτο σοφωτέρα αὐτὴν ποιεῖ. Πολὺ τοίνυν μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι φίλους ἀγαθοὺς τὰ τῶν φίλων ἀγαθὰ ποιοῦντα κτᾶσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν φίλων λύπης ἀπαλλάττοντα. 7. Ἔστι δαί τοι, ἔφη, τοιαῦτα ῥᾴδιον ἐξευρεῖν τὰ ἡδύνοντα; Τὰ γὰρ δὴ αὐτὸν γε ἑκάστου αὐτῶν χαίρειν ποιοῦντα εἶναι ἡδύνοντα οὐκέτι ἀγνοεῖν ἐμοί, ἔφη καὶ τὰ μισεῖ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἡδύνοντα πολλὰ νομίζοντα; 8. Τὸν μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἀκοντίου κίνησιν ἐπιστήμονα ποιοῦντα, τοῦτον αὐτὸν ἡδύνειν ἔφην ἂν καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἡδύνοντα πολλὰ ἐξευρίσκειν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἑρμηνέα τοῦ ἱππικοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐθέλοι εἶναι, ἔφη ἂν καὶ τοῦτον ἡδύνειν. Ἐὰν δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἱππικοῦ ἀνθρώπου φίλον ποιῇ τις, πολλοὺς ἂν ἔφην ἡδύνειν ἑαυτῷ ἐξευρίσκειν. 9. Τὸν δὲ τοῦ πολέμου ἄρχοντα ἐπιστήμονα ποιοῦντα, τοῦτον αὐτὸν ἡδύνειν ἔφην ἂν καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἡδύνοντα πολλὰ ἐξευρίσκειν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἄρχοντος φίλον τις ἑαυτὸν ποιοῖ, ἔφη ἂν καὶ τοῦτον ἡδύνειν ἑαυτῷ ἐξευρίσκειν. Ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἄρχοντος ἐθέλοι εἶναι, ἔφη ἂν καὶ τοῦτον ἡδύνειν. 10. Τὸν δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄνδρα ἐπιστήμονα ποιοῦντα, τοῦτον αὐτὸν ἡδύνειν ἔφην ἂν καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἡδύνοντα πολλὰ ἐξευρίσκειν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀνδρὸς φίλον τις ἑαυτὸν ποιοῖ, ἔφη ἂν καὶ τοῦτον ἡδύνειν ἑαυτῷ ἐξευρίσκειν. Ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐθέλοι εἶναι, ἔφη ἂν καὶ τοῦτον ἡδύνειν. Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, ἐγὼ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ. Ἐν μὲν δὴ τούτοις, ἔφη καὶ μάλα εὖ παρεσκευάσθαι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, καὶ μὴ δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμεῖς, καὶ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποκνήσω, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν φίλον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ

ἀποκλείειν, καὶ ἀῤῥωστήσαντός γε φίλου φροντιστικῶς ἐπισκέψασθαι, καὶ καλόν τι πράξαντος σφόδρα συνησθῆναι, καὶ τῷ σφόδρα σου φροντίζοντι ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ κεχαρισθαι. Μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη ἡ Θεοδότη, ἐγὼ τούτων οὐδὲν μηχανῶμαι. 11. Καὶ μήν, ἔφη, πολὺ διαφέρει τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀνθρώπῳ προσφέρεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ δὴ βίᾳ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν ἕλοις, οὔτε κατάσχοις φίλον, εὐεργεσίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἡδονῇ τὸ θηρίον τοῦτο ἁλώσιμόν τε καὶ παραμύνιμόν ἐστιν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. 12. Καὶ ἡ Θεοδότη, Τί οὖν οὐ σύ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγένου συνθηρατὴς τῶν φίλων; Ἐάν γε νὴ Δί', ἔφη, πείθῃς με σύ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν, ἔφη, πείσαιμί σε; Ζητήσεις, ἔφη, τοῦτο αὐτὴ καὶ μηχανήσει, ἐάν τί μου δέῃ. Εἰςιθι τοίνυν, ἔφη, θαμινά. 13. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώπτων τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην, Ἀλλ', ὦ Θεοδότη, ἔφη, οὐ πάνυ μοι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι σχολάσαι· καὶ γὰρ ἴδια πράγματα πολλά, καὶ δημόσια, παρέχει μοι ἀσχολίαν· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ φίλαι μοι, αἳ οὔτε ἡμέρας, οὔτε νυκτὸς ἀφ' αὑτῶν ἐάσουσί με ἀπιέναι, φίλτρα τε μανθάνουσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἐπῳδάς. 14. Ἐπίστασαι γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οἴει, ἔφη, Ἀπολλόδωρόν τε τόνδε καὶ Ἀντισθενην οὐδέποτέ μου ἀπολείπεσθαι; διὰ τί δὲ καὶ Κέβητα καὶ Σιμμίαν Θήβηθεν παραγίγνεσθαι; εὖ ἴσθι, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἄνευ πολλῶν φίλτρων τε καὶ ἐπῳδῶν καὶ ἰύγγων ἐστί. 15. Χρῆσον τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, τὴν ἴυγγα, ἵνα ἐπὶ σοὶ πρῶτον ἕλκω αὐτήν. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ αὐτὸς ἕλκεσθαι πρός σε βούλομαι, ἀλλὰ σὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ πορεύεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ πορεύσομαι, ἔφη· μόνον ὑποδέχου. Ἀλλ' ὑποδέξομαί σε, ἔφη, ἐὰν μή τις φιλωτέρα σου ἔνδον ᾖ.

CHAPTER XII.

SUMMARY.

Some traits of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

νουσι, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τόν τε λοιπὸν βίον ἥδιον καὶ κάλλιον διαζῶσι, καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισὶ καλλίους ἀφορμὰς εἰς τὸν βίον καταλείπουσιν. 5. Οὗτοι χρή, ὅτι ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀμελεῖν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἧττον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ ἀγῶνι, οὐδὲ ἐν πράξει οὐδεμιᾷ μεῖον ἕξεις, διὰ τὸ βέλτιον τὸ σῶμα παρεσκευάσθαι· πρὸς πάντα γάρ, ὅσα πράττουσιν ἄνθρωποι, χρήσιμον τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν· ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς τοῦ σώματος χρείαις πολὺ διαφέρει ὡς βέλτιστα τὸ σῶμα ἔχειν. 6. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ δοκεῖς ἐλαχίστην σώματος χρείαν εἶναι, ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τούτῳ πολλοὶ μεγάλα σφάλλονται, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ σῶμα; καὶ λήθη δέ, καὶ ἀθυμία, καὶ δυσκολία, καὶ μανία πολλάκις πολλοῖς, διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος καχεξίαν, εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν ἐμπίπτουσιν οὕτως, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐκβάλλειν. 7. Τοῖς δὲ τὰ σώματα εὖ ἔχουσι πολλὴ ἀσφάλεια, καὶ οὐδεὶς κίνδυνος διά γε τὴν τοῦ σώματος καχεξίαν τοιοῦτόν τι παθεῖν, εἰκὸς δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία τῶν διὰ τὴν καχεξίαν γιγνομένων καὶ τὴν εὐεξίαν χρήσιμον εἶναι· καίτοι τῶν γε τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐναντίων ἕνεκα τί οὐκ ἂν τις νοῦν ἔχων ὑπομείνειεν; 8. Αἰσχρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ διὰ τὴν ἀμέλειαν γηρᾶσαι, πρὶν ἰδεῖν ἑαυτόν, ποῖος ἂν κάλλιστος καὶ κράτιστος τῷ σώματι γένοιτο. Ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἀμελοῦντα· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλει αὐτόματα γίγνεσθαι.

CHAPTER XIII.

SUMMARY.

This chapter contains various pithy remarks of Socrates to various individuals.

1. We should not be offended at want of civility in another, any more than at personal deformity. (§ 1.)

2. The best remedy for a want of relish in eating, is to stop eating before satiety supervenes. (§ 2.)

3. In eating and drinking, be not too hard to please. (§ 3.)

4. If you wish to punish a slave for any faults or vices, first see whether you yourself may not be laboring under similar ones. (§ 4.)

...to the man who does nothing one or more days in succession can likewise perform a journey of one or more days. "Now you understand a journey, Socrates, is a task by all one is over, so as not to be too much harmed by the course of it. (§ 5.)

...to it is impossible for a man who has gone through an immense number and hour, you cannot go more, to be surprised at meeting begins and later by his slave. (§ 6.)

1. Ὑπερῄρκουν δὲ τοῦτ' τοῦτο, ὅτι πρακτικὸς τῶν χρεῶν, καὶ ἀντιποιοῦμαι. Τελεῖν, ἔφη, τί, εἰ μὴ τὸ ποιεῖν ἕκαστα ἐπιστήμῃ τις, μὴ δὲ ἀμελοῖτο, ὅτι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀμελοῦντες ἀναπλεῖν πειρῷντο, τοῦτό σε λέγει.

2. Ἀλλὰ δὲ λέγουσι ὅτι ἀνδρὶ ἀνδρὶ, Ἀνοιμωκτί, ἔφη, τινὲς φάρμακον ἀγαθὸν ἐνδόσεως. Ἐμοιγε δέ, ἔφη, Παλαιστῇ Παλαιστῇ κίνδυνος, ἔφη· καὶ ἐβλάπτε τε καὶ τὸν χρόνον, καὶ ὑγιαινόντων ἔφη ἀνδρῶν ἀναπλεῖν.

3. Ἀλλὰ δ' οὐ λέγουσι, ὅτι πρῶτον ἐγὼ παῖ λοιπὸ τὸ ἔθος ἐ τέλεσ, Τοῦτο δ', ἔφη, ἀνδρὶ ἀνδρὶ ἐκείνοις, ἔφασκε ἔτος τοῦ. Ἀλλὰ γυμνοῦ ἔφη, ὅτε ἐκείνοις, ἔφασκε· Ἀμ' οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ τέλεσ τοῦ ἔθος τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκείνοις αὐτῷ; Μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνοις, ὡς ἔθος αὐτῷ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῦτο χρῆσθαι. Πότερον δέ, ἔφη, τὸ παῖ καὶ ἔθος ἀνθρώποις τοῦτο ἔστιν; ἢ τὸ ἐν Ἀναξίμανδρος; Τὸ ἐν Ἀναξίμανδρος τοῦτο, ἔφη. Πότερον δὲ Ἐκείνοις ἐγχωρεῖ, τὸ παῖ καὶ, ἢ τὸ ἐν Ἀναξίμανδρος; Τὸ ἐν Ἀναξίμανδρος, ἔφη. Ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἔφη, ἐστὶ μεμελετηκέναι ἀγαθοποιεῖν ἕκαστα τῶν τε ἀλλοτρίων καὶ τῶν οἰκείων.

4. Κινδυνεύειν δὲ τοῦτο λέγουσι ἀπόλαυσιν, ἔφασκε, ἡ χρησιμοποιεῖν τῷ θαρρεῖν. Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἐμπειρίαν τε ἐν, ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶ, καὶ μελετῶμεν δὲ ἀγαθοποιεῖν· Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν ἀπόλαυσιν, τοῦτο δὲ ἐκείνοις τοῦτο ἐστὶ ἐκ τοῦ, τε, ἢ ἐν ἀνθρώποις;

5. Ἐπιστάσθαι δὲ τοῦτο τοῦτο Πλουσιάδη ἀπόλαυσιν; Εἰ, ἔφη, μᾶλλόν τι τῷ πράττειν; ἐπ' καὶ ἐκεῖνο τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ἐκεῖνο τοῦτο ἔμοιγε συμβαίνει; καὶ ἐκεῖνο συμβαίνει, τοῦτο τοῦτο ἔμοιγε

στήσεις, περιπατήσας δειπνήσεις καὶ ἀναπαύσει· οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι, εἰ ἐκτείναις τοὺς περιπάτους, οὓς ἐν πέντε ἢ ἓξ ἡμέραις περιπατεῖς, ῥᾳδίως ἂν Ἀθήνηθεν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἀφίκοιο; Χαριέστερον δὲ καὶ προεξορμᾶν ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ὑστερίζειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκάζεσθαι περαιτέρω τοῦ μετρίου μηκύνειν τὰς ὁδοὺς χαλεπόν, τὸ δὲ μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ πλείονας πορευθῆναι πολλὴν ῥᾳστώνην παρέχει· κρεῖττον οὖν ἐν τῇ ὁρμῇ σπεύδειν, ἢ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ.

6. Ἄλλου δὲ λέγοντος, ὡς παρετάθη μακρὰν ὁδὸν πορευθείς, ἤρετο αὐτόν, εἰ καὶ φορτίον ἔφερε. Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἱμάτιον. Μόνος δ' ἐπορεύου, ἔφη, ἢ καὶ ἀκόλουθός σοι ἠκολούθει; Ἠκολούθει, ἔφη. Πότερον κενός, ἔφη, ἢ φέρων τι; Φέρων νὴ Δί', ἔφη, τά τε στρώματα καὶ τἆλλα σκεύη. Καὶ πῶς δή, ἔφη, ἀπήλλαχεν ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ; Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, βέλτιον ἐμοῦ. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, εἰ τὸ ἐκείνου φορτίον ἔδει σε φέρειν, πῶς ἂν οἴει διατεθῆναι; Κακῶς νὴ Δί', ἔφη· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδ' ἂν ἠδυνήθην κομίσαι. Τὸ οὖν τοσούτῳ ἧττον τοῦ παιδὸς δύνασθαι πονεῖν πῶς ἠσκημένου δοκεῖ σοι ἀνδρὸς εἶναι;

CHAPTER XIV.

SUMMARY.

In this chapter are contained various remarks of Socrates in praise of frugality.

1. In the first place we are informed in what way he brought it about that, at feasts of contribution, no one of the party should strive to surpass another in abundance of supply. (§ 1.)

2. Definition of an ὀψοφάγος. (§ 2–4.)

3. Remarks of Socrates on a person who tasted of various dishes, and employed, at the same time, but a single piece of bread. (§ 5, 6.)

4. Explanation of the term εὐωχεῖσθαι. (§ 7.)

1. Ὁπότε δὲ τῶν ξυνιόντων ἐπὶ δεῖπνον οἱ μὲν μικρὸν ὄψον, οἱ δὲ πολὺ φέροιεν, ἐκέλευεν ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν παῖδα τὸ μικρὸν ἢ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέναι, ἢ διανέμειν ἑκάστῳ τὸ μέρος. Οἱ οὖν τὸ πολὺ φέροντες ᾐσχύνοντο τό τε μὴ κοι-

ποιοῦσι τοὺς ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τούτῳ, καὶ τὰ μὲ διαπράττεται τὸ δικαίως ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ τὸ δικαίως τῆς τε κακίας καὶ ἄλλου οὐδενὸς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν, ἐπιστάμενοι πολλοὶ ὄντες;

6. Καταφανῶς δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς ξυνδικάζουσιν καὶ μὲν οὐ τοὺς κατηγόρους, τὰ δὲ ὑμῶν αὐτοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ λέγοντα, λέγων ἔφην πρὸς ὀλίγους, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἄξιον εἴη, Ἔχετε μοι δὴ, ἔφη, οἱ ἄνδρες, εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ ποίᾳ τινὶ ἄξιον ἀνθρώπου ἀγαθοῦ κακόνους, ἀδίκως μου γάρ δὴ πάντες ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ὄμνυτε, ὅτι ποιῶ· ἀλλὰ πῶς οἴεσθε ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν μοι κακόνους; Οὐ γάρ οἶδ', ἔφη τις τῶν παρόντων. 7. Τί γάρ; ἔφη, εἴ τις ὑμᾶς τῶν ἵππων τὸν αὐτὸν τὸν ἄριστον ἵππον κάπῃ μὲ ἀκόσμως, ἀλλ' ἐβλαπτε λυκοὺς τύπτων ἐπιστάμενος εἶναι ὄντας, ἢ οὔ; Ξυνῳδὴ γ' ἂν δὴ ἔφη, ἄλλῳ τῳ ἐγκαλοῦντος αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρόντων. Τί δὲ μισοῦσι τοὺς ἄριστα ἵππους ἐπιστάμενους; Ὅτι μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ οὗτοι δικαίως ἂν τιμωρίαν ἀλλήλων – καὶ ἔτιγε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τοὺς ἀνοήτως τοὺς ἵππους κακῶς ἂν μᾶλλον τιμωροῖντο εἰκότως. 8. Τοῦτο δὲ τοὺς Σωκράτους κτείνοντας, ποιοῦσι ὁ κακόνους τῷ ἀρίστῳ εἰμένῳ τὰ λοιπὰ, τὸ μὲν ἴδιον οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι βλάπτειν, ἄλλοις δὲ ἐπιτιθέντες. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης κατανεύσαντος. Παραπλησίως, ἔφη, ποιοῦσι οἱ πόλεως, ἀποκτείνοντες τὸν ἄριστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀδικοῦντας.

9. Τίνων δὲ καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἕνεκα τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπῄνουν ὑμῶν οἱ πολῖται; Ἆρα γίγνεσθ', ἔφη, ἐπιτηδειότητος ἐφετοῦ, ἢ μᾶλλον τὸ ἄνδρα ἐπιστήμονα, ἢ ἐν πρόσοδοι ἐποίει καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀξίωμα ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλάμβανεν; Πλεῖστ' μὲν τὸν τῶν ἵππων ἐπιστήμονα, πολιτικώτατον εἶναι, ἃ δὲ ἐκείνοις μὲ κοινωνικώτατος, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐφετοῦντα. Ἐ κοινωνικὸν, εἶπεν, τὸν ἵππον ἐπιστάμενον, ἐκκαλοῦντα τε καὶ κακόνουν τῶν ἐπιστήμην κτᾶσθαι. 10. Ἐκεῖνο πῶς οὐ γελοῖον ἔστι, ἐπιστάμενον μὲν ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς ἄριστα ἐπιστάμενοις, ἄλλον δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον

ποιούμενα μετατιθέναι; καὶ ἄλλο δέ τι προσγίγνεται τῷ ἅμα πολλὰ ἐπεσθίειν ἐθισθέντι· μὴ παρόντων γὰρ πολλῶν μειονεκτεῖν ἄν τι δοκοίη, ποθῶν τὸ σύνηθες· ὁ δὲ συνεθισθεὶς τὸν ἕνα ψωμὸν ἑνὶ ὄψῳ προπέμπειν, ὅτε μὴ παρείη πολλά, δύναιτ' ἂν ἀλύπως τῷ ἑνὶ χρῆσθαι.

7. Ἔλεγε δὲ καί, ὡς τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων γλώττῃ ἐσθίειν καλοῖτο· τὸ δὲ εὖ προσκεῖσθαι, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τῷ ταῦτα ἐσθίειν, ἅτινα μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν μήτε τὸ σῶμα λυποίη, μήτε δυσεύρετα εἴη· ὥστε καὶ τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι τοῖς κοσμίως διαιτωμένοις ἀνετίθει.

XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA

OF

SOCRATES.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

SUMMARY.

First chapter continues the account of the various modes by which Socrates drew his young companions to him, and, while he rendered them virtuous, secured them all to his love and practice of virtue.

μαθήσεως δὲ καταφρονοῦντας, ἐδίδασκεν, ὅτι αἱ ἄρισται δοκοῦσαι εἶναι φύσεις μάλιστα παιδείας δέονται, ἐπιδεικνύων τῶν τε ἵππων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας, εἰ μὲν ἐκ νέων δαμασθεῖεν, εὐχρηστοτάτους καὶ ἀρίστους γιγνομένους, εἰ δὲ ἀδάμαστοι γένοιντο, δυσκαθεκτοτάτους καὶ φαυλοτάτους· καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐφυεστάτων, φιλοπόνων τε οὐσῶν, καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν τοῖς θηρίοις, τὰς μὲν καλῶς ἀχθείσας ἀρίστας γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὰς θήρας, καὶ χρησιμωτάτας, ἀναγώγους δὲ γιγνομένας, ματαίους τε καὶ μανιώδεις καὶ δυσπειθεστάτας. 4. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, ἐῤῥωμενεστάτους τε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντας, καὶ ἐξεργαστικωτάτους ὧν ἂν ἐγχειρῶσι, παιδευθέντας μὲν καὶ μαθόντας, ἃ δεῖ πράττειν ἀρίστους τε καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτους γίγνεσθαι· (πλεῖστα γὰρ καὶ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζεσθαι·) ἀπαιδεύτους δὲ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς γενομένους, κακίστους τε καὶ βλαβερωτάτους γίγνεσθαι· κρίνειν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπισταμένους, ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, πολλάκις πονηροῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμασι, μεγαλείους δὲ καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας, δυσκαθέκτους τε καὶ δυσαποτρέπτους εἶναι· διὸ πλεῖστα καὶ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζονται. 5. Τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ πλούτῳ μέγα φρονοῦντας, καὶ νομίζοντας οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι παιδείας, ἐξαρκέσειν δέ σφισιν οἰομένους τὸν πλοῦτον πρὸς τὸ διαπράττεσθαί τε ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐφρένου, λέγων, ὅτι μωρὸς μὲν εἴη, εἴ τις οἴεται μὴ μαθὼν τά τε ὠφέλιμα καὶ τὰ βλαβερὰ τῶν πραγμάτων διαγνώσεσθαι, μωρὸς δ', εἴ τις μὴ διαγιγνώσκων μὲν ταῦτα, διὰ δὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, ποριζόμενος, οἴεται δυνήσεσθαι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττειν· ἠλίθιος δ', εἴ τις μὴ δυνάμενος τὰ συμφέροντα πράττειν, εὖ τε πράττειν οἴεται καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον αὐτῷ ἢ καλῶς ἢ ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι· ἠλίθιος δὲ καί, εἴ τις οἴεται διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, δόξειν τι ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι δοκῶν εὐδοκιμήσειν.

CHAPTER II.

SUMMARY.

The many-sided reasoning and discourse with Aristippus by the son of Aristippus a young man, who feared [amid] the surprise [a wisdom and] acquirements of all others of the same age with himself. Socrates on the reason of a conversation with him, exercises him in reading the [poems] of the very chiefs on the knowledge of which he had previously prided himself so much.

τι παρά του· δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι λέγειν ἀρχόμενος ὧδε προοιμιάσεται· 4. Παρ' οὐδενὸς μὲν πώποτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν ἔμαθον, οὐδ' ἀκούων τινὰς εἶναι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν ἱκανούς, ἐζήτησα τούτοις ἐντυχεῖν, οὐδ' ἐπεμελήθην τοῦ διδάσκαλόν μοί τινα γενέσθαι τῶν ἐπισταμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἀναντία· διατετέλεκα γὰρ φεύγων οὐ μόνον τὸ μανθάνειν τι παρά τινος. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δύξαι· ὅμως δὲ ὅ τι ἂν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ἐπίῃ μοι, συμβουλεύσω ὑμῖν. 5. Ἁρμόσειε δ' ἂν οὕτω προοιμιάζεσθαι καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις παρὰ τῆς πόλεως ἰατρικὸν ἔργον λαβεῖν· ἐπιτήδειόν γ' ἂν αὐτοῖς εἴη, τοῦ λόγου ἄρχεσθαι ἐντεῦθεν· Παρ' οὐδενὸς μὲν πώποτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην ἔμαθον, οὐδ' ἐζήτησα διδάσκαλον ἐμαυτῷ γενέσθαι τῶν ἰατρῶν οὐδένα· διατετέλεκα γὰρ φυλαττόμενος οὐ μόνον τὸ μαθεῖν τι παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δόξαι μεμαθηκέναι τὴν τέχνην ταύτην· ὅμως δέ μοι τὸ ἰατρικὸν ἔργον δότε· πειράσομαι γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἀποκινδυνεύων μανθάνειν. Πάντες οὖν οἱ παρόντες ἐγέλασαν ἐπὶ τῷ προοιμίῳ. 6. Ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸς ἦν ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἤδη μέν, οἷς ὁ Σωκράτης λέγοι, προσέχων, ἔτι δὲ φυλαττόμενος αὐτός τι φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ νομίζων τῇ σιωπῇ σωφροσύνης δόξαν περιβάλλεσθαι, τότε ὁ Σωκράτης, βουλόμενος αὐτὸν παῦσαι τούτου, Θαυμαστὸν γάρ, ἔφη, τί ποτε οἱ βουλόμενοι κιθαρίζειν, ἢ αὐλεῖν, ἢ ἱππεύειν, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἱκανοὶ γενέσθαι, πειρῶνται ὡς συνεχέστατα ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται δυνατοὶ γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ καθ' ἑαυτούς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἀρίστοις δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πάντα ποιοῦντες καὶ ὑπομένοντες, ἕνεκα τοῦ μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀξιόλογοι γενόμενοι τῶν δὲ βουλομένων δυνατῶν γενέσθαι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά, νομίζουσί τινες ἄνευ παρασκευῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας αὐτόματοι ἐξαίφνης δυνατοὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἔσεσθαι. 7. Καίτοι γε τοσούτῳ ταῦτα ἐκείνων δυσκατεργαστότερα φαίνεται, ὅσῳ περ πλειόνων περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευομένων, ἐλάττους οἱ κατεργαζόμενοι γίγνονται· δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπιμελείας δέονται πλείονος καὶ ἰσχυροτέρας οἱ τούτων

ἐμοιγε, ἢ οἱ ἐκείνων. 9. Καὶ ἐπεὶ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτον τὸν Εὐθύδημον, τοιοῦτον λόγοις ὄντα Σωκράτης· ὃς δ' ἤρξατο αὐτὸν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἐπιφανῆ ὄντα, διὰ δυνάμεις, καὶ προθυμούμενον ἀκούειν, πάνυ ἤλθεν ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν· τοιαυτηδὶ ἐξεπαίδευεν αὐτὸν τοὺς Εὐθυδήμους. Εἰπὲ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τοὺς θεοὺς ἆρα ἡγῇ δεῖσθαι, παλὰ γράμματα συνείρων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους γιγνομένους; Νὴ τὸν Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· καὶ ἐγὼ γε σπουδῇ, ἵνα δὲ κτήσωμαι, ὡς ἂν δυνατὸν, πειρῶμαι. 10. Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀγαθὸν γὰ σοι, ἤδη τοὺς ἀγρίους καὶ χαλεποὺς τροφῶν ἡμέρους ἀνθρώπους ποιῶν, ἢ πειθοῖ· ἄμεινον γὰρ δὴ τοὺς ἡμέρους ἀγρίους καὶ χαλεποὺς πολὺ βελτίους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὰς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων γνώμας ἀγαθὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἐκπαιδεύοντας. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἤρετο ἀνόπιν ἰὼν, ποιῶν δικαίους τοὺς Σωκράτους ἑταίρους τῆς παιδείας. 11. Ὁ δὲ ἐκπαιδεύων αὐτὸν ἤρετο τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, Τί δὲ δὴ δικαίους ἀγαθοὺς γιγνῶσκε, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, συλλέγων τὰ γράμματα; Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο ὁ Εὐθύδημος οὐκοῦν ἔγωγε, πάλιν ὁ Σωκράτης, Ὅταν μὴ ἐπίστῃ, ἔφη· παλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀστὶ συγγράμματα. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκριτόκακον βούλει γενέσθαι, γνοὺς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων; Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴ γοητείας ἐπιθυμεῖς, ἔφη, ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ἵνα τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὠφελῇς, ἵνα δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτῃς; Οὐδὲ γοητείας, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀστεῖος γενέσθαι; ἔφη ἐκεῖνος γενέσθαι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτον ἐφίεσθαι, Ἀλλὰ μὴ δικανικὸς, ἔφη καὶ γὰρ τὸ δικάζειν τοῖς μὴ κακοῖς δὴ τοῦτο ἀστεῖον. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη· τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους δεῖν οἶδα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἀφελοῦντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δεομένους. 11. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· Ἀλλὰ βήτωρ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τοιοῦτος τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιθυμεῖ, δ' ἐν ἐκκλησίαις τοὺς πολίτας γνώμας καὶ ἀποφάσεις, καὶ ἔργων λόγους καὶ σκέψεις τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους; Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Σοφὸν γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα ἀνεῖναι. Νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὴν καλλίστην ἀρετὴν καὶ μεγί-

στης ἐφίεσαι τέχνης· ἔστι γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὕτη, καὶ καλεῖται βασιλικὴ· ἀτάρ, ἔφη, κατανενόηκας, εἰ οἷόν τ' ἐστί, μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον, ἀγαθὸν ταῦτα γενέσθαι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τέ γε ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης ἀγαθὸν πολίτην γενέσθαι. 12. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, σὺ δὴ τοῦτο κατείργασαι; Οἶμαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἧττον φανῆναι δίκαιος. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, τῶν δικαίων ἐστὶν ἔργα, ὥςπερ τῶν τεκτόνων; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὥςπερ οἱ τέκτονες ἔχουσι τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔργα ἐπιδεῖξαι, οὕτως οἱ δίκαιοι τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοιεν ἂν διεξηγήσασθαι; Μὴ οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ δύναμαι ἐγὼ τὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργα ἐξηγήσασθαι; καὶ νὴ Δί' ἔγωγε τὰ τῆς ἀδικίας· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ὀλίγα ἐστὶ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν τοιαῦτα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἀκούειν. 13. Βούλει οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, γράψωμεν ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν Δ, ἐνταυθοῖ δὲ Α; εἶτα ὅ τι μὲν ἂν δοκῇ ἡμῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔργον εἶναι, πρὸς τὸ Δ τιθῶμεν, ὅ τι δ' ἂν τῆς ἀδικίας, πρὸς τὸ Α; Εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, προσδεῖν τούτων, ποίει ταῦτα. 14. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης γράψας, ὥςπερ εἶπεν, Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ἔστιν ἐν ἀνθρώποις τὸ ψεύδεσθαι; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. Ποτέρωσε οὖν, ἔφη, θῶμεν τοῦτο; Δῆλον ἔφη, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ ἐξαπατᾶν ἐστι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Τοῦτο οὖν ποτέρωσε θῶμεν; Καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν. Τί δέ; τὸ κακουργεῖν; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι; Καὶ τοῦτο. Πρὸς δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ οὐδὲν ἡμῖν τούτων κείσεται, ὦ Εὐθύδημε; Δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη. 15. Τί δ'; ἐάν τις στρατηγὸς αἱρεθείς, ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἐχθραν πόλιν ἐξανδραποδίσηται, φήσομεν τοῦτον ἀδικεῖν; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Δίκαια δὲ ποιεῖν οὐ φήσομεν; Καὶ μάλα. Τί δ'; ἐὰν ἐξαπατᾷ πολεμῶν αὐτοῖς; Δίκαιον, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο. Ἐὰν δὲ κλέπτῃ τε καὶ ἁρπάζῃ τὰ τούτων, οὐ δίκαια ποιήσει; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἐγώ σε τὸ πρῶτον ὑπελάμβανον πρὸς τοὺς φίλους μόνον ταῦτα ἐρωτᾶν. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, ὅσα πρὸς τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐθήκαμεν, πάντα καὶ πρὸς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ θετέον ἂν εἴη; Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. 16. Βούλει οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτω

φίλους, ἀναμνησθῆτε πάλιν, πρὶν μὲν τοὺς συλλόγους ἀ-
κούειν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα πονεῖν πρὸς ἃ τοὺς φίλους ἐβού-
λεσθε, ἀλλὰ δεῖν τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους οὐ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι. Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος. 13. Τί οὖν; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης,
εἰ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐβούλεσθε ἄριστον ἐργάσασθαι τὸ στρατιωτικὸν γυ-
μνάσιον ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ γενόμενον, καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ τούτου
παύσας τῶν κακῶν τὸν στρατιώτην, συνεσκεύασε τὸν ἀγα-
θὸν τοιοῦτον ἄρχοντα; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη τοῦτο ἂν ποιῆσαι
στρατηγός. Εἰ δὲ τὸν αὖ δικαστικὸν γυμνάσιον, καὶ
τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀφαιρούμενον, εἰρωτήσειε, μὴ οὐκοῦν τὰ φθο-
νεῖσθαι ὀφ, καὶ τὸ μισεῖσθαι κἄπαν ἕτοιμος εἴη ποιεῖν,
ταῦτα καὶ τὸν εἰσιόντα τοῦ θεσμοῦ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, καὶ
ταῦτα ἂν εἰδέναι καλά. Τί δ', ἔφη, εἰ τὸν αὖ φίλους ἔστιν φί-
λον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφθείρειν ἐπιτηδεύοι, κλέπτῃ ἢ ἁρπάζῃ ἢ ἄλλο
τι τοιοῦτον, ταῦτα καὶ τοιοῦτον ἄν εἶναι; Καὶ ταῦτα
μὴ ΔΙ', ἔφη, τούτῳ γε ἂν δικαιοσύνην. 14. Λέγεις, ἔφη σὺ
αὐτὸν τοὺς φίλους ἄνευ τοῦ ἀνιᾶσθαι; Μὰ ΔΙ' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ μετατίθεσθαι τὰ ἀμφότερα, οὕτως ἔχειν.
ΔΙΟΤΙ γε ταῦτ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐξίσου τοῖς μισοῦσι, ἢ μᾶ-
λλον ἐπίπονα. 15. Εἰ δὲ δὴ τοὺς φίλους εἰρωτήσειεν τοι-
αῦτ' ἄττα, ἢν μηδὲ τοῦτο παραλείπωσιν ἀκούοντες, τίνων
ἀδικούντων ἕνεκα ὁ ἕκαστος, ἢ ὁ ἄνευ; Ἀλλ', ὦ Δάμωνος,
ἀκούσῃ καὶ ἐγὼ τοιούτου μὴ ἀποκάμνων· καὶ γὰρ τὰ
φιλικὰ πάντα τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν δοκεῖ μοι, ἢ ὅσα τοὺς
γονέας· ἅπαν δὲ εἰμήθης μοι ἀδικοῦντα εἶναι τὸν ἄνευ
γνώμης τοῦ δικαίου· τὸν μὲν γὰρ δὶ τοῦ μαθεῖν καὶ
διανοεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι, ὄντων τῶν γραμμάτων. Κἀγώ-
γε. Πότερον δὲ γραμματικώτερον κρίνεις, ἢ ὃς ἂν ἐκ τῶν
ἐμῶν γραφῶν καὶ ἀναγνώσεται, ἢ ὃς ἂν ἄνευ; Ὃς ἂν ἐκ
τούτων, ἔφασκε· δύναται γὰρ ἂν σπάνιν ἀναλύσας, καὶ ἀμβλὺ
κἀπὶ πολλὰ τεμεῖν· ὁμοίως ἡ μὴ ἐκεῖνα μὴ ἀμβλὺν γράμμα γραμ-
ματικὸν ἂν μὴ ἢ δὲ ἄνευ ἀγράμματον. Εἰκὸς γάρ οὕτ'. Τὸν
ἄνευ δὲ πότερον ἡ ἄνευ φιλόλογον καὶ ἐμμελῆ νόμιζε,
ἢ ἀνεπ; Δῆλον, ἔτη ὁ ἐκεῖνος. Ἐγκαλεῖ γραμματικῶν τρό-
πον τὸν ἐπιτιθέναι γράμματα τοῖς μὴ ἐπιτιθέναι τρό

εἶναι; Ναί. Δικαιότερον δὲ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου; Φαίνομαι· δοκῶ δέ μοι καὶ ταῦτα, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως, λέγειν. 21. Τί δὲ δή, ὃς ἂν βουλόμενος τἀληθῆ λέγειν, μηδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγῃ, ἀλλ' ὁδόν τε φράζων τὴν αὐτήν, ποτὲ μὲν πρὸς ἕω, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς ἑσπέραν φράζῃ, καὶ λογισμὸν ἀποφαινόμενος τὸν αὐτόν, ποτὲ μὲν πλείω, ποτὲ δ' ἐλάττω ἀποφαίνηται, τί σοι δοκεῖ ὁ τοιοῦτος; Δῆλος νὴ Δι' εἶναι, ὅτι, ἃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι, οὐκ οἶδεν. 22. Οἴσθα δέ τινας ἀνδραποδώδεις καλουμένους; Ἔγωγε. Πότερον διὰ σοφίαν, ἢ δι' ἀμαθίαν; Δῆλον, ὅτι δι' ἀμαθίαν. Ἆρ' οὖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ χαλκεύειν ἀμαθίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου τυγχάνουσιν; Οὐ δῆτα. Ἀλλ' ἄρα διὰ τὴν τοῦ τεκταίνεσθαι; Οὐδὲ διὰ ταύτην. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ σκυτεύειν; Οὐδὲ δι' ἓν τούτων, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον· οἱ γὰρ πλεῖστοι τῶν γε τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπισταμένων ἀνδραποδώδεις εἰσίν. Ἆρ' οὖν τῶν τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια μὴ εἰδότων τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτ' ἐστίν; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. 23. Οὐκοῦν δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ διατειναμένους φεύγειν, ὅπως μὴ ἀνδράποδα ὦμεν. Ἀλλὰ νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ ᾤμην φιλοσοφεῖν φιλοσοφίαν, δι' ἧς ἂν μάλιστα ἐνόμιζον παιδευθῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἀνδρὶ καλοκἀγαθίας ὀρεγομένῳ· νῦν δὲ πῶς οἴει με ἀθύμως ἔχειν, ὁρῶντα ἐμαυτὸν διὰ μὲν τὰ προπεπονημένα οὐδὲ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι δυνάμενον, ὑπὲρ ὧν μάλιστα χρὴ εἰδέναι, ἄλλην δὲ ὁδὸν οὐδεμίαν ἔχοντα, ἣν ἂν πορευόμενος βελτίων γενοίμην; 24. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, εἰς Δελφοὺς δὲ ἦδη πώποτε ἀφίκου; Καὶ δίς γε νὴ Δία, ἔφη. Κατέμαθες οὖν πρὸς τῷ ναῷ που γεγραμμένον τό ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ; Ἔγωγε. Πότερον οὖν οὐδέν σοι τοῦ γράμματος ἐμέλησεν, ἢ προσέσχες τε καὶ ἐπεχείρησας σαυτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν, ὅστις εἶης; Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη· καὶ γὰρ δὴ πάνυ τοῦτό γε ᾤμην εἰδέναι· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τι ἤδειν, εἴγε μηδ' ἐμαυτὸν ἐγιγνωσκον. 25. Πότερα δέ σοι δοκεῖ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν, ὅστις τοὔνομα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον οἶδεν, ἢ ὅστις, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς ἵππους ὠνούμε-

ἀγνοήσασαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν κρείττοσι πολεμήσωσιν, αἱ μὲν ἀνάστατοι γίγνονται, αἱ δ' ἐξ ἐλευθέρων δοῦλαι. 30. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Ὡς πάνυ μοι δοκοῦν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον εἶναι τὸ ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκειν, οὕτως ἴσθι· ὁπόθεν δὲ χρὴ ἄρξασθαι ἐπισκοπεῖν ἑαυτόν, τοῦτο πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπω εἴ μοι ἐθελήσαις ἂν ἐξηγήσασθαι. 31. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὁποῖά ἐστι, πάντως που γιγνώσκεις. Νὴ Δί', ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ταῦτα οἶδα, καὶ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων φαυλότερος ἂν εἴην. Ἴθι δή, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐξήγησαι αὐτά. Ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη· πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, αὐτὸ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νομίζω, τὸ δὲ νοσεῖν, κακόν· ἔπειτα τὰ αἴτια ἑκατέρου αὐτῶν, καὶ ποτά, καὶ βρωτά, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν φέροντα, ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ νοσεῖν, κακά. 32. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν. ὅταν μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἴτια γίγνηται, ἀγαθὰ ἂν εἴη, ὅταν δὲ κακοῦ, κακά. Πότε δ' ἄν, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν ὑγιαίνειν κακοῦ αἴτιον γένοιτο, τὸ δὲ νοσεῖν, ἀγαθοῦ; Ὅταν νὴ Δί', ἔφη, στρατείας τε αἰσχρᾶς, καὶ ναυτιλίας βλαβερᾶς, καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τοιούτων οἱ μὲν διὰ ῥώμην μετασχόντες ἀπόλωνται, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν ἀπολειφθέντες σωθῶσιν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὠφελίμων οἱ μὲν διὰ ῥώμην μετέχουσιν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν ἀπολείπονται. Ταῦτα οὖν, ἔφη, ποτὲ μὲν ὠφελοῦντα, ποτὲ δὲ βλάπτοντα μᾶλλον ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά ἐστιν; Οὐδὲν μὰ Δία φαίνεται, κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. 33. Ἀλλ' ἥ γέ τοι σοφία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἀγαθόν ἐστιν· ποῖον γὰρ ἄν τις πρᾶγμα οὐ βέλτιον πράττοι σοφὸς ὤν, ἢ ἀμαθής; Τί δαί; τὸν Δαίδαλον, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὅτι ληφθεὶς ὑπὸ Μίνω διὰ τὴν σοφίαν, ἠναγκάζετο ἐκείνῳ δουλεύειν, καὶ τῆς τε πατρίδος ἅμα καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστερήθη, καὶ ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδιδράσκειν μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ, τόν τε παῖδα ἀπώλεσε, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠδυνήθη σωθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἀπενεχθεὶς εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους, πάλιν ἐκεῖ ἐδούλευεν; Λέγεται νὴ Δί', ἔφη, ταῦτα. Τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδους οὐκ ἀκήκοας πάθη; τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ πάντες

ἀναγκάζονται ἀδικεῖν. 39. Οὔκουν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴγε ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τοὺς μὲν τυράννους εἰς τὸν δῆμον θήσομεν, τοὺς δὲ ὀλίγα κεκτημένους, ἐὰν οἰκονομικοὶ ὦσιν, εἰς τοὺς πλουσίους; Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἔφη· Ἀναγκαζει με καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν δηλονότι ἡ ἐμὴ φαυλότης· καὶ φροντίζω, μὴ κράτιστον ᾖ μοι σιγᾶν· κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν εἰδέναι. Καὶ πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχων ἀπῆλθε, καὶ καταφρονήσας ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι. 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσῄεσαν, οὓς καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνόμιζεν· ὁ δὲ Εὐθύδημος ὑπέλαβεν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀνὴρ ἀξιόλογος γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ὅτι μάλιστα Σωκράτει συνείη· καὶ οὐκ ἀπελείπετο ἔτι αὐτοῦ, εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον εἴη· ἔνια δὲ καὶ ἐμιμεῖτο ὧν ἐκεῖνος ἐπετήδευεν· ὁ δὲ ὡς ἔγνω αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἥκιστα μὲν διετάραττεν, ἁπλούστατα δὲ καὶ σαφέστατα ἐξηγεῖτο, ἃ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἰδέναι δεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν κράτιστα εἶναι.

CHAPTER III.

SUMMARY.

It was a settled rule with Socrates, that the young should never be urged to engage in public affairs, or in any other vocation whatsoever, until their minds had been moulded by virtuous precepts, and especially until they had been inspired with piety toward the gods. He therefore shows unto Euthydemus, in the present chapter, that the gods consult for the welfare of men, and ought therefore to be worshipped by them.

1. Τὸ μὲν οὖν λεκτικούς, καὶ πρακτικούς, καὶ μηχανικοὺς γίγνεσθαι τους συνόντας οὐκ ἔσπευδεν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον τούτων ᾤετο χρῆναι σωφροσύνην αὐτοῖς ἐγγενέσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ταῦτα δυναμένους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ δυνατωτέρους κακουργεῖν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. 2. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς ἐπειρᾶτο σώφρονας ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας. Ἄλλοι μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλους οὕτως ὁμολοῦντι παραγενόμενοι διηγοῦντο· ἐγὼ δέ, ὅτε πρὸς Εὐθύδημον τοιάδε διελέγετο, παρεγενόμην. 3. Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη,

πορίζεσθαι, πῶς οὐχ ὑπὲρ λόγον; Ἀνέκφραστον. Τὸ δὲ τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπειδὰν ἐν χειμῶνι τράπηται, προσιέναι τὰ μὲν ἀδρύνοντα, τὰ δὲ ξηραίνοντα, ὧν καιρὸς διελήλυθεν, καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενον μηκέτι ἐγγυτέρω προσιέναι, ἀλλ' ἀποτρέπεσθαι, φυλαττόμενον, μή τι ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος θερμαίνων βλάψῃ· καὶ ὅταν αὖ πάλιν ἀπιὼν γένηται, ἔνθα καὶ ἡμῖν δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅτι, εἰ προσωτέρω ἄπεισιν, ἀποπαγησόμεθα ὑπὸ τοῦ ψύχους, πάλιν αὖ τρέπεσθαι καὶ προσχωρεῖν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ἔνθα ὢν μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ὠφελοίη; Νὴ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα παντάπασιν ἔοικεν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα γιγνόμενος. 9. Τὸ δ' αὖ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ὑπενέγκαιμεν οὔτε τὸ καῦμα, οὔτε τὸ ψῦχος, εἰ ἐξαπίνης γίγνοιτο, οὕτω μὲν κατὰ μικρὸν προσιέναι τὸν ἥλιον, οὕτω δὲ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀπιέναι, ὥστε λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς εἰς ἑκάτερα τὰ ἰσχυρότατα καθισταμένους; Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἤδη τοῦτο σκοπῶ, εἰ ἄρα τί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον, ἢ ἀνθρώπους θεραπεύειν· ἐκεῖνο δὲ μόνον ἐμποδίζει με, ὅτι καὶ τἆλλα ζῶα τούτων μετέχει. 10. Οὐ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, φανερόν, ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀνατρέφεται; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ζῶον αἰγῶν τε καὶ οἰῶν, καὶ ἵππων, καὶ βοῶν, καὶ ὄνων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἀπολαύει, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ πλείω τῶν φυτῶν· τρέφονται γοῦν καὶ χρηματίζονται οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπὸ τούτων, ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνων· πολὺ δὲ γένος ἀνθρώπων τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένοις εἰς τροφὴν οὐ χρῶνται, ἀπὸ δὲ βοσκημάτων γάλακτι, καὶ τυρῷ, καὶ κρέασι τρεφόμενοι ζῶσι· πάντες δὲ τιθασσεύοντες καὶ δαμάζοντες τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ζώων, εἴς τε πόλεμον καὶ εἰς ἄλλα πολλὰ συνεργοῖς χρῶνται. Ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη· ὁρῶ γὰρ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πολὺ ἰσχυρότερα ἡμῶν, οὕτως ὑποχείρια γιγνόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥστε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται. 11. Τὸ δ', ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ μὲν καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα, διαφέροντα δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐστί, προσθεῖναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰσθήσεις ἁρμοττούσας πρὸς ἕκαστα, δι' ὧν ἀπολαύομεν πάν-

θείου μετέχει, ὅτι μὲν βασιλεύει ἐν ἡμῖν, φανερόν, ὁρᾶτα. δὲ οὐδ αὐτή. Ἃ χρὴ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶι ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα, τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον. 15. Ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἀμελήσω τοῦ δαιμονίου, σαφῶς οἶδα· ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀθυμῶ, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὰς τῶν θεῶν εὐεργεσίας οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀνθρώπων ἀξίαις χάρισιν ἀμείβεσθαι. 16. Ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀθύμει, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· ὁρᾷς γάρ, ὅτι ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεός, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν ἐπερωτᾷ, πῶς ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς χαρίζοιτο, ἀποκρίνεται ΝΟΜΩι ΠΟΛΕΩΣ· νόμος δὲ δήπου πανταχοῦ ἐστι, κατα δύναμιν ἱεροῖς θεοὺς ἀρέσκεσθαι· πῶς οὖν ἂν τις κάλλιον καὶ εὐσεβέστερον τιμῴη θεούς, ἢ, ὡς αὐτοὶ κελεύουσιν, οὕτω ποιῶν; 17. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ τῆς μὲν δυνάμεως μηδὲν ὑφίεσθαι ὅταν γάρ τις τοῦτο ποιῇ, φανερὸς δήπου ἐστὶ τότε οὐ τιμῶν θεούς· χρὴ οὖν μηδὲν ἐλλείποντα κατὰ δύναμιν τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς θαρρεῖν τε καὶ ἐλπίζειν τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά· οὐ γὰρ παρ' ἄλλων γ' ἄν τις μείζω ἐλπίζων σωφρονοίη, ἢ παρὰ τῶν τὰ μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν δυναμένων, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰ τούτοις ἀρέσκοι· ἀρέσκοι δὲ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον, ἢ ὡς μάλιστα πείθοιτο αὐτοῖς; 18. Τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ λέγων τε καὶ αὐτὸς ποιῶν, εὐσεβεστέρους τε καὶ σωφρονεστέρους τοὺς συνόντας παρεσκεύαζεν.

CHAPTER IV.

SUMMARY.

Discourse of Socrates with Hippias the Sophist, in which the former opens up the fountain heads of the Law of Nature and of Nations.

1. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου γε οὐκ ἀπεκρύπτετο ἣν εἶχε γνώμην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργῳ ἀπεδείκνυτο, ἰδίᾳ τε πᾶσι νομίμως τε καὶ ὠφελίμως χρώμενος, καὶ κοινῇ, ἄρχουσί τε ἃ οἱ νόμοι προστάττοιεν πειθόμενος, καὶ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις οὕτως, ὥστε διάδηλος εἶναι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους εὐτακτῶν· 2. Καὶ ὅτε ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπιστάτης

ἔρηταί σε, πόσα καὶ ποῖα Σωκράτους ἐστίν, ἄλλα μὲν πρότερον, ἄλλα δὲ νῦν πειρᾷ λέγειν; ἢ περὶ ἀριθμῶν τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν, εἰ τὰ δὶς πέντε δέκα ἐστίν, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ νῦν, ἃ καὶ πρότερον, ἀποκρίνει; Περὶ μὲν τούτων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ σύ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω· περὶ μέντοι τοῦ δικαίου πάνυ οἶμαι νῦν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, πρὸς ἃ οὔτε σύ, οὔτ' ἄν ἄλλος οὐδεὶς δύναιτ' ἀντειπεῖν. 8. Νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ἔφη, μέγα λέγεις ἀγαθὸν εὑρηκέναι, εἰ παύσονται μὲν οἱ δικασταὶ δίχα ψηφιζόμενοι, παύσονται δὲ οἱ πολῖται περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντές τε καὶ ἀντιδικοῦντες καὶ στασιάζοντες, παύσονται δὲ αἱ πόλεις διαφερόμεναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων, καὶ πολεμοῦσαι· καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶδ', ὅπως ἂν ἀπολειοθείην σου, πρὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι τηλικοῦτον ἀγαθὸν εὑρηκότος. 9. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκούσει, πρίν γ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποφήνῃ, ὅ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι· ἀρκεῖ γάρ, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷς, ἐρωτῶν μὲν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δ' οὐδενὶ θέλων ὑπέχειν λόγον, οὐδὲ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενός. 10. Τί δέ; ὦ Ἱππία, ἔφη, οὐκ ἤσθησαι, ὅτι ἐγώ, ἃ δοκεῖ μοι δίκαια εἶναι, οὐδὲν παύομαι ἀποδεικνύμενος; Καὶ ποῖος δή σοι, ἔφη, οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν; Εἰ δὲ μὴ λόγῳ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ ἀποδείκνυμαι· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἔργον εἶναι; Πολύ γε νὴ Δί', ἔφη· δίκαια μὲν γὰρ λέγοντες πολλοὶ ἄδικα ποιοῦσι, δίκαια δὲ πράττων οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἄδικος εἴη. 11. Ἤισθησαι οὖν πώποτέ μου ἢ ψευδομαρτυροῦντος, ἢ συκοφαντοῦντος, ἢ φίλους ἢ πόλιν εἰς στάσιν ἐμβάλλοντος, ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀδικον πράττοντος; Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπέχεσθαι οὐ δίκαιον ἡγεῖ; Δῆλος εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ νῦν διαφεύγειν ἐγχειρῶν τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι γνώμην, ὅ τι νομίζεις τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ἃ πράττουσιν οἱ δίκαιοι, ἀλλ' ἃ μὴ πράττουσι, ταῦτα λέγεις. 12. Ἀλλ' ὅμην ἔγωγε, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸ μὴ θέλειν ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν δικαιοσύνης ἐπίδειγμα εἶναι· εἰ δέ σοι μὴ δοκεῖ, σκέψαι, ἐὰν τόδε σοι μᾶλλον ἀρέσκῃ· φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νομιμον δικαιον εἶναι. Ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, νόμιμον τε καὶ

οοὺς κρίνωσιν οἱ πολῖται, οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς αὐλητὰς ἐπαινῶσιν, οὐδ' ὅπως τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιητὰς αἱρῶνται. οὐδ' ἵνα τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδωνται, ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῖς νόμοις πείθωνται τούτοις γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμμενόντων, αἱ πόλεις ἰσχυρόταταί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέσταται γίγνονται· ἄνευ δὲ ὁμονοίας, οὔτ' ἂν πόλις εὖ πολιτευθείη, οὔτ' οἶκος καλῶς οἰκηθείη. 17. Ἰδίᾳ δὲ πῶς μὲν ἄν τις ἧττον ὑπὸ πόλεως ζημιοῖτο, πῶς δ' ἂν μᾶλλον τιμῷτο, ἢ εἰ τοῖς νόμοις πείθοιτο; πῶς δ' ἂν ἧττον ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡττῷτο; ἢ πῶς ἂν μᾶλλον νικῴη; τίνι δ' ἄν τις μᾶλλον πιστεύσειε παρακαταθέσθαι ἢ χρήματα, ἢ υἱούς, ἢ θυγατέρας; τίνα δ' ἂν ἡ πόλις ὅλη ἀξιοπιστότερον ἡγήσαιτο τοῦ νομίμου; παρὰ τίνος δ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῶν δικαίων τύχοιεν ἢ γονεῖς, ἢ οἰκεῖοι, ἢ οἰκέται, ἢ φίλοι, ἢ πολῖται, ἢ ξένοι; τίνι δ' ἂν μᾶλλον πολέμιοι πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἀνοχάς, ἢ σπονδάς, ἢ συνθήκας περὶ εἰρήνης; τίνι δ' ἂν μᾶλλον, ἢ τῷ νομίμῳ, σύμμαχοι ἐθέλοιεν γίγνεσθαι; τῷ δ' ἂν μᾶλλον οἱ σύμμαχοι πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἡγεμονίαν, ἢ φρουραρχίαν, ἢ πόλεις; τίνα δ' ἄν τις εὐεργετήσας ὑπολάβοι χάριν κομιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον, ἢ τὸν νόμιμον; ἢ τίνα μᾶλλον ἄν τις εὐεργετήσειεν, ἢ παρ' οὐ χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι νομίζει; τῷ δ' ἄν τις βούλοιτο μᾶλλον φίλος εἶναι, ἢ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ἢ τῷ ἧττον ἐχθρός; τῷ δ' ἄν τις ἧττον πολεμήσειεν, ἢ ᾧ ἂν μάλιστα μὲν φίλος εἶναι βούλοιτο, ἥκιστα δ' ἐχθρός, καὶ ᾧ πλεῖστοι μὲν φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι βούλοιντο εἶναι, ἐλάχιστοι δ' ἐχθροὶ καὶ πολέμιοι; 18. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἱππία, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιδείκνυμι νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· σὺ δ' εἰ τἀναντία γιγνώσκεις, διδασκε Καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας, Ἀλλά, μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔ μοι δοκῶ τἀναντία γιγνώσκειν οἷς εἴρηκας περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. 19. Ἀγράφους δέ τινας οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὦ Ἱππία, νόμους; Τούς γ' ἐν πάσῃ, ἔφη, χώρᾳ κατὰ ταὐτὰ νομιζομένους. Ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὺς ἔθεντο; Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, οἵ γε οὔτε συνελθεῖν ἅπαντες ἂν δυνηθεῖεν, οὔτε ὁμόφωνοί εἰσι; Τίνας οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις τεθεικέναι τοὺς νόμους τούτους; Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, θεοὺς οἶμαι τοὺς

πλησιάζοντας

CHAPTER V.

SUMMARY.

THE advantages resulting from habits of self-control, and the evils attendant upon an opposite course of life.

1. Ὡς δὲ καὶ πρακτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας ἑαυτῷ, νῦν αὖ τοῦτο λέξω· νομίζων γὰρ ἐγκράτειαν ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ μέλλοντι καλόν τι πράξειν, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸς φανερὸς ἦν τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἠσκηκὼς ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἔπειτα διαλεγόμενος προετρέπετο πάντων μάλιστα τοὺς συνόντας πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν. 2. Ἀεὶ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν τρὸς ἀρετὴν χρησίμων αὐτός τε διετέλει μεμνημένος, καὶ τοὺς συνόντας πάντας ὑπομιμνήσκων· οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Εὐθύδημον περὶ ἐγκρατείας τοιάδε διαλεχθέντα· Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἆρα καλὸν καὶ μεγαλεῖον νομίζεις εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὶ καὶ πόλει κτῆμα ἐλευθερίαν; Ὡς οἷόν τέ γε μάλιστα, ἔφη. 3. Ὅστις οὖν ἄρχεται ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, καὶ διὰ ταύτας μὴ δύναται πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, νομίζεις τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον εἶναι; Ἥκιστα, ἔφη. Ἴσως γὰρ ἐλεύθερον φαίνεταί σοι τὸ πράττειν τὰ βέλτιστα, εἶτα τὸ ἔχειν τοὺς κωλύσοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν ἀνελεύθερον νομίζεις. Παντάπασί γε, ἔφη. 4. Παντάπασιν ἄρα σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀνελεύθεροι εἶναι; Νὴ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, εἰκότως. Πότερον δέ σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς κωλύεσθαι μόνον τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, ἢ καὶ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τὰ αἴσχιστα ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔμοιγ', ἔφη, δοκοῦσι ταῦτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι, ἢ ἐκεῖνα κωλύεσθαι. 5. Ποίους δέ τινας δεσπότας ἡγεῖ τοὺς τὰ μὲν ἄριστα κωλύοντας, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα ἀναγκάζοντας; Ὡς δυνατὸν νὴ Δί', ἔφη, κακίστους. Δουλείαν δὲ ποίαν κακίστην νομίζεις εἶναι; Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, τὴν παρὰ τοῖς κακίστοις δεσπόταις Τὴν κακίστην ἄρα δουλείαν οἱ ἀκρατεῖς δουλεύουσιν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. 6. Σοφίαν δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀπεργοῦσα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ ἀκρασία

ἀν τιμώντων αὐτοὺς ἐκάλλιον, ἢ οἱ ἄκοσμα περὶ τοὺς γονέας καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἀφελοῦνται τὰ ἐκείνων καὶ ἀπαλλοτριοῦσι τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους καὶ τοὺς φίλους, καὶ πολλοὺς εὐεργετοῦντες τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτήδεια, πολὺ τὸ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς κρείττους αἱρεῖσθαι. Ἐρώτα τοίνυν, ἔφη. Τί δὲ σοφώτερον ἂν εἴη βιβλίου, τῶν δὲ ῥητόρων ἕτερος ἢ τὰ ἀκόντα πράξαντα; αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔφασαν τὰ ἐναντία πεφασμένα καὶ ἀφανῆ ποιεῖν ἐστιν. Ἀναλογοῦ καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη. Τοὺς δὲ στρατηγοὺς, οὐκ ἀγαθοὺς, οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀφανεῖς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους τοὺς ἀπείρους τὰ δέοντα πράττειν ὁρᾷς ὅτι πάντων μὲν ἀναισθήτους, μάλιστα δὲ ἀμούσους τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς ταμίους τὸ ἀκριτον τοῦτο ἀναγκαιοτάτους, οἷς τὰ ἀνδράποδα κάκιστ' ἔχει; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀμούσους εἶναι; Εἶεν γάρ, ἔφη. Ἔκαστον ἄρα, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἀμούσους ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι; Εἰκότως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἦ καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀμούσους; Πῶς; ἔφη. Τὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐλεῖν ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν, οὐκ ἄμουσον ἡγῇ εἶναι; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Τί δὲ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκροᾶσθαι ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Τί δὲ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκούειν ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἁπτόμενον ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ σοφὸν ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἰόντα ἐπὶ ἄλλο τι ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἢ ἐφ' ὃ ἦλθεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖ

καὶ ἐχθροὺς κρατήσειεν, ἀφ' ὧν οὐ μόνον ὠφέλειαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡδοναὶ μέγισται γίγνονται, οἱ μὲν ἐγκρατεῖς ἀπολαύουσι, πραττοντες αὐτά, οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐδενὸς μετέχουσι· τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἧττον φήσαιμεν τῶν τοιούτων προσήκειν, ἢ ᾧ ἥκιστα ἔξεστι ταῦτα πράττειν, κατεχομένῳ ἐπὶ τῷ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὰς ἐγγυτάτω ἡδονάς; 11. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Δοκεῖς μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειν, ὡς ἀνδρὶ ἥττονι τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν πάμπαν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρετῆς προσήκει. Τί γὰρ διαφέρει, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἄνθρωπος ἀκρατὴς θηρίου τοῦ ἀμαθεστάτου; ὅστις γὰρ τὰ μὲν κράτιστα μὴ σκοπεῖ, τὰ ἥδιστα δ' ἐκ παντὸς τρόποι ζητεῖ ποιεῖν, τί ἂν διαφέροι τῶν ἀφρονεστάτων βοσκημάτων; ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι. 12. Καὶ οὕτως, ἔφη, ἀρίστους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεστάτους ἄνδρας γίγνεσθαι, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους· ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι, διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα· δεῖν οὖν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἑαυτὸν ἕτοιμον παρασκευάζειν, καὶ τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους, καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.

CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY.

SOCRATES strove to teach those who associated with him the true art of reasoning, since he always held that whoever had acquired clear ideas himself of any matter, could, with equal clearness, explain those ideas to others; while, on the other hand, it was not to be wondered at if such as were deficient in that particular should not only be led into error themselves, but likewise mislead others.

1. Ὡς δὲ καὶ διαλεκτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας, πειράσομαι καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν. Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις

ἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμην ἀνανκαῖον εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας, οὐδὲν ἂν δοκεῖν σοι διαφέρειν τοῦ τοὺς τὸ σκέλος λαμβάνειν, καὶ ἄλλους ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι ἵππους καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους ἱππεύειν, τοὺς ἐπισταμένους εἶναι χείρους; οὐδέποτε ἔλεγες. Πάντα γὰρ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω· ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἐπιστήμονα ἀνανκαῖον εἶναι, τοιοῦτον εἶναι. 2. Πρῶτον δὲ τοῦτο σκοπῶμεν· ἆρά σοι φαίνεται τὸν ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ἀνανκαῖον; Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, πολὺ τὸ κεφάλαιον τοῦτο εἶναι. Καὶ ὃς· Κελεύεις οὖν δή; ἔφη. Ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἡ ἀνανκαία ἐστίν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ἡ τῶν ἀναγκαίων τινῶν. Τίνων δὲ ἂν καὶ ἀναίτιον τοῦτον, τῶν ἀναγκαίων τινῶν; Οὐκ ἄλλο γοῦν οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων τούτων οὐδὲν ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος εἶναι, οὐδὲν δέ, ὡς δεῖ τοῦτο ἔχειν τοῦτον. Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἀναγκαίων τούτων οὐδὲν ἄνευ τοῦτου τοῦ τρόπου ἐστίν, ἡ ὡς χρὴ ἄλλον; Οὐ γὰρ οἶδα, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ δὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων τινά, ἢ ὡς οἷόν τε ἄλλως; τοῦτο οἶμαι, ἔφη. 3. Ὃ ἄρα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀναγκαίων κτήματα εἰδώς, ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, αὐτὸς δὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν ἃ γε ταῦτα ποιεῖ, εὖ δεῖ ποιεῖ; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ὃ δὲ γε εὖ ποιῶν, ἀγαθὸς ἔσται; Πάνυ γε οὖν, ἔφη. Ὃ ἄρα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀναγκαίων κτήματα εἰδώς, ἀγαθὸς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχει; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ἐμοί.

3. Ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἆρα ἄρχειν, ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ἄρχειν ἄμεινον; Οὐκ ἄλλου καὶ πολὺ τοῦτου· ἢ τίνα, ἢ ὅστις ἐπίσταιτο, καὶ ἃ δεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους χρήσθαι, τούτου ἂν εἴη. Οὐκοῦν εἰ αὐτὸς τούτων χρήσεται ἀνθρώποις, ὡς δεῖ, χρήσεται; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ γε, ὡς δεῖ, χρήσεται, καλῶς χρήσεται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπους καλῶς χρῆσθαι, καλῶς πράττουσι πόλεσιν προστατεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ; Εἶεν γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ οἰκίαν τοιοῦτος προστατεύσει, ἔσται οἰκία καλῶς οἰκουμένη; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 4. Δοκεῖ δέ σοι οἰκία, ἔφη, ἀνευ οἰκετῶν; Ἧττον γ' οἶμαι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ οἰκετῶν προστατεύσει, ἔσται οἰκία καλῶς οἰκουμένη; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 5. Δοκεῖ δέ σοι οἰκέτης, ἔφη, ἄνευ κακίας; Ἧττον οἶμαι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ καὶ κακίας προστατεύσει, ἔσται οἰκέτης ὠφέλιμος; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ γε ἐπιστήμων τοῦ ὠφελίμους ποιεῖν, ἔσται ὠφέλιμος οἰκέτης. Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν

οὖν τινας πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, μὴ εἰδότας ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Εἰδότας δὲ ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν οἴει τινὰς οἴεσθαι δεῖν μὴ ποιεῖν ταῦτα; Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη. Οἱ δας δέ τινας ἄλλα ποιοῦντας, ἢ ἃ οἴονται δεῖν; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Οἱ ἄρα τὰ περὶ ἀνθρώπους νόμιμα εἰδότες, τὰ δίκαια οὗτοι ποιοῦσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὔκουν οἵ γε τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦντες, δίκαιοί εἰσι; Τίνες γὰρ ἄλλοι; ἔφη. Ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε ἄρα ὁριζοίμεθα, ὁριζόμενοι δικαίους εἶναι τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ περὶ ἀνθρώπους νόμιμα; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

7. Σοφίαν δὲ τί ἂν φήσαιμεν εἶναι; εἰπέ μοι, πότερά σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφοί, ἃ ἐπίστανται, ταῦτα σοφοὶ εἶναι, ἢ εἰσί τινες, ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται, σοφοί; Ἃ ἐπίστανται δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις, ἅ γε μὴ ἐπίσταιτο, ταῦτα σοφὸς εἴη; Ἆρ' οὖν οἱ σοφοὶ ἐπιστήμῃ σοφοί εἰσι; Τίνι γάρ, ἔφη, ἄλλῳ τις ἂν εἴη σοφός, εἴ γε μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ; Ἄλλο δέ τι σοφίαν οἴει εἶναι, ἢ ᾧ σοφοί εἰσιν; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα σοφία ἐστίν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐπίστασθαι; Οὐδὲ μὰ Δί' ἔμοιγε πολλοστὸν μέρος αὐτῶν. Πάντα μὲν ἄρα σοφὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνθρωπον εἶναι; Μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Ὃ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος, τοῦτο καὶ σοφός ἐστιν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

8. Ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, καὶ τἀγαθὸν οὕτω ζητητέον ἐστί; Πῶς; ἔφη. Δοκεῖ σοι τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. Τί δέ; τὸ ἄλλῳ ὠφέλιμον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἐνίοτε ἄλλῳ βλαβερὸν εἶναι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ἄλλο δ' ἄν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον, ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὅτῳ ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

9. Τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἔχοιμεν ἄν πως ἄλλως εἰπεῖν, ἢ, εἰ ἔστιν, ὀνομάζεις καλὸν ἢ σῶμα, ἢ σκεῦος, ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν, ὃ οἶσθα πρὸς πάντα καλὸν ὄν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο ἑκάστῳ καλῶς ἔχει χρῆσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Καλὸν δὲ

δ' ἐκ τιμημάτων, πλουτοκρατίαν, ὅπου δ' ἐκ πάντων, δημοκρατίαν.

13. Εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ περί του ἀντιλέγοι, μηδὲν ἔχων σαφὲς λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως, ἤτοι σοφώτερον φάσκων εἶναι, ὃν αὐτὸς λέγοι, ἢ πολιτικώτερον, ἢ ἀνδρειότερον, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὡδέ πως. 14. Φῂς σὺ ἀμείνω πολίτην εἶναι, ὃν σὺ ἐπαινεῖς, ἢ ὃν ἐγώ; Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐπεσκεψάμεθα, τί ἐστιν ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου; Ποιῶμεν τοῦτο. Οὔκουν ἐν μὲν χρημάτων διοικήσει κρατοίη ἂν ὁ χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν ποιῶν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ἐν δέ γε πολέμῳ, ὁ καθυπερτέραν τῶν ἀντιπάλων; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἐν δὲ πρεσβείᾳ ἄρα, ὃς ἂν φίλους ἀντὶ πολεμίων παρασκευάζῃ; Εἰκότως γε. Οὔκουν καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ, ὁ στάσεις τε παύων, καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιῶν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὕτω δὲ τῶν λόγων ἐπαναγομένων, καὶ τοῖς ἀντιλέγουσιν αὐτοῖς φανερὸν ἐγίγνετο τἀληθές. 15. Ὁπότε δὲ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίοι, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου· τοιγαροῦν πολὺ μάλιστα, ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχεν· ἔφη δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἀναθεῖναι τὸ ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα εἶναι, ὡς ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους.

CHAPTER VII.

SUMMARY

Socrates always showed himself solicitous to have his friends become capable of performing their own business, that they might not stand in need of others to perform it for them. For this reason, he made it his study, more than any other man, to find out wherein any of his followers were likely to excel in things not unbecoming a wise and good man; and in such points as he himself could give them any instruction about, he did so with the utmost readiness, and where he could not, he was always ready to carry them to some more skilful master. Yet was he careful to

by the hands of the men of every nation, parting to each people what was best for the practical purposes of life.

1. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου γνώμης ἀποφαινομένους Σωκράτης πρὸς τοιῷδε διελέγετο λόγῳ, ὅτου μὲν ἄρχειν ἄξιοι τῶν ἐμπείρως εἶναι· δῆλα δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς τοιαῦτα φύσιν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπου, οἷς τρόπον τινὰ τοῦτον μὲν γῆν, ὃν δ' ὑγρὸν εἶναι, μέλισσαν δ' εἶναι φύσει εἶναι, ὅτου τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων μάθῃ· ὧν δὲ πρακτέον ἀνθρώπῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἶναι, ἐκ μὲν τούτου οὐδὲν πρόσθεν ἐπιδείκνυται, ὅτου δὲ αὐτὸς ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἢ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἴδιον αὐτοῖς. 2. Ἐδόκουν δὲ καὶ μέγα ὅτου ἔδει δρεπάνην εἶναι ἑκάστου πρὸ μικροῦ τοῦ αὐτὸν πεποιῆσθαι· αὐτῶν γοῦν μέγα μὲν τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖν μαθόντα, ὅσῳ ἀκριβὲς τὸ γνώμων, εἰ ποιεῖ ὀρθάς, τῷ κανόνι ἰδεῖν ἢ περιφέρειαν ἢ περιφέρειαν, ἢ ἀκριβῶς ἢ ἐγγὺς ἀποβλέποντα· αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτο μέλλον εἶναι ποιεῖν ὀρθὸν ὁρᾶν πρὸς τὸν προτέχοντα τὸν κανόνα τῇ κατηγόρᾳ, ἅμα τήν τε γῆν, ὅπισθεν ἐόντα αὐτόν, καὶ τὸν μικρὸν ἀνθρώπων ἀπόπατον. 3. Τὸ δὲ μέγα τῶν ἀνηκόντων ἀκριβοῦσθαι γεωμετρίαν ἱκανὴν ἀποδείκνυον· ἢ γὰρ τῶν ὁπλίτων τάξις, πῶς δεῖ ἄρχειν· καὶ τὰ ἐκ μηχανῆς κάλλη ἐν ἔργῳ δὴ τοῦτο ἔφασκον εἶναι ἀκριβῶς ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τε καὶ ὠφελίμων μαθημάτων ἀποφαίνων. 4. Ἔδοκουν δὲ καὶ ἀστρολογίαν ἱκανὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐκείνην μέχρι τοῦ ἐκείνῳ τε ὥρας καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἀρκοῦσαν γιγνώσκειν· ὅτου γὰρ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας καὶ μηνὸς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ γιγνομένου, ἐκ τούτου ἐπίστασθαι τὰ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φαινόμενα, καὶ ὅταν ἄλλα ἢ ὁπόταν ἢ μηνὸς ἢ ἐνιαυτοῦ περιτύχῃ, τὰς τοῦ ἔργου τελεσφορίας χρόνῳ· τὰς ὥρας τῶν ἀστρικῶν ἀναγιγνώσκοντας· καὶ τούτου δὲ μάθοι ἂν μαθὼν τοῦτο τὸ τῶν ἀνεμοσκοπῶν, τίνι ἐκάστοτε καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, ὧν ἀναγκαῖα τοῦτο τὰ μαθήματα. 5. Τὸ δὲ μέγα τοῦτο ἀκριβοῦσθαι μαθόντα, μὴ ἐν τοῖς καὶ τὰ μὴ δεῖ ἐν τῇ μέσῃ πεφυκυῖᾳ ἔστιν, καὶ τοὺς πλείστους τε καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτους ἀνθρώπους τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν πεφυκότων, καὶ τῶν ἀέρων

αὐτῶν ζητοῦντας κατατρίβεσθαι, ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέτρεπεν· ὠφέλειαν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἔφη ὁρᾶν· καίτοι οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἦν· ἔφη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι κατατρίβειν ἀνθρώπου βίον, καὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὠφελίμων ἀποκωλύειν. 6. Ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ἢ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα, ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν· κινδυνεῦσαι δ' ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν, ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι. 7. Ἐκεῖνος γάρ, λέγων μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον, ἠγνόει, ὡς τὸ μὲν πῦρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὁρᾶδίως καθορῶσιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν ἥλιον οὐ δύνανται ἀντιβλέπειν, καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου καταλαμπόμενοι τὰ χρώματα μελάντερα ἔχουσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς οὔ· ἠγνόει δέ, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων ἄνευ μὲν ἡλίου αὐγῆς οὐδὲν δύναται καλῶς αὔξεσθαι, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς θερμαινόμενα πάντα ἀπόλλυται· φάσκων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἠγνόει, ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πυρὶ ὢν οὔτε λάμπει, οὔτε πολὺν χρόνον ἀντέχει, ὁ δὲ ἥλιος τὸν πάντα χρόνον πάντων λαμπρότατος ὢν διαμένει. 8. Ἐκέλευε δὲ καὶ λογισμοὺς μανθάνειν, καὶ τούτων δὲ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκέλευε φυλάττεσθαι τὴν μάταιον πραγματείαν, μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεπεσκόπει, καὶ συνδιεξῆει τοῖς συνοῦσι. 9. Προέτρεπε δὲ σφόδρα καὶ ὑγιείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς συνόντας, παρά τε τῶν εἰδότων μανθάνοντας ὅσα ἐνδέχοιτο, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστον προσέχοντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, τί βρῶμα, ἢ τί πόμα, ἢ ποῖος πόνος συμφέροι αὐτῷ, καὶ πῶς τούτοις χρώμενος ὑγιεινότατ' ἂν διάγοι· τοῦ γὰρ οὕτω προσέχοντος ἑαυτῷ, ἔργον ἔφη εἶναι εὑρεῖν ἰατρὸν τὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν συμφέροντα αὐτῷ μᾶλλον διαγιγνώσκοντα ἑαυτοῦ. 10. Εἰ δέ τις μᾶλλον, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν, ὠφελεῖσθαι βούλοιτο, συνεβούλευε μαντικῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ εἰδότα, δι' ὧν οἱ θεοὶ τοῖς

ἀνθρώπους περὶ τῶν προσηκόντων σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν, ἢν μὴ γίγνεσθαι σαφηνείᾳ ἀδύνατον.

CHAPTER VIII.

SUMMARY

Socrates proceeds to show, in the concluding chapter that the study of Harmony was no part of his teaching; how guilty it falsified in relation to the current opinion; how it was pursued by its votaries; and how worthless with a brief reminiscence of the arguments that have been advanced throughout it.

1. Εἰ δὲ τις ἴσως ἀποροῖτο αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα διατεμνομένου, ἢ τε ἀστρολογία, καὶ ἡ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἐπιστήμη, ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀστρολογικῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀφέστηκεν, οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἀπορήσειεν· ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτων τοιαῦτα διαλέγεσθαι, οἷα ἂν παύσῃ ἄνθρωπον τελέως ἀμαθῆ ὄντα. ἔστι γὰρ μὴ ἀγνοοῦντα τοῦτο εἰδέναι, καὶ τὸ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀνάγκης μακρὰν ἀπέχειν, ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς χρείας ἐγγὺς τῆς μανίας ἀπελαύνειν, πολλὴν σωφροσύνην. τῆς τε ὥρας πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχοντα καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐπιστάμενον καὶ ἀναγκαίως ἔχοντα εἰδέναι, καὶ τῆς εὐπορίας τοῦ σιτίσασθαι προνοητικὸν καὶ ἀκριβοῦντα ἱκανῶς. 2. ἐπιτηδεύειν γὰρ, οὐδένα τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἀξιῶν ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι· ἀνάγκῃ μὲν γὰρ ἐργάσεσθαι αὐτὰ, μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔργων· ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄξια μὲν μισθοῦ τοῦ μισθοῦ εἶναι τὸν δὲ τούτου μισθὸν ἐκ δημοσίου ἀποτίνεσθαι, ὅτῳ δὲ ἡ θεραπεία τὰ ἄξια ἀποτίνοιτο· καὶ τὸν χρόνον τούτων ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσι μηκέτι ἐλάττω γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μείζω· ἢ τὸν ἐπιτηδεύοντα χρόνον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιτηδεύοντα μείονα γίγνεσθαι· καὶ τὸν χρόνον τούτων ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσι μηκέτι ἐλάττω γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μείζω· ἢ τὸν ἐπιτηδεύοντα χρόνον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιτηδεύοντα μείονα γίγνεσθαι. 3. Καὶ τῶν δὲ τοῦ καλλίστου ἢ κάκιστα ἀπολύσας; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι καλόν; ἢ ὃν δὲ μὴ λανθάνει τοὺς ἀκούοντας; τοῦτο δ' ἂν γένοιτο ἀδύνατον· τοῦτο δ' ἂν γένοιτο ἀδύνατον· τοῦτο δ' ἂν γένοιτο ἀδύνατον·

δαιμονεστάτου; 4. Λέξω δὲ καὶ ἃ Ἑρμογένους τοῦ Ἱπποτίκου ἤκουσα περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἔφη γάρ, ἡδὺ μὲν Μελήτου γεγραμμένου αὐτὸν τὴν γραφήν, αὐτὸς ἀκούων αὐτοῦ πάντα μᾶλλον, ἢ περὶ τῆς δίκης διαλεγομένου, λέγειν αὐτῷ, ὡς χρὴ σκοπεῖν ὅ τι ἀπολογήσεται· τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν· Οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι τοῦτο μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι; ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἤρετο, ὅπως; εἰπεῖν αὐτόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιῶν διαγεγένηται, ἢ διασκοπῶν μὲν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, πράττων δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπεχόμενος, ἥνπερ νομίζοι καλλίστην μελέτην ἀπολογίας εἶναι. 5. Αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν εἰπεῖν· Οὐχ ὁρᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἱ Ἀθήνησι δικασταὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἤδη μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδικοῦντας ἀπέλυσαν; Ἀλλὰ νὴ τὸν Δία, φάναι αὐτόν, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας, ἠναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον. 6. Καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν· Θαυμαστὰ λέγεις· τὸν δέ· Θαυμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ βέλτιον εἶναι, ἐμὲ τελευτᾶν τὸν βίον ἤδη; οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἐγὼ οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἄν, οὔτε βέλτιον, οὔθ' ἥδιον ἐμοῦ βεβιωκέναι; ἄριστα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ζῆν τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπιμελομένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δέ, τοὺς μάλιστα αἰσθανομένους, ὅτι βελτίους γίγνονται. 7. Ἃ ἐγὼ μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ χρόνου ἠσθανόμην ἐμαυτῷ συμβαίνοντα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐντυγχάνων, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους παραθεωρῶν ἐμαυτόν, οὕτω διατετέλεκα περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ γιγνώσκων· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἐμοὶ φίλοι οὕτως ἔχοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ διατελοῦσιν, οὐ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἐμέ, καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοῦντες οὕτως ἂν εἶχον πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φίλους, ἀλλὰ διόπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἂν οἴονται ἐμοὶ συνόντες βέλτιστοι γίγνεσθαι. 8. Εἰ δὲ βιώσομαι πλείω χρόνον, ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἀκούειν ἧττον, καὶ διανοεῖσθαι χεῖρον, καὶ δυσμαθέστερον καὶ ἐπιλησμονέστερον ἀποβαίνειν, καὶ ὧν πρότερον βελτίων ἦν, τούτων χείρω γίγνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ μὴν ταῦτά γε μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ μὲν

NOTES.

NOTES.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

§ 1.

Τισι ποτὲ λόγοις. "By what arguments in the world," *i. e.*, by what possible arguments. Observe the intensive force which *ποτὲ* here gives to the interrogative, and, moreover, that *τίσι* is here put for *οἱοτισι*, since sometimes, in indirect questions, the simple interrogative forms are used for the compound, when the indirect question assumes the character of the direct. (*Kühner*, § 877, *Obs.* 2, *Jelf.*)—*οἱ γραψάμενοι Σωκράτην.* "They who accused Socrates." Observe the force of the middle voice. The expression *γράφεσθαί τινα* properly means, to *cause* the name of an accused person to be *written* down before a magistrate, and, as this was virtually done by the accuser's handing in a written indictment, the full form of expression is *γραφὴν γράφεσθαί τινα*, the verb governing, in fact, a double accusative. But *γραφήν* is commonly omitted. (*Stallb. ad Plat., Euthyphr.*, c. 1, B. *Schömann, de Comit. Athen.*, p. 179.) The accusers of Socrates were Meletus, a young tragic poet; Lycon, a public orator; and Anytus, a tanner, but a man of great influence in the state. (Consult *Wiggers' Life of Socrates*, p. 407 of this volume.)—*ὡς ἄξιος εἴη θανάτου τῇ πόλει.* "That he was deserving of death with regard to the state," *i. e.*, at the hands of the state. The dative is here employed to express a general reference. (*Matthiæ*, § 387.)—*εἴη.* Observe the employment of the optative to indicate what others asserted, not what the writer himself believed. (*Kühner*, § 802, 3, *b.*, *Jelf.*)

ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραφή. "For the accusation." The particle *μέν* is here what the grammarians term solitary, that is, without its usual concomitant *δέ*. (*Kühner*, § 766, *Jelf.*)—*γραφή.* The accusation, as the word imports, was in writing, which was always the case in public actions. The term *γραφή* means properly nothing more than a writ. It was necessary, in the first place, that the date should be affixed, then the name of the magistrate before whom it was brought, then those of the accused and the accuser, or accusers, then the heads of the indictment, and, lastly, the names of the witnesses. (*Schömann, de Comit. Athen.*, p. 179.)—*τοιάδε τις ἦν.* "Was some such a one (as this)," *i. e.*, was in substance as follows. Xenophon

gives here merely a general summary of the imperfect, devoid of all determination. Observe the particles at which we imperfect is *to render.* (*Kühner*, § 659. 4, *Jelf*.)

silent. "In a strong sense," i. e., deep sense in the eye of the law—only one § 1016, section 2 = 1. 2. "In not acknowledging (as would have been more acknowledged as guilt," i. e., in not acknowledging by word of mouth or, in other words, in not acknowledging according to the usual, established usages of the part. The part of the charge they assert, that Socrates neglected the accustomed worship of the country. As regards this peculiar employment of regular verbal forms, cf. *Plat. Euthyph.*, p. 11. B., and *Aristoph. ad fin.*, *Clouds*, 904; *Ad Pers.*, 107.—Ἄλλα καινὰ δαιμόνια. "Other strange divinities." The allusion here is primarily to what was called the genius or daemonium of Socrates—(*Schol. to* ——) "Whatever be in a strong-bred sire"!

§ 2.

γράψαι μὲν οὖν. "In the first place, then," i. e., as regards the first charge. Observe that μὲν here stands opposed to δεῖ in the commencement of sect. 3.—τοῦ. In the sense of τίνι. (*Plat. Rep.*, I. 338, 2.)—πολὺ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον. "What possible kind of proof do they adduce?" i. e., what in the world do they find any proof in support of this? Observe the infinitive form of verb and complete sense of the word, p. 1.—ἐκεῖνο τὸ μὲν κατηγόρημα ἦν τοιόνδε. "It was both equally and exceedingly." Instead of the imperfect form ἦν, perhaps ἐστὶ, &c., the Greeks had the power, as fully was already observed, of expressing a thing with the utmost force by simply stating it. (*Krüger*, § 56, 10. 1. 2.)—ἐκεῖνο. The distinctive assertion of the Greeks when pointing to the original and older matter, around which were arranged the appendages of the more modern of the family. The Romans, on the other hand, laid more attention also to the conjunctions, which form so rare feature in the matter of the ancient—parataxis.—ὑπὲρ τούτων. "For these matters." The Greek was partial to such more vernacular terms than the Latin idiomatic, since it signifies but means by which the journey of life may be performed, the vessel be well provisioned; thus in the above, and like examples &c., where the wish of the poet is directed by inspiration, as well as the signs which the gods throw in the way of man. (*Hist. Anc.*, 2 v. *Germania.*)

ἀκούσαντες. "Being commonly reported," i. e., and a matter of common conversation. The reading of the ordinary text, ἀκούσαντες ὡς, was unnecessarily adopted by the best critics. (*Cobet.*)

pare *Bornemann, ad loc.*)—*ὡς*. "How that."—*φαίη*. The optative in the indirect narration (*oratio obliqua*), to denote the assertion of another. (*Kühner*, § 885, 2, *Jelf.*)—*τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν*. "That the deity gave intimations unto him." The term *δαιμόνιον*, in general, signifies the same as *θεῖον*, *i. e.*, "divine," or whatsoever proceeds from the gods. Hence the expression *τὸ δαιμόνιον* (with the article) has the same meaning as *τὸ θεῖον*, "the deity," "the divinity." (Compare *Proleg.*, ch. v.)—*αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι εἰσφέρειν*. "To have accused him of introducing." The verb *αἰτιάομαι* is often construed, as here, with an accusative and an infinitive. (Compare ii., 7, 12.)

§ 3.

καινότερον τῶν ἄλλων. Observe that *ἄλλων* here takes the place of *ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι*. The Greeks are so fond of the genitive with the comparative, that they even put in the genitive an object to which the comparison does not directly refer. (*Buttmann*, § 132, *note* 5, *ed. Rob.*)—*μαντικὴν νομίζοντες*. "Acknowledging the existence of an art of divination," *i. e.*, believing in divination.—*οἰωνοῖς τε καὶ φήμαις, κ. τ. λ.* "Omens from birds, and voices, and signs, and sacrifices." By *φῆμαι* are meant omens taken from the voices of men, and hence some supply *ἀνθρώπων* here. By *σύμβολα* are meant signs of various kinds, such as thunder, lightning, the meeting a person, &c. By *θυσίαι* are indicated the omens and presages derived from inspecting the entrails of victims.—*οὗτοί τε*. The particle *τὲ* here stands opposed to the *καί* in *κἀκεῖνος*, so that *οὗτοί τε γὰρ . . . . κἀκεῖνος* is the same, in fact, as saying *ὡς γὰρ οὗτοι . . . . οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνος*.—*τοὺς ὄρνιθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας*. "That the birds (which they see), or the persons that meet them."—*τοῖς μαντευομένοις*. "To those who consult by divination."—*κἀκεῖνος δὲ οὕτως ἐνόμιζεν*. "And so, likewise, did he think." (Compare note on *οὗτοί τε*.)

§ 4.

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι. "The majority of persons, however." The particle *ἀλλά* here introduces a limitation to the preceding clause, the writer now proceeding to show how it was that Socrates, though entertaining these sentiments respecting divination in common with the multitude, yet incurred the accusation of impiety. (*Herbst, ad loc.*)—*ἀποτρέπεσθαί τε καὶ προτρέπεσθαι*. "That they are both diverted (from some things) and urged on (to others)."—*ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν*. "As he really thought," *i. e.*, as he really be-

That is, as often as the circumstances mentioned in the succeeding clause occurred, so often would he have appeared, &c. (*Kühner, ad loc. Kühner, G. G.*, § 424, *β., Jelf.*)—*εἰ προαγορεύων ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ*, &c. "If, in forewarning them of things as shown (unto him) by some deity, he were thereupon even openly uttering what was false" Observe the employment of *ἐφαίνετο* with a participle, and its supplying in this way the place of an adverb, while the participle is to be rendered by a tense. (*Buttmann*, § 144, *note* 8, *ed. Rob.*)—*κἄτα*. Contracted for *καὶ εἶτα*. The forms *κἄτα* and *κἄπειτα* (*καὶ ἔπειτα*) are often introduced before participles where we would expect the simple *εἶτα* and *ἔπειτα*. In such cases *καί* is not expletive, as some imagine, but has the force of "even." (*Heindorf ad Plat., Phæd.*, 89, D. *Stallb. ad Plat., Gorg.*, 457, B.)—*ὅτι οὐκ ἂν προέλεγεν*. The imperfect, again, of an action often repeated.—*εἰ μὴ ἐπίστευεν ἀληθεύσειν*. "If he had not believed that he was about to speak the truth," *i. e.*, that these predictions of his would actually come to pass.

ταῦτα δέ. "Now with regard to these things," *i. e.*, his believing that he was about to foretell what would come to pass. The train of ideas is as follows: A sure knowledge of the future is an attribute of deity alone. If, then, any man believes that he is going to predict the future truly, he must, of course, refer this to the inspiration of deity, that is, he must, of course, believe in the existence of deity. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*πιστεύων δὲ θεοῖς*. "Now, if he trusted in gods," *i. e.*, if he were sure that his predictions would come to pass, because they were foreshown unto him by the deity.—*πῶς ἐνόμιζεν*. "How did he believe," *i. e.*, how could he possibly think.

§ 6.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐποίει καὶ τάδε. "But, in truth, he did this also." The particles *ἀλλά μήν* are here employed to express a strong affirmation or asseveration, and serve to introduce a new argument, and that, too, a very weighty one, for the purpose of proving that Socrates believed in the existence of gods. The adversative *ἀλλά* is aimed at the calumnies of his accusers, while *μήν* serves to show the confidence of his defender.—*τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα*. "The things that were necessary to be done," *i. e.*, whatever might be their issue. The reference is to things that must be done, as a matter of course, and which are required either by duty, or sound reason, or necessity. These follow fixed and certain rules, without which they can not be performed.—*καὶ πράττειν*. "Even (so) to do." Equivalent to *οὕτω καὶ πράττειν*.—*ἐνόμιζεν*. Ernesti reads *ἐνόμιζον*, the conjecture of

§ 7

§ 8.

τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις, κ. τ. λ. "He said, however, that the gods reserved unto themselves the most important of the things connected with these pursuits," *i. e.*, the more important results arising from their exercise. Supply after *τούτοις* the words *τοῖς μαθήμασιν ὄντων.—δῆλον εἶναι.* "Was manifest." In Greek, any dependent clause, in an *oratio obliqua*, may stand in the accusative and infinitive, depending on a verb of saying. In Latin, this is restricted to such clauses of the *oratio obliqua* as are introduced by relative pronouns or relative conjunctions. (*Kühner*, § 889, *Jelf.*)

οὐτενσαμένῳ. Observe the force of the middle in this word and in *οἰκοδομησαμένῳ*, as referring to the doing of a thing for one's self.

εἰ συμφέρει. "Whether it be advantageous (or not)." The particle *εἰ* is neither affirmative nor negative, but we must always ascertain from the context whether affirmation or negation is to be implied.—*ἵνα εὐφραίνηται.* "In order that he may be gladdened," *i. e.*, that he may enjoy happiness. Observe the employment of the subjunctive after the aorist participle, to indicate an event continued into present time. (*Heindorf ad Plat., Protag.*, p. 29.)—*εἰ διὰ ταύτην ἀνιάσεται.* "Whether he shall not be grieved on her account." Observe the negative force of *εἰ* as required by the context; and, moreover, that *ἀνιάσεται*, the future middle, is to be taken in a passive sense. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*κηδεστάς.* "Relatives." Connexions by marriage.—*εἰ στερήσεται.* "Whether he shall not be deprived." The future middle again in a passive sense.

§ 9.

εἶναι δαιμόνιον. "Appertains to the deity." Observe that *δαιμονιον* (literally "divine") is here opposed to all that springs from the operation of the human intellect.—*τῆς ἀνθρωπινης γνώμης.* "Are within the reach of human intellect." Supply *εἶναι.—δαιμονᾶν.* "Are mad." The primary meaning is, "to be possessed by an evil spirit," and hence "to be driven to madness." As *δαιμονᾶν*, then, is equivalent to *ὑπὸ δαίμονος κατέχεσθαι*, observe the oxymoron implied by it as opposed to *δαιμόνιον.—ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρωποις ἔδωκαν, κ. τ. λ.* "(Respecting those things) which the gods have given unto men to discern by learning," *i. e.*, by exerting their own reasoning powers. The participle here expresses the means, and is put in the same case with *ἀνθρωποις*. So in Latin, *nobis dedit esse beatis*. In other words, *μαθοῦσι*, though it does not belong immediately to *ἀνθρώποις*, but to *διακρίνειν*, stands in the dative by a species of attraction. (*Buttmann*, § 144, note 5, *ed. Rob.*)

part of the morning, previous to this, was termed *πρωΐ*, or *πρὸ τῆς ἡμέρας*. Compare *Anab.*, i., 8, 1.

ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι. "Where he would be likely to hold intercourse with the greatest number of persons," *i. e.*, where he thought he would meet with most. Sometimes the *oratio obliqua* is used in the dependent clauses of an *oratio recta*, when it is to be marked, that a statement is made, not as by the speaker himself, but as passing in another person's mind. (*Kühner*, § 585, *Obs.*, *Jelf.*) —*καὶ ἔλεγε μὲν ὡς τὸ πολύ.* "And he was for the most part engaged in conversation." Socrates never delivered any complete discourse, but conversed with his hearers in a friendly manner, on topics just as they were suggested by the occasion.

§ 11.

Σωκράτους . . . . . οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν, οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν. "Either saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying." Verbs of seeing are not properly construed with the genitive except in poetry. Here, however, *εἶδεν* is construed with *πράττοντος*, in order to preserve the symmetry of expression, since *λέγοντος ἤκουσεν* immediately follows. (*Kühner*, 528, *Anm.*, 3, *Germ. ed.*)—*τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως.* "The nature of the universe." The inquiries of Socrates were turned away from the speculative questions which had engaged previous philosophers, such as the origin and formation of the world, the unity of the first cause and the variety of its operations, in short, from divine to human affairs.

ἥπερ. "As." Literally, ("in the way) in which." Supply *ὁδῷ*. —*ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος, κ. τ. λ.* "How that which was called *κόσμος* by the professors of wisdom was brought into being." By *κόσμος* is here meant "the world," or "universe," so called from its perfect arrangement and order, and hence opposed to the *indigesta moles* of Chaos. The term is said to have been first employed in this sense by Pythagoras. The Latin *mundus* corresponds exactly to this. (*Phot.*, *Biblioth.*, *cod.* 659. Compare *Bentley*, *Phal.*, p. 391, *ed. Dycc.*) —*σοφιστῶν.* Employed here in the sense of *ῥησοφόρων*. The earlier philosophers were all called *σοφισταί*, in the better sense of the term. Pythagoras first modestly styled himself *φιλόσοφος*, or a *lover of knowledge* or *wisdom* for its own sake, an *amateur*. We must not confound these *σοφισταί* with the later sophists in the time of Socrates.—*ἔφυ.* This reading occurs in one MS., and in the early editions. Most of the MSS. have *ἔχει*, which Zeune, Schneider, Bornemann, Dindorf, and others have adopted. Consult, however, Kühner's note.

§ 12

§ 13

emotions of the mind, in place of *ὅτι*. Strictly speaking, however *εἰ* is purposely used in such cases, to carry with it an expression of uncertainty and doubt. The Attic custom of avoiding a tone of decision in discourse was the occasion of this and, in accordance with this custom, *εἰ* is used of things not only highly probable, but, as in the present instance, entirely certain. (*Buttmann*, § 149, *Rob.*)—*ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας, κ. τ. λ.* "Since that even they who pride themselves most upon discoursing concerning such matters as these." For the construction here with the infinitive *δοξάζειν*, consult note on *δῆλον εἶναι*, § 8. The verb *φρονεῖν*, with *ἐπί* and a dative, signifies "to pride one's self upon something." It is usually accompanied by the adverb *μέγα*. (Compare *Matthiæ*, § 585, *b.*)—*διακεῖσθαι*. "Are affected," *i. e.*, act.

§ 14.

τῶν τε γὰρ μαινομένων. The particle *τέ* here corresponds to *τέ* in the words *τῶν τε μεριμνώντων*, and the two sentences are to be regarded as parallel to one another. The *τέ* in the first sentence is to be rendered "as," and in the second "so." Xenophon rarely connects by means of *τέ . . . . τέ*. Such an arrangement occurs more frequently in poetry; whereas, in prose, we generally find it only when whole sentences, or, at least, complete portions of sentences, are to be connected. (*Kühner*, 754, 3, *Jelf.*)—*τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ φοβεῖσθαι*. Compare *Horat., Sat.*, ii., 3, 53: "*Est genus unum Stultitiæ nihilum metuenda timentis.*"—*ἐν ὄχλῳ*. "Amid a crowd," *i. e.*, before a large concourse.—*οὐδ' ἐξιτητέον εἰς ἀνθρώπους εἶναι*. "That they must not even go out among men," *i. e.*, go into public. With *ἐξιτητέον* supply *αὐτοῖς*. Neuter verbals in *τέον* denote necessity, and answer to the Latin gerund in *dum*.

λίθους καὶ ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα. "Stones and common pieces of wood," *i. e.*, stocks and stones. The participle *τυχών* is often used to signify any thing common or comparatively worthless; any thing which may be met with any where. Hence *ξύλα τὰ τυχόντα* will mean literally "pieces of wood that *meet* us, (*i. e.*, with which we meet), any where and at any time;" in which observe the force of the aorist. Schneider thinks that by *λίθους* and *ξύλα statues* of stone or wood are here meant, but the epithet *τὰ τυχόντα* clearly disproves this. Xenophon, on the contrary, alludes, as Kühner correctly remarks, to the principle of Fetichism, that is, the worship of material substances, such as stones, plants, weapons, &c., a species of idolatry still common among the negro tribes in some of the western parts of Africa.

§ 15.

ἐσκόπει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ. Compare note on the commencement of § 12.—*ἀρ'*. "Whether."—*τ' ἀνθρώπεια*. "Human arts." Literally, "the things appertaining to man."—*τοῦθ', ὅ τι ἂν μάθωσιν, ποιήσειν*. "That they will practice that, whatsoever they may have learned."—*οἱ τὰ θεῖα ζητοῦντες*. "They who seek to investigate celestial things."—*αἷς ἀνάγκαις*. Compare § 11.—*ὕδατα*. "Rains."—*ὥρας*. "Seasons."—*καὶ ὅτου δ' ἄλλου*. "And whatever else also." Observe the force of *δέ*.—*ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστα*. "In what way each of such things as these." Supply *ὁδῷ* after *ἢ*.

§ 16.

τῶν ταῦτα πραγματευομένων. "Those who busied themselves about these things." The verb *πραγματεύομαι* properly means "to make any thing one's business," "to work at it," "to take it in hand."—*αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἂν ἀεὶ διελέγετο*. "He himself, however, was always, as often as an opportunity occurred, conversing on subjects relative to man." We have given *ἂν* here, with the imperfect indicative, the meaning assigned to it by Hermann (*ad Vig.*, p. 820. Compare *Reisig, de vi et usu ἂν particulæ*, p. 115). Our common English idiom, however, would answer just as well, and would, besides, harmonize better with *ἀεί*, "He himself, however, *would* always be conversing," &c.—*τῶν ἀνθρωπείων*. Socrates, as we have already observed, strove to turn the attention of his countrymen from speculative questions of a physical nature to the subject of moral duties, and to the love of virtue; and hence Cicero might well say of him that he was the first who called down philosophy from heaven to earth, and introduced her into the cities and habitations of men, that she might instruct them concerning life and manners, concerning good and evil things. (*Tusc. Quæst.*, v., 4.)

σκοπῶν. "Considering," *i. e.*, investigating.—*τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία*. "What self-control, what mad desire." *Μανία* here stands opposed to *σωφροσύνη*, as in Plato's Protagoras (323, B.): *ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, ... ἐνταῦθα μανίαν.*—*ἀνδρεία*. "Manliness." For *ἀνδρεία* in this place, Stephens and Zeune write *ἀνδρία*, contrary to all the MSS. *Ἀνδρία* is properly "fortitude," whereas here the idea of courage is required, in opposition to cowardice or *δειλία*. (Consult *Kühner, ad loc.*, and compare iv., 6, 10.)—*πολιτικός*. "A statesman." Literally, "one skilled in regulating the affairs of a state."—*ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων*. "One skilled in governing men."—*καλοὺς κἀγαθούς*. "Honorable and worthy." The ethical

§ 17

§ 18

or "presiding officer," in both the senate and the assembly of the people, and he had the power of passing or rejecting any thing that was proposed to him. He had also the key of the treasury. As his office involved very important powers, it lasted for only a single day.

τὸν βουλευτικὸν ὅρκον. "The senatorial oath."—*ὀμόσας · · · · γενόμενος.* Observe the asyndeton. Two or more participles often stand in the same sentence without being connected by a copulative conjunction *καί* or *τέ*. This is the case when the participles are opposed to each other, or in a climax, or where (as in the present instance) two or more single actions are brought forward in rapid succession. (*Kühner*, § 706, *Jelf.*)

ἐν ᾧ ἦν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους βουλεύσειν. "In which it was (contained), that he will discharge the duties of a senator according to the laws," *i. e.*, in which there was a clause to that effect. The expression *κατὰ τοὺς νόμους βουλεύσειν* is the subject of *ἦν.*—*ἐν τῷ δήμῳ.* "Over the people," *i. e.*, in the assembly of the people. Literally, "among the people."—*παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα στρατηγούς, κ. τ. λ.* "To put to death by a single vote, in violation of the laws, all the nine commanders, namely, Thrasyllus and Erasinides, with their colleagues." The Athenian commanders here referred to had gained a brilliant naval victory over the Lacedæmonians, near the islands called Arginusæ, B.C. 406. After the battle, however, a tempest arose, which prevented the Athenian leaders from saving the shipwrecked sailors and soldiers, and from taking up and burying the dead. For this omission they were publicly accused, and six of them, who had returned to Athens, were put to death. A discrepancy, however, exists with regard to the number of these commanders. The text here says *nine* (*ἐννέα*), but Xenophon himself, elsewhere, makes the number only *eight* (*Hist. Gr.*, i., 7), and this last would appear to be the more correct sum. (Compare *Kuhn ad Æl., V. H.*, iii., 17.) The whole number of commanders was originally ten (*Diod. Sic.*, xiii., 74); but one of them, Archestratus, died at Mytilene, and Conon, another, was not present at the fight. (*Xen., Hist. Gr.*, i., 6, *seqq.*)

μιᾷ ψήφῳ. This was illegal, because, according to law, each commander ought to have been tried separately. (*Xen., Hist. Gr.*, i., 7, 37.) Observe, moreover, that these words are placed immediately after *ἐννέα στρατηγούς*, to render the opposition more striking.—*τοὺς ἀμφὶ Θράσυλλον καὶ Ἐρασινίδην.* A well-known Greek idiom. (*Matthiæ*, § 583.) Thrasyllus and Erasinides are here specially named, because they were the two most prominent objects of attack. It seems that after the victory the Athenian commanders

σιγῇ βουλευόμενα. "And those that are planned by us in silence," *i. e.*, and our most secret thoughts. Observe that *τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα* are here opposed to the combined idea in *τὰ λεγόμενα* and *πραττόμενα*, since if these two latter expressions were not intended to form one united idea, *πραττόμενα* would have the article. (*Herbst, ad loc.*)—*σημαίνειν.* "Give indications," *i. e.*, signs and omens.

§ 20.

ὁπως ποτέ. "How in the world."—*περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς μὴ σωφρονεῖν.* "Was not sound in his belief respecting the gods." Literally, "was not sound of mind with respect to the gods."—*ποτε.* "At any time."—*οἷά τις ἂν καὶ λέγων, κ. τ. λ.* "As, were one both to say and do, he would both be in reality, and would be considered to be, a most pious man." Literally, "as one both saying and doing would both be," &c. Observe that *ἂν* belongs here in construction to the optative coming after. The position of this particle in a sentence depends wholly on euphony, or perhaps, also, on the need of making the uncertainty expressed by it earlier or later perceptible (*Buttmann*, § 139, *note* 4, *Rob.*)

CHAPTER II.

§ 1.

καὶ τὸ πεισθῆναί τινας. "The circumstance, also, that certain persons were persuaded." This is taken as the subject to *φαίνεται*, the infinitive with the neuter of the article having the force of a substantive. (*Matthiæ*, § 539.)—*πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις.* "In addition to the things that have been mentioned," *i. e.*, to what has been already said of him in the preceding chapter.—*ἀφροδισίων, καὶ γαστρός, κ. τ. λ.* "Was the most temperate of all men as regarded sensual pleasures and appetite." Kühner observes that *ἀφροδισιων* and *γαστρός*, being without the articles, have the force of verbs, a remark altogether out of place here, and only calculated to mislead.—*πρὸς χειμῶνα.* On Socrates' endurance of cold, consult Wiggers' life of him, p. 397 of this volume.—*πρὸς τὸ μετρίων δεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ.* "So trained to want but little." Literally, "to the wanting of moderate things." The infinitive with the neuter of the article again employed as a noun.—*πάνυ μικρὰ κεκτημένος.* "Although possessing very trifling means." In the Œconomicus of Xenophon (ii., 3), Socrates remarks to Critobulus, that, if he could find a reasonable purchaser, he should perhaps get five minæ for all his property, including his house. Five minæ are equal to $88, the mina being

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

attended not only to the mind, but also to the body. With regard to ἀλλὰ μήν, consult notes on i., 1, 6.—τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπερπίπτοντα, κ. τ. λ. "He did not approve, accordingly, that one eating above measure labor above measure," *i. e.*, he did not approve of over-exercise in connection with over-eating. The allusion appears to be to the ancient Athletæ, whose voracity was as proverbial as their exercises and training were severe. Compare Athenæus, x., 5: πάντες οἱ ἀθλοῦντες, μετὰ τῶν γυμνασμάτων, καὶ ἐσθίειν πολλὰ διδάσκονται, and also *Upton ad Epictet., Diss.* iii., 15, 3.—τὸ δέ, ὅσα γ' ἡδέως, κ. τ. λ. "But he approved of duly digesting by sufficient exercise those things, as many as the appetite receives with pleasure." Observe that ψυχή denotes not only the soul, but also its desires, propensities, appetites, &c. A similar usage prevails in the case of the Latin *animus*.—ἐκπονεῖν. Literally, "to work off," *i. e.*, to digest by labor.—ἕξιν. "Habit," *i. e.*, mode of life.—ὑγιεινήν τε ἱκανῶς εἶναι. "Was both conducive to health in a sufficient degree." Adverbs placed after adjectives, like ἱκανῶς in the present instance, are intended to have an emphatic force. (*Stallb. ad Plat., Phædr.*, p. 256, E.)—τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. "The proper care of the intellect," *i. e.*, its due cultivation.

§ 5.

ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν ἦν. "But yet, most assuredly, he was not." The particles οὐ μήν are often employed when something is opposed, with a strong assertive force, to what has gone before. It was stated in the previous section that Socrates was neither neglectful of the body himself, nor commended those who were; *still, however*, it is here remarked, he was *by no means* an effeminate man. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—ἀλαζονικός. A covert hit at the Sophists, who were famed for ostentatious display of all kinds.—ἀμπεχόνη. "In his upper garment." The ἀμπεχόνη was a robe, or fine upper garment, worn by women and effeminate men. The terms ἀμπεχόνη and ὑπόδεσις comprehend, as Heindorf remarks, the whole ordinary attire of the Greeks, as far as externals were concerned. (*Heind. ad Plat., Hipp. Maj.*, p. 291.) On the form ὑπόδεσις, with the short penult, consult *Lobeck ad Phryn.*, p. 445.—διαίτῃ. "Habits of life."

οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐποίει. "No, truly, nor did he make."—ἔπανε. "He caused them to cease." Observe the force of the active here, as contrasted with that of the middle, ἐπαύετο, "he caused himself to cease," *i. e.*, he ceased.—τοὺς δὲ ἑαυτοῦ, κ. τ. λ. "And he exacted no compensation from those who desired his instruction." Literally, "who were desirous of him." This whole passage is remark-

§ 6

§ 7

μή, so that the former μή is a conjunction ("lest)," and the latter a repetition of the negative notion in the principal clause. (*Kühner*, § 750, *Obs.* 2.)

§ 8.

τῶν ξυνόντων ἑαυτῷ, κ. τ. λ. "That those of the persons, who associated with him, that received the opinions which he himself maintained," *i. e.*, that those of his followers who listened to and acted upon his instructions. Literally, "who received the things which he himself approved of."—εἰ μὴ ἄρα. "Unless forsooth." Observe the ironical use of ἄρα. (*Kühner*, § 788, 5, *Jelf.*)

§ 9.

ἀλλά, νὴ Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη. "But, in very truth, said the accuser," *i. e.*, but, said the accuser, it is a positive fact, that, &c. Literally, "but, by Jove," &c. Νή is a particle of affirmative adjuration, and the accusative Δία depends on some verb, such as ὄμνυμι, &c., which is readily supplied by the mind. (*Kühner*, § 566, 2, *Jelf.*) Some commentators regard νὴ Δία here as coming from Xenophon, not from the accuser, and give it an ironical force. This, however, is decidedly inferior. Compare the explanation of Heinze: "*Ja, allerdings ist Sokrates ein Verfuhrer der Jugend.*"—ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη. The more usual order would have been ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, since ἔφη is commonly placed before its nominative. The same remark applies to the Latin *inquit*. The accuser referred to here is probably Meletus, who first laid the charge before the king-archon.—ὑπερορᾶν τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων. "To despise the established laws."—ὡς μωρὸν εἴη, κ. τ. λ. "That it was a foolish thing (for a people) to appoint the rulers of their state by means of a bean." Observe the employment of the optative in the *oratio obliqua*, as indicating the alleged sentiments of Socrates. The force of the middle, also, in καθίστασθαι, must be particularly noted. The active, καθιστάναι τινά, would be, to appoint one over another; whereas the middle, καθίστασθαί τινα, is to appoint one over one's self, and is here employed with reference to a people appointing their own rulers. In place of καθίστασθαι, Bornemann, Dindorf, and Sauppe read καθιστάναι, without any propriety. Most of the old editions, moreover, have μωρῶν, "that it was the part of fools."—ἀπὸ κυάμου. The Athenian magistrates were elected by lot, the lots employed being white and black beans. The names of the candidates were placed in one urn, and black and white beans in another. Those whose names were drawn out with the white beans were elected. (*Hermann, Polit. Ant.*, § 149.)

§ 10

αὖτα πράττειν, from a conjecture of Schæfer's (*ad Dion. Hal.*, p. 111) but in his note proposes τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν. Kühner, however, successfully defends the ordinary reading.

§ 11.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ συμμάχων, κ. τ. λ. "But, in very truth, the man that dares to employ open force would need allies not a few." With regard to ἀλλὰ μήν, consult notes on i., 1, 6.—οὐδενός. "Not a single one." The full construction would be οὐδενὸς συμμάχου δέοιτ' ἂν.—καὶ γὰρ μόνος ἡγοῖτ' ἄν, κ. τ. λ. "For he would think himself, even though unaided, able to persuade." More literally, "even though all alone." Observe the construction of the nominative with the infinitive, the reference being to the same person that forms the subject of the verb. Observe also the force of καί in connection with μόνος.—Καὶ φονεύειν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κ. τ. λ. "Moreover, it least of all accords with the character of such persons as these to slay a man."—ἢ ζῶντι πειθομένῳ χρῆσθαι. "Than to have him living and voluntarily obedient." Literally, "than to use him a living persuaded one."

§ 12, 13.

ἀλλ' ἔφη γε ὁ κατήγορος. "But, said the accuser in particular." The force of γέ here must be noted, and the idea intended to be conveyed may be stated thus: "What you say is well enough on general grounds; I will mention, however, a particular instance, as regards two of the followers of Socrates, which will show how inapplicable your remarks are to the case of that philosopher."—ὁμιλητὰ γενομένω. "After having been intimate companions," *i. e.*, intimate as followers. Observe the employment of the dual to give more precision to the sense. Ὁμιλητά is the nominative dual of ὁμιλητής.

Κριτίας. Critias, the son of Callæschrus, was a follower of Socrates, by whose instructions he profited but little in a moral point of view, and, together with Alcibiades, gave a color by his life to the charge against the philosopher of corrupting the youth of the day. He became eventually one of the thirty tyrants, and was conspicuous above all his colleagues for rapacity and cruelty. He was slain at the battle of Munychia, fighting against Thrasybulus and the exiles. He is said to have been a vigorous speaker (*Cic., de Orat.*, ii., 22), and he composed, also, some elegies and dramatic pieces. In philosophy he was but a dabbler and dilettante. (*Smith, Dict. Biogr., s. v.*)—Ἀλκιβιάδης. Alcibiädes was the son of Clinias, and nephew

Plato (187, E.): *οὔ μοι δοκεῖς εἰδέναι ὅτι, ὃς ἂν ἐγγυτάτω Σωκράτους ᾖ λόγῳ, καὶ πλησιάζῃ διαλεγόμενος, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ πρότερον ἀρξηται διαλέγεσθαι, μὴ παύσασθαι ὑπὸ τούτου περιαγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, πρὶν ἂν ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ διδόναι περὶ αὑτοῦ λόγον, κ. τ. λ.*

§ 15.

ὁρῶντε. It is neater to make *ὁρῶντε* and *ὄντε* nominatives absolute, the construction changing in the accusative *αὐτώ* before *ὁρέξασθαι*, than to construe them as accusatives after *αὐτώ* and agreeing with it.—*ὄντε οἷω προείρησθον.* "Being such as they have before this been said to be."—*πότερόν τις αὐτὼ οᾖ.* The subjunctive here stands alone and independent, in a question implying doubt, and thus forms what is technically termed the deliberative subjunctive. (*Matthiæ*, § 515, 2. *Kühner*, § 417, *Jelf.*)—*τοῦ βίου τοῦ Σωκρατους ἐπιθυμήσαντε.* "Because they desired (to lead) the life of Socrates." Literally, "having become desirous of the life of Socrates." The participle is here employed to denote the cause or reason. (*Kühner*, § 697, *a.*, *Jelf.*)—*καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης.* "And (to possess) the self-control." Literally, "and of the self-control." With regard to the Socratic *σωφροσύνη*, compare iv., 3, 1.—*ὀρέξασθαι τῆς ὁμιλίας αὐτοῦ.* "Were eager for his intimacy." The verb *ὀρέγω*, in the middle voice, means properly "to stretch one's self out after a thing," "to desire a thing with outstretched hands," and is construed with a genitive of the object desired. (*Matthiæ*, § 350.) Compare § 16: *Σωκράτους ὠρεχθήτην.*—*νομίσαντε.* "Because they thought." Compare note on *ἐπιθυμήσαντε*, above.

§ 16.

θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτοῖν. "That, if the deity had granted unto them both." Literally, "the deity giving unto them two."—*ἑλέσθαι ἂν αὐτώ, κ. τ. λ.* "They two would, without any hesitation, have chosen rather to die." Observe the force of the aorist here in denoting rapidity of determination, and the absence of all hesitation. —*δήλω δ' ἐγενέσθην, κ. τ. λ.* "Now they both became manifest (in this respect) from the things which they (subsequently) did," *i. e.*, now this was rendered manifest by their subsequent conduct; they proved the truth of this remark by the acts which they subsequently perpetrated. Compare, as regards the construction of *δήλω* here, the notes on i., 1, 2, *θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς ἦν.*—*ὡς τάχιστα.* "As soon as."—*τῶν συγγιγνομένων.* Their fellow-disciples are meant.—*ἀποπηδήσαντε.* "Having bounded away from." A strong expression in place of *ἀποφοιτήσαντε*. Jacobs (*Socr.*, p 199) compares Phi-

§ 17.

§ 18.

§ 19

ἐπιστήμων; and on this construction of the accusative with verbal adjectives, consult *Matthiæ*, § 346, *Obs.* 3.—*οὕτω γιγνώσκω*. This question, whether virtue could be obtained by learning, and was not a natural quality, was frequently discussed by the ancient philosophers. The opinion of Socrates was, that virtue could be acquired by instruction and improved by practice. (Consult iii., 9, 1, and iv., 1, and also *Bornemann ad Xen., Conviv.*, ii., 6.)—*ὁρῶ γάρ, ὥςπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος, κ. τ. λ.* "For I see that, even as (I perceive) that they who do not exercise their bodies," &c. After *ὥςπερ* we must supply *ὁρῶ* from the previous clause. This simple process will entirely obviate the necessity of our having recourse, with Kuhner, to the doctrine of attraction, by which the structure of the secondary clause is made to conform to that of the primary. The natural arrangement, however, would be *ὥςπερ . . . οἱ μὴ τὰ σώματα ἀσκοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν, οὕτω καί, κ. τ. λ.*

§ 20.

κἂν ὦσι. "Even though they be."—*ὡς τὴν μὲν τῶν χρηστῶν, κ. τ. λ.* "Because (as they are convinced) their intercourse with the virtuous is a practice of virtue, whereas that with the bad is a destruction (of the same)." Observe here the employment of the accusative absolute with *ὡς*. This particle is joined to the simple participle, or the genitive or accusative absolute, when we assign or suggest some reason, in the mind of another person, why he does a certain thing. (*Buttmann*, § 145, *note* 5, *Rob.*)—*ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ, κ. τ. λ.* This distich is taken from Theognis (v. 35, 36). Socrates appears to have been fond of quoting it. Compare *Xen., Conviv.*, ii., 4. *Plat., Men.*, 95, D. The first line of the couplet is a hexameter, the second a pentameter.—*ἄπ'*. Observe the anastrophe.—*διδάξεαι.* "You will learn." Literally, "you will cause yourself to be taught." Observe the force of the middle.—*ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.* "You will destroy even the intellect you have."—*καὶ ὁ λέγων.* The author of the hexameter, which follows after this, is unknown.—*αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, κ. τ. λ.* "The good man, however, is at one time erring, at another time excellent." The object of this last quotation is to show the necessity of the constant and unremitting exercise of virtue, since even the good man, if he neglect this for a moment, is liable to be surprised by the inroads of vice.

§ 21.

κἀγὼ δὲ. Compare i., 1, 3.—*ὁρῶ γάρ, ὥςπερ, κ. τ. λ.* Compare notes on § 19.—*τῶν ἐν μέτρῳ πεποιημένων ἐπῶν, κ. τ. λ.* "That they

§ 28.

§ 29.

§ 31.

by *jam, ut rem paucis complectar.*—*συμμάχῳ.* "As an ally."—*ἐκείνου δ' ἀπαλλαγέντε.* "But when they had departed from him." Observe here the anomalous construction of the participle in the nominative dual, as indicating the whole, while the two subjects follow separately, each with its own adjuncts and verb. Grammarians explain this by the figure called *τὸ σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος.* (*Kühner*, § 478, § 708, 2, *Jelf.*)—*φυγὼν εἰς Θετταλίαν.* This was in B.C. 406 probably (the year in which the generals who had conquered at the Arginusæ were put to death), for we find him at that time in Thessaly, fomenting a sedition of the Penestæ, or serfs, against their lords. According to Xenophon, in his Grecian History (ii., 3, 15, 36), he had been banished by a decree of the people, and this it was which afterward made him so rancorous in his tyranny, when one of the thirty, in B.C. 404.—*ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένοις.* "Living in lawlessness rather than just-dealing." Literally, "making use of lawlessness," &c. The Thessalians were proverbial for their licentiousness, perfidy, and treachery. Compare *Plato, Crit.*, 53, D.

Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὖ. "But Alcibiades, on the other hand." Compare § 12.—*διὰ μὲν κάλλος.* Alcibiades was remarkable at every period of his life for the extraordinary beauty of his person.—*ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν.* "By many and respectable females." The Greeks regularly join *πολίς* with another adjective, expressing praise or blame. (*Matthiæ*, § 444.)—*ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δυνατῶν κολακεύειν, κ. τ. λ.* "Being corrupted by many men, and these skilled in flattery," *i. e.*, by the arts of many adroit and skillful flatterers. We have given *δυνατῶν κολακεύειν* its natural signification here, with Jacobs (*Sucr.*, p. 23). Compare iv., 2, 6, where *ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται δυνατοὶ γενέσθαι* is made to correspond in meaning to *ἱκανοὶ γενέσθαι πειρῶνται.* Kühner is clearly wrong when he makes *δυνατῶν κολακεύειν* refer here to those whose flattery had weight with Alcibiades; on the contrary, *δυνατῶν* is precisely equivalent to *δεινῶν.* Compare *Schneider, ad loc.*, and *Fischer, Ind. ad Theophrast. Charact., s. v. δυνατὸς διακονῆσαι.*—*τῶν γυμνικῶν ἀγώνων.* "In the gymnastic contests."—*οὕτω κἀκεῖνος, κ. τ. λ.* The demonstrative pronoun is often repeated, for the sake of emphasis, in the second member of a comparison. (*Kühner*, § 658, *Jelf.*)

§ 25.

ὠγκωμένω. "Being swelled with pride."—*ἐπηρμένω δέ.* "Being elated too."—*πεφυσημένω δέ.* "Being puffed up, moreover."—*διατεθρυμμένω δέ.* "Being corrupted likewise."—*ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις*

§ 26

§ 27

§ 28.

οὑτω δέ. "In this same way, too."—*εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐποίει, κ. τ. λ.* "If he himself were accustomed to do any thing evil, he would naturally have appeared on all such occasions to be an evil man." Observe the employment of the imperfect to denote the repetition of an action, and also the peculiar arrangement of the protasis and apodosis to express impossibility or disbelief, that is, *εἰ* with the imperfect in the former, and *ἄν* with the same tense in the latter; so that it is necessarily implied, "but he was not accustomed to do any thing evil." (*Buttmann*, § 139, 9, 4, *Rob.*)—*εἰ δ' αὐτὸς σωφρονῶν διετέλει.* "If, however, he himself was always practicing self-control." Here we have *εἰ* with the indicative, in the protasis, to indicate a condition that is certain, followed by *ἄν* with the optative in the apodosis, to mark a result as utterly uncertain. (*Kühner*, § 853, *Jelf.*)

§ 29.

ἀλλ' εἰ καί, κ. τ. λ. "But if, even though doing nothing evil himself," &c. This period forms part of the previous section in the old editions.—*Κριτίαν μέν.* The particle *μέν* is added, because Xenophon had intended to mention Alcibiadès also; and the particle *τοίνυν* is here, as often elsewhere, used to mark a transition to the example or instance which the writer is proceeding to adduce. (*Hartung*, ii., p. 348, *seq.*)—*Εὐθυδήμου.* This was Euthydemus, surnamed *ὁ καλός*, the son of Diocles. (Compare *Plato, Sympos.*, § 37.) Mention is again made of him in iv., 2, 1; nor does he appear different from the one who is spoken of in the third and fifth chapters of the same book. He must not be confounded, however, with Euthydemus, the brother of Dionysodorus mentioned in iii., 1, 1. —*ἀπέτρεπε λέγων.* "He endeavored to dissuade him by saying." Literally, "endeavored to turn him away," *i. e.*, from his object Observe the force of the imperfect.

§ 30.

τοῦ δὲ Κριτίου, κ. τ. λ. "But he, Critias, not hearkening to such admonitions as these." Supply *νουθετήμασι*, or something equivalent. Observe, moreover, the presence of the article with the proper name, for the purpose of making the opposition a stronger one.—*καὶ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου.* "And, in particular, Euthydemus." The conjunction *καί* has here an incressive or emphatic force. (*Kühner*, § 759, *Jelf.*)—*ὑϊκὸν πάσχειν.* "To be swinishly affected." One MS. gives *τι* before *ὑϊκόν*, which some few editions, without any necessity,

§ 31.

appear the better side, or, in other words, black appear white. (*Stallb. ad Plat., Apol.*, 18, B.; *Aristoph., Nub.*, 95, *seqq.*) The charge, however, was only just against the Sophists. (Compare *Wiggers' Life of Socrates*, p. 418 of this volume.)—*οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε, οὔτε αὐτός, κ. τ. λ.* "For neither did I, for my part, either myself ever hear this from Socrates, or learn it from another, who said that he had heard it (from him)," *i. e.*, for neither did I, &c., ever hear Socrates himself profess to teach the art of disputation, &c. The common text has *οὔτε γάρ*, which Bornemann adopts; but the true form is *οὐδὲ γάρ*, which corresponds, in negative propositions, to *καὶ γάρ* in affirmative ones.

§ 32.

ἐδήλωσε δέ. "But it soon appeared evident (that Socrates was the person aimed at)." Observe here the force of the aorist in denoting quickness of result; and, moreover, that *ἐδήλωσε* itself is taken in an intransitive sense, as equivalent to *δῆλον ἐγένετο.* (Compare *Matthiæ*, § 360, 2, and *Kühner*, § 373, 1, *Jelf.*) Lange, with less correctness, makes *ἐδήλωσε* transitive, and refers it to Critias.—*καὶ οὐ τοὺς χειρίστους.* "And these not the worst," *i. e.*, not persons of the lowest or common stamp. A litotes, for "persons of high standing." Compare *Seneca, de Tranq. An.*, c. 3: "*Triginta tyranni mille trecentos cives, optimum quemque, occiderant.*" The persons who were now singled out for destruction were men of unblemished character, without any strong political bias, who had gained the confidence of the people by their merits or services, and might be suspected of preferring a popular government to the oligarchy under which they were living. (*Thirlwall*, iv., p. 184.)—*πολλοὺς δὲ προετρέποντο ἀδικεῖν.* "And impelled many to be guilty of injustice." Observe here the employment of the middle in an apparently active sense, but in reality with a full middle force, "impelled for themselves," *i. e.*, to gratify their own base views, by making others accomplices in their wickedness. An illustration of the text is afforded by Plato, *Apol.*, 32, C., where Socrates tells the story of his having been ordered by the thirty, along with four others, to bring Leon of Salamis to Athens. "That government," he adds, "though it was so powerful, did not frighten me into doing any thing unjust; but, when we came out of the Tholos, the four went to Salamis and took Leon, but I went away home."

εἰπέ πεν. "Casually observed."—*δοκοίη.* The optative again, as expressing the sentiments of the speaker.—*νομεύς.* "A keeper."—*μὴ ὁμολογοίη εἶναι.* "Would not confess that he was." The

[illegible] (Compare *Kuhner*, § 655, *Jolf*.)

§ 33

[illegible] (*Kuhner*, § 622, *Jolf*.)

§ 34

[illegible]

δῆλον ὅτι. Examples are extremely rare of a present tense (*δῆλόν ἐστι*), followed by *ὅτι* and an optative (*ἀφεκτέον εἴη*) in place of an indicative. The true employment of the optative is when the words of another are given in past time or in the *oratio obliqua*. (Compare *Kühner, ad loc.*)—*δῆλον ὅτι περατέον ὀρθῶς λέγειν.* The meaning of the whole passage is given as follows by Kühner: "You interdict the art of speaking. The question then presents itself, whether you mean the art of speaking rightly or not rightly. If you interdict the art of speaking rightly, such as I practice, then one must abstain from speaking rightly, which is absurd. If, on the other hand, you interdict the art of not speaking rightly, such as the Sophists practice, we must strive to speak rightly, and, consequently, my mode of speaking, which teaches how to speak rightly, must be approved of; for it can not be imagined that you interdict the art of speaking both rightly and not rightly. Your interdict, therefore, can have no reference to me, who teach to those who associate with me the art of speaking rightly."

§ 35.

ἐπειδή. The common text has *ἐπειδάν*, but the indicative *λογεῖς* with *ἐπειδάν* would be solecistic. (Compare *Matthiæ*, § 521, *Obs.* 1.) —*τάδε σοι εὐμαθέστερα, κ. τ. λ.* "We proclaim the following things unto you as being more easy to understand: not to converse with the young at all," *i. e.*, we give you now an order more easy to understand, &c. Compare iv., 4, 3, where it is stated that Socrates paid no obedience to this order.—*ὡς ἄλλο τι ποιῶ, κ. τ. λ.* "As I may do something else than the things which have been ordered." We have given *ὡς* here the force of a comparative conjunction, with Kühner, making it equivalent to the German *wie*, "as." Jacobs, however, explains it by *ὥστε με ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν*, and Sauppe by "*adeo ut faciam.*"—*μέχρι πόσων ἐτῶν.* "To what number of years," *i. e.*, until what age. Compare the Latin "*intra quot annos.*"—*ὀσον περ, εἶπε, χρόνον, κ. τ. λ.* "For even as long a time, replied he, as it is not permitted one to be a senator." Citizens could not be elected to the office of senator until they were thirty years old. Observe here the employment of the genitive of time. A space of time is put in the genitive, when it is regarded as the necessary condition of the notion of the verb. (*Kühner*, § 523, *Jelf.*)—*νεωτέροις τριάκοντα ἐτῶν.* "With persons younger than thirty years."

§ 36.

ἄν τι ὠνῶμαι. "If I am inclined to buy any thing." Observe the conditional *ἄν* beginning, as usual, a clause —*ἢν πωλῇ.* The

§ 37

incumbent on me), then, said Socrates, (to refrain) also from the things that follow these (examples)," *i. e.*, to refrain from all reasonings which follow from these illustrations, namely, on justice, &c.—*τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων*. After *τὰ ἄλλα*, or *οἱ ἄλλοι*, the article is often repeated. The common text has *τῶν ἄλλων τῶν δικαίων*, which Schütz interprets "*de iis, quæ justis sunt opposita*;" but the true reading is *τοιούτων*, the reference being to the other virtues, namely, wisdom, temperance, fortitude, &c.—*καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε*. "And in particular from herdsmen." Compare § 32, in explanation of this allusion.—*ὅπως μὴ ποιήσῃς*. So in all the MSS. and printed editions. This is one of the many passages which are cited against Dawes' canon, "*that the particles ὅπως μή are not joined with the 1st aor. subjunctive active or middle, but that in place thereof the future indicative is used.*" As this canon rests on no grammatical or logical grounds, so it is shaken by the fact that in many passages, by the agreement of the MSS., *ὅπως* is joined with the 1st aor. subj. active; for, since a change of HI into EI, and of Ω into O, is all that is required to make the 1st aor. subj. a future indicative, great opportunities were thereby opened to the inaccuracy of transcribers. (*Kühner*, § 812, 1, *Jelf.*)—*ἐλάττους τὰς βοῦς*. Some think this refers to an Athenian coin, having on it the figure of an ox, as if Charicles had threatened Socrates with a fine. (Compare *Rasche*, *Lex. R. N.*, i., *col.* 1587.) Others translate *βοῦς* "cattle," supposing that Socrates is here threatened with death. This is certainly the better view of the subject. Compare § 32.

§ 38, 39.

τοῦ περὶ τῶν βοῶν λόγου. "His remark respecting the cattle," *i. e.*, the simile he had uttered respecting them. Compare § 32.—*οἵα μὲν οὖν ἡ συνουσία, κ. τ. λ.* "Of what nature, then, was the intercourse of Critias with Socrates," &c.—*οἵαν δ' ἂν ἐγωγε, κ. τ. λ.* "I indeed, for my part, would say, that no one ever derived any instruction from a person that did not please him," *i. e.*, any thing that exercised a lasting effect on his subsequent conduct.—*οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους ὠμιλησάτην*. "Did not, because Socrates pleased them, associate (with him)."—*εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς*. The same with the Latin "*statim ab initio*."—*οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ μᾶλλον, κ. τ. λ.* "They strove to hold discussions with none others but those most versed in state affairs." Literally, "with not any others rather than with those," &c. As regards the expression *πράττουσι τὰ πολιτικά*, compare i., 6. 15.

§ 60.

§ 61.

§ 62.

claring thereby," &c. Literally, "write down," *i. e.*, cause to be written down or enrolled. The middle voice (*ἐγράψατο*) would be more regular here, since *γράφειν νόμον*, in the active, is properly applied to those who propose or enact laws for others, not for themselves. Compare *Sturz, Lex. Xen., s. v. γράφειν*, i., 9. Observe, moreover, the employment of the aorist here to denote what is customarily done, and which requires it to be rendered by a present.—*πότερον δὲ τἀγαθὰ νομίσαν δεῖν ποιεῖν*. "But whether (do they so enact), after having made up their minds that we ought to do the things that are good." The common text has *ἐνόμισαν*, but the best editions now admit in place of it the elegant emendation of Reiske, namely, *νομίσαν*. The participle apparently stands by itself, but the finite verb is, in reality, to be supplied from the previous sentence. For other instances of this construction, consult *Matthiæ*, § 556, *Obs.* 1.—*ὦ μειράκιον*. "My boy."

§ 43.

ὥςπερ ὅπου. "As (happens) where." Supply *γίγνεται* after *ὥςπερ*. —*ταῦτα τί ἐστιν*; "what are these (enactments)?"—*ὅσα ἂν τὸ κρατοῦν, κ. τ. λ.* "Whatsoever the controlling power of the state, after having deliberated, what it is incumbent to do," *i. e.*, what the several members of the state ought to do.—*κρατῶν*. "Ruling over."—*καὶ ταῦτα*. "These things also," *i. e.*, these enactments.

§ 44.

ἀνομία. "Lawlessness."—*ἆρ' οὐχ ὅταν*. "Is it not when."—*ὁ κρείττων . . . . τὸν ἥττω*. "The stronger, ... the weaker."—*ἀνατίθεμαι γάρ, κ. τ. λ.* "For I retract (the assertion), that whatever things a tyrant prescribes, without having persuaded (the citizens), is a law." Observe that the article *τό* belongs here to the whole phrase following after. *Kühner*, § 457, 1, *Jelf.*) The old editions less correctly have *τοί* in place of it. Observe, moreover, that *ἀνατίθεμαι* is a metaphor from the game of draughts, in which *ἀναθεῖναι πεττόν* signifies "to take up," *i. e.*, "to remove" or "withdraw a man," and place it elsewhere. Compare ii., 4, 4, and iv., 2, 33. The verb *μετατίθεσθαι* occurs, in the same sense, in iv., 2, 18.

§ 45, 46.

κρατοῦντες. "By the strong hand." Literally, "exercising authority."—*εἴτε γράφων, εἴτε μή*. "Whether making it the subject of a written enactment or not." Supply *γράφων* in the second clause. —*κρατοῦν τῶν τὰ χρήματα ἐχόντων*. "Lording it over those having

§ 67

Jelf.)—*ὑπὲρ ὧν* The preposition *ὑπέρ*, in a causal sense, mostly coincides with *περί*, although more rarely thus employed. (Compare *Buttmann, Ind. ad Midiam*, p. 188.)—*Ὑπερ ἐνεκεν καί.* The Greeks frequently insert *καί* ("even," "also") after relative pronouns, to mark a certain gradation. (*Hartung*, i., p. 136.)

§ 48.

Κρίτων. Crito was a wealthy Athenian, who became an intimate friend and disciple of Socrates, having discovered his eminent talents, and who induced him to give up the profession of his father, namely, sculpture. (*Wiggers' Life of Socrates*, p. 374 of this volume.)—*Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ Χαιρεκράτης.* Chærephon and Chærecrates were brothers, natives of Athens, and followers of Socrates. (Compare ii., 3, 1 and 15. *Schol. ad Aristoph., Nub.*, 104, 144, 146, 504.)—*καὶ Ἑρμοκράτης.* These words have been inserted by Schneider from two MSS. Who this Hermocrates was, however, is unknown. He certainly ought not to be confounded with the Syracusan general of that name, who fought against Nicias, the Athenian, during the Peloponnesian war. Van Prinsterer thinks that we ought to read *Ἑρμογένης*, Hermogenes having been a friend and follower of Socrates. (*Prosopogr. Plat.*, p. 225, *seq.*)—*Σιμμίας.* Simmias was a native of Thebes, who went to Athens to study under Socrates.—*Κέβης.* Cebes was a Theban philosopher, and a follower of Socrates, with whom he was connected by intimate friendship. He is introduced by Plato as one of the interlocutors in the Phædo, and as having been present at the death of the philosopher. One of his works, the *Πίναξ*, or Picture of Human Life, is still extant, and much admired.—*Φαιδώνδης.* Thus in several MSS. This Phædondes was a Cyrenean, according to Ruhnken (*ad loc.*); but, according to Heindorff (*ad Plat., Phæd.*, p. 13) and Wyttenbach (*ad Phæd.*, p. 118), a Theban. The common text has *Φαίδων δέ*, where *δέ* has the force of *ἔτι*.

δημηγορικοὶ ἢ δικανικοί. "Able popular speakers or skillful advocates."—*καὶ οἴκῳ, καὶ οἰκέταις, κ. τ. λ.* "They might be able to conduct themselves in a becoming manner toward their families, and domestics, and relations," &c. Literally, "to make a becoming use of family," &c. Observe that *οἰκέτης* strictly means an inmate of one's house, but most usually a house-slave or domestic. On the other hand, *οἰκεῖος* means a relation, and answers to the Latin *propinquus* or *cognatus.*—*οὔτε νεώτερος οὔτε πρεσβύτερος ὤν.* "Either in youth or in more advanced age." As regards *νεώτερος* here, where we would expect *νέος*, compare *Kühner*, § 784, *Jelf.*

§ 49

who know how to act as advocates." The verb *συνδικέω* means, properly, to be a *σύνδικος* or advocate; and *σύνδικος* itself, one who takes hold of a case along with another (*σύν*, *δίκη*), an assistant in a cause, &c. (Compare *Hermann, Pol. Ant.*, § 142, 14.)

§ 52.

ἔφη δέ. Supply *ὁ κατήγορος.—ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος, κ. τ. λ.* "That it is no advantage for them to be well disposed." Supply *ἐστί* after *ὄφελος.—φάσκειν δὲ αὐτόν.* "And that he frequently remarked." Observe the frequentative force of *φάσκω.—ἑρμηνεῦσαι.* "To explain them," *i. e.*, to teach them clearly unto others. Compare *Sturz, Lex. Xen., s. v.—οὕτω διατιθέναι.* "So disposed," *i. e.*, succeeded in exerting such an influence over.—*ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς, κ. τ. λ.* "That all others were in no estimation with them in comparison with himself," *i. e.*, were held in no account by them, &c. With *μηδαμοῦ* Weiske supplies *λόγου* or *τιμήματος*, of which Kühner approves. It is much neater, however, to regard *μηδαμοῦ* as the simple adverb; literally, "were *no where* in comparison with him." Compare the remark of Hermann on *οὗ* and *αὐτοῦ*. (*De Ellips. et Pleon. in Ling. Gr.*, p. 151.)—*πρὸς ἑαυτόν.* A similar construction occurs in Latin. Thus, *Terent., Eun.*, ii., 3, 69: "*At nihil ad nostram.*"

§ 53.

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συγγενῶν. The common text has *τε* after *συγγενῶν*, which, as Herbst remarks, can not be endured. We have thrown it out, therefore, with Weiske, Herbst, and other editors. Kühner seeks to defend it, but on very feeble grounds, making *συγγενῶν* and *φίλων* to be in apposition with *ἄλλων*, and attempting to account for the presence of *περί* before *φίλων* by the circumstance of the latter word's denoting a class of persons distinct from both *πατέρων* and *συγγενῶν.—καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε δή.* "And in addition to these things in very truth," *i. e.*, and besides, what is still more to the purpose. Xenophon here concedes even more than the accuser alleges, and proceeds to adduce other instances of apparent paradoxes in the remarks of Socrates; from all which, however, he deduced sound and useful conclusions. Observe the strengthening effect of *δή*. (*Kühner*, § 722, *Jelf.*) The editions prior to that of Weiske have *πρὸς τούτοις γε διότι.* Our present reading is the conjectural emendation of that scholar.—*γίγνεται φρόνησις.* "Intelligence exists." The general idea intended to be conveyed here is more fully developed in § 55.—*ἐξενέγκαντες.* The second aorist of

rather done once for all here."

—*μή, τῷ οἰκεῖος εἶναι πιστεύων, κ. τ. λ.* "He be not neglectful of them, relying upon the circumstance of his being a relation, but endeavor," &c. Observe that the subject of discourse from § 54 onward is *ἕκαστος*, and compare the remark of Kühner: "*Dictum est, quasi antecesserit παρεκάλει ἕκαστον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.*"—*πειρᾶται.* Subjunctive present.

§ 56.

τὰ πονηρότατα. "The worst passages." Supply *μέρη* or *ἔπη*.—*τούτοις μαρτυρίοις χρώμενον.* "Using these as proofs." Compare § 49.—*Ἡσιόδου μὲν τό.* "That the line of Hesiod, for instance." The apodosis is found at the commencement of § 58, the particle *μέν* here marking the first instance cited, and *δέ*, in *τὸ δὲ Ὁμήρου*, the second. Observe, moreover, that *τό* in the present passage (with which supply *ἔπος*) is the accusative, and was intended to depend on *λέγειν* coming after, but, in consequence of the line's intervening, *τοῦτο* is inserted for perspicuity' sake, which takes the place of *τό*, and the particle *δή* serves to mark this change of construction. We have, therefore, an anacoluthon in *Ἡσιόδου μὲν τό*. Hesiod was an ancient Greek poet, whose name is often mentioned by the ancients in connection with that of Homer. He was a native of Asera in Bœotia, whence he is often called the Aserean bard.

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, κ. τ. λ. "For work is no disgrace, but idleness, on the other hand, is a disgrace." On the peculiar force of the particles *δέ τε*, when in juxtaposition, consult *Hartung*, i., p. 71. The line of Hesiod here quoted is from the Works and Days, v. 311. The poet is treating of agriculture, and by *ἔργον* means labor in the fields, which, he says, is no disgrace. The enemies of Socrates, however, understood, or pretended to understand, *ἔργον* as signifying any action whatever, and joined *οἰδέν* with it, although it belongs to *ὄνειδος*. According to this view, the meaning of the line would be, "no work is a disgrace, but idleness (of any kind) is a disgrace." The measure of the verse is hexameter.—*τοῦτο δὴ λέγειν αὐτόν, ὡς, κ. τ. λ.* "That this line, then, he explained (in such a way), as if the poet bids us," &c. Supply *οὕτως* in the first clause, to which *ὡς* becomes opposed in the second. There is no need, therefore, of our giving *λέγειν*, with Seyffert, a double object, namely, *τοῦτο* and *ὡς*, "*diesen Vers nennen, und sagen dass*," &c.—*καὶ ταῦτα.* "Even these."

§ 57.

Σωκράτης δ' ἐπειδὴ ὁμολογήσαιτο, κ. τ. λ. "Now, whenever Socrates allowed that the being a worker was both useful and good for

verse of the extract.—*τὸν ἐλάσασκεν.* "This one he smote." The form *ἐλάσασκεν* is iterative for *ἤλασεν*, from *ἐλαύνω*. The reference is properly to a *driving back* by blows.—*ὁμοκλήσασκε.* Iterative form for *ὠμόκλησε*, from *ὁμοκλέω*, "to reprove," "to chide."

δαιμόνι'. "Fellow." Consult note on *δαιμόνι'* in verse 3.—*ἀτρέμας ἧσο.* "Sit quietly," *i. e.*, take a seat and be quiet.—*σὺ δέ.* "For thou art." Supply *εἶς.*—*οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ, κ. τ. λ.* "Neither at any time counted in war nor in council," *i. e.*, neither numbered among the brave in war, nor admitted to the council of chieftains.—*ἐξηγεῖσθαι.* "Interpreted."—*ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς ἐπαινοίη.* "As if the poet recommended."—*δημοτάς.* "The common people." According to the lexicon of Zonaras, as quoted by Ruhnken, *δημοτής*, in the sense in which it is here employed, is peculiar to the Ionic writers, and Xenophon is the only one of the Attic authors who uses it in this meaning. The regular Attic term is *δημοτικούς.*

§ 59.

καὶ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν οὕτω, κ. τ. λ. "And (no wonder), for in this way he would have inferred," &c., *i. e.*, by this same train of reasoning he must have inferred, &c.—*ἄλλως τ' ἐὰν πρὸς τούτῳ.* "Especially if, in addition to this." The expression *ἄλλως τε* is here of the same force as *ἄλλως τε καί.* (*Kühner, ad loc.*) The *καί* after *τούτῳ* belongs to *θρασεῖς.*—*θρασεῖς.* "Bold of deportment," *i. e.*, of insolent spirit.—*κἂν τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες.* "Even though they happen to be."

§ 60.

ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε, κ. τ. λ. "Socrates, however, for his part, in opposition to all this, was evidently both a friend of the common people and a lover of mankind." The particle *ἀλλά* refers to the negation, *οὐ ταῦτ' ἔλεγε*, in § 59. Observe also the peculiar force of *γέ*, and compare the explanation of Kühner, "*Socrates tamen, si quis alius*," &c.—*φανερὸς ἦν ὤν.* Literally, "was manifest as being."—*πολλοῖς ἐπιθυμητὰς καὶ ἀστούς. κ. τ. λ.* "Although he received numbers of persons desirous of hearing him, both citizens and strangers." Observe here the force of *ἐπιθυμητάς*, and compare *Apol. Socr.*, § 28: Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐπιθυμητὴς μὲν ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ (Consult notes on § 5.)—*μισθὸν ἐπράξατο.* Compare § 5.—*ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως, κ. τ. λ.* "But ungrudgingly bestowed a share of his instructions upon all." Observe that *τῶν* is here the partitive genitive. (*Kühner*, § 535, *Jelf.*)—*ὧν τινες, μικρὰ μέρη, κ. τ. λ.* He hints at Aristippus and some others of Socrates' followers, who taught for pay. Aristippus was the first that did this. (*Ruhnk., ad loc.* Com

§ 61

however, it refers to the operations of thieves and highwaymen of all classes. The offence was published with death if the articles stolen or taken were of the value of ten drachmæ. (*Meier und Schöm., Att. Proc.*, iii., 1, p. 229, 359, *seqq.*)—*τούτοις*. "For these offenders." The pronoun is here in the plural, after the collective *τις*, because a whole class of offenders are referred to. (*Matthiæ*, § 434.)—*ὧν πάντων*. "From all which offences."

§ 63.

ἀλλὰ μήν. Compare i., 1, 10.—*συμβάντος*. "Having resulted."—*προδοσίας*. "Of treason."—*οὐδὲ μήν*. Compare i., 2, 5.—*ἰδίᾳ γε*. "In a private capacity."—*οὔτε κακοῖς περιέβαλεν*. "Or involve him in evils." Compare *Demosth., de Fals. Leg.*, p. 216, 9: *τὸν φανερόν τι ποιῆσαι βουληθέντα . . . . τηλικαύτῃ καὶ τοιαύτῃ συμφορᾷ περιβάλλειν. Id. c. Timocr.*, p. 740, 22: *τοιοῦτόν γ' ὄντα καὶ οὕτως αἰσχροῖς ὑνείδεσι περιβάλλοντα ἐκεῖνον.—ἀλλ' οὐδ' αἰτίαν, κ. τ. λ.* "Nay, he never even was charged with any one of the acts that have been mentioned."

§ 64.

πῶς οὖν ἔνοχος ἂν εἴη τῇ γραφῇ; "How, then, could he be liable to the indictment (brought against him)?"—*ὃς ἀντὶ μέν*. After an interrogative clause, the relative pronoun is often put for the demonstrative *οἵτος*, or *οὗτος γάρ*. (*Kühner*, § 834, *Jelf.*) And sometimes without a preceding interrogation, as in iii., 5, 11. With the particle *γέ* it becomes more emphatic. Compare iii., 5, 16.—*γέγραπτο*. This is Bornemann's reading, from one of the best MSS., in place of the common lection *ἐγέγραπτο*. Grashof, cited by Kühner, has satisfactorily proved, that the second or syllabic augment of the pluperfect is often omitted, not only by the poets, but also by prose writers, for the sake of euphony, when, in the case of simple verbs, a vowel precedes which can not be elided; and when, in the case of compound ones, the preposition with which they are compounded ends in a vowel. (*Kühner, ad loc. Matth.*, § 165.)—*φανερὸς ἦν θεραπεύων*. Compare i., 1, 2.—*ἠτιᾶτο*. According to Kühner, *γέγραπτο* refers to what was stated in the written indictment, and *ἠτιᾶτο* to the time when the verbal accusation was made, on which the written one was founded. The distinction, however, does not appear to be a tenable one.

τούτων μὲν παύων. Verbs signifying "to cause to cease," "to cease," &c., such as *παύω, παύομαι, λήγω*, are construed with a genitive (*Matthiæ*, § 355.)—*τῆς δὲ καλλίστης, κ. τ. λ.* Verbs signify

CHAPTER III

§ 1

thought that the gods knew best what kinds of things are good," *i. e.*, are real blessings. With regard to the combination *καὶ δε*, compare i., 1, 3. Observe, too, the employment of *ὡς* with the accusative absolute, as indicating a reason existing in the mind of another. Compare note on i., 2, 20.—*ἁπλῶς τἀγαθὰ δίδυναι*. As regards the Socratic precept here involved, consult Plato, *Alcib.*, ii., *c.* 9, where are found the following well known and beautifully-expressed lines :

> Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις
> Ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπάλεξειν.

οὐδὲν διάφορον εὔχεσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "Prayed for nothing different than if they should pray for a gambling affair," &c., *i. e.*, prayed as unreasonably as if they should pray for success in a gambling affair, &c.—*φανερῶς ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο*. "Manifestly uncertain in what way they would be likely to result." Compare i., 1, 6.

§ 3.

θυσίας δὲ θύων, κ. τ. λ. "In offering up, moreover, humble sacrifices from humble means," *i. e.*, and when, moreover, from his humble means he offered up humble sacrifices. The means or material, by or from which any thing is done or made, is often expressed in Greek, for the sake of greater distinctness, by *ἀπό* and a genitive. Compare i., 2, 14.—*οὐδὲν μειοῦσθαι*. "That he was in no respect inferior to." Verbs derived from comparatives are construed with a genitive, as here, *τῶν θυόντων*. (*Matthiæ*, § 357.)—*οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς, κ. τ. λ.* "For he said that it would neither be becoming in the gods if they took delight," &c. Literally, "that it would neither have itself becomingly for the gods," &c. The particle *ἂν* is omitted here before the infinitive *ἔχειν*. In such expressions as indicate propriety, duty, necessity, &c., that is, in clauses where *καλῶς εἶχε, ἐδει, χρῆν*, &c., are employed, it accorded with the genius of the Greeks as well as Latins to represent that which was becoming, necessary, &c., as unconditionally true, its not happening being partially kept out of sight. (*Kühner*, § 858, 3. *Jelf.*)

ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον κεχαρισμένα. "Would be more acceptable."—*οὔτ' ἂν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, κ. τ. λ.* Kühner thinks that *ἂν* might also have been omitted here. It seems, however, to be required by the context : "nor would it *in all likelihood* be," &c. The idea intended to be conveyed by the whole clause is simply this, that if the gods take more delight in the offerings of the bad than those of the good, life becomes unto the good not worth leading, since the bad, in that event, will be the recipients of all the more important favors of the

§ 4

§ 5.

διαίτῃ ὀε, κ. τ. λ. There appears to be a want of connection between this section and the previous one; the transition from piety toward the gods to every-day life appears harsh. Kühner thinks that Xenophon naturally passes from the duties of men toward the deity to their duties toward their fellow-men.—*ἐπαίδευσε.* "He trained."—*εἰ μή τι δαιμόνιον εἴη.* "Unless there were some divine interference," *i. e.*, unless some obstacle were opposed from on high. More literally, "unless there were something proceeding from the deity."—*τοσαύτης δαπάνης.* "So much money" (as would suffice to lead such a life as that of Socrates). Observe that *δαπάνη* has here the signification of "money for spending."—*οὕτως ἂν ὀλίγα ἐργάζοιτο.* "Could obtain so little by his labor." Observe here the peculiar force of *ἐργάζεσθαι*, "to earn by one's exertions," and compare *Herod.*, i., 24, *ἐργασάμενον δὲ χρήματα μεγάλα.*—*ἐχρῆτο.* "He consumed."—*ἡδέως.* "With pleasure," *i. e.*, with an appetite.—*ἐπι τούτῳ.* "For this," *i. e.*, that he might eat with an appetite. Dindorf reads *ἐπὶ τοῦτον, i. e., σῖτον.*—*ὄψον αὐτῷ εἶναι.* "Served as a relish for him." Any thing eaten with bread was called *ὄψον*, and even without bread, as flesh-meat, fish, &c., and hence every sort of more delicate food, sauces, condiments, &c. Compare *Cicero, Tusc. Disp.*, v., 34, 97: "*Socratem ferunt, quum usque ad vesperum contentus ambularet, quæsitumque esset ex eo, quare id faceret, respondisse, se, quo melius cœnaret, opsonare ambulando famem.*"

§ 6.

εἰ δέ ποτε κληθεὶς ἐθελήσειεν, κ. τ. λ. Compare § 4.—*ὡςτε φυλάξασθαι, κ. τ. λ.* "Namely, so as to guard against the being filled above measure," *i. e.*, the being surfeited. A simple infinitive, or, what is more forcible, an infinitive with *ὥςτε*, is often added, to explain an antecedent word, or clause, more accurately and fully. (*Matthiæ*, § 531, *Obs.* 2. *Kühner*, § 669, *Jelf.*)—*ὑπὲρ τὸν καιρόν.* The term *καιρός* is often employed to denote the measure of a thing. Compare *Ages., Vit.*, 5, 1: *σίτων δ' ὑπὲρ καιρὸν ἀπέχεσθαι ᾤετο χρῆναι.*—*τὰ πείθοντα μὴ πεινῶντας ἐσθίειν.* "Those viands which persuade men to eat when not hungry."—*τὰ λυμαινόμενα γαστέρας, κ. τ. λ.* "Which ruin stomachs, and heads, and minds." Observe here the employment of the plural, the reference being to the case of many individuals. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)

§ 7.

ἐπισκώπτων. "In sportive mood," *i. e.*, jocularly. Literally, "joking."—*καὶ τὴν Κίρκην ὑς ποιεῖν.* "That Circe also made (men)

CHAPTER IV.

§ 2.

περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου. "Concerning the deity."—*Ἀριστόδημον τὸν Μικρὸν ἐπικαλούμενον.* "Aristodemus, surnamed the Little." Aristodemus was a most devoted friend, and constant companion of Socrates. He is described as an austere man, and always walking barefoot, which he seems to have done in imitation of Socrates. (*Plat., Symp.*, 173, B. Compare *Davis. ad Max. Tyr., diss.* 3, p. 504.)—*καταμαθὼν αὐτόν.* "Having observed him."—*οὔτ' εὐχόμενον.* The editions previous to that of Ernesti have *μηχανώμενον*, "when undertaking any thing." Leunclavius, however, ingeniously conjectured *οὔτ' εὐχόμενον*, which Ernesti introduced into the text.—*ἔστιν οὕστινας ἀνθρώπους, κ. τ. λ.* "Do you admire any men for their intelligence." The form *ἔστιν οἳ* was so firmly established, that neither the number of the relative had any influence on the verb *ἔστι*, nor is the tense changed, though the time spoken of be past or future; hence this form assumed the character of the substantival pronoun *ἔνιοι*, and by means of the cases of the relative has a complete inflexion. And then, as a question, *ἔστιν οἵτινες* is employed. (*Kühner*, § 817, 5, *Jelf.*)—*τεθαύμακας.* Observe the continued meaning implied by this tense: "have you admired and do you still admire," *i. e.*, do you admire? (*Matthiæ*, § 497.)—*ἔγωγε.* Supply *τεθαύμακα.*

§ 3.

καὶ ὅς. "And he." The pronoun *ὅς*, of the same origin as *οὗτος*, is used as a demonstrative or personal pronoun, frequently in Homer, and also by the Attics, at the beginning of a proposition. (*Kühner*, § 816, 3, *a.*, *Jelf.*)—*ἐπὶ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπῶν ποιήσει.* "For the composition, then, of epic verse," *i. e.*, in epic poetry, then. Observe that *ἐπί* here with the dative has a causal signification, answering to the Latin *propter.*—*ἐπῶν ποιήσει.* Homer every where applies the term *ἀοιδή* to the delivery of poems, while *ἔπη* merely denotes the every-day conversation of ordinary life. On the other hand, later authors, from Pindar downward, use the term *ἔπη* frequently to designate poetry, and especially epic, in contradistinction to lyric, or *μέλη.* (*Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit.*, iv., 3.)—*ἐπὶ δὲ διθυράμβῳ.* "For the dithryamb, on the other hand." The dithyramb was a kind of choral song, of a lofty but usually inflated style, originally in honor of Bacchus, afterward also of other gods. Cobet conjectures that we ought to read *διθυράμβων*, understanding *ποιήσει*, because, according to him, *διθύραμβος*, like *ἔπος* and *μέλος*, is not used in the singular when expressive of poetry, but in the plural. Dithyrambic

emphasis to the word which precedes it. (*Hartung*, ii., p. 383.)—*πρυσετεθησαν*. The aorist again refers to what is customary in the case of each one of our species. So also *ἐνειργάσθη*, farther on.—*τῶν διὰ στόματος ἡδέων*. "The pleasant things procured by means of the mouth." Literally, "by means of *a* mouth;" and hence the absence of the article in the Greek, the reference being a general one to the whole species. So *γλῶττα* immediately after, not *ἡ γλῶττα*.—*εἰ μὴ γλῶττα, κ. τ. λ.* "If a tongue had not been formed within as an indicator of these."

§ 6.

προνοιας ἔργῳ ἐοικέναι. "To resemble a work of prescience." We have not hesitated to recall *ἔργῳ*, the reading of the modern editions. Kühner adopts *ἔργον*, which appears in many MSS. and several early editions, and gives *ἐοικέναι* the force of *haberi*, or *putari*. This, however, appears extremely far-fetched, and wanting in energy.—*τὸ, ἐπεὶ ἀσθενής, κ. τ. λ.* "(Namely), since the sight is delicate, the guarding it with eye-lids like doors." The verb *θυρόω* properly denotes, "to furnish with doors." Observe, again, the employment of the aorist to denote what is customary.—*αὐτῇ χρῆσθαί τι*. "To use it in any respect."—*ἀναπεφύνυται . . . . συγκλείεται*. Middle voice.—*ἠθμὸν βλεφαρίδας ἐμοῦσαι*. "The implanting of eye-lashes as a sieve." The *ἠθμός* properly was a kind of sieve or strainer, used by the Greeks to strain or percolate their wine. We have given *ἠθμός* the rough breathing with Ernesti and others, on the authority of the scholiast to Apollonius Rhodius (i., 1294) and the Sigæan inscription. (*Böckh. Corp. Inscr. Græc.*, i., p. 19, *seqq.*) Ruhnken prefers *θριγκόν*, "a fence," the conjecture of Victorius, but the allusion to the winds in the previous clause suits better the idea conveyed by *ἠθμόν*, namely, the shielding of the eye from the fine particles of dust, &c.—*ὀρύσι τε ἀπογεισῶσαι, κ. τ. λ.* "And the causing the parts above the eyes to jut out with eye-brows like the eaves of a cornice or coping, or like eaves. The root *γεῖσον* is said to be of Carian origin, the term *γίσσα* in the Carian language being equivalent to *λίθος* in Greek. (*Steph. Byz.*, *s. v.* Μονόγισσα. *Ruhnk. ad Tim.*, *Lex.*, p. 65.)

τὸ δέ, τὴν ἀκοὴν δέχεσθαι. "And, again, this circumstance, (namely), that the hearing receives." We have placed a comma after *τὸ δέ* with Weiske, as making a neater construction than joining *τό* at once with *τὴν ἀκοὴν δέχεσθαι*. Observe that we have now a succession of independent clauses, forming, as it were, so many nom-

§ 7.

§ 8

ing verb, the subject of the infinitive is omitted, and is in the nominative. But, whenever an emphasis is required, the subject of the infinitive is expressed, and is then in the accusative, as here, *σαυτόν*. (*Buttmann*, § 142, *Rob.*)—*ἐρώτα γοῦν καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι.* These words are omitted by Bessario (in his version) and by Ernesti, on the suggestion of Ruhnken. They were first thrown out of the Greek text by Schütz, whom Schneider and others follow. The objection against them is, that they mar the regular flow of the passage; but they are found in all the MSS., without a single exception, and could hardly, therefore, have proceeded from any other than Xenophon himself. Lange gives the following explanation of the words in question: "Since modesty prevented Aristodemus from expressly affirming, and truth prevented his denial, he answers guardedly and cautiously thus: 'Interrogate then, and I will answer,' *i. e.*, by my answers you will know that I *φρονιμόν τι ἔχω*."

καὶ ταῦτα εἰδώς. "And that, too, when you know."—*πολλῆς οὐσης.* "While, at the same time, there is much of it," *i. e.*, while, at the same time, it is so boundless in extent.—*καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁήπου, κ. τ. λ.* "And that your body has been compacted for you by your having received a scanty portion of each of the other elements, that are, as is well known, immense in their nature." Observe the force of *δήπου* here, answering to the Latin *ut notum est*, or *scilicet*, and consult *Sturz, Lex. Xen., s. v.*—*νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἆρα, κ. τ. λ.* "And do you think that you alone have, by some lucky chance or other, caught a mind, existing nowhere else?" Compare *Cicero, N. D.*, 11, 6: "*Unde enim hanc* (mentem) *homo arripuit? ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates.*"—*σε συναρπάσαι.* The accusative with the infinitive, not the nominative, because emphasis is required. Compare note on *σὺ δὲ σαυτὸν δοκεῖς, κ. τ. λ.*, at the commencement of this section.—*καὶ τάδε τά.* Thus in three MSS., in place of the common reading *καὶ τά.*—*δι' ἀφροσύνην τινά, κ. τ. λ.* "Hold on in their course of order through some idle folly, as you suppose."

§ 9.

μὰ Δί'. "Certainly." Μά is a particle of swearing, like the Latin *per*, and by itself neither affirms nor denies, but simply exercises a strengthening influence. Hence it is used in both affirmation and negation. In affirmation it is joined with *ναί*, as *ναὶ μὰ Δία*, and in negations, with *οὐ*, as *οὐ μὰ Δία*. But when *μὰ Δία* is used simply, without *οὐ*, a negative either precedes or follows. In the present instance it refers to what has gone before, namely, *ἀλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν φρόνιμον εἶναι*, and *οὐ γάρ* belongs to what follows.—*τοὺς*

§ 10

§ 11

cordance with the ingenious emendation of Kühner, and have placed a comma after *κακοπαθεῖν* instead of a colon.—*ἔπειτα*. "In the next place." More commonly *ἔπειτα δέ*. (Compare *Viger*, viii., 8, 10.)—*τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἑρπετοῖς*. "To the rest of animals." Observe that *ἑρπετά* is here employed in its general sense of things that move upon the earth, since *ἕρπω* means "to walk" as well as "creep." This, however, is rather its poetical usage; in prose, it commonly means "reptiles."—*τὸ πορεύεσθαι*. "The power of proceeding," *i. e.*, the faculty of motion.—*προςέθεσαν*. "They add." Observe the force of the aorist.

§ 12.

καὶ μήν. "And in truth." These are particles here of transition. Compare ii., 3, 10.—*μόνην τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, κ. τ. λ.* "They have made that alone of men such, as, by touching the mouth at different times in different parts, both to articulate the voice," &c., *i. e.*, to utter articulate sounds. Before *οἵαν*, supply, as before, *τοιαύτην*. Compare § 6.—*καὶ σημαίνειν πάντα, κ. τ. λ.* The same as *καὶ οἷα ἡμᾶς σημαίνειν πάντα, κ. τ. λ.* When there are two or more adjectival clauses in succession, depending on the same verb, or on different verbs, but in the same government, the relative is generally used but once, and thereby the two sentences are united into one. Compare (*Kühner*, § 833, *Jelf.*)

§ 13.

οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἤρκεσε. "Still farther, it was not sufficient merely," *i. e.*, and yet this alone was not sufficient. The particle *τοίνυν* here has merely the effect of continuing the discourse, and marks no inference or conclusion from what precedes. Compare *Sturz*, *Lex. Xen.*, *s. v.* 2, and *Schaefer ad Demosth.*, *Olynth.*, i., p. 222.—*ἐπιμεληθῆναι*. For the middle *ἐπιμελήσασθαι*.—*καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κρατίστην, κ. τ. λ.* "He has also implanted in man the soul, which is most excellent in its nature," *i. e.*, which is his lordliest part. The adjective *κρατίστην* here forms the predicate, and is equivalent to *ἡ κρατίστη ἐστίν*. In such cases it is without the article. (*Matthiæ*, § 277, *b.*)—*τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου ζώου, κ. τ. λ.* "For what other animal's soul, in the first place, has perceived the gods, who have arranged these most stupendous and beautiful works, that they exist?" *i. e.*, has perceived that the gods exist, who have arranged, &c. By a very elegant idiom, a noun, which, if the sense only were regarded, should be the subject of a verb subsequent in the construction of the sentence, is made to depend on some other verb preceding in

p. 74, cf. Rep

sumes a direct interrogatory form, still retaining the conjunction Numerous instances of this construction are given by Fritzsche *Quæst. Luc.*, p. 134, *seqq.* (Compare *Kuhner*, § 882, *Jelf.*)—*νομιεῖς.* Attic for *νομίσεις.*

§ 15.

συμβούλους. "Advisers." This is the reply of Aristodemus, who alludes particularly to the so-called genius of Socrates.—*ὅταν δὲ Ἀθηναίοις, κ. τ. λ.* The answer of Socrates.—*πυνθανομένοις τι διὰ μαντικῆς.* "Inquiring about any thing by means of divination." This refers not only to the consulting of omens, but also of oracles. —*οὐ δοκεῖς.* "Do you not think."—*τέρατα.* "Portents."—*ἀλλὰ μόνον σὲ ἐξαιροῦντες, κ. τ. λ.* "But picking you alone out (from all mankind), do they hold you in neglect?" Literally, "do they put you down in neglect," *i. e.*, put you down and have done with you.

§ 16.

οἴει δ' ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς ἐμοῦσαι. "Do you think, moreover, that the gods would have engendered."—*εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν.* That is, *εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν.*—*ἐξαπατωμένους.* That is, in the opinion they had formed, that the gods were able to benefit and to injure.—*τὰ χρονιώτατα καὶ σοφώτατα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων.* "The most abiding and the wisest of human institutions."—*αἱ φρονιμώτατα ἡλικίαι.* "The most discreet periods of life." Compare *Cicero, N. D.*, ii., 3.—*θεῶν ἐπιμελέσταται.* The adjective here governs the genitive, because the verb to which it corresponds (*ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*) governs the same case. (*Matthiæ*, § 348, *Obs.* 1.)

§ 17.

ὠγαθέ. "My good friend." Contracted from *ὦ ἀγαθέ.* This expression has always a slight shade of irony or sarcasm, like *O bone* in Latin. (Compare *Viger*, iii., 3, 1, and *Hermann, ad loc.*)—*ἐνόν.* "While it is within you."—*καὶ τὴν ἐν παντὶ ὀρόνησιν, κ. τ. λ.* "That the intelligence, also, which pervades every part of the universe, disposes that universe in such a way as may be pleasing unto it." —*καὶ μὴ.* "And (you ought) not (to suppose)." Supply *οἰεσθαι χρή.*—*δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι.* "Can reach the length of many stadia." The stadium was 600 Greek, or 606¾ English feet. The preposition *ἐπί* is employed in definitions of place, answering to the question "how far?" (*Matthiæ*, § 586, *c.*)—*περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε.* Observe that *φροντίζω* is also construed with the simple genitive. The present arrangement, however, carries with it an air of greater precision. (*Matthiæ*, § 348, *Obs.* 2.)

§ 18.

§ 19

CHAPTER V.

§ 1.

&c. The genitives *γαστρός, οἴνου*, &c., are genitives of comparison, and *ἥττω γαστρός*, &c., means, literally, "inferior to," or "less than gluttony," &c. (*Matthiæ*, § 361, *a.*) So in Latin we have "*inferior voluptatibus.*" Observe, moreover, the absence of *ὄντα* after *ἥττω*, the omission of the participle of *εἰμί* being common in such cases, where the adjective has a predicative force. (*Kühner*, § 682, 3, *Self.*)—*τοὺς πολεμίους κρατῆσαι.* The verb *κρατέω* has the meaning of "to subdue," "to master," when joined with the accusative; whereas, when it governs the genitive, it means "to rule over," &c.

§ 2.

εἰ δὲ γενόμενοι. "And if, on having arrived."—*τῷ ἐπιτρέψαι, κ. τ. λ.* "To commit unto any one either male children to educate, or maiden daughters to protect, or money to preserve." Observe that the infinitive is used frequently after verbs in themselves of complete meaning, but which would not be sufficiently defined without such an addition, to express a purpose; as here, *παιδεῦσαι, διαυλάξαι, διασῶσαι.* (*Matthiæ*, § 532.)—*ἀξιόπιστον εἰς ταῦτα.* "Worthy of confidence for these things," *i. e.*, in these matters.—*ἡγησόμεθα.* Observe the indicative in the apodosis, after *εἰ* with the optative in the protasis, and hence expressing a positive certainty that we will not regard him as such. (*Kühner*, § 855, *b.*, *Self.*)—*ταμιεῖα.* "Our granaries."—*ἔργων ἐπίστασιν.* "The superintendence of agricultural labors." Observe that *ἔργον*, like the Latin *opus*, is often used to denote agricultural operations, or laboring in the fields. (Compare *Ruhnken ad Ter.*, *Eun.*, ii., 1, 14.)—*διάκονον καὶ ἀγοραστὴν τοιοῦτον.* "An agent and purveyor of such a character." The *ἀγοραστής* was a slave who purchased provisions for the family; a family purveyor. Zeune and Bornemann read *τὸν τοιοῦτον*, from Stobæus and Athenæus. The article, however, is added to this word only when it refers to a person already known. (Compare ii., 8, 3, and *Matthiæ*, § 265, 7.)

§ 3.

ἀκρατῆ. "If intemperate."—*πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον, κ. τ. λ.* "How is it not worth one's while that he himself guard against becoming such." Observe the effect of the particle *γέ* on *αὐτόν*, giving the pronoun a species of reflexive force.—*καὶ γάρ, οὐχ ὥσπερ, κ. τ. λ.* The order is, *καὶ γάρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεονέκται, κ. τ. λ., οὕτως ὁ ἀκρατὴς οὐ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις, κ. τ. λ.—τῶν ἄλλων ἀφαιρούμενοι χρήματα.* The verb *ἀφαιρεῖσθαι* is usually construed with two accusatives. (*Matthiæ*, § 418.) An example of its construction with a genitive of the person occurs

αἰσχράν. "Not less disgraceful than any other." For *οὐχ ἧττον αἰσχρὰν ἢ ἄλλην τινά*, compare iii., 5, 18; iv., 2, 12.

CHAPTER VI.

§ 1.

ἄξιον δ' αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ. "It is worth while, also, not to omit those things, that were likewise said by him, in the course of conversation with Antiphon the Sophist." The genitive *αὐτοῦ* does not depend on *ἄξιον*, but on the relative clause *ἃ διελέχθη*, and it is the same as saying *ἄξιον αὐτοῦ πρὸς Ἀντιφῶντα λόγους μὴ παραλιπεῖν.* (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*Ἀντιφῶντα.* The Antiphon here meant was an Athenian Sophist. He must be distinguished from the orator of the same name, and also from Antiphon the tragic poet, although the ancients themselves appear to have been doubtful as to who the Antiphon here mentioned by Xenophon really was. (*Ruhnken, Opusc.*, i., p. 148, *seqq.*)—*τοὺς συνουσιαστὰς αὐτοῦ παρελέσθαι.* "To draw off from him those who associated with him," *i. e.*, his followers. Observe that *συνουσιαστάς* here is equivalent to *συνόντας* or *συνδιατρίβοντας* elsewhere. (Compare *Heusing. ad Plut., de lib. ed.*, p. 90.)

§ 2.

τἀναντία τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολελαυκέναι. "To have enjoyed the opposite from your philosophy," *i. e.*, to have reaped fruits of a directly opposite kind, namely, hardship and wretchedness. Observe that *ἀπολαύω* is construed with the accusative and genitive. (*Matthiæ*, § 327.)—*ζῇς γοῦν οὕτως.* "At any rate, you live in such a way." The component parts of *γοῦν*, namely, *γέ* and *οὖν*, are both perceptible here, "at least, for the matter of that," *i. e.*, at any rate. —*οὐδ' ἂν εἷς.* More emphatic than *οὐδεὶς ἄν.*—*διαιτώμενος.* "Being kept."—*τὰ ῥαυλότατα.* "That are of the worst description." Observe the force of the article.—*ἱμάτιον ἠμφίεσαι.* "You are clad in an outer garment." The *ἱμάτιον* was an outer garment, cloak, or mantle, worn above the *χιτών* or tunic. It was, in fact, a square piece of cloth, thrown over the left, and brought round over or under the right shoulder.—*ἀνυπόδητος.* At the siege of Potidæa, in particular, he is said to have walked barefoot through snow and ice. (*Diog. Laert.*, ii., 12.)—*ἀχίτων.* This must not be so understood as if he covered his naked body with only the outer cloak or *ἱμάτιον*. Socrates usually wore only the *shirt*, *ὑπενδύτης*, but not the second covering *over* that, namely, the *ἐπενδύτης*, which *κατ' ἐξοχήν* the ancients called the "tunic" or *χιτών*. (*Ernesti, ad loc.*)

§ 3, 4

§ 5

Kühner, § 284, c, *Jelf*.

reference to this life of mine." (Matthiæ, § 317.)

σθαι, κ. τ. λ. "Or because my viands are, as you suppose, more difficult to supply one's self with, in consequence of their being." &c. We have here, again, with *ὡς*, a construction similar to that in the preceding clause, *ὄντα* being understood after *χαλεπώτερα*, except that we have now the accusative absolute instead of the genitive absolute.—*πορίσασθαι.* An active or middle infinitive is often used in Greek, where a passive supine would be expected in Latin. This occurs particularly after adjectives, and more especially after *ῥᾴδιος* and *χαλεπός.* (*Matthiæ*, § 535.)—*ἐμοὶ ἃ ἐγώ.* A correction of Ernesti's, confirmed by two MSS. The common text has *ἐμοὶ λεγω.*—*ὁτι ὁ μὲν ἡδιστα ἐσθίων, κ. τ. λ.* "That he who eats with the greatest relish requires condiments least."—*τοῦ μὴ παροντος ποτοῦ.* "Drink difficult to procure." Literally, "drink that is not present," *i. e.*, not ready at hand.

§ 6.

Ἱμάτια. Governed by *μεταβαλλόμενοι.*—*καὶ ὑποδήματα ὑποδοῦνται.* "And bind sandals under their feet." More freely, "put on sandals." The *ὑπόδημα* was merely a sole bound to the foot. Observe the force of the middle in *ὑποδοῦνται.*—*διὰ τὰ λυποῦντα τοὺς πόδας.* "By the things which annoy the feet."—*ἤδη οὖν ποτε ἠσθου.* "Now, then, have you ever perceived."—*μᾶλλόν του ἔνδον μένοντα.* "Remaining at home more than any other," *i. e.*, more than any other who was more seasonably clad. Observe that *του* is Attic for *τινός.* So, presently, *τῳ* for *τινί.*—*διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τοὺς πόδας.* "On account of any annoyance to my feet."

§ 7, 8.

μελετήσαντες. "On having practiced," *i. e.*, by dint of exercise.—*ἀμελησάντων.* "Who neglect (exercise)."—*πρὸς ἂν μελετῶσι.* Observe that *ἂν* is for *ἃ ἂν.* The common reading is *πρὸς ἃ μελετῶσι.*—*ἐμὲ δὲ ἄρα οὐκ οἴει, κ. τ. λ.* "And do you not think that I, by constantly practicing to endure with my body every thing that may befall it," &c.—*τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν γαστρί, κ. τ. λ.* "Think you, moreover, that there is any more effectual cause of my not being a slave to appetite, &c., than my regarding those other things as more pleasing than these, which (other) things," &c.—*ἐν χρείᾳ ὄντα.* "When used."—*ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλπίδας, κ. τ. λ.* "But also (delight) as affording hopes," &c. Observe that *εὐφραίνει* belongs also to this clause, being understood with it.—*καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε.* Compare i., 4, 12.—*ὁτι οἱ μὲν οἰόμενοι, κ. τ. λ.* "That they who think they are in no respect prosperous are not delighted."—*καλῶς προ-*

favourably."—ὡς εὖ πραττόντων. "As being happy in their efforts."

§ 9

§ 10.

§ 11.

γοῦν, § 2, and with regard to *πράττῃ*, compare note on *τοὺς δὲ ἑαυτοῦ*, *κ. τ. λ.*, i., 2, 5.—*καιτοι*. "And yet."—*νομιζωι*. "If you considered it."—*οὐδενὶ ἂν μὴ ὀτι*, *κ. τ. λ.* "You would not only not give to any person gratis, but not, indeed, if you received any thing less than the value," *i. e.*, so far from giving to any one gratuitously, you would not part with it unless you received its full equivalent. The construction here is elliptical, the full form being *μὴ λέγω ὀτι*, *κ. τ. λ.* "Not to say that you would not give," &c., as in Latin, *ne dicam*. (*Matthiæ*, § 610, 2. *Kühner*, § 762, 2, *Jelf.*)—*ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας*. The regular construction would be *ἐλαττον ἢ ἡ ἀξία τούτων τῶν χρημάτων ἐστί*: oftentimes, however, when, as here, we ought to have *ἢ* followed by an entire proposition, the substantive of this is alone employed, and put in the genitive. (*Matthiæ*, § 451. *Kühner*, § 783, *h.*, *Jelf.*)

§ 12.

δῆλον δή. "It is evident, then."—*εἰ καί*. Observe that *καί* does not belong to *εἰ*, but to *συνουσίαν* in the signification of also. (Compare *Kühner*, § 861, *Jelf.*)—*ὤου*, 2d sing. imperf. ind. of *οἴομαι*.—*καὶ ταύτης ἂν οὐκ ἔλαττον*, *κ. τ. λ.* "You would exact for this, likewise, no less money than it is worth."—*δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἴης*. "You may, perchance, then be," &c.—*ἐπὶ πλεωνεξίᾳ*. "For your own advantage."—*σοφὸς δὲ οὐκ ἄν*. "A wise man, however, you can not in all likelihood be." Supply *εἴης* after *ἄν*. (*Kühner*, § 430, 1, *Jelf.*)—*μηδενός γε ἀξια*. "Things worthy of nothing, indeed," *i. e.*, worth nothing at all; of no practical value. Observe the emphasis which *γε* imparts here to *μηδενός*.

§ 13.

παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται, *κ. τ. λ.* "With us it is thought that it is alike honorable and alike disgraceful to dispose of one's beauty and wisdom (unto others)." More freely, "that beauty and wisdom may be disposed of alike honorably and alike disgracefully," *i. e.*, it is disgraceful to sell either for lucre's sake; it is honorable to employ either in gaining a firm friend. The verb *διατίθεσθαι* is properly used of merchants who expose their goods for sale; here, however, it is applied in part to the Sophists, who sold their knowledge to all who could afford to pay. Observe the force of the middle in this verb: "to set forth or arrange *as one likes*," *i. e.*, as *he thinks* may tempt others to buy.—*καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστήν*. "Both an honorable and worthy admirer."—*καὶ τὴν σοφίαν τοὺς μέν*, *κ. τ. λ.* "And they stigmatize as Sophists those who sell wisdom for money to whosoever wishes (to buy)." Socrates means, that from their inor-

all that was good and honorable."

§ 15

in *ἡγειταῖ* the reading of most MSS. In three MSS. and some old editions we have *ἡγεῖτο*. Ernesti and other more recent editors read *ἡγοῖτο . . . . . πράττοι*, from three MSS.—*αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ πράττει, κ. τ. λ.* "And yet does not himself engage in public affairs, if, indeed, he knows (aught about them)." Observe the air of sarcasm in *εἴπερ ἐπίσταται*. For *ἐπίσταται* some have *ἐπίσταιτο*, others *ἠπίστατο*.—*ποτέρως δέ*. "But whether." The particle *δέ* in interrogations often refers to something to be supplied by the imagination. Thus, in the present instance, the full form of expression would be, *Λέγεις μὲν ἐμὲ τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ πράττειν · ποτέρως δέ, κ. τ. λ.*—*ἢ εἰ ἐπιμελοίμην τοῦ, κ. τ. λ.* "Or if I should exercise care about the making as many as possible fit to engage in them," *i. e.*, if I should endeavor to train as many as possible to a fitness for engaging in them.

CHAPTER VII.

§ 1.

εἰ καί. Compare i., 6, 12.—*ἀλαζονείας*. "From arrogant assumption."—*προέτρεπεν*. Compare i., 2, 64.—*ἐπ' εὐδοξίᾳ*. "To a fair reputation." Schneider, Reiske, Dindorf, and Ernesti read *ἐπ' εὐδοξίαν*, but the dative denotes more of what is abiding and permanent.—*ἀγαθὸς τοῦτο, ὅ, κ. τ. λ.* "Actually good in that, in which," &c. Observe that *τοῦτο* and *ὅ* are accusatives of nearer definition. —*ὧδε ἐδίδασκεν*. "He proved in the following way."

§ 2.

ἐνθυμώμεθα γάρ. The particle *γάρ* refers to the previous discourse of Socrates, in which incidental mention was made of arrogance and ostentation.—*ἀρ' οὐ τὰ ἔξω τῆς τέχνης, κ. τ. λ.* "Must he not imitate good flute-players in all the external appendages of their art?" Literally, "with reference to the things without their art." —*σκεύη καλά*. "Splendid attire." Some think that instruments are meant; but these are not *ἔξω τῆς τέχνης*. The musicians of ancient Greece were accustomed to go about dressed in the most splendid and costly habiliments.—*ἔπειτα*. For *ἔπειτα δέ*. Compare i., 2, 1.—*ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔργον, κ. τ. λ.* "But yet he must nowhere undertake any open performance (of skill)."—*γελοῖος*. "A fit subject of ridicule."—*ἄνθρωπος ἀλαζών*. "A vain-boaster."—*καίτοι*. "And yet."—*κακοδοξῶν*. "Being in bad repute."

§ 3.

ὡς δ' αὕτως. "In this same way, moreover." So in several MSS., in place of the common reading *ὡσαύτως*.—*ἐννοῶμεν, τί ἂν*

Riden." (Kaiser, ad loc.)

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

§ 1.

τοιαῦτα λέγων. "By the following arguments." Literally, "by saying such things" as follow.—*προτρέπειν.* Compare i., 2, 64.—*ἰσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν, κ. τ. λ.* "To practice continence as regarded the desire of food, and drink, and sleep, and (to exercise) endurance of cold, and heat, and toil." The original contains some difficulty here, though we may correctly say *ἐγκράτεια πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ, αἰ ποτοῦ, καὶ ὕπνου*, yet we can not so well explain the connected words *ἐγκράτεια πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν ῥίγους, καὶ θάλπους, καὶ πόνου.* Sauppe supposes Xenophon to have negligently blended together two constructions, intending to say *ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν βρωτοῦ, κ. τ. λ.*, and then, as if *πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν* did not precede, to add *ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν ῥίγους, κ. τ. λ.* This is the simplest explanation, and is adopted also by Kühner. Similar instances of neglect of strictness in style occur in the best authors. Dindorf, however, reads *καὶ ῥίγος, καὶ θάλπος, καὶ πόνον*, but, if Xenophon had intended this, he would undoubtedly have repeated the preposition *πρός*, and would have said *καὶ πρὸς ῥῖγος, κ. τ. λ.* (*Wheeler, ad loc.*)

γνοὺς δέ. Observe that *δέ* has here the force of *γάρ.*—*ἀκολαστοτέρως ἐχοντα, κ. τ. λ.* "Was disposed, after a more intemperate manner than usual, toward such things as these." Literally, "as having himself," &c.—*Ἀρίστιππε.* This was the celebrated Aristippus, a native of Cyrene, and the subsequent founder of the Cyrenaic school. He remained with Socrates almost up to the time of his execution. Though a disciple of the philosopher, he wandered both in principle and practice very far from the teaching and example of his great master. He was luxurious in his mode of living, indulged in sensual gratifications, and was the first of the followers of Socrates who afterward took money for his teaching. The doctrine of his school was, that pleasure formed the chief good, and pain the chief evil. The anecdotes which are told of him, however, by no means give us the notion of a person who was the mere slave of his passions, but rather of one who took a pride in extracting enjoyment from all circumstances of every kind, and in controlling adversity and prosperity alike (*Smith, Dict. Biogr.*, vol. i., p. 298.)

§ 3.

ὕπνου ἐγκρατῆ. "Temperate in sleep." Adjectives, derived from verbs which govern a genitive, are construed also with the same case. Compare i., 5, 6; ii., 6, 1; and *Matthiæ*, § 361.—*κοιμηθῆναι.* "To lie down." Passive in a middle sense.—*ἀγρυπνῆσαι.* "To remain awake (all night long)."—*τί δέ.* "But what!" *i. e.*, but further. This combination of particles serves for the purpose of passing on quickly to a fresh point, and is analogous to the Latin *quid vero.*—*τῷ αὐτῷ.* Supply *προσθετέον.*—*τὸ ἀφροδισίων ἐγκρατῆ εἶναι, κ. τ. λ.* At the end of this clause we must mentally supply *ποτέρῳ ἂν προσθείημεν.*—*ἄρχειν.* "For governing." Observe the employment of the infinitive to express a purpose, and compare *Matthiæ*, § 532, *a.*—*τὸ μαθεῖν, εἴ τι ἐπιτηδειόν ἐστι, κ. τ. λ.* "If there be any branch of instruction adapted to the mastering of our antagonists, unto which of the two would it be more proper that the learning of this be added!"—*ἄνευ τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων.* "Without instruction of this kind."

§ 4.

ἧττον ἂν ἁλίσκεσθαι. "Would be less likely to be ensnared."—*τούτων γὰρ ὅηπου, κ. τ. λ.* "For some of these, namely, being allured by appetite, and certain ones (of this number), though very shy, being yet attracted to the bait by the desire of gratifying their gluttony, are captured, while others are entrapped by drink." The words *ἐνια δυσωπουμενα* are subjoined to the preceding words *τὰ μὲν γαστρὶ δελεαζόμενα* by the figure called by grammarians *σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος.* Thus, *τὰ μὲν γαστρὶ δελεαζόμενα* refer to the whole, of which *ἔνια δυσωποὺμενα* indicate a part, and the verb *ἁλίσκεται* is joined to the clause which denotes the part, while the clause that refers to the whole is left without any verb. (*Kühner*, § 708, 2, *Jelf.*)—*οἷον.* "As, for instance."—*συνέφη καὶ ταῦτα.* "He assented to these things also."

§ 5.

ταὐτὰ πάσχειν, κ. τ. λ. "To be affected in the same way with the most senseless of wild creatures." Literally, "to suffer the same things with," &c. Observe that *ταὐτά* here is for *τὰ αὐτά.* All words denoting coincidence, equality, similarity, &c., take the dative. (*Kühner*, § 594, 2, *Jelf.*)—*ὡσπερ.* "As, to cite an instance."—*εἰς τὰς εἱρκτάς.* "Into the private apartments (of dwellings)." By *εἱρκτάς* are here meant the *γυναικεῖα*, or women's apartments, where, in accordance with Grecian custom, the females of the fam-

6, 7

βούλεται is to be deduced from the words ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπου which precede. Observe, moreover, that ὧν is by attraction for τούτων ἃ. —προεστῶτα. "On becoming the presiding officer."—τοῦτου δίκην ὑπεχειν. "To have to give an account of this," *i. e.*, to render himself liable to punishment for this.

§ 9.

καὶ γὰρ ἀξιοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις. "And, (no wonder), for states think it right."—ἐγώ τε . . . . αἵ τε. Compare i., 1, 14.—ἀφθονα. "In abundance." Marking the predicate, as is shown by the position of the article with ἐπιτήδεια. (*Matthiæ*, § 277, *b.*)—ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθά. "As many advantages as possible."—πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν, κ. τ. λ. "To have much trouble for themselves, and to afford it unto others." Many alterations of the text have been proposed here, but without any necessity; for those engaged in official duties are of necessity obliged to impose their respective duties on their subordinates, and to excite in them a spirit of activity and energy. (*Wheeler, ad loc.*) —οὕτως παιδεύσας. "After having thus trained them," *i. e.*, after they had been thus trained.—ᾗ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἡδιστα βιοτευειν. "To pass their lives in the way in which (it is) both most easy and agreeable." With ᾗ supply ὁδῷ.

§ 10, 11.

βούλει σκεψώμεθα. Compare § 1.—πότεροι. Some read πότερον. —ἢ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι. So in five MSS. The article is omitted in the common editions.—ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν. Observe that ὧν is here by attraction for οὑς.—Σύροι, καὶ Φρύγες, καὶ Λυδοί. Jacobs aptly remarks, that Socrates designedly mentions, out of several nations, those held in the greatest contempt among the Greeks.—Μαιῶται. The Mæotians dwelt near the Palus Mæotis, or *Sea of Asoph*. They are distinguished from the Scythians by Herodotus, iv., 123.—Λίβυες. By the Libyans are here meant the roving tribes in the interior of Africa.—ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι. "Nay, I indeed." A formula of objection in reply.—οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν, κ. τ. λ. "Neither, on the other hand, do I consign myself unto slavery," *i. e.*, assign myself to the class of those who are ruled over by others. The αὖ in this clause refers back to, and connects itself with the commencement of § 8. The meaning is, as I am not inclined, on the one hand, to assign myself a place among those desirous of ruling, so, on the other, am I as little inclined to belong to the class of the subjugated.—τὶς μεση τούτων ὁδός. "A middle kind of path." The pronoun τὶς is often separated from its substantive by the interposition of several words. —οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς. Supply ἄγουσα.

§ 12.

§ 12

of the latter's labor."—*οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλείω.* "Do not shut myself up in any one state."—*ξένος.* "A temporary guest."

§ 14.

τοῦτο μέντοι ἤδη, κ. τ. λ. "Now, truly, you mention in this an admirable artifice." Ironical. By *πάλαισμα* is properly meant a trick or artifice peculiar to wrestlers, by which they endeavored to trip up their antagonists. Here, however, it denotes any cunning and artful device in general.—*ἐξ οὗ.* "Since."—*Σίννις, καὶ ὁ Σκείρων,* &c. These were celebrated robbers destroyed by Theseus. There is a pleasant irony in this speech of Socrates. He means, in fact, to say, although such cruel robbers as Sinnis, Sciron, and Procrustes no longer infest the public roads, yet there are not wanting other men to injure you. Hence, though he uses the expression *οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀδικεῖ,* he means directly the reverse. We have retained the ordinary orthography in the name *Σίννις,* although the more correct form would appear to be *Σίνις.* Compare *Valck. ad Eurip., Hippol.*, 977.—*οἱ μὲν πολιτευόμενοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι.* "They who live as free citizens in their native states." The idea intended to be conveyed is this: If the most careful endeavors, on the part of the citizens of states, to repress wrong-doing, are nevertheless insufficient, how little can unprotected strangers reckon on personal security.—*πρὸς τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καλουμένοις.* "In addition to those who are called relations by blood." The term *ἀναγκαῖοι* answers to the Latin *necessarii*, and denotes those that are connected with us by necessary or natural ties, or, in other words, those related by blood.—*οἷς ἀμύνονται.* "By which they seek to repel."—*ὁμως ἀδικοῦνται.* "Are nevertheless wronged."

§ 15.

ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁδοῖς. This and *εἰς ὁποίαν δέ* are opposed to *οὐδὲν μέν,* &c. Hence the double *δέ.*—*πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβων.* "Spending much time," *i. e.*, in passing from state to state, and from city to city.—*ἥττων.* "Inferior," *i. e.*, as being a mere stranger.—*καὶ τοιοῦτος, οἵοις, κ. τ. λ.* "And that, too, when you are such a character as," &c. Observe the employment of the plural in *οἵοις* after the singular *τοιοῦτος,* the reference in *οἵοις* being to an entire class, and not to any definite individual. (*Kühner*, § 819, 2, *a.*, *Jelf.*) The reference, moreover, in *τοιοῦτος* is to one who is a mere vagrant, who roams about without any settled abode, who is the citizen of no one state, and is, therefore, unprotected by any. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*διὰ τὸ ξένος εἶναι.* Observe the nominative with the infinitive, the ref-

the most conspicuous fate."

i. e., so far forth as this, that. Analogous to the Latin *quatenus*.—*ὁ μὲν ἑκὼν πεινῶν.* "He who, from choice, suffers hunger."—*πίοι.* Supply *ἂν*. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 515, *Obs.*—*ὁπόταν βούληται.* In the previous clause we had *ὁπότε βούλοιτο*, the optative being employed because an uncertain doubtful condition was implied: here, however, we have the subjunctive, because the present *ἔξεστιν* precedes. (*Matthiæ*, § 521, *Obs.* 2; *Kühner*, § 844, *a.*, *Jelf.*)—*ἐπ' ἀγαθῇ ἐλπίδι πονῶν εὐφραίνεται.* "Relying on a good hope, takes delight in laboring." The preposition *ἐπί* with the dative is employed here to denote the ground of mental affection. (*Kühner*, § 634, *c.*, *Jelf.*) The reading *πονῶν* is a conjectural emendation of Taylor on Lysias, p. 491, confirmed by MSS. The old editions have *ῥρονῶν*.—*τοῦ λήψεσθαι.* "Of being about to seize the prey."

§ 19.

καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα, κ. τ. λ. "And yet, such rewards of toil are worth but little." The indefinite *τὶς*, when joined with adjectives, &c., brings the notion of these words more prominently forward, by either increasing or weakening that notion, according as the meaning of the word or the context requires. Here the effect is a weakening one. (*Kühner*, § 659, 4, *Jelf.*)—*ὅπως χειρώσονται.* Schneider reads, from two MSS., *χειρώσονται*, in compliance with Dawes' canon. But compare i., 2, 37.—*καλῶς οἰκῶσι.* "They may regulate well." Compare i., 1, 17.—*φίλους εὖ ποιῶσι.* To do a person good or evil is construed in Greek with two accusatives, or with an accusative of the person and the adverb *εὖ* or *κακῶς*. *Εὐεργετεῖν* and *κακουργεῖν* are construed with an accusative of the person. Compare iv., 4, 17.—*εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα.* "For such objects as these."—*εὐφραινομένους.* "Full of happiness." More literally, "gladdened (in feeling)."—*ἀγαμένους.* "Admiring."—*ζηλουμένους.* "Emulated."

§ 20.

αἱ μὲν ῥᾳδιουργίαι. "Slothful habits."—*ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἡδοναί.* "Easily obtained pleasures," *i. e.*, obtained at the moment of desire. Such is the interpretation of Straub, adopted by Kühner, and supported by the whole connection of the passage. "*Voluptates ejusmodi, quas, ubi concupiveris, statim, utpote sine ullo labore paratas, percipere liceat.*" The old interpretation was "pleasures of momentary duration," and so Schneider, "*eas voluptates, quæ statim percipiuntur, et quarum usus brevi tempus durat.*" (*Wheeler, ad loc.*)—*σώματι εὐεξίαν ἐνεργάζεσθαι.* "To work out a good habit for the body," *i. e.*, a good habit or condition of body. The old editions have *εὐ-*

(*Matthiæ*, § 364.) The line here quoted is a trochaic tetrameter catalectic, and scanned as follows:

τῶν πόν|ων πῶλ||οισιν | ἡμῖν ‖ πάντα | τἀγάθ'|οῖ θε|οί.

ὦ πονηρέ, μὴ τὰ, κ. τ. λ. "Ah! wretched one, seek not after the things that are soft, lest thou mayest obtain those that are hard," *i. e.*, seek not after an easy life, lest you may only obtain a hard one. Observe that *μώσο* (contracted *μῶ*) is the present imperative of *μώομαι*, an Epic lengthened form of *μάομαι*. This line is also a trochaic tetrameter catalectic, and scanned as follows:

ὦ πόν|ηρὲ, ‖ μὴ τὰ | μᾶλ|ακὰ ‖ μῶσ|ῶ, ‖ μὴ τὰ | σκλ|ῆρ' ἐλ|ῇς.

The entire clause, from *καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ τόπῳ* to the end of the line, is regarded as an interpolation by Valckenaer (*ad Herod.*, ii., 117), because the ancient writers are not accustomed to employ *τόπος* when speaking of a passage of any book or writer. Schütz and Schneider concur in this opinion, and Dindorf even goes so far as to regard the whole passage in the light of a spurious addition, from *μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος*. Voigtlaender, however, has successfully defended the ordinary text. (*Obs.*, pt. 1, p. 13.)

§ 21.

καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφός, κ. τ. λ. "Moreover, Prodicus the wise also, in the work which he has composed concerning Hercules." Observe the force of the article as repeated after *συγγράμματι*, and here rendered for perspicuty' sake by an entire clause, as if *γεγραμμένῳ*, or something equivalent, were understood. Prodicus was a native of Iulis, in the island of Ceos, and was eminent as a Sophist and rhetorician; although here, as Welcker observes, Xenophon separates him from the rest of the Sophists by the more honorable appellation of *ὁ σοφός*. (*Welcker, Kleine Schriften*, ii., p. 466.) Prodicus visited Athens frequently, for the purpose of transacting business on behalf of his native city. Socrates was one of his pupils in rhetoric. (*Plato, Meno*, 96, *D.*)—*συγγράμματι*. Xenophon merely refers to the work in question under the general appellation of *σύγγραμμα*. Its true title, however, was Ὧραι, which Welcker refers to the youthful bloom of Hercules. (*Suidas, s. v.* Ὧραι, *Welcker, l. c.*) The apologue itself is generally known, at the present day, by the title of "The Choice of Hercules."

ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδεικνυται. "Which, as is well known, he is accustomed to read unto very many." Literally, "he exhibits." The verb *ἐπιδείκνυμι* is properly employed in the sense of

well explained by Kühner, "*ut . . . . præ se ferre* (*φαίνεσθαι*) *videretur* (*δοκεῖν*)."

τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἐχειν ἀναπεπταμένα. "That she had her eyes, moreover, opened widely." This is the bold, immodest stare, opposed to the modest and retiring look.—*ἐσθῆτα δε, ἐξ ἧς, κ. τ. λ.* "And an attire, through which youthful beauty might most shine forth," *i. e.*, attire, the texture of which allowed the youthful beauty of her limbs to be clearly apparent. The reference is to what was termed the Coan robe or attire, and which had a great degree of transparency. Consult *Dict. Ant., s. v. Coa vestis.*—*κατασκοπεῖσθαι δὲ θαμὰ ἑαυτήν.* "That she frequently, also, looked down at herself," *i. e.*, surveying her dress and person.—*αὐτὴν θεᾶται.* If the optative were here employed in the place of the indicative, we would have *αὐτήν.* (*Kühner, ad loc.*) Compare i., 2, 49.—*ἀποβλέπειν.* "She looked back."

§ 23.

πλησιαίτερον. Thus in several MSS. and early editions. The common reading is *πλησιέστερον.*—*ἰέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.* "Proceeded in the same manner (as before)," *i. e.*, with the same quiet gait, neither slower nor faster. Observe here the construction of the accusative (*τὴν μὲν πρόσθεν ῥηθεῖσαν*) with the infinitive, the reference being still to what Prodicus says.—*φθάσαι.* "To get before her," *i. e.*, to anticipate her.—*ἀποροῦντα.* "At a loss."—*ἐὰν οὖν ἐμὲ φίλην ποιησάμενος.* "If, then, (you shall turn yourself thither) after having made me your friend." Supply, from the previous clause, *ἐπὶ τὸν βίον τράπῃ.* Compare *Hermann, ad Vig.*, § 227, p 776, *seqq.* Five MSS. give *ποιήσῃ*, and two *ποιήσει.* The common text has *ποιήσῃς.* We have given *ποιησάμενος*, on good MS. authority, with Bornemann, Kühner, and others.—*καὶ τῶν μὲν τερπνῶν οὐδενός, κ. τ. λ.* "And you shall taste of every pleasure." Literally, "and you shall be without tasting of no one of the things that are delightful." Observe that *ἄγευστος* takes the genitive on the same principle that *γεύεσθαι*, "to taste," is construed with it.—*τῶν χαλεπῶν ἄπειρος.* "Without any experience of troubles."

§ 24, 25.

οὐ φροντιεῖς. "You shall not concern yourself about." Observe that *φροντιεῖς* is the Attic form of the future for *φροντίσεις.*—*πραγμάτων.* "Public affairs."—*σκοπούμενος διέσει.* "You shall be always considering." There is some doubt about the true reading here. We have given *διέσει* (with the more Attic termination) from

§ 26

§ 27

for the purpose of securing your attention, the promise of pleasurable enjoyment. Observe that *προοιμια ἡδονῆς* stands here opposed to *τὰ ὀντα*, that is, *τὰ ἀληθῆ*, just as *μετ' ἀληθειας* stands opposed here to *ἐξαπατήσω*.—*τὰ ὄντα*. "The things that are," *i. e.*, the existing state of things.—*ἠπερ οἱ θεοὶ διέθεσαν*. "Even as the gods have ordained (them to be)."

§ 28.

τῶν ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ καλῶν οὐδέν. "No one of the things that are good and honorable."—*ἵλεως*. Attic for *ἵλάους*.—*θεραπευτέον τοὺς θεούς*. "You must worship the gods." Supply *σοί ἐστι*. Verbals in *τέον* are construed like the Latin gerund in *dum*, with the substantive verb and the dative of the personal pronoun; and though passive in derivation, they nevertheless govern the cases of the verbs from which they are derived, like actives. (*Matthiæ*, § 447. 2.)—*ἀξιοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι*. "You claim to be admired for virtue." Compare *ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς*, § 27.—*τὴν γῆν θεραπευτέον* "You must till the earth."—*ὁρμᾷς αὔξεσθαι*. "You are eager to increase your means." Observe the force of the middle.—*τὰς πολεμικὰς τέχνας αὐτάς τε, κ. τ. λ.* "You must both learn the arts of war themselves from those who are acquainted with them, and must practice how you ought to use them," *i. e.*, you must not only learn, but must practice them.—*εἰ δὲ καί*. After a succession of members of a discourse, beginning with *εἴτε*, the concluding member, which is the most important one, commences with *εἰ δέ*. (Compare *Kühner*, § 778, *Obs.*, *Jelf.*) So in Latin, after a repetition of *sive*, the final member begins with *si vero*. (*Kühner*, *ad Cic. Tusc.*, i., 41, 97.)—*τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα*. "You must accustom your body to render obedience to your mind." Cicero gives the explanation of this passage in the *De Officiis* (i., 23), as cited by Victorius: "*Exercendum corpus, et ita afficiendum est, ut obedire consilio et rationi possit.*"—*σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἱδρῶτι*. The preposition *σύν* with the dative of the instrument is of rare occurrence. (Compare *Kühner*, § 623, *Jelf.*)

§ 29.

ὡς χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδόν, κ. τ. λ. "How painful and tedious a road to her joys this woman tells you of." Observe the force of the article in *τὰς εὐφροσύνας*, *the* joys which *she* promises.—*ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν*. "Unto the happiness which I have in store," *i. e.*, unto *my* happiness. Observe again the force of the article.

§ 30

§ 31

thy train of revelers." By *θίασος* is properly meant a band or company engaged in celebrating some festival, chiefly of Bacchus, with dancing, singing, &c. It is here employed in an ironical sense, to denote a noisy and licentious crew of the votaries of vicious indulgence. Observe that *θιάτων* is the partitive genitive.—*οἱ νέοι μὲν ὄντες.* The plural here refers to *θιασῶται*, as implied in *θιάσου*.—*ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀνόητοι.* "Mere dotards in their intellects," *i. e.*, enfeebled to dotage by licentious excesses.—*ἀπόνως μὲν λιπαροί, κ. τ. λ.* "Maintained throughout early life in idleness amid abundance of all kinds," *i. e.*, maintained by the labors of others, such as parents or relations. We have given *λιπαροί* here the meaning assigned to it by Kühner, "*in omnium rerum affluentia.*"—*τρεσόμενοι.* In place of this, which is the reading of all MSS. and early editions, many later editors have given *ὀρρώμενοι*, the conjecture of Ruhnken. The emendation, however, is altogether unnecessary. The votaries of vicious pleasure are described as being maintained by others in their youth, and being compelled to maintain themselves in age, at which latter period their previous excesses have left them broken down in body and mind, and little able to do any thing for their own support. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)

ἐπιπόνως δὲ αὐχμηροί, κ. τ. λ. "And passing through old age with heavy toil, amid all the squalidness of penury." Observe the opposition between *αὐχμηροί* and *λιπαροί*, and also between *ἀπόνως* and *ἐπιπόνως*.—*τοῖς μὲν πεπραγμένοις.* "On account of the things done by them," *i. e.*, their past excesses. Observe the employment of the dative to express the cause of the action. (*Matthiæ*, § 399.)—*τοῖς δὲ πραττομένοις βαρυνόμενοι.* "And weighed down by the things that are at present getting done," *i. e.*, oppressed and broken down by the weight of their present labors.—*τὰ μὲν ἡδέα.* "Pleasures." *τὰ χαλεπά.* "Hardships."

§ 32.

σύνειμι. "Associate with."—*καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις οἷς προσήκει.* "And by men by whom it is becoming to be honored," *i. e.*, by the good among men. Supply *παρ'* before *οἷς*, and *τιμᾶσθαι* after *προσήκει*. This omission of the preposition is common in both Greek and Latin. Thus, iii., 7, 3: *ἐν ταῖς συννοσίαις, αἷς σύνει*, and *Convic.*, iv., 1: *ἐν τῷ χρύνῳ, ᾧ ἡμῶν ἀκούω.* So in Latin, *Corn. Nep., Cim.*, 3, 1: "*Incidit in eamdem invidiam, quam pater suus,*" &c.

§ 33.

ἡδεῖα μὲν καὶ ἀπράγμων ἀπόλαυσις. "A sweet and simple enjoyment." The term *ἀπράγμων* refers to the absence of all labored

§ 36.

future the sentence. "[before the immersion,]" i.e. the ritual of baptism given all purport. "the sentimental, between the sentimental." —συμφέρει σε ἀεί τινι, a. τ. λ. "To endeavor in every degree to befriend yourself of those things which relate to the future period of your life."

CHAPTER II

§ 1

ἀποκαλοῦσιν, καὶ τί ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι, οὓς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο ἀποκαλοῦσιν; (Compare *Matthiæ*, § 567; *Kühner*, § 883, 2, *Jelf.*) For the double accusative after *ἀποκαλοῦσιν*, consult *Matthiæ*, § 420, *Obs.* 2, *b.*—*τοὺς εὖ παθόντας.* "Those who have received a kindness."—*οὐκουν δοκοῦσί σοι, κ. τ. λ.* "Do they not, then, deem it right to class the ungrateful among the unjust?" Zeune thinks that *δεῖν* ought to be supplied after *δοκοῦσι*. But this is quite unnecessary, since *δοκοῦσι* itself implies the notion of what is fit or becoming. (*Kühner, ad loc.* Compare *Kühner*, § 665, *Jelf.*)

§ 2.

ἤδη δέ ποτ' ἐσκέψω. "And have you ever hitherto considered."—*εἰ ἄρα . . . . ἀδικόν ἐστι.* In case of reality, *εἰ* is used with an indicative; but in case of a future event, yet to be investigated, *ἐάν* with the subjunctive is employed after *σκέψασθαι*. (*Matthiæ*, § 526.)—*καὶ τὸ ἀχαριστεῖν πρὸς μὲν τοὺς φίλους, κ. τ. λ.* "So the acting with ingratitude toward our friends is unjust."—*καὶ δοκεῖ μοι, ὑφ' οὗ ἄν, κ. τ. λ.* "And from whomsoever, whether friend or foe, one, on having received a favor, does not try to make a grateful return, (that one) appears to me to be an unjust person." The peculiar construction of this sentence arises from a species of attraction, the relative clause being in construction with the dependent clause. (*Kühner*, § 825, 1, *Jelf.*) The more simple arrangement would have been as follows: *καὶ δοκεῖ μοι, ὅστις ἄν, ὑπό τινος εὖ παθών, μὴ πειρᾶται χάριν ἀποδιδόναι, ἄδικος εἶναι.* A similar structure occurs in Cicero (*Tusc.*, i., 34.)

§ 3.

εἴ γε οὕτως ἔχει τοῦτο. "If, indeed, this be so." The particle *εἰ* with an indicative is often followed by an optative with *ἄν* in the apodosis, when the result is to be represented as uncertain, as only possible, not decided upon in the speaker's mind; and hence, this is a less decided way of expressing the notion of the future indicative, *ἄν* referring to the condition of the former sentence. (*Kühner*, § 853, *b.*, *Jelf.*)—*εἰλικρινής τις ἀδικία.* "A kind of sheer injustice." The primitive meaning of *εἰλικρινής* is, "examined by the sun's light" (*εἵλη, κρίνω*), "tested," "found genuine." Hence arise the significations of "unmixed," "pure," "clear," "palpable," "sheer," &c. The common form is *εἰλικρινής*, for which we have not hesitated to substitute *εἰλικρινής*, with the initial aspirate, as more in accordance with etymology, and as usually found in the best MSS. of Plato.—*ὅσῳ τις μείζω ἀγαθὰ παθών.* "By how much one having

hering," *i. e.*, from non-existence.

τ. λ. "Nor the infant knowing by whom it is fondly tended." The best view of this much-contested clause is to regard *γιγνῶσκον τὸ βρέφος* as a nominative absolute. (Compare *Wannowski, de Construct. quæ dicitur absoluta*, p. 6.) Kühner, with much less propriety, regards it as a sort of oratorical anacoluthon, and that Xenophon used the nominative instead of the genitive, "*membrorum concinnitatis servandæ causa.*"—*στοχαζομένη.* "Guessing." A beautifully appropriate term to denote a mother's fond sagacity.—*ἐκπλῆροῦν.* "To satisfy it."—*τίνα χάριν.* "What return."

§ 6.

ἃ μὲν ἂν αὐτοὶ ἔχωσιν, κ. τ. λ. "Whatever good rules for the conduct of life the parents themselves may have, they teach unto them." Observe the employment here of *ἔχειν* in the sense of possessing, and compare i., 6, 13.—*δαπανῶντες.* "Incurring expense." *ἐπιμελοῦνται.* "Exercise an anxious care."—*ὡς δυνατὸν βέλτιστοι.* "As far as possible the best." In order to strengthen the signification of superlatives, particles and clauses are often added. (*Matthiæ*, § 461.)

§ 7.

ἀλλά τοι, εἰ καί. "But, in truth, although."—*πεποίηκε.* Supply *ἡ ἐμὴ μήτηρ*, which Lamprocles had in his mind, the whole previous discourse being in reference to her.—*τὴν χαλεπότητα.* "Her harshness of temper." Xanthippe, the wife of Socrates, was notorious for her violent temper. Consult Wiggers' Life of Socrates, p. 396 of this volume.—*ἀγριότητα.* "The wild temper."—*ἡ μήτηρ.* The article is not added, because Socrates speaks of mothers in general. Lamprocles, however, uses the article in the succeeding clause, *τῆς μητρός*, because he means his own mother.—*τῆς μητρὸς, τῆς γε τοιαύτης.* "That of my mother, at least of such a mother as she is."—*ἢ δακοῦσα, ἢ λακτίσασα.* "By having either bitten or kicked you."

§ 8.

ἀλλά, νὴ Δία, ἔφη, κ. τ. λ. "(No), but in very truth she utters, replied the other, things which one would not wish to hear for his whole life," *i. e.*, though he must lose his life unless he be willing to hear them. Observe that *ἐπί* here marks condition. (*Matthiæ*, § 585, *3*.) The particle *ἀλλά* at the beginning of the present clause is elliptical, the full idea being, *οὐ κακόν τί μοι ἔδωκεν, ἀλλά, κ. τ. λ.*—*σὺ δὲ πόσα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ.* "And yet, how much trouble, replied Socrates, difficult to endure, do you think you have caused

§ 9

§ 10

§ 11, 12

Literally, "have you been prepared," and are you still prepared.—*ἔγωγε*. "I would, indeed, endeavor to please." Supply *ἂν πειρώμην ἀρέσκειν*.—*ἀγαθοῦ συλλήπτωρ*. "An assistant in the acquisition of good."—*καί, ἄν τι σφαλλόμενος τύχῃς, κ. τ. λ.* "And, if you may have chanced to stumble in any respect, may kindly lend aid to you from near at hand."—*συνοδοιπόρον, ἢ σύμπλουν, κ. τ. λ.* "Would it make no difference to you, that a fellow-traveler, or fellow-passenger, or if you should meet with any one else, (in any other station of life, that such an one) be a friend or an enemy!" *i. e.*, or whatever person you should come in contact with.—*τῆς παρὰ τούτων εὐνοίας*. "Of the benevolence proceeding from these."—*ἐγωγε*. Supply *οἶμαι δεῖν*.

§ 13.

εἶτα. Compare i., 2, 26.—*ἄλλης μὲν ἀχαριστίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελεῖται, κ. τ. λ.* "Takes no cognizance of any other species of ingratitude, nor gives judgment against (any other)." After *δικάζει* supply *ἄλλην*.—*περιορᾷ*. "Overlooks."—*εὐ πεπονθότας*. Compare § 3.—*γονεας μὴ θεραπεύῃ*. An action was allowable for any neglect or insult toward a parent, and was termed *γραφὴ κακώσεως γονέων*. Compare *Meier und Schömann, Att. Proc.*, p. 288, *seqq.*; and *Hermann, Gr. Ant.*, § 133, 11.—*δίκην*. "A fine."—*καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζουσα, κ. τ. λ.* "And, rejecting, does not permit this one to be an archon, thinking that the sacrifices in behalf of the state would neither be duly offered if this one were to offer them," &c. Observe again the employment of *ὡς* with the absolute case of the participle, with reference to something thought of, &c.—*οὔτε ἄλλο καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, κ. τ. λ.* Complete the sentence as follows: *οὔτε ἄλλο καλῶς καὶ δικαίως οὐδὲν ἂν πραττόμενον, τούτου πράξαντος*, so as to correspond with *οὔτε ἂν θυόμενα, τούτου θύοντος*. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 568, 3.—*καὶ τοῦτο ἐξετάζει ἡ πόλις ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων δοκιμασίαις*. "The state examines into this also in the scrutinies of candidates for offices of magistracy." More literally, "in the scrutinies of magistrates." By *δοκιμασια* at Athens was meant an examination or scrutiny into the life and character of candidates for magisterial offices. If the examination took place in the senate, it was called *ἀνάκρισις*; if in the forum, before the regular court of investigation, *δοκιμασία*. In either case, however, the investigation was held after the election, and before the candidate elect entered upon office. (*Dict. Ant., s. v.* Docimasia and Anacrisis.)

§ 14.

ἂν σωφρονῇς. "If you are wise."—*παρημέληκας τῆς μητρός*. Verbs signifying "to neglect," or "be careless about" any thing, are fol-

[illegible]

CHAPTER III

§ 1

[illegible]

§ 2

[illegible]

ing a solitary life."—*ἐπικινδύνως.* "In an insecure state."—*ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν, κ. τ. λ.* "While in the case of brothers men are ignorant of this same thing." The construction often changes from singular to plural, as here, and vice versa. We may here supply *ἄνθρωποι.* (*Matthiæ*, § 293. *Kühner*, § 390, 1, *a.*, *Jelf.*)—*οἱ δυνάμενοι.* "The rich." Literally, "they who are able (so to do)."—*τῶν δ' ἀδελφῶν ἀμελοῦσιν.* Compare ii., 2, 14; iv., 3, 15.—*ὥςπερ ἐκ πολιτῶν, κ. τ. λ.* "As if friends were made from citizens only." The absolute case is often put by the Attics in the accusative, with *ὡς περ*, when it marks the motive of an action. (Compare *Matthiæ*, § 568, 569. *Kühner*, § 704, *Jelf.*)

§ 4, 5.

καὶ μήν. "And yet." In a simple sentence, *καὶ μήν* would merely signify, "and in very truth," &c.; here, however, it is employed to mark an opposition to what precedes, and the meaning changes in consequence. (*Kühner*, § 728, *Jelf.*)—*μέγα μὲν ὑπάρχει.* "Greatly conduces."—*ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, κ. τ. λ.* "Since even among wild animals there springs up a sort of affection toward those that are fostered with them." The genitive is here used objectively. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 367.—*ἀλλ' εἰ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, κ. τ. λ.* "Why, my good Socrates, if the difference between us were not great," &c.—*καὶ μὴ φεύγειν.* "And not to avoid him."—*ἀγαθόν.* "Is a good thing." Supply *ἔστι*, and consult note on *χρησιμώτερον*, § 1.—*ὧν οἷον δεῖ.* "Provided he is such as he ought to be."—*ὁπότε μέντοι παντὸς ἐνδέοι, κ. τ. λ.* "But when he might fail in every particular, and might be in every respect the very opposite (to what he ought to be), why should one attempt impossibilities?" The common version renders *ὁπότε μέντοι παντὸς ἐνδέοι* by "*at si plane desit officio*," which is opposed to the usage of the verb. The true idea is given by Weiske, and approved of by Kühner: "When as yet he is infinitely in fault; when he is the direct opposite of a brother." (*Wheeler, ad loc.*)

§ 6.

πότερα δέ. Compare i., 6, 15, and *Matthiæ*, § 446.—*ἢ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ πάνυ ἀρέσκει.* "Or are there some whom he even altogether pleases." Observe in *ἔστιν οἷς* the peculiar idiom that prevails, and that *ἔστι*, not *εἰσί*, is employed, though the relative following be in the plural. (*Matthiæ*, § 482.) This is imitated in Latin. Thus we have in Propertius (iii., 9, 17) the following:

> "*Est quibus Elææ concurrit palma quadrigæ:*
> *Est quibus in celeres gloria nata pedes.*"

§ 7. 8

§ 9

§ 10

plan against him." By *ποικίλον* is here meant something nicely planned, or carefully and skillfully arranged. Compare Bremi, and Jacobs, *ad Demosth. c. Phil.*, iii., p. 120, 37, and Stallbaum, *ad Plat., Sympos.*, 182, B. (*Kuhner, ad loc.*)—*οἷς δὲ καὶ σύ.* By attraction, for *τούτοις ἃ καὶ σύ.*—*ἁλόντα.* "On having been gained over."—*περὶ πολλοῦ ἂν ποιεῖσθαί σε.* "Would esteem you very highly." Literally, "would make you for himself (something) above much." Observe the force of the middle, and consult *Matthiæ*, § 589.

§ 11.

οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως, ἔφη, λέγων, κ. τ. λ. "You could not tell me too soon, said he, whether you have perceived me acquainted with some love-charm, with which I have been ignorant that I am acquainted," *i. e.*, possessing some love-charm which I have been ignorant of having. The expression *οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως λέγων* means literally, "you could not anticipate by telling me," and hence more freely, "now do tell me at once, without any hesitation." Compare *Matthiæ*, § 553, 2. *Kuhner*, § 694, *Jelf.* So, again, *ὃ ἐγὼ εἰδὼς ἐλήλυθα ἐμαυτόν* means literally, "which I have escaped my own observation in knowing."—*κατεργάσασθαι.* "To bring it about," *i. e.*, to cause. On the construction *κατεργάσασθαί τινα καλεῖν σε*, consult *Matthiæ*, § 531.—*ὁπότε θύοι.* A banquet usually followed a sacrifice. (*Dict. Ant., s. v.* Sacrificium.)—*κατάρχοιμι ἂν τοῦ αὐτός, κ. τ. λ.* "I would myself begin with inviting him," &c. Verbs signifying "to begin," such as *ἄρχειν, ἄρχεσθαι, ὑπάρχειν, κατάρχειν*, &c., are construed with a genitive. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 335, 9.

§ 12, 13.

προτρέψασθαι. "To urge."—*ὁπότε ἀποδημοίης.* "Whenever you might be going abroad."—*ξένον ποιῆσαι ὑποδέχεσθαι σεαυτόν.* "To cause any host to receive you under his roof," *i. e.*, to give you a hospitable reception. Observe the force of *ὑπό* in composition.—*εἰς τὴν ἐκείνου.* Supply *πόλιν.*—*Ἀθήναζε.* For *Ἀθήνασδε*, the final letter *σ* coalescing with the *δε* into *ζε*. (*Kuhner*, § 332. *Obs.* 5, *Jelf.*)—*εἴ γε βουλοίμην αὐτὸν προθυμεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ.* "If, indeed, I should wish him to be desirous of accomplishing for me the things for which I might have come," *i. e.*, the objects of my journey thither.—*αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ ποιεῖν.* With *αὐτόν* supply *ἐμέ.*

§ 14.

τάντ' ἄρα σύ γε, κ. τ. λ. "Then, (according to your own showing) you, for your part, though acquainted with all the love-charms among

§ 10.

§ 11.

path," *i. e.*, should make way for.—*ὑπαναστῆναι.* The genitive *θάκων*, which is otherwise usually added, is omitted here on account of the presence of the participle *καθήμενον.*—*καὶ κοίτῃ μαλακῇ τιμῆσαι.* "And should honor him with a soft seat." Compare *Hom., Il.*, ix., 617, 659; *Od.*, xxiv., 254.—*καὶ λόγων ὑπείξαι.* "And should yield to him in conversation." More literally, "should draw back from," &c.—*ὠγαθέ.* "My good friend." Compare i., 4, 17.—*μὴ ὄκνει.* "Be not averse."—*τὸν ἀνδρα.* "This man." Much more emphatic than *ἐκεῖνον* would have been. Kühner thinks that the term is perhaps intended to indicate the full-grown manhood of Chærephon, as opposed to the youth of Chærecrates.—*σοὶ ὑπακούσεται.* The verb *ὑπακούω* is construed with a genitive or dative. So, also, *κατακούω.* (*Matthiæ*, § 362, § 392.)—*φιλότιμος.* "Fond of honorable distinction." Taken here in a good sense.—*ἐλευθέριος.* "Liberal of spirit."—*τὰ μὲν γὰρ πονηρὰ ἀνθρώπια, κ. τ. λ.* "For worthless wretches you could not in any other way more effectually allure," &c. The particle *γάρ* gives a reason here for what went before, namely, *καὶ πάνυ ταχύ, κ. τ. λ.*—*ἀνθρώπια.* The term *ἀνθρώπιον*, like the Latin *homuncio*, is always indicative of contempt or inferiority.—*μάλιστ' ἂν κατεργάσαιο.* "You could most effectually gain over."

§ 17.

τί γὰρ ἄλλο, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ. "Why, what else will result, said Socrates, save that you will stand a chance of showing," &c., *i. e.*, save that you will perhaps show. The verb *κινδυνεύω* signifies, "to run a risk," "to stand a chance," &c. A negation is often more strongly expressed by a question. So *τί ἄλλο, ἤ* is used with a finite verb for *οὐδὲν ἄλλο*, where we must not repeat the preceding or following verb with *τί ἄλλο*, but supply in the mind a general verb, such as *γίγνομαι, ποιῶ, πάσχω.* Compare *Matthiæ*, § 488, 11. Hence, the full expression here would be *τι γὰρ ἄλλο γενήσεται.*—*ἐπιδείξαι, σὺ μὲν χρηστός, κ. τ. λ.* The verb *δείκνυμι*, and its compounds *ἐπιδείκνυμι*, &c., in the sense of "to show," take properly a participle, and in the sense of "to teach," an infinitive. But they also take the infinitive when the object of the verb indicates something not clearly perceived, but merely thought of as possible. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον.* "To this (fraternal) contest."—*πάνυ φιλονεικήσειν.* "Will strive most emulously."

§ 18.

οὕτως διάκεισθον. "You two are so affected (toward one another)," *i. e.*, are as unnaturally affected.—*τὼ χεῖρε* A feminine

CHAPTER IV

§ 1

μέν ους. Dindorf reads *ἐπιμελουένους*. But the shorter form of this verb is less frequent in Attic.

§ 2.

καὶ γὰρ οἰκίας, κ. τ. λ. Compare Cicero, *de Am.*, xv., 55: "*Quid autem stultius, quam, cum plurimum copiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quæ parantur pecunia, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa; amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam vitæ, ut ita dicam, supellectilem?*" Cicero has here evidently imitated the Greek of Xenophon.—*ὁρᾶν ἔφη*. Although *ἔφη* has just preceded, yet it is here repeated, in accordance with a very ordinary Greek usage, arising from the language of daily converse. (*Kuhner, ad loc.*)—*φίλον δέ, ὁ*. The neuter *ὁ* is put here by a species of attraction for *ὄν*.—*οὔτε ὅπως κτήσονται ὀρυττιζοντας*. "Neither caring how they shall acquire." For *κτήσονται*, which is supported by MS. authority, the common text has *κτήσωνται*.—*οὔτε ὅπως οἱ ὄντες, κ. τ. λ.* "Nor in what way those who are (already their friends) may be preserved so for themselves." The old editions, with four Paris MSS., have *ὅπως οἷόν τε ἑαυτοῖς σώζοντας*.

§ 3.

ἀλλὰ καί. "Nay, more."—*τἆλλα πρὸς ὑγιείαν*. "The other things conducive to health," *i. e.*, to convalescence. Some recent editions have, with one MS., *τἄλλα τά*.—*ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς οἰκέταις*. "In the case of their domestics." More literally, "on account of their domestics."—*ζημίαν ἡγουμένους*. "Thinking it a loss."—*οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔσθαι*. "That they were in no respect worse off (than before)."—*ἀθεράπευτον οὐδ' ἀνεπίσκεπτον*. "To be unattended to, or not looked after."

§ 4.

καὶ πάνυ πολλῶν αὐτοῖς ὄντων. "Although they had very many."—*τῶν δὲ φίλων, κ. τ. λ.* Compare Cicero, *de Am.*, xvii., 62: "*Sæpe* (Scipio) *querebatur, quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent, ut capras et oves quot quisque haberet, dicere posset; amicos quot haberet, non posset dicere.*"—*ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς πυνθανομένοις, κ. τ. λ.* "But that, even on having attempted to recount this to those making the inquiry, (the persons) whom they placed among their friends, these they take up again." They enumerate persons at first, but correct themselves, and reject them on second thoughts. The allusion in *ἀνατίθεσθαι* is to the movements on a draught-board, when, after having put down a piece, we take it up again, and alter or take back our move. Observe, moreover, that the infinitive *ἀνατίθεσθαι* is put here for

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

a friend fail to prove kindly serviceable." For the construction of λείπεσθαι with the participle, consult *Matthiæ*, § 554, *g.*, and, as regards οὐδενός in the genitive, § 317.—πρὸ αὑτοῦ. "For himself." Compare *Matthiæ*, § 575.—ταῦτα ὁ φίλος πρὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐξήρκεσεν. "These things the friend is wont to supply amply for his friend." Observe here the force of the aorist in denoting what is habitual. Commentators generally supply participles here from the finite verbs which precede, such as ἐξεργαζόμενος, &c., but Kühner considers this quite unnecessary, since the idea implied by ἐξήρκεσεν is sufficiently full without them.—ὃ καλεῖται οἶκος. Here the neuter relative ὃ agrees with the antecedent κτήματος, as being the most emphatic word. Compare § 2.

CHAPTER V.

§ 1.

ἄλλον αὐτοῦ λόγον. "Another conversation of his."—ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτόν. "To examine himself," *i. e.*, excited him to the task of self-examination.—ὁπόσου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη. "As to of how much value he might be unto his friends," *i. e.*, in the estimation of his friends.—πενίᾳ πιεζόμενον. "When pinched by poverty."—Ἀντισθένη. Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates, and after his death the founder of the Cynic sect. This form of the accusative is more common with Plato than with Xenophon, who generally employs the form ending in ην. Thus we have Ἀντισθένην, iii., 11, 17, and *Symp.*, 11, 12. So Σωκράτη in Plato, but Σωκράτην in Xenophon. (*Kuhner, ad loc.*)—ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀμελοῦντος αὐτοῦ. "In the presence of the neglectful person himself."

§ 2.

ἆρ', ἔφη, ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, εἰσί τινες ἀξιαι φίλων, κ. τ. λ. "Are there, said he, O Antisthenes, any values of friends, even as (there are) of domestics?" *i. e.*, is there any standard of value for friends, as there is for domestics?—ὁ μὲν που. "One, perhaps."—δύο μνᾶν. The Attic mina (μνά) was equivalent to one hundred drachmæ, or seventeen dollars sixty cents of our currency. Sixty minæ made the ordinary talent. The market-price of slaves at Athens, exclusively of the variations caused by the greater or less demand and supply, was very different according to their age, health, strength, beauty, natural abilities, mechanical ingenuity, and moral qualities. Compare *Böckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens*, vol. i., p. 92.—Νικίας. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, whose life has been written by Plutarch. His

εὑρόν est id (pretium), quod res venalis reperit (*πωλεῖν τι τοῦ εὑρόντος*, Etwas verkaufen für das was es findet)." Some editions have *ἀποδίδοται*, but the subjunctive is preferable.—*ἐπαγωγὸν ἤ.* "There may be an inducement."—*τὸ πλεῖον τῆς ἀξίας.* "More than his value." Observe the force of the article in *τῆς ἀξίας*, literally, "*the* value (*i. e.*, which he estimates him at)."—*προδιδομένους* "Parted with," *i. e.*, forsaken.

CHAPTER VI.

§ 1.

φρενοῦν. "To give wise instruction." More literally, "to make wise."—*Κριτόβουλε.* Critobulus was the son of Crito, and a follower of Socrates. Compare i., 2, 48; ii., 9, 1.—*πῶς ἂν ἐπιχειροίημεν σκοπεῖν.* "How should we undertake to look out for one?" *i. e.*, how should we proceed to search for one? The Attic form of the optative of verbs in *έω* is rarely used in the plural. (*Rost*, § 77, p. 227.) —*ἆρα πρῶτον μὲν ζητητέον, κ. τ. λ.* "Must we, in the first place, seek for one who," &c. Many commentators consider *ἆρα*, in cases like the present, equivalent to *ἆρ' οὐ*, or the Latin *nonne*. This, however, is not correct. It is true, *ἆρα* implies doubt, and hence is for the most part used negatively, or, in other words, prepares one for a negative answer, being then equivalent to the Latin *num*. Attic urbanity, however, employs this particle even in interrogations where no doubt whatever is implied, that is, where, as in the present instance, the interrogator knows for certain that the person interrogated will give an affirmative answer. Hence it thus often subserves the purposes of delicate irony. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*ἀρχει.* "Holds in subjection."—*ὑπνου.* "Love of sleep."—*ὁ κρατούμενος.* "He who is subjugated."—*μὰ Δί', οὐ δῆτα.* "No, surely, he could not indeed."—Supply *δύναιτ' ἄν.*—*τοῦ μὲν ὑπὸ τούτων, κ. τ. λ.* The particle *μέν* is solitary here, as in *ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραφή*, in i., 1, 1.—*ἀφεκτέον εἶναι.* "That we must refrain from," *i. e.*, must avoid. Supply *ἡμῖν.*

§ 2.

τί γάρ; "What then?" Observe that *τί* is found in many combinations, especially with particles, to give greater animation to the discourse. The literal force of *τί γάρ* appears to be "*what, for* (we have not yet done with the subject)?" In the previous section we have *πρῶτον μέν*, and would here naturally expect *εἶτα δέ*, but the place of this last is supplied by the more animated and impressive

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

as Kühner remarks, *εὔορκος* is used in opposition to the character of the avaricious man, § 4, who, in his eagerness for gain, cares neither for justice nor for his covenants, and who, in § 19, is called *ἄπιστος*.—*καὶ φιλόνεικος πρὸς τὸ μή, κ. τ. λ.* "And emulous as regards the not being behind-hand in doing good," &c. Verbs signifying "to be inferior," or "to fail," are construed with a participle. (*Matthiæ*, § 554, *g.*)—*τοῖς χρωμένοις.* "Unto those who make use of him," *i. e.*, unto those friends who avail themselves of his services.

§ 6, 7.

οὐ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαιρόμενοι. "Not drawing an inference from their words." The dative is used with some verbs, with which, in Latin, no instrument or means is signified. The verb *τεκμαίρομαι* is sometimes construed with *ἀπό*, or *ἐκ* and a genitive. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 396.—*εἰργασμένον.* "To have made." Literally, "as having made."—*τούτῳ πιστεύομεν.* "In this one we place confidence." We have here a kind of attraction, for *τοῦτον πιστεύομεν ποιήσειν.*—*καὶ ἄνδρα δὴ λέγεις, κ. τ. λ.* "And do you mean, then, said he, that a man who is seen benefiting his former friends, is manifest as intending to serve his subsequent ones?" *i. e.*, that the man who has openly benefited his previous friends will clearly be inclined also to serve his future friends. Many verbs, and verbal expressions, which are used impersonally in other languages, particularly in the construction of the accusative with the infinitive, in Greek usually take the chief word of the following proposition as a subject. The expressions *δῆλόν ἐστι*, "it is clear;" *δίκαιόν ἐστι*, "it is right," &c., are most usually thus construed. (*Matthiæ*, § 297.)—*καὶ γὰρ ἵππους, κ. τ. λ.* "I do, replied Socrates, for whomsoever I see using even former horses well, I think that this one uses others also well." Observe that *γάρ* is here elliptical, referring to *λέγω*, or something equivalent understood, while *καί*, on the other hand, is to be construed with *ἵππους*. There is no need, moreover, as the context plainly shows, of our reading *χρήσεσθαι* instead of *χρῆσθαι*, with Valckenaer.

§ 8.

εἶεν. "Well, be it so." Attic for *εἰήσαν*, but used adverbially as a mere particle of transition.—*ἔφη.* "Said Critobulus."—*πρῶτον μέν, ἔφη, κ. τ. λ.* "In the first place, replied Socrates, we must look to the omens from the gods, whether," &c. Literally, "to the things from the gods." *ὃν ἂν ἡμῖν τε δοκῇ, κ. τ. λ.* "As regards him whom it may appear good unto us (to make our friend

§ 9, 10

§ 11

be a rapid transition from one clause to the other, especially when the second clause begins, as in the present instance, with ἀλλά (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*τοῖς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ ὀιλοτιμουμένοις.* "To those (only who were ambitious after virtue," *i. e.*, who were eager in the pursuit of virtue.

§ 12, 13.

σχεδόν τι λέγεις, κ. τ. λ. "You seem to say nearly (as follows), that we ought to use, as charms unto each, such expressions, as one, on hearing him that praises, will not think that he utters laughing at him all the while," *i. e.*, that we ought to use, as charms to each, such praises, as that when one hears them he will not think himself mocked.—*οὕτω μὲν γάρ.* That is, if he thought he were ridiculed.—*τὸν εἰδότα.* "The one that was conscious."—*λέγων.* "By telling him."—*οὔκ· ἀλλ' ἤκουσα.* Compare note on *οὐκ· ἀλλά*, § 11.—*ἤκουσα μέν.* "I, for my part, have heard." Observe the force of *μέν*, and compare note on *οἶμαι μέν*, § 5.—*ἐπίσταιτο.* The optative, as Kühner remarks, is aptly employed here, because the reference is to something which Socrates had heard from others, but did not know of himself, and hence Bornemann makes the clause equivalent to *ἤκουσα λεγόντων, ὅτι Περικλῆς ἐπίσταιτο.*—*ἐποίει.* Observe the sudden change to the indicative, occasioned by the transition from the *oratio obliqua* to the *recta*, that is, from the indirect narration to the direct.—*περιάψας τι ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ.* "By having attached some advantage to it."

§ 14.

εἰ μέλλομεν. "If we should be about." Schneider, following the conjecture of Heindorf, reads *εἰ μέλλομεν*, "if we are about," implying certainty; but the optative is preferable, as leaving it undecided whether the thing is about to take place or not.—*λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν.* "Both in speaking and in acting." Herbst considers *λέγειν* to refer to the oratorical powers of Pericles, and *πράττειν* to the illustrious deeds of Themistocles; but both statesmen were remarkable for these qualities united. Socrates had already compared the oratory of Pericles with the music of the Sirens, to show the power of language; he now introduces, in the exploits of Themistocles (*πράττειν*), and in his admirable counsels for the state (*λέγειν*), the effect of both in gaining affection. (*Kühner, ad loc. Wheeler, ad loc.*)—*σὺ δ' ὤου.* "And did you think."—*οἷόν τ' εἶναι.* "That it was possible."

§ 15, 16

§ 17, 18

§ 19, 20.

πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχω. "I am altogether despondent." Compare note on *πολεμικῶς ἔχουσι*, § 18.—*οὔτε γὰρ τοὺς πονηρούς, κ. τ. λ.* An anacoluthon, for in § 20 there ought to follow, *οὔτ' ἂν τοῖς*, &c.—*πλεονέκται.* "Avaricious."—*ἀκρατεῖς.* "Incontinent."—*πάντως.* The common text has *πάντες.*—*πεφυκέναι.* "To be by their very nature." *ἀλλὰ μήν.* Compare i., 1, 6.—*οὐδ' ἂν τοῖς χρηστοῖς, κ. τ. λ.* "The bad could never harmonize with the worthy for friendship."—*εἰ δὲ δή.* "But if then, (as you say)." Compare § 18.—*στασιάζουσί τε περὶ τοῦ πρωτεύειν.* "Are both at variance (with each other) for pre-eminence."—*φθονοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς.* "From mutual envy."—*ἑαυτοῖς . . . . . ἀλλήλους.* The reflexive and reciprocal pronouns are often used promiscuously, merely for the purpose of varying the language. (*Kühner*, § 654, 2, *Jelf.*)—*τίνες ἔτι.* "Who any longer," *i. e.*, who after this.

§ 21.

ἀλλ' ἔχει μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ λ. "These things, however, my good Critobulus, replied Socrates, are somewhat diversified in their character," *i. e.*, do not all follow one and the same rule. Compare the explanation of Ernesti: "*In hoc genere quædam varietas deprehenditur.*" The question here arises as to what Socrates means by *ταῦτα*, whether he has in view the *φιλικά* and *πολεμικά*, or whether he refers to the difference existing between the really good among men and the pretendedly so. The latter is undoubtedly the more correct view, and the point which he wishes to establish is this, that although differences and dissensions may arise among the really good, because the *φιλικά* are by the very constitution of our nature intermingled with *πολεμικά*, yet these differences are soon allayed by the influence of correct and virtuous principles. (*Lange, ad loc.*)—*τὰ μὲν φιλικά.* "Principles of love."—*συνεργοῦντες.* "By co-operating."—*καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες, κ. τ. λ.* "And, understanding this, entertain a grateful feeling toward one another," *i. e.*, feel mutual gratitude.—*τὰ δὲ πολεμικά.* "And also principles of hostility."—*ἐναντιοῦνται.* "Oppose one another." Observe the force of the middle.—*πολεμικόν.* "Are productive of hostility." Literally, "are a hostile thing." Observe that *πολεμικόν* is a neuter adjective without a substantive in the predicate. Compare ii., 3, 1.—*δυσμενές.* "Begets ill will."—*μισητόν.* "Is deserving of hatred." We have followed Kühner in rendering this. Commentators generally, but less correctly, explain it by "producing," or "causing hatred."

§ 26.

συνθεμένους ἐπὶ τοὺς χείρους ἰέναι. "To unite together and advance against the weaker." Construe the participle and infinitive as two infinitives united by the copulative *καί.*—*πάντας ἂν τοὺς ἀγῶνας, κ. τ. λ.* "The former would conquer in all the contests, and they would obtain all the prizes." When the condition and consequence are both past actions, whose relation to each other shows that any action would have taken place if another had happened, the indicative of past time is used twice, in the protasis with *εἰ* alone (hence here *εἰ ἐξῆν*), and in the apodosis with *ἂν* (hence here *ἂν ἐλάμβανον*).—*ἐκεῖ μέν.* Equivalent to *ἐν τοῖς γυμικοῖς ἀγῶσιν.*—*ἐν δὲ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς.* "In those political contests," *i. e.*, in those states. Supply *ἀγῶσιν.*—*οὐδεὶς κωλύει, κ. τ. λ.* "No one prevents a man from benefiting the state in concert with whomsoever he may please."—*κτησάμενον.* "For a person who has acquired."—*πολιτεύεσθαι.* "To conduct public affairs."—*κοινωνοῖς καὶ συνεργοῖς τῶν πράξεων.* "As sharers and co-operators in his proceedings."

§ 27.

ἀλλὰ μήν. Compare i., 1, 6.—*καὶ τούτων πλειόνων ἐὰν ἀντιτάττηται.* "And these in greater numbers if he oppose."—*εὖ ποιητέον.* "Ought to be well treated."—*προθυμεῖσθαι.* "To be zealous in their exertions."—*τοὺς βελτίστους ἐλάττονας εὖ ποιεῖν, κ. τ. λ.* "To treat well the most deserving, although fewer in number, than the worse, being more in number," *i. e.*, to treat well a few of the more deserving class rather than a large number of the worse.—*εὖ ποιεῖν τοὺς χείρους.* This is the reading of Ernesti, in accordance with the version of Bessario, "*beneficiis.*" The previous editions had *εὐεργετῶν.*

§ 28.

καὶ τοιοῦτος γιγνόμενος. "And in endeavoring to become such." Compare the explanation of Kühner: "*dum talis fieri studes.*" Bornemann and others, from three MSS., read *γενόμενος.*—*συλλαβεῖν ἔχοιμι.* The verb *ἔχειν* with an infinitive is equivalent to *δύνασθαι.*—*διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι.* "From my being prone to love." He means the love of real loveliness, namely, of truth, virtue, and honor, with which he endeavored also to inspire his followers.—*ἐπιτηδείως γε πρὸς ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσω ἀνθρώπων, κ. τ. λ.* "For with regard to whatsoever persons I may desire, I am all impelled in a powerful degree to the being loved in turn by them, because loving them; and to the being longed for, because longing for; and to the being even desired in turn for the sake of my intercourse, because desirous of holding in

plest form of attraction, the relative depending on a preposition, and yet being in the same case as is required by the verb. (*Kühner*, § 822, 2, *Jelf.*)

§ 35.

ταῦτα μὲν δή. "These things, then."—*πρὸς οὓς.* For *πρὸς τουτους, οὕς.*—*φίλους ποιήσασθαι.* "To make friends unto yourself." Observe the force of the middle.—*καὶ ἐπί τε τοῖς καλοῖς ἔργοις, κ. τ. λ.* "And exult at the noble actions of your friends no less than at your own." Observe that *ἑαυτοῦ* has here the force of *σεαυτοῦ.* (*Matthiæ*, § 489, 2.)—*ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.* "At the prosperity."—*οὐκ ἀποκάμνεις μηχανώμενος.* "Are not weary in contriving."—*καὶ ὅτι ἐγνωκας, κ. τ. λ.* "And that you consider it to be a manly virtue." Kühner is offended with the repetition of the conjunction *ὅτι* here, and ascribes it to negligence on the part of the writer. For the employment of the infinitive after *ἔγνωκας*, consult *Matthiæ*, § 530, 2.—*πάνυ ἐπιτήδειον.* Observe that *πάνυ* is separated from its adjective for the purpose of making it more emphatic. Compare *Kühner*, § 904, 1, *Jelf.*—*οἶμαι εἶναί με.* Observe here the accusative with the infinitive, where we would regularly expect the nominative, the subject being the same with that of the preceding verb. This is done, however, because emphasis is required. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 536, *Obs.*

§ 36.

ὥςπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ σοὶ ὄν. "As if it were not in your own power." The case absolute is often put by the Attics in the accusative with *ὥςπερ* when it marks the motive of an action, &c. (*Matthiæ*, § 568.)—*μὰ Δί' οὔχ, ὥς ποτε, κ. τ. λ.* "No, indeed, (it is not in my power), as I once heard Aspasia (say)." Literally, "as I once heard from Aspasia." With *οὔχ* supply *ἐπί μοι ἐστι.* The allusion is to the celebrated Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles, who is said by some to have been the preceptress of Socrates in the art of speaking. This story, however, is most probably untrue, and has arisen from a misconception of a passage in the Menexenus of Plato, p. 235, E. (Consult *Wiggers' Life of Socrates*, p. 377 of this volume.) Weiske maintains that Socrates praises this female as his teacher solely on the principle of irony, and that he never intended to mean that he really heard the lessons of Aspasia. The same point is ably argued by *C. F. Hermann* (*Disp. de Socr. Mag.*, &c. p. 19, *seqq.*).

ἀγαθὰς προμνηστρίδας. "That upright match-makers."—*τἀγαθά.* "The good qualities (of individuals)"—*δεινὰς εἶναι συνάγειν, κ. τ λ.*

§ 39.

ἀλλὰ συντομωτάτη τε, κ. τ. λ. Compare *Cicero, de Off.*, ii., 12: "*Praeclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam proximam et quasi compendiariam dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut, qualis haberi vellet, talis esset.*" —*ὅ τι.* "In whatever."—*τοῦτο καὶ γενέσθαι, κ. τ. λ.* "Is in this even to endeavor to be actually good."—*σκοπούμενος.* "On consideration." Both *σκοπέομαι*, the deponent, and *σκοπέω*, the active verb, are in use; for an explanation of which, consult *Kühner*, § 363 5, *Jelf.*)—*αὐξανομένας.* "Capable of being increased." Literally "getting increased."—*ταύτῃ.* "In this way," *i. e.*, the way which I have unfolded. We have given in the text the reading drawn by Schütz from the margin of the Roman edition, and adopted by Kühner and other editors. The common editions have *οὕτως οἶμαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς ταῦτας θηρᾶσθαι.* Most MSS. omit *οὕτως.* Simpson and Edwards have *οἶμαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς ταῦτας θηρᾶσθαι*; Ernesti gives *οὕτως οἶμαι δεῖν θηρᾶν ἡμᾶς.—θηρᾶσθαι.* "To hunt (for friends)." In the middle, *θηρώμαι* is used just like the active. Compare *Kühner*, § 363, 5, *Jelf*, and the note on *σκοπούμενος* above.—*πως ἄλλως.* "(How to do this) in any other way." Supply *θηρᾶσθαι.*

CHAPTER VII.

§ 1.

καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀπορίας γε, κ. τ. λ. "And, indeed, as regarded the difficulties of his friends, those which arose through ignorance he endeavored to remedy by advice."—*διδάσκων.* "By teaching (his followers)"—*ἱρῶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, κ. τ. λ.* "And, among these, I will mention those instances to which I am privy from having been with him." Literally, "which I know along with him." Compare Kühner: "*Dicam ea, quibus, cum ab eo dicerentur, interfui, sive quorum testis auritus sum.*"—*Ἀριστάρχου.* Of this Aristarchus nothing is known. He must not, however, be confounded with the oligarchical leader of that name, who is mentioned by Thucydides, viii., 90.—*σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα.* "Having a gloomy countenance." Compare ii., 6, 18, and 36.—*τοῦ βάρους μεταδίδοναι.* "To impart the cause of your heaviness." Verbs signifying "to impart," or "communicate," are construed with a genitive of the thing, and a dative of the person. (*Matthiæ*, § 326, 3.)—*ἡμεῖς.* He modestly refers to others along with himself, though, in fact, he himself alone is meant

Latin *ille*. Of the individual in question, however, we at the present day know nothing.—*τρεφων*. "Though supporting."—*τὰ ἐπιτήδεια*. "The necessaries of life."—*ἀλλὰ καὶ περιποιεῖται τοσαῦτα*. "But also makes so much." More literally, "makes so much over and above (this) for himself," *i. e.*, lays up so much.—*πολλοὺς τρέφων*. "Supporting many," *i. e.*, who support many.—*ὅτι νὴ Δί'*. "Yes, because."

§ 4.

τὸν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πονηροτέρων εὐπορεῖν. "That he should become wealthy by means of the more worthless."—*νὴ Δί', ἔφη*. "Certainly, (it is disgraceful), replied Aristarchus." The connection in the train of ideas is this: Certainly it is disgraceful that I should be in poverty, for I have to support free citizens, well brought up and tenderly reared, who ought to live in a manner superior to common slaves. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*ἐλευθερίως πεπαιδευμένους*. "Persons liberally educated."

§ 5.

ἆρ' οὖν. For *ἆρ' οὖν οὐ*. Just as the simple *ἆρα* is sometimes put for *ἆρ' οὐ*. Consult *Heindorf, ad Plat., Cratyl.*, p. 388, B.; *Herm., ad Soph., Antig.*, 628.—*ἄλφιτα*. "Barley meal."—*τί δ' ἄρτοι*; "But what of bread?"—*τί γάρ*; *ἔφη, κ. τ. λ.* "What then? said he; are both male and female articles of apparel (useful), and inner vests, and cloaks, and sleeveless tunics?" Several species of garments are here mentioned. The *ἱμάτιον* was, properly speaking, an upper garment, outer robe, or gown, worn above the *χιτών*, and answering in the case of males nearly to the Roman toga. Here, however, the term is used in the plural of clothes or articles of apparel generally. The *χιτώνισκος* was a small *χιτών*, or tunic, worn next the body. The *χλαμύς* was a thick, warm cloak, worn loosely, and chiefly by soldiers. (*Poll.*, x., 124. *D'Orville, ad Charit.*, p. 384.) The *ἐξωμίς* was a man's tunic, without sleeves, leaving the shoulders bare. Sometimes the *ἐξωμίς* had one sleeve, and left one shoulder bare; this last, however, was usually the dress of slaves, poor men, cynics, &c. The first kind is here meant.—*ἔπειτα, ἔφη, οἱ παρὰ σοί, κ. τ. λ.* "Then, said he, do those with you know how to make no one of these things? Nay rather, all, as I think." Observe that *μὲν οὖν*, or *μενοῦν*, seems to answer to the Latin *immo*, and is almost entirely confined to replies, affirmative, negative, or corrective. (*Kühner*, § 730, *b.*; § 880, 9.)—*ἐγῷμαι*. For *ἐγὼ οἶμαι*.

§ 6

[illegible] "Do you not know, then?" The passive use is that used to express of happiness or misery (compare § 2 29—*sup. init.*). The next clause is connected to that expressed by the preceding δεω with the genitive (*Kühner*, § 650 *f*.)—Neoptolemus. All we know of this person is, that he was an Athenian soldier, and became one of the commanders at sea[illegible] called Lysimachia, "a happy local conjecture," by the editor of Apollodorus, *Bibl.* 3, 26—Lysimachus. That even Aeginetan "no bad pastry" in the trade is meant to enhance the public wealth. Compare Xen. *Cyrop.* ii. 2, 10; *An. Epp.* i. 3, and 28. For the more general meaning consult Liv. *An.* 2 4—Lucian. Instructing [illegible] in hatred of that person. "It is here given the form of the name as assumed by Shakespeare, who appears to have taken it from some "Gesta" &c. Something like Boothy's conception of Lysimachus for Edmondson from Nicholas (Wheeler, *ad loc.*)

Against Ar[illegible] = and Demosthenes, on the homage of Children." The [illegible] part of which is commonly applied, belongs all to the title *Against* (Aeschin). The person here referred to is perhaps = Demosthenes "with the Magistrate." Magnes was a small merchant of Cleonae, living in the west end mentioned of Athens. The pupil was Magnes. The Aeginetans paid considerable attention to wrestling associations, which they used to send to the Athenian soldiers. Compare Dissing ad Aeschin., Athens, Bibl.—where also the Aeginetans, p. 1. 1. "I've been here with these barbarians already twice for provisions, on that time I was amongst those to wait at the Aeginetan's and Lysimachus' barbarians." Mass finally, "some bold barbarians by purchase"—[illegible], however, "here with me." Supply *ἔρχου*.

§ 7

[illegible] "The [illegible] of the Athenians all over Greece, who live in that [illegible] way, passing their time most pleasantly, and do not desire their property" &c.—§ 12—*sup. Apion*, 1, 1. "Or do you imagine that Greeks and barbarians are equally [illegible]," &c. Observe that *ἀνάγκη* is ancient here, because *δίκαιον* and *ἀνάγκη* denote things without the "as [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]." The latter is used when [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

§ 8.

ἔμαθον δέ, ἃ οὐδ', κ. τ. λ. The verb *ἔμαθον* is here placed before the interrogative particle *πότερον* for the sake of greater emphasis. (*Kühner*, § 903, *Jelf.*)—*ὡς οὔτε χρήσιμα ὄντα, κ. τ. λ.* "Because they thought that they were neither useful for life, nor that they themselves would ever practice any of them." Literally, "as being neither useful . . . . . nor as being (themselves) about to practice," &c.—*ἐπιμελήσεσθαι.* One MS. has *ἐπιμελήσασθαι*, which is the common form of the future of this verb.—*ποτέρως γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον, κ. τ. λ.* "For in which case would men be more likely to be under the influence of self-control? when idle? or," &c.

§ 9.

ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν μέν. "But now, too." Schneider incloses *καί* here in brackets, as savoring of interpolation. It is well defended, however, by Bornemann and Kühner. The train of ideas is as follows: You and the other members of your family not only are stinted in the means of subsistence, but *now*, *too*, as I imagine, you entertain unfriendly feelings toward one another.—*ἐκείνοις δὲ σὲ ὁρῶσαι, κ. τ. λ.* "And they, seeing you annoyed with them."—*ἐκ δὲ τούτων κίνδυνος, κ. τ. λ.* "And from these feelings there is danger that both (present) hostility be increased, and previous affection be diminished." Observe that *κίνδυνος* is usually construed with *μή* and a subjunctive or an optative. Schneider (*ad Anab.*, vi., 1, 21) has collected some examples of its construction with an infinitive.—*ἐὰν δὲ προστατήσῃς, κ. τ. λ.* "But if you shall take care that they be employed," *i. e.*, shall make arrangements to provide them active employment.—*ὁρῶν.* "On seeing."—*αἰσθόμενοι.* "On having perceived."—*τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνων χάριν αὐξήσετε.* "You will increase the kind feeling resulting from these (services)." With *ἐκείνων* supply *εὐεργεσιῶν.*—*φιλικώτερον ἕξετε.* Compare ii., 6, 18, and 36.

§ 10.

θάνατον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ προαιρετέον ἦν. "Death were preferable to it." Observe here the omission of *ἄν*. This ellipsis is most usual in expressions of necessity, duty, propriety, &c., as here with the verbal adjective in *τέος*, since it accorded with the genius of the Greeks as well as Latins to represent that which was necessary, &c., as unconditionally true, its not happening being partially kept out of sight. (*Kühner*, § 858, 3, *Jelf.*) It will be borne in mind here that *προαιρετέον* is the neuter singular, governing *θάνατον* in the accusative.—*κάλλιστα καὶ πρεπωδέστερα γυναικί.* "Most honorable

§ 11

§ 12

§ 13

§ 14

am he who preserves you yourselves also." *i. e.*, you yourselves as well as your wool, lambs, cheese, &c. This is Weiske's explanation. Schneider, however, refers *καί* to *καὶ αὐτόν*, "*et dominum*," which he makes to be understood. This, however, is inferior to the former. —*προουλάττομι ὑμᾶς*. Stephens for *ὑμᾶς* would read here *ὑμῶν*, but Hindenburg opposes to this the passage in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, 539; *νηὸν δὲ προφύλαχθε.—φοιτύμενοι μὴ ἀπόλησθε*. When the principal verb is in the optative, with or without *ἄν*, the dependent verb is generally in the optative, if the aim proposed is merely a supposition, without any notion of its realization; but if this notion does come in, the subjunctive is employed. Here, then, the dog insinuates, that if he himself did not guard the sheep, they would most certainly have reason to fear lest they might perish. Compare *Kühner*, § 808, *Jelf.*—*ὅτι ἀντὶ κυνός, κ. τ. λ.* "That you are a guardian and protector unto them as valuable as a dog."—*οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑνός*. "Not even by any one."—*ἐργαζόμεναι*. "Plying their tasks."

CHAPTER VIII.

§ 1.

διὰ χρόνου. "After some interval of time." Like the Latin "*interjecto aliquo tempore*." Compare *Matthiæ*, § 580.—*πόθεν φαίνει*. "Whence do you show yourself," *i. e.*, whence come you. A familiar mode of addressing an old friend. Compare *Plato, Protag., init: πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνει*, which Cicero (*ap. Prisc.*, vi., p. 106) renders by "*Quid tu? unde tandem apparas, O Socrate?*"—*Εὐθηρε*. Nothing farther is known of this individual.—*ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου, κ. τ. λ.* "Just before the close of the war, said he, O Socrates, (I came) from abroad; now, however, (I come) from the city here," *i. e.*, at present, however, I am dwelling in the city here. In speaking of the termination of the war, Eutherus very probably alludes to the peace of Theramenes, by which the Athenians lost all their possessions beyond the confines of Attica. Compare *Hist. Gr.*, ii., 2; *Plut., Vit. Lys., c.* 14. This was in B.C. 406. Simpson, however, refers it to the fifty years' peace, B.C. 422.—*ἀφῃρέθημεν*. The passive *ἀφαιρεῖσθαι*, "to be deprived," is construed with an accusative of the thing taken away.—*ἐν τῇ ὑπερορίᾳ*. "In the country beyond the confines (of Attica)." Observe that *ὑπερορία* has a general reference to all foreign parts both within Greece and without. —*ἐπιδημήσας*. "Sojourning here."—*τῷ σώματι ἐργαζόμενος*. "By bodily labor." Literally, "by laboring with my body."—*δοκεῖ δέ οι . . . . ἔχοντα*. Compare note on *ἢ ἃ ἔξεστιν ἀριθμήσαντας*, i., 1, 9

§ 2

§ 3, 4

§ 5

§ 6

you."—*φυλάττεσθαι*. "To avoid."—*οὕτω γὰρ ἥκιστα, κ. τ. λ.* "For in this way I think that you will be least involved in censure, and will most effectually find aid in your poverty."—*διαρκέστατα*. "Most independently."

CHAPTER IX.

§ 1.

οἶδα δέ ποτε αὐτόν, κ. τ. λ. "I know, also, of his having once heard from Crito," *i. e.*, I remember, also, his having once heard Crito say.—*τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν*. "To attend to his own affairs." All the orators and comedians prove the truth of Crito's complaint. Life, indeed, was harassing and full of trouble at Athens, on account of the swarm of sycophants or informers, whom the people permitted to accuse and harass the better class, erroneously thinking that it tended to preserve the purity of their democracy. A peculiar term *σείειν* was used to denote the assaults of these calumniators upon the rich. (*Schneider, ad loc. Wheeler, ad loc.*)—*ἐμὲ εἰς δίκας ἀγουσιν*. "Are bringing actions against me." Literally, "are leading me into actions."—*ἢ πράγματα ἔχειν*. "Than have any trouble (about the matter)," *i. e.*, than be involved in the trouble of a lawsuit.

§ 2, 3.

κύνας δὲ τρέφεις; The particle *δέ* in interrogations often refers to something to be supplied by the imagination. So here, "(what you say is bad enough), *but* do you keep dogs," &c. Compare i., 6, 15. —*ἀπὸ τῶν προβάτων*. The Greeks, as well as the Latins, often repeat the preposition of a compound word before the case of the substantive.—*οὐκ ἂν οὖν ὑρέψαις καὶ ἀνδρα, κ. τ. λ.* "Would you not, then, support a man also," &c.—*εἰ μὴ φοβοίμην, ὅπως μή, κ. τ. λ.* "If I were not afraid that he might in some way turn upon myself." Literally, "how he might turn," &c. After verbs of fearing we sometimes find, in Attic, *ὅπως μή* instead of the simple *μή*, with the force of the Latin *quomodo non*. (*Kühner*, § 814, *Obs.* 4, *Jelf.*)—*χαριζόμενον οἷω σοὶ ἀνδρί, κ. τ. λ.* "For a person gratifying such a man as you are, rather than being hated by him, to be benefited." Observe that *οἷῳ σοὶ ἀνδρί* is for *ἀνδρὶ τοιούτῳ οἷος σὺ εἶ*.—*τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν*. These genitives, according to Schneider, depend on *τινές* understood. But Kühner more correctly makes them depend on *οἵ*.—*πάνυ ἂν φιλοτιμηθεῖεν*. "Would deem it a great honor."

[illegible]

—*ἐν ᾗ αὐτὸν ἐδει κριθῆναι, κ. τ. λ.* "In which he must, (if found guilty), be condemned (to the punishment) which he must suffer, or (to the fine) which he must pay," *i. e.*, in which it would be decided what bodily or pecuniary mulct he should render as atonement. Observe that *παθεῖν* and *ἀποτῖσαι* are technical terms, peculiar to the formula employed in Athenian trials, the first having reference to bodily punishment, the second to a pecuniary fine. (Compare *Att. Proc.*, p. 739.)

§ 6, 7.

πολλὰ καὶ πονηρά. The Greeks regularly join *πολύς* with another adjective expressing praise or blame. (*Matthiæ*, § 444.)—*πάντ' ἐποίει, κ. τ. λ.* "Did every thing in his power to get rid of Archedemus."—*οὐκ ἀπηλλάττετο.* "Did not leave him alone." More literally, "did not depart from him."—*ἕως τόν τε Κρίτωνα ἀσῆκε.* "Until he had both ceased to annoy Crito."—*αὐτῷ.* "To (Archedemus) himself."—*ἤδη τότε.* "Then, indeed." The Latin *tum vero.* —*ἵνα τοῦ κυνὸς ἀπολαύωσιν.* "That they may have the benefit of his dog."—*φύλακα.* "As a protector."

§ 8.

τῷ Κρίτωνι ἡδέως ἐχαρίζετο. "Gladly gratified Crito (in this)," *i. e.*, acceded to his wishes in protecting his friends also.—*καὶ οὐχ ὅτι μόνος, κ. τ. λ.* "And I do not say that Crito alone was left in tranquillity, but also his friends." Equivalent to *καὶ οὐ λέγω ὅτι μόνος, κ. τ. λ.* A more emphatic mode of expression than *καὶ οὐ μόνον ὁ Κρίτων, κ. τ. λ.* These are the words of Xenophon.—*εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ τούτων, κ. τ. λ.* "And if any one of those by whom he was hated, sought to make it a source of reproach unto him, that he, being benefited by Crito, fawned upon him." Observe here the employment of the optative, as denoting the sentiments of those who made the charge in question. The common reading is decidedly inferior.—*τοῖς δὲ πονηροῖς διαφέρεσθαι* "And to be at variance with the bad."—*πειρᾶσθαι.* This infinitive is objected to by Kühner; but it is found in all the MSS. and printed editions.

CHAPTER X.

§ 1.

Audiam. Why this person must be not known—τὸν τῆς ... ἄγνωστον ... ; "Did you not tell me that Gaius was away, so you have come to ask me for your money back?" However that may have to proceed by words and not connected with oneself, [illegible] "how could he pay you?" It is to this question, the future *accommodi.* (*Matthiæ*, § 512, 9.)

§ 2.

nisi hilare ... ; "Yes, by Jove, and, indeed." An Observe that *nisi* here implies an answer in the affirmative; and the particle γε is added for the sake of emphasis—ἐστιν ταῦτα. "A woman not bringing him any [illegible]—*nisi hilare*, ... The sense that here is to be [illegible] but an [illegible] [illegible]. "Give a risk of perishing"—[illegible]. "That it is worth your while"—[illegible]. For the subjunctive [illegible]. Compare ... 4, 10, and ... 1, 1, 4.

§ 3.

est quo utili ... Compare ... 6, 3, 4. These words to ... belong to Sosarion, though otherwise marked in the edition of Hermann—[illegible]. "Impossible [illegible] Sosarion"—[illegible]. Hermagoras was the son of a wealthy citizen of Athens, named Hippocrates. His brother Callias inherited all the property of his father, so that he himself was in very great poverty. He was a faithful friend of Socrates—[illegible]. "The having an agent"—[illegible]. "Unknown substantial acquaintance, which scarcely anyone at ... 4, 6, and ... 11, 2). The general harmony, in the same form, and is found also in *Phædon*, Now, viii., 24. An illustration of kind of [illegible] [illegible] of expression [illegible] given, we have selected that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and others—and of subsequent [illegible] [illegible]. Sosarion and Hippocrates were to brothers. Words and [illegible] [illegible].

§ 4, 5.

ut primo ... ; "Most [illegible] formerly." [illegible] [illegible] that point, to have [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

power to purchase for a small sum what is worth a large one." Literally, "to buy for little what is worth much."—*διὰ τὰ πράγματα.* "In consequence of the present state of affairs," *i. e.*, in such times as the present.—*νομίζω γὰρ οὔτε σοί, κ. τ. λ.* "For I think that neither is your inviting him to come more honorable to you than your going yourself unto him, nor is your doing these things a greater boon to him than to yourself," *i. e.*, while the making him your friend is not more for his advantage than for your own.—*τοῦ αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν.* Here, the attraction being neglected, *αὐτόν* is for *αὐτῷ.* (*Kühner*, § 675, *Jelf.*)

§ 6.

οὐ πολὺ τελέσας. "Without much expense." Literally, "having not expended much."—*ὃς ἔργον εἶχε.* "Who made it his employment, that," &c. Compare *Kühner:* "*Qui sedulo id agebat, et pro officii sui parte ducebat, ut,*" &c.

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

§ 1.

§ 2, 3

§ 4

Attics. For the dative after *προςπαίζω*, consult *Lobeck ad Phryn.*, p. 463. In the signification of *deriding*, it is construed with an accusative in Plato, *Menex.*, p. 235, *C.*, and *Phædr.*, p. 265, *C.*—*ὡςπερ Ὅμηρος, κ. τ. λ.* The passage occurs in *Il.*, iii., 169, *seq* —*γεραρόν*. "Of stately bearing."—*καὶ οὑτως ὁδε.* "Even in this same way, our friend here."—*στρατηγεῖν μαθών* A little before we have *μεμαθηκὼς ἥκε.* The aorist participle signifies that a person *has learned*; the perfect, however, signifies more, namely, that he *has learned and understands*, i. e., is master of his subject.—*καὶ ἐάν.* "Even if."—*διατελεῖ ὤν.* "Continues to be." The verb *διατελέω*, in place of an infinitive, is construed with a participle. Compare *Kuhner*, § 694, *Jelf.*

§ 5.

ἵνα καί. Supply *ἡμεῖς* from the following *ἡμῶν, i. e., ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἐάν, κ. τ. λ.—ταξιαρχῇ, ἢ λοχαγῇ σοι.* "Command a company or section under your command." Literally, "for you." The *τάξις*, in Xenophon, is a body of infantry containing usually one hundred and twenty-eight men. Once, in the Cyropædia, however (ii., 1, 14), it is made to consist of one hundred men. The *λόχος* was a subdivision of the *τάξις*. Consult the commentators on *Anab.*, i., 2, 25.—*πόθεν ἤρξατό σε διδάσκειν, κ. τ. λ.* "With what did he begin to teach you generalship?" The verb *ἄρχεσθαι* is used with an infinitive when the notion of the dependent verb is only in intention not in act. (*Kühner*, § 688, *Jelf.*)—*καὶ ὅς.* Consult note on i., 4, 3—*ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, εἰς ὅπερ, κ. τ. λ.* "With the same thing with which he even concluded."—*τὰ τακτικά.* "Tactics." The art of arranging and disposing the men and the ranks on all occasions and under all circumstances.

§ 6.

ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ. "Yet assuredly, said Socrates, this, indeed, is the smallest part of strategy." The adjective *πολλοστός* means, properly, "one of many," answering to the Latin *multesimus*; hence, generally, "very little," "smallest," "least."—*παρασκευαστικὸν τῶν.* Adjectives denoting capability, fitness, skill, including those in *ικός*, are construed with a genitive. (*Matthiæ*, § 344.)—*μηχανικόν.* "Quick in contrivances," *i. e.*, inventive.—*ἐργαστικόν.* "Hard-working."—*ἀγχίνουν.* "Shrewd."—*καὶ φυλακτικόν τε καὶ κλέπτην.* "And both conservative and a thief," *i. e.*, both well qualified to guard and take care of his own, and yet, at the same time, craftily to deprive his adversaries of what is theirs. —*καὶ*

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

§ 10.

τί οὖν οὐ σκοποῦμεν. "Why, then, do we not consider." A formula of exhortation, by way of question, for *σκοπῶμεν οὖν.*—*πῶς ἂν αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ.* "By what means we may not fall into error with regard to them," *i. e.*, by what means we may be free from mistake on these points.—*βούλομαι.* "I am desirous (that we should)."—*ἁρπάζειν.* "To seize upon."—*τοὺς φιλαργυρωτάτους.* "The most covetous."—*τί δὲ τοὺς κινδυνεύειν μέλλοντας;* "But what must we do with regard to those who are about to encounter danger?" *i. e.*, but how must we arrange the soldiers if they are about to brave some perilous enterprise? With *τί δὲ* supply *χρὴ ποιεῖν.*—*ἆρα.* The Latin *nonne.*—*οὗτοι γοῦν εἰσιν.* "For these, indeed, are they." Compare i., 6, 2.—*ἄδηλοι.* "Concealed from notice." The idea is, that they who are eager after praise and distinction can not lie concealed, but are every where conspicuous, and may therefore easily be selected.

§ 11.

τάττειν. "To arrange your troops."—*ὅποι καὶ ὅπως.* "For what object, and in what way." Compare the explanation of Kühner: "*ὅποι, quo*, significat *consilium, ad quod* singulis ordinibus utendum sit: *ὅπως rationem, qua* singulis ordinibus utendum sit ad consilium exsequendum."—*τῶν ταγμάτων.* "Of your divisions."—*πρὸς ἃ οὔτε τάττειν, κ. τ. λ.* "Against which it is not fitting either to draw up or lead your troops in one and the same way."—*ἐπανερώτα.* "Question him anew."—*αἰσχυνεῖται.* Observe that *αἰσχύνεσθαι* and *αἰδεῖσθαι* take an infinitive, when the feelings prevent the person from acting; the participle, when the person has done something which causes them. Compare *Kühner*, § 685; iii., *Obs.*—*ἐνδεᾶ.* "In want (of proper information)," *i. e.*, uninstructed. Herbst supplies after *ἐνδεᾶ* the words *τῶν εἰς στρατηγίαν.*

CHAPTER II.

§ 1.

ἐντυχὼν δέ ποτε, κ. τ. λ. "Having met, moreover, on one occasion, with a certain person who had been chosen to be a general." Observe that *τῳ* is here Attic for the indefinite *τινί.*—*τοῦ ἕνεκεν.* "On what account." The form *τοῦ* is here Attic for the interrogative *τίνος.*—*Ὁμηρον* Compare *Il.*, i., 263; ii., 243.—*ἀρά γε ὅτι* "Is it not, indeed, because." The particle *γέ*, added to an inter-

(Kühner, § 707, Jelf.)

CHAPTER III.

§ 1.

καὶ ἱππαρχεῖν δέ τινι, κ. τ. λ. "I know, too, of his having conversed on one occasion, to the following effect, with a certain person who had been chosen to be a hipparch," *i. e.*, a general of cavalry. At Athens there were two *ἵππαρχοι*, or generals of cavalry, who had supreme command over the cavalry force of the state, but yet were themselves under the authority of the ten *στρατηγοί*, or generals of infantry. Xenophon has described the duties of the hipparch in a separate tract, entitled Ἱππαρχικός.—*οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ πρῶτος, κ. τ. λ.* "For it is not surely for the sake of riding as first of the horsemen." Observe that *τοῦ ἐλαύνειν* depends on *ἕνεκα* understood. So *τοῦ γνωσθῆναι* a little after. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 496, 1.—*πρῶτος*. Attraction. Compare *τῷ φανερὸς εἶναι*, 1, 2, 3.—*οἱ ἱπποτοξόται*. "The horse-archers." A species of light cavalry.—*γοῦν*. "At any rate." Compare notes on 1, 6, 2.—*τοῦ γνωσθῆναί γε*. "For the sake of being known, at least." Supply *ἕνεκα*.—*οἱ μαινόμενοι*. Compare the explanation of Weiske: "*Furiosi quidem facile in vulgus innotescunt ut a pueris etiam rideantur.*"

§ 2.

ἀλλ' ἄρα ὅτι, κ. τ. λ. "But is it then because you think that you could deliver over to the state the cavalry, after having rendered it more efficient?" Kühner conjectures *ἀλλ' ἀρα*, "but perhaps it is," &c., without any interrogation; being guided to this by one of the Parisian MSS., which has *ἂν ἀρα*. Observe that the particle *ἂν* in our text, which belongs to *παραδοῦναι*, is put after *βέλτιον* to make that word more emphatic. Compare *Kühner*, § 431, 2.—*γενέσθαι*. "You might become." Supply *ἂν* with this verb from the previous clause.—*καὶ μάλα*. Compare ii., 2, 1.—*καὶ ἔστι γε, νὴ Δί', καλόν*. "And it is a noble thing, indeed."—*ἡ δὲ ἀρχή που, κ. τ. λ.* "But the command to which you have been chosen, extends, unless I am mistaken, to horses as well as riders?" There is here a half-suppressed interrogation, and we have pointed the sentence accordingly. The expression *ἐφ' ἧς* may be rendered more literally, "for which," since *ἐπί* here denotes, in fact, the object. (*Kühner*, § 633, 3, *Jelf.*)—*ἔστι γὰρ οὕν*. "Yes, for it is really so." Compare *Kühner* § 737, 2, *Jelf.*

§ 5

28, 15. 'Come, then.'—ἴθι δή: ... 'How do you mean?'—πῶς: ... 'Because I ...—ὅτι ... ἐγώ εἰμι ... ἐγώ: ... 'How that would ...' ... 'Certainly, naturally, as follows: ...' ... 'I will ... upon him ...' ... 'Alcibiades would change the whole ... Agesilaus ...' ... 'But this is refuted by Xenophon: who says ... Cyrus ...' ... 'Herod. ...—τίνα ...' ... 'Sequence'?

§ 6

... ὡς οὖν, ὡς ἐ ... ... 'If then, said Socrates, ... that your money ... to you ... ...

§ 7, 8.

τοῦ βάλλειν ὡς πλείστους, κ. τ. λ. "Will you entertain any concern that your troops, from their steeds, may spear as many (foes) as possible?" Observe that *βάλλειν* here has the same force as *ἀκοντίζειν*. Compare the explanation of Kühner: "*Ut quam plurimi ab equis jaculentur.*"—*θήγειν τὰς ψυχάς.* "Of whetting the courage."—*εἴπερ ἀλκιμωτέρους ποιεῖν.* "If you do, indeed, (think) of rendering them more valiant." Supply *διανοῇ*, and compare the explanation of Morus: "*Si quidem eos fortiores reddere cogitas.*"—*εἰ δὲ μή* "If I have not hitherto." Supply *διανενόημαι.*—*ὅπως δέ σοι πείθωνται, κ. τ. λ.* "But have you taken any thought as to the means by which your cavalry are to be made to obey you."—*ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀλκίμων.* "Valiant and spirited."

§ 9, 10.

ἐκεῖνο μὲν δήπου οἶσθα. "You are doubtless aware of this."—*βελτίστους.* "Most skillful."—*ἰατρικώτατον.* "The best physician."—*καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.* "Certainly, replied he, and they are very obedient." Supply *πείθονται* after *μάλα.*—*μάλιστα εἰδώς.* "To know best."—*βέλτιστος ὢν αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ.* "Shall clearly appear to be the best among them." Literally, "shall be manifest as being the best." Compare ii., 6, 7.—*εἰς τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἐμοί.* "As regards their obeying me," *i. e.*, to make them obey me.—*πολὺ νὴ Δί', ἔφη, ῥᾷον, κ. τ. λ.* "Far more easily, indeed, than if it were incumbent on you to prove that evil is better and more profitable than good."

§ 11.

λέγεις σύ. "Do you mean."—*πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις.* "In addition to his other duties."—*τοῦ λέγειν δύνασθαι.* "Of being able to harangue."—*σὺ δ' ᾤου, ἔφη, κ. τ. λ.* "And did you suppose, said Socrates, that one must needs command cavalry by silence?" Compare i., 6, 15.—*νόμῳ.* "According to the institutions of the state." In this clause Socrates speaks of the training of youth, &c., as appointed and regulated by the institutions of the state; in the next member (*εἴ τι ἄλλο καλόν, κ. τ. λ.*), he speaks of those arts which one learns by his own inclination, although usually not classed with the regular instruction of a freeman in a free state. (*Wheeler, ad loc. Schütz, ad loc.*)—*δι' ὧν γε ζῆν ἐπιστάμεθα.* "By which we know how to lead a well-regulated life," *i. e.*, by which we enjoy civilized life. Observe that by *ζῆν* is meant here a life well regulated by order, and under the laws and customs established by the state, as opposed to a rude and uncivilized existence.—*διὰ λόγου.*

§ 12.

§ 13, 14.

§ 15.

CHAPTER IV.

§ 1.

Νικομαχίδην. Who this person was is not known.—ἐξ ἀρχαιρεσιῶν ἀπιόντα. "Coming away from the election of public officers." By ἀρχαιρεσίαι are meant the assemblies of the people which were held for the election of those public officers at Athens who were not chosen by lot. Consult *Dict. Ant.*, *s. v.*—στρατηγοί. Of the public officers chosen by these general assemblies of the people, the most important were the strategi, taxiarchi, hipparchi, and phylarchi. The strategi, or generals, were ten in number, one for each of the ten tribes.—οὐ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, κ. τ. λ. "(You may well ask this question), for are not the Athenians, O Socrates, just the same as ever," *i. e.*, just as ungrateful as they have ever shown themselves to be. Compare the explanation of Kühner: "*nonne tales sese exhibuerunt, quales in omnibus rebus sese exhibent.*"—ὃς ἐκ καταλόγου στρατευόμενος, κ. τ. λ. "Who am worn out in serving from the list both as a commander of a company and of a brigade." The λοχαγός was the commander at Athens of one hundred men; so, again, the ταξίαρχος at Athens commanded the τάξις, or quota of infantry furnished by a φυλή. The like cavalry officers were called φύλαρχοι. By κατάλογος is here meant the list of those persons who possessed a certain amount of property, and were therefore liable to regular military service. These persons alone were allowed to serve in the regular infantry, while the lower class had not this privilege. The former were called οἱ ἐκ καταλόγου στρατεύοντες, and the latter οἱ ἔξω τοῦ καταλόγου.—ἀπογυμνούμενος. "Baring himself," *i. e.*, taking off his robe.

§ 2, 3.

ἀγαθόν. "An advantage."—εἰ γε. "Since, indeed."—καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἔμποροι, κ. τ. λ. "(Certainly not), for even the merchants," &c.—ὃ στρατηγῷ προσεῖναι, κ. τ. λ. "Which is a proper characteristic to be added to a general," *i. e.*, a proper characteristic for a general.—κεχορήγηκε. "He has been a chorāgus." It was customary for the wealthiest Athenians to be called upon in turn by the state, to bear the expenses of a chorus. Consult *Dict. Ant.*, *s. v.* Choragus.—πᾶσι τοῖς χοροῖς νενίκηκε. "He has proved victorious with all his choruses."—μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Νικομαχίδης, κ. τ. λ. "Yes, indeed," replied Nicomachides, "but to lead a chorus and an army is in no respect

duties, who are competent (to discharge them)." This is the reading of Stobæus, and is adopted by Bornemann, Dindorf, and Kühner The old editions have *τὸ προστάττειν ἑκαστους ἐπιτηδείους πράττειν.* —*καὶ τοῦτ'*. "This, likewise, is so."—*ἀμφοτεροις προσήκειν.* "Is incumbent on both."—*προσάγεσθαι.* "To gain for themselves. — *ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι προσήκει.* In § 8 the construction is different, *ἀμφοτέροις οἶμαι προσήκειν.* The dative is here the personal object of the verb; the accusative, on the other hand, is to be construed with the infinitive. Compare *Kühner*, § 674, *Jelf*.—*περὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα* "In their own operations."

§ 10, 11.

ταῦτα μέν, ἔοη, πάντα, κ. τ. λ. "All these points, said he, belong equally to both; to fight, however, no longer to both," *i. e.*, is no longer a common trait.—*ἀλλ' ἐχθροί γέ τοι, κ. τ. λ.* "Both, however, have enemies, at least."—*ἐκεῖνο παριείς.* "Waving that, tell me." Supply *λέξον* after *παριείς*, an ellipsis which suits the eager and impatient character of Nicomachides.—*ἡ οἰκονομική.* "Skill in economy." Literally, "the art of economy."—*ἐνταῦθα δήπου καὶ πλεῖστον.* "Here, doubtless, it will benefit most essentially." Supply *ὠοελήσει.*—*ὡς τὸ μαχόμενον τοὶς πολεμίους νικᾶν.* "As for one when fighting to conquer his enemies." Supply *τινά* with *μαχόμενον.*—*τὰ συμφέροντα.* "The things that conduce."—*τὰ φεροντα.* "The things that tend."—*νικητικὴν οὖσαν.* "To be likely to ensure victory."—*οὐχ ἥκιστα δέ, κ. τ. λ.* "And, what is not the least of these things, if he be unprepared, he will avoid joining battle," *i. e.*, and, above all, if he be unprepared, &c. Herbst, less correctly, makes *τούτων* depend on *ἀπαράσκευος*, and alters the punctuation accordingly.

§ 12.

μὴ καταφρόνει. After these words *οὖν* seems to have been omitted, because Socrates finishes his discourse with this paragraph.— *τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν.* "Those men that are skilled in household management."—*πλήθει μόνον.* "Only in amount."—*τῶν κοινῶν* "Of those of a public nature."—*τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παραπλήσια ἔχει* "While it has all else exactly similar."—*τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι, κ. τ. λ.* "But the most important point is this, that," &c. Supply *τοῦτό ἐστι* after *μέγιστον*, and consult, on this construction, *Matthiæ*, § 432, p. 711.—*γίγνεται.* "Is managed."—*δι' ἄλλων μὲν ἀνθρώπων . . δι' ἄλλων δέ.* "By men of one nature . . . . by men of another"—*ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις.* "A different kind of men."—*οἰκονομικοὶ*

[illegible] "Thou wast savage."—[illegible] "Immediately conduct."—[illegible] "Cannot resist to him." Literally, "on both sides."

CHAPTER V.

§ 1.

Dresser. The natural use of the widespread Paradise. "Nine Princes sat out on new Fortunes and Fields, here in lawful warfare, for the goodness which accrued thereby, for adventure, for glory, for, in short, for what he had himself sought or to pursue against perilous chiefs, and abroad how to roll this task, by the unchained [illegible] after his own name. "The younger Princes was one of the six principle who succeeded attendants to the administration of affairs, and was put on trial, together with the [illegible], by the Athenians after the manner of Lycurgus. "Compare [illegible] and [illegible]. "The joy of the celebrated Paradise." "The results have given rise the form of an [illegible] and [illegible]. "What you are elected general?" "More literally, "you having become a general." "Better that it now be," "[illegible] by it being." "I would wish that these things were any which you mention," [illegible] [illegible]. "I am unable to discover." "[illegible] [illegible]. "Compare [illegible]. "How the [illegible] [illegible]. "What now the essential of refreshing [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] by what human [illegible] possibility of [illegible] this, under present circumstances.

§ 2.

[illegible] you." "Compare [illegible] and [illegible]. "Figurative and beautiful figure."—[illegible]. "Glad to [illegible]."—[illegible] with [illegible] [illegible]. "The [illegible] [illegible] appear to me to be obvious."—[illegible] the [illegible] appear. "The [illegible] to [illegible] to be of [illegible], we [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. "The [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible], as [illegible] [illegible] to be [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible], as [illegible] [illegible]. "[illegible] [illegible]." "Compare [illegible]. "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

§ 3.

φιλοφρονέστατοι. "Of the kindest temper."—*ἀπερ.* "Which traits."—*ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας τε καὶ πατρίδος.* "For the sake of both a good name and their native country," *i. e.*, for the purpose of both gaining renown and defending their country.—*οὐκ ἐστιν οἷς ὑπάρχει.* "There are not to any," *i. e.*, no people has. Observe that *ἐστιν οἷς* is equivalent here to *ἐνίοις.* This usage of *ἐστιν οἱ* for *ἔνιοι*, &c., is so firmly established in the language, that neither the number of the relative has any influence on the verb *ἐστι*, nor is the tense changed, though the time spoken of be past or future. An imitation of this occurs in Propertius: "*Est quibus Eleæ concurrit palma quadrigæ: Est quibus in celeres gloria nata pedes*" (iii., 9, 17). Compare *Kühner*, § 817, 5, *Jelf. Matthiæ*, § 482.—*ᾧ πολλοὶ ἐπαιρόμενοι* "By which circumstance many being incited." Observe that *ᾧ* here refers to the fact of the glorious achievements performed by their forefathers.

§ 4.

ταῦτα μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις πάντα. "All these things you say true." The English idiom here agrees with the Greek in employing the adjective with a kind of adverbial force.—*ἥ τε σὺν Τολμίδῃ τῶν χιλίων, κ. τ. λ.* "Both the disaster of the thousand with Tolmides at Lebadea." Tolmides, son of Tolmæus, was a general of great bravery. During the banishment of Conon, he carried on many expeditions with success. After Conon's death, B.C. 447, he marched, contrary to the advice of Pericles, with an army of volunteers, amounting to a thousand heavy-armed men, including the flower of the Athenian youth, against the Bœotian exiles, and other partisans of the same cause, who had made themselves masters of Chæronea, Orchomenus, and some other towns in Bœotia. The Athenians were completely defeated, many of them were taken prisoners, and Tolmides himself was among the slain. The battle was fought in the neighborhood of Coronea; but, from the vicinity of the places, it is said sometimes to have been fought at Chæronea, sometimes at Lebadea. This last-mentioned place was a city of Bœotia, about midway between Haliartus and Chæronea, and to the west of the Lake Copaïs. Compare *Thucyd.*, i., 113.—*ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ.* "At Delium." Delium was a city of Bœotia, on the sea-cost, north of the mouth of the Asopus. A battle was fought here, in which Hippocrates, the Athenian general, was slain, B.C. 424.—*ἐκ τούτων.* "By reason of these things," *i. e.*, of the defeats just mentioned.—*πρὸς τοὺς Βοιωτούς.* "In comparison with the Bœotians." A brief

[illegible] Compare I. 1, 3. *Kühner*, § 781. *Jelf*.

[illegible] "The spirit"—[illegible] "To live"—[illegible] "that they themselves, by themselves," i. e., that [illegible] "Unaided."

§ 5, 6

[illegible] "And yet the state appears to me to be none [illegible] "Compare the explanation of Schütz. [illegible] "[illegible] "[illegible] "[

verb of the sentence. Compare *Kühner*, § 696, *Obs.* 6, *Jelf*. *Matthiæ*, § 565, 2.—*μετ' ἀρετῆς*. "By their valor." Compare *Matthiæ*, § 587, *a*.—*τοῦτ' αὐ δεικτέον, κ. τ. λ.* "We must show that this attribute again belonged to them most (of any people) from ancient time." Observe that *τοῦτο* refers to *τὸ μετ' ἀρετῆς πρωτεύειν*.—*καὶ ὡς τούτου ἐπιμελούμενοι, κ. τ. λ.* Observe here the change of construction, the particle *ὡς* with the finite verb being employed, instead of the writer's continuing on with the participle. This is done for the sake of variety, and to prevent the too great accumulation of participles in the sentence, the difference otherwise being quite immaterial. Compare *Kühner*, § 804, 4.

§ 9.

εἰ τούς γε παλαιοτάτους, κ. τ. λ. "If we should remind them, who have themselves heard of it, that their most ancient ancestors, of whom we hear, were the bravest of men." Zeune well explains *ἀκηκούτας* here by "*cum ipsi audiverint*." Weiske, on the other hand, with much less propriety, translates it by "*qui dicti sint*," "*qui nomen habuerint*," referring it to *προγόνους*, not to *αὐτούς*. All that is requisite is to repeat mentally after *ἀκηκουτας* the words *ἀρίστους γεγονέναι*. Compare *Kühner*, § 896, *Jelf*.

§ 10.

ἆρα λέγεις τὴν τῶν θεῶν κρίσιν, κ. τ. λ. "Do you mean the trial between the gods, which Cecrops and his assessors in judgment decided from their virtue?" By *κρίσιν* is here meant the controversy between Neptune and Minerva, as to which of the two should be the patron deity of Athens. The question was decided in favor of Minerva. According to one account, the gods themselves were the judges; according to another, Cecrops and Cranaus. (Compare *Apollod.*, iii., 14, 1.) Xenophon follows here a third account. By the expression *οἱ περὶ Κέκροπα* is meant the whole bench of judges seated with Cecrops, or, in other words, his assessors. We must be careful here not to refer the phrase to Cecrops alone. Such an employment of *οἱ περί*, to designate merely a single individual, would be characteristic of a writer of the Silver Age. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*λέγω γάρ*. "Yes, I mean that." More literally, supplying at the same time the ellipsis, "(You are right), for I mean it."—*Ἐρεχθέως τροφὴν καὶ γένεσιν*. The Erechtheus here meant was the earlier one of the two, and was the fourth king of Athens, and the son of Vulcan and Minerva. He was father of Pandion I., and grandfather of the younger Erechtheus, who was the sixth king of Athens

§ 12, 13.

διέμειναν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν "They ever remained in their own land." Supply *γῇ*. Hence the Athenians prided themselves on being *αὐτοχθονες* and *γηγενεῖς*.—*ὑπὲρ δικαίων*. "For their just rights."—*ἐπέτρεπον ἐκείνοις*. "Submitted the case to them," *i. e.*, to their arbitration.—*καὶ θαυμάζω γε*. Compare i., 1, 20.—*ἡ πόλις ὅπως ποτ', κ. τ. λ.* "How our city ever inclined to the worse," *i. e.*, ever degenerated. Conjunctions which usually stand at the commencement of a clause, are often placed after one or more words, to render these words more emphatic. The same arrangement is common in Latin writers also. Compare *Cic., Tusc.*, ii., 4, 12. Zeune reads, with one of the earlier editions, *εἰ ἡ πόλις οὕτω*, but this does not agree with the context, for the wonder of Pericles is, *how* the state at length declined, as appears from what follows.—*διὰ τὸ πολὺ ὑπερενεγκεῖν, κ. τ. λ.* "By reason of their vast superiority, and their being best, having sunk into carelessness, fall behind their antagonists."

§ 14.

ἂν ἀναλάβοιεν. "Might they regain."—*οὐδὲν ἀπόκρυφον, κ. τ. λ.* "That does not appear to me to be any thing mysterious."—*τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα*. "The pursuits."—*μηδὲν χεῖρον ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύοιεν*. "They should practice them after no worse fashion than those did."—*οὐδὲν ἂν χείρους ἐκείνων γενέσθαι*. "(It appears unto me) that they would be in no respect inferior to them." Observe here the change of construction, the nominative with the infinitive being employed in *ἀπόκρυφον εἶναι*, and here the accusative with the same mood.—*τούς γε νῦν πρωτεύοντας*. The Lacedæmonians. Herbst remarks, that Xenophon always prefers the Lacedæmonian form of government to the Athenian.—*καὶ τούτοις τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντες* "And practicing the same pursuits with these."

§ 15.

λέγεις, ἔφη, πόρρω που, κ. τ. λ. "You mean, said he, that moral excellence is, without doubt, far distant unto our city; for when will the Athenians," &c. Observe here the force of *που*, which is to be construed with *πόρρω*, not with *λέγεις*, and compare the remark of Weiske (*Pleon. Gr.*): "*Vim intendendi hæc particula* (*που*) *habet, adjecta v. g. τῷ πόρρω. Zosim.*, ii., 1, *πόρρω που*, 'longissime:' *sed Xenophon, Mem.*, iii., 5, 15, *item metaphorice.*" The connection of the sentence is this: Since by adopting the discipline of Lacedæmon, you think you can recall the Athenians to their pristine valor and glory, you seem to hint that at present the Athenians are

for advice to the Lacedæmonians" and the various answers [illegible] "But who begin from their wits are prone to show contempt for their elders" [illegible] [illegible] "A good habit of body"

§ 16

[illegible] "Pelo themselves" [illegible] "If they be as it was said" [illegible] "If they be of one mind as may appear by the [illegible] "Instead of beseeching with one another for mutual benefit" [illegible] "But have been very brief and passing" [illegible] "Seeing" [illegible] "And whether very many wise" For this comparison of [illegible] [illegible] "Than by judging each other" [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] "And nothing their public affairs as if belonging to another state" [illegible] "After" [illegible] [illegible] "And yet one must in the same what they chose for such reasons" [illegible] [illegible] refers to the several antecedent clauses.

§ 17, 18

[illegible] "Then all which needed great [illegible] but [illegible] saying by in the state" [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] "Then it is also to be" [illegible] [illegible] "Then that the Athenians are allowed with more favourable dignity" The well-worn [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] "Compare [illegible] "Is [illegible] [illegible] "Brought [illegible] [illegible] "Then are the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

§ 19, 20.

τοῦτο γάρ τοι, κ. τ. λ. "(You are right), said he, for this, indeed, is even strange, that such persons as these, namely, should obey," &c. Such persons as actors, sailors, rowers, &c., were generally men of the lower order, or slaves, whereas the *ὁπλῖται* and *ἱππεῖς* were citizens of the higher class.—*προκεκρίσθαι.* "To be superior."—*ἡ δὲ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή, κ. τ. λ.* "But does not, O Pericles, the council of the Areopagus consist of persons who have been most fully approved of?" The council, or, rather, court of the Areopagus, held its sittings on a small rocky eminence to the west of, and not far from the Athenian Acropolis. This eminence was called "Mars' Hill," whence the name of the court. The Areopagus was a body of very remote antiquity, and gave judgment in capital cases. Consult *Smith, Dict. Ant., s. v.*—*τῶν δεδοκιμασμένων.* The most worthy and religious of the Athenians were admitted as members of this council, and such archons as had discharged their duty with care and fidelity. Hence the high character enjoyed by the court.—*νομιμώτερον.* "More in accordance with the laws."—*σεμνότερον.* "With more dignity."—*δίκας δικαζοντας.* "Deciding cases." Observe the force of the active here. The middle would mean, "instituting or commencing lawsuits."

§ 21, 22.

καὶ μήν. "Yet surely."—*οὐδενὶ τούτων προσέχουσιν.* "They attend to no one of these things."—*ἴσως γάρ.* "(True); for perhaps." Compare iv., 4, 13, *seq.* Edwards less neatly supplies *οὐ θαυμαστόν.*—*οὐδὲ εἷς.* Compare i., 6, 2.—*ὅσοι τούτων ἄρχουσι.* "As many as take the lead in these matters."—*ἐφ' οἷς ἑορτᾶζει.* "Over which they preside."—*αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν.* "Take office without due preparation." The verb *αὐτοσχεδιαζω* literally means, "to act off-hand," &c.—*οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔχειν.* "Are not the less able," *i. e.*, although you are a general, like one of them.—*ἥρξω ποτ' ἄν.* Compare note on *ἄρχονται καταφρονεῖν*, § 15.—*καὶ πολλὰ μὲν οἶμαι, κ. τ. λ.* "I think, too, that you have received and keep in remembrance many of your father's principles of warfare."—*συνειλεγέναι.* "Have collected." From *συμφέρω.*

§ 23.

πολλὰ μεριμνᾶν. "Feel much anxiety." The verb *μεριμνῶ* is construed in this same way with an accusative in iv., 7, 6. It is construed with *περί* and a genitive in i., 1, 14.—*ὅπως μὴ λάθῃς σεαυτόν, κ. τ. λ.* "That you may not unconsciously be ignorant of any one

§ 24, 25

γάλην δε προβολήν, κ. τ. λ. "And prove a powerful bulwark for the citizens of this country."—*ἐπιχείρει αὐτοῖς.* Compare ii., 3, 5.—*ἐὰν δέ τι ἀδυνατῇς.* "And even if you be unable with respect to any one of them," *i. e.*, unable to accomplish any one of them.—*καταισχυνεῖς.* "Will you bring shame upon."

CHAPTER VI.

§ 1.

Γλαύκωνα. This Glauco, son of Aristo, was brother of Plato the philosopher. There was another Glauco, father of Charmides, and uncle to Plato. Compare iii., 7, 1.—*ὑτ' ἐπεχείρει δημηγορεῖν.* "When he was attempting to harangue the populace."—*οὐδέπω εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς.* The young men of Athens, at the age of eighteen, were permitted to exercise the rights of free citizens, and to take office in the management of public affairs. (Compare *Schömann, de Comit Athen.*, p. 76, 105.)—*ὄντων ἄλλων οἰκείων, κ. τ. λ.* "Although he had both other relations and friends."—*παῦσαι ἑλκόμενόν τε, κ. τ. λ.* "To prevent him from both being dragged down from the bema." The bema was a stone platform or hustings in the Athenian place of assembly, ten or eleven feet high, with an ascent of steps Schneider cites, in illustration of the present passage, *Plato, Protag.*, p. 139, c., where it is mentioned, that occasionally wretched orators were dragged from the bema, and driven from the assembly by the *τοξόται*, a body of men kept to serve as the police of Athens, and deriving their name from the bows (*τόξα*) with which they were armed.—Πλάτωνα. Aulus Gellius (*N. A.*, xiv., 13) states, that a spirit of rivalry and opposition existed between Xenophon and Plato, and asserts that hence there is no mention of the name of the latter in the works of the former. Muretus, however, employs the present passage to refute him. (*Var. Lect.*, v., 14.) Cobet and Böckh both consider the whole story of their rivalry to be a mere fabrication.—*ἔπανσεν.* "Caused him to cease (from this conduct)."

§ 2.

ἐντυχὼν γάρ. The particle *γάρ* refers to the previous paragraph. —*πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸ ἐθελῆσαι, κ. τ. λ.* "He, in the first place, detained (and led) him into a willingness to listen, by having made such remarks as the following." Compare *Anab.*, vii., 8, 20, where *εἰς τό* with the infinitive likewise occurs.—*ἡμῖν.* "For us." The *dativus commodi*. Compare *Kuhner*, § 599, *Jelf.*—*νὴ Δί', ἔφη, καλὸν γάρ.* "To be sure, replied he, for it is an honorable office." The

on all sides."

§ 3. 4

§ 5.

§ 6

§ 7. 8

δὲ ὤν, κ. τ. λ. "But if he be weaker, he would very likely lose even the things that are already his," *i. e.*, would lose his all.—*τόν γε βουλευσόμενον.* "The minister, at least, who is about to deliberate."—*ἐὰν μὲν ἡ τῆς πόλεως κρείττων ᾖ.* "If that of his own state be superior." Observe that *ἡ* refers to *δύναμις*, implied from the previous clause.—*ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ πολέμῳ.* Compare ii., 3, 5.—*τῶν ἐναντίων.* For *τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων.*—*εὐλαβεῖσθαι πείθῃ.* "He may persuade it to act with caution."

§ 9, 10.

εἶτα. "And then." For *εἶτα δέ.*—*οὕτως γε ἀπὸ στόματος.* "So readily, at least, by word of mouth," *i. e.*, off hand, by memory.—*εἰ γέγραπταί σοι, ἔνεγκε.* "If it has been written out by you, bring it."—*οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ πολέμου, κ. τ. λ.* "Well, then," said he, "we will suspend our deliberating respecting war in the first place." Certain adjectives with an article, in the accusative feminine singular, are used adverbially, as *τὴν πρώτην, τὴν εὐθεῖαν*, &c., where some supply *ὁδόν.* (*Kühner*, § 558, *Jelf.*)—*αὐτῶν.* "Of the things involved in it."—*ἀλλά τοι.* "But certainly." Compare i., 2, 36.—*ὅτι σοι μεμέληκε.* Bornemann reads from one MS. *ὅτι σοι ἤδη με μέληκε.*—*ὁπόσαι τε φυλακαὶ ἐπίκαιροί εἰσι.* "Both how many fortresses are in favorable positions."—*ἱκανοί.* "Sufficient to guard them."—*συμβουλεύσειν.* Supply *οἰδά σε.* Observe that the construction changes here, from *ὅτι* and a future verb, to the infinitive. Compare *Kühner*, § 804, 4, § 683, 1, *Obs. Jelf.* One MS. has *συμβουλεύσεις*, which Dindorf adopts.

§ 11.

νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, κ. τ. λ. "Yes, indeed, replied Glaucon, I, for my part, will advise then to remove all, on account of their being kept in such a way that," &c. After *ἔγωγε*, supply *συμβουλεύσω ἀφαιρεῖν*, and observe that *αὐτὰς φυλάττεσθαι* is the same as *φυλακὰς φυλάττεσθαι.*—*ὥςτε κλέπτεσθαι, κ. τ. λ.* "That the things which are in it are stolen from the country." We have given the conjecture of Valckenaer, supported by three MSS., for the common reading *ὥςτε καὶ ἁπτεσθαι.* Zeune, with some early editions, reads *ὥςτε καὶ βλάπτεσθαι.*—*τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας.* For *τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ (ὄντα) ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς χώρας.* Compare *Kühner*, § 617, *Jelf.*—*καὶ ἁρπάζειν.* "To plunder also." This is opposed to *κλέπτεσθαι.* Not only to be stolen, but even to be openly pillaged.—*αὐτός.* "In person."—*οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ περὶ τούτων, κ. τ. λ.* "Shall we therefore, said he, delay then about these things also, when we may no longer be indulging in

sand, so that the whole number of the Attic population would be about half a million.—*οἰκιῶν*. By *οἰκίαι* are here meant "houses;" by *οἴκων* in the next sentence or clause, "households" or "families."—*τὸν τοῦ θείου*. "That of your uncle, for instance." The individual here referred to was Charmides. Compare iii., 7, 1.—*δέεται δέ*. "For he stands in need of help."—*καὶ πλείοσιν ἐπιχειρήσεις* "You will even attempt to do so for more."—*ἐν τάλαντον*. The weight of course is here meant, not a sum of money. The talents of weight most in use were the Euboic or Attic talent (here meant), equal to almost fifty-seven pounds, and the Æginetan, equal to about eighty-two and one quarter pounds.

§ 15, 16.

πειθεσθαί μοι. "To follow my advice."—*μετὰ τοῦ θείου*. "Including your uncle."—*δυνήσεσθαι ποιῆσαι πείθεσθαι*. Here are three connected infinitives, without any other word intervening; a circumstance not uncommon in Greek authors. Compare iv., 6, 6. *Cyrop.*, i., 3, 13. *Matthiæ*, § 545, *Obs.*—*ὀνλάττον*. "Take care." Observe the force of the middle.—*τοῦ εὐδοξεῖν*. "Of reputation."—*σφαλερόν*. "Slippery."—*ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, κ. τ. λ.* "Think, too, of the rest of men, as many as you know to be such as appear," &c. For the genitive after *ἐνθυμεῖσθαι*, consult *Matthiæ*, § 349.

§ 17, 18.

ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν εἰδότων, κ. τ. λ. "Then think, too, of those who know what they both say and do," *i. e.*, who know the subjects on which they speak, &c.—*ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα ἐπισταμένων ὄντας*. "To be of the number of those who have most knowledge."—*πειρῶ κατεργάσασθαι, κ. τ. λ.* "Endeavor to bring about as much as possible the actually knowing those things which you wish to perform," *i. e.*, endeavor really to become most skilled in what you wish to attempt.—*διενέγκας*. "Having surpassed."—*τὰ τῆς πολεως πράττειν*. Compare i., 6, 15.

CHAPTER VII.

§ 1.

Χαρμίδην. Charmides was the son of the elder Glauco, and uncle to Glauco the younger. He was uncle also, by the mother's side, to Plato, who introduces him, in the dialogue which bears his name, as a very young man at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. He was a great favorite with Socrates. In B.C. 404,

§ 2, 3

used with respect to fear, hope, desire, and other affections of the mind. Compare *Haase, ad Reg. Lac.*, iii., 2, p. 94.—*καὶ σέ γε διδάξων, κ. τ. λ.* "And yet, said he, I am impelled to inform you." Observe that *καί* has here the force of *καίτοι* or *καὶ μήν*. Verbs of motion are accompanied regularly by participles future, to express the object of the verb. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 566, 6.—*αἰσχύνει*. "You are, nothwithstanding, ashamed."—*τοὺς γναφεῖς αὐτῶν*. "Of the fullers among them."—*τοὺς ἐμπορους*. "The merchants." The *ἐμπόροι* were properly those merchants who embarked and traded personally from port to port; and hence they are here opposed to *οἱ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ μεταβαλλόμενοι*, "those who barter wares in the market-place."—*ὁ τι*. "In what way."—*συνίσταται*. "Is composed."

§ 7.

τί δὲ οἴει διαφέρειν, κ. τ. λ. "In what, then, do you suppose that what you are doing is other than that a man, who is superior to those practiced in the palæstra, yet fears the untrained?" *i. e.*, in what do you suppose that your conduct differs from that of him who, being superior to the practiced athletæ, yet fears the untrained? Kühner well expresses here the force of *διαφέρειν* by *aliud esse quam*, or *præstabilius esse quam*. Observe, too, the force of *ἀσκηταί*, as denoting athletes regularly trained in the palæstra, and opposed to the *ἰδιῶται*, who are altogether unacquainted with gymnastic training. —*οὐ γὰρ τοῖς πρωτεύουσιν, κ. τ. λ.* "For do you not, although easily holding conference with those who are superior officers in the state, some of whom hold you in contempt, and although far superior to those who practise the addressing the people, nevertheless shrink from delivering your sentiments," &c.—*καταφρονηκόσιν*. Compare the explanation of Kühner, as elucidating the force of the perfect here: "Perfectum indicat . . . . . *contemsisse et adhuc in contemtu habere.*"

§ 8, 9.

καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἕτεροι, ἔφη. "(Very true), for even the others, said he, (whom you meet in private, do so)."—*εἰ ἐκείνους, ὅταν τοῦτο ποιῶσιν, κ. τ. λ.* "If, easily putting down those persons whenever they may attempt this, you nevertheless think that you shall not be able in any way to manage these." The particle *δέ* often stands thus, especially in Attic writers, after a protasis, or after a participle which has the effect of a protasis. (*Matthiæ*, § 616, 3.)—*προσφέρεσθαί τινι* signifies, "to conduct one's self toward one," "to treat any one in a particular way," and hence, "to

CHAPTER VIII

against Aristippus, who sought *ἐνοχλοῦν τὸν Σωκράτην οχ* a captious interrogation.—*ποιεῖν*. Observe that *ποιεῖν* is here equivalent in fact to *ἀποκρίνεσθαι*, the verb *ποιῶ*, like the Latin *facio*, being frequently made to supply the place of a verb that has preceded, by means of a general reference to it.

§ 3.

εἴ τι οἶδα πυρετοῦ ἀγαθόν. "Whether I know any thing good for a fever." Observe the peculiar construction of *ἀγαθός* with the genitive, and consult *Kühner*, § 100, *Jelf*. — *ἀλλὰ μήν*. "Well, then."—*ὁ μηδενὸς ἀγαθόν ἐστιν*. "Which is good for no one thing." The Socratic doctrine, as here laid down by Xenophon, is this, that nothing is good or useful of itself, but only with reference to something else.—*οὔτε δέομαι*. "Nor do I want (to know it)." Supply *εἰδέναι*.

§ 4.

ὡς οἷόν τε μὲν οὖν, κ. τ. λ. "Nay, said he, some are as dissimilar as possible." Observe that *μὲν οὖν* here has somewhat the force of the Latin *immo*.—*τῷ καλῷ πρὸς δρόμον*. "To one who is beautifully formed for running."—*καλὸς πρὸς πάλην*. This reading Ernesti introduced, in place of the common one *καὶ ἄλλος πρὸς πάλην*.—*καλὴ πρὸς τὸ προβαλέσθαι*. "Handsomely formed for flinging in front of one's self," *i. e.*, for defence in front.—*ὡς ἔνι ἀνομοιοτάτη*. "As dissimilar as possible."

§ 5.

οὐδὲν διαφερόντως, ἔφη, κ. τ. λ. "You answer me, said the other, in no respect differently than when," &c., *i. e.*, you give an answer now no way different from your previous one when I asked you, &c.—*ἄλλο μὴν ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ καλὸν εἶναι*. "That the good is one thing, indeed, and the beautiful another." More literally, "that one thing indeed is good, and another thing is beautiful."—*ὅτι πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα, κ. τ. λ.* "That all things are both beautiful and good, with reference to the same things," *i. e.*, that with reference to the same things, all that is beautiful is also good.—*ἡ ἀρετὴ . . . . ἀγαθόν*. Compare ii., 3, 6.—*τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτά*. "In both the same way, and with reference to the same objects."—*πρὸς ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ τἄλλα πάντα, κ. τ. λ.* "And all the other things which men use are considered both beautiful and good with reference to those same things, with reference to which they may be useful," *i. e.*, are considered beautiful and good with reference to their utility.

§ 8.

§ 9

§ 10

store up his property." Bornemann reads *τίθοιτο*, and so Matthiæ (§ 213, 3), remarking that the optative present passive and 2d aor. mid. of *τίθημι* and *ἵημι*, in Attic, have frequently the form of the optative of a baryton verb, in which case the accent is drawn back, as in the imperative. The testimony, however, of the ancient grammarians is for the most part opposed to this. Compare *Göttling, Greek Accent*, p. 24. *Eng. transl.* — *γραφαὶ δὲ καὶ ποικιλίαι, κ. τ. λ.* "But paintings and decorations (on the walls) deprive one of more pleasurable feelings than they afford." The portion of the building reserved for these was wholly excluded from the rays of the sun, and therefore cold and cheerless in winter. By *ποικιλίαι* appear to be meant frescoes, and in this sense Hermann also here understands them, remarking, "*ποικιλίας intellegenda esse censeo* ornamenta parietibus illita, *quæ ποικίλματα dicta in Œcon.*, ix., 2."

ναοῖς γε μὴν καὶ βωμοῖς, κ. τ. λ. "For temples and altars, however, he said the most becoming place was that which, being most open to the view, might be most free from the tread of men." Altars and temples, but more particularly the latter, were usually surrounded by a circuit wall (*περιβολῳ*), the area included within which was usually thickly planted with trees and shrubs. Socrates disapproves of this arrangement, since he wished the place to be fully exposed to view, as if the worshippers could thus fancy that they saw the deity before them, and could address him as if present. (*Kuhner, ad loc. Wheeler, ad loc.*)—*ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ ἰδόντας, κ. τ. λ.* "For that it was pleasant to pray the moment one beheld it, and pleasant, too, to approach it in perfect purity." Observe the force of the aorist in denoting an instantaneous action; and, with regard to the latter clause, compare the explanation of Schütz: "*Si via, quæ ad templum ducat, parum frequens sit, facilius adituri ab omni piaculo puros se servare possint.*"

CHAPTER IX.

§ 1, 2.

ἡ ἀνδρία πότερον, κ. τ. λ. "Whether courage was acquired by education or endowed by nature." More literally, "was a thing to be taught or natural." The substantive is placed before *πότερον* to make it more emphatic. Compare ii., 7, 8.—*φύεται.* "Is formed by nature."—*πρὸς τὰ δεινά.* "To encounter dangers."—*ἔθεσι.* "Institutions," *i. e.*, national usages.—*τόλμῃ.* "In daring."—*πᾶσαν φύσιν μαθήσει, κ. τ. λ.* "That every nature is increased with regard to courage by instruction and training." The same sentiment oc-

by several editors.—*οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, κ. τ. λ.* "That they were no more so than both the unwise and intemperate." We have given *ἀκρατεῖς*, the reading of four MSS., in place of the common reading *ἀμαθεῖς*.—*ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομενων.* "From every thing possible," *i. e.*, by all possible means.

§ 5.

ἔοῃ δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, κ. τ. λ. The train of reasoning of the whole passage is as follows: Justice and every other virtue is wisdom; but all just and virtuous things are also beautiful and good; he who knows all that is beautiful and good (i. e., *sapiens*, *σοφός*), will prefer nothing else to these; and so (*οὕτω*) the wise man will do all that is beautiful and good.—*οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, κ. τ. λ.* "Nor would they who were not acquainted with them be able to effect them, nay, would actually commit error if they attempt them." Observe that *ἄν* continues its force throughout the whole of this clause.—*δῆλον εἶναι ὅτι . . . . σοφία ἐστί.* For *ὅτι σοφία εἴη.* Compare i., 1, 13.—*δικαιοσύνη.* The names of virtues and vices are often used without an article. The article which immediately follows is added on account of the adjective *ἄλλη.* It is omitted in one Paris MS.

§ 6.

μανίαν γε μήν. Compare i., 4, 5.—*τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.* "Ignorance in the abstract."—*καὶ μὴ ἃ οἶδε, κ. τ. λ.* "To imagine as well as actually believe that one knows, not what he knows, (but what he really does not know)," &c. When a negative is prefixed to an article or a relative, a conjunction or preposition, it may not be separated therefrom, for it is attached to it for the purpose of making or suggesting an antithetical clause to be supplied in the mind; thus, the full expression here would be, *μὴ ἃ οἶδεν, ἀλλ' ἃ μὴ οἶδεν.* "Not what he knows, but what he does not know," *i. e.*, simply, "what he does not really know."—*τοὺς μέντοι πολλούς, κ. τ. λ.* "He said that the multitude indeed do not say that those are mad who err in those matters of which the many are ignorant, but call," &c.—*ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ γιγνώσκουσι.* The attraction of the relative is here owing to the omission of the demonstrative pronoun.

§ 7.

μέγας οὕτως οἴηται εἶναι. "Think himself to be so tall." Observe the construction of the nominative with the infinitive; and, moreover, the emphatic position of *οὕτως*, literally, "tall to such a degree."

"A great aberration of intellect."

chosen by lot."—*ὁπότε . . . . ὁμολογήσειε.* Compare i., 2, 57.—*ἐπεδείκνυεν ἔν τε νηΐ, κ. τ. λ.* "He used to show that, in a ship, the one who understood matters was the actual commander." Reiske would add *κυβερνᾶν*, but without necessity, for *ὁ ἐπιστάμενος* is frequently, as here, used absolutely.—*οἷς ὑπάρχει τι ἐπιμελείας δεόμενον.* "Who have any office requiring care."—*ἂν μὲν αὐτοὶ ἡγῶνται, κ. τ. λ.* "If they think that they are acquainted with it, take care of it themselves; but if they do not think that they understand it," &c.—*ἐν δὲ ταλασίᾳ.* "In wool spinning, moreover."

§ 12, 13.

μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ὀρθῶς λέγουσι. "Not to yield obedience to upright advisers."—*καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, κ. τ. λ.* "And how is it possible that he should not obey, especially since there is a sure penalty impending if one obey not," &c. *Καί* implies wonder at the beginning of a question, in which the inquirer takes up what has been said, and turns it into an *argumentum ad absurdum*. Compare iii., 13, 6; iv., 4, 10.—*τὸν εὐ φρονοῦντα.* "A prudent monitor."—*τὸν δὲ ἀποκτείνοντα. κ. τ. λ.* "What, said he, do you think that the man who slays the best of his allies," &c. Ernesti, Dindorf, and Bornemann read *ἀποκτείναντα* from Stobæus and one Paris MS. Sauppe explains this aorist as implying an unsuccessful attempt; but Kühner and Jelf reject this signification of the tense. (*Kühner*, § 403, *Obs. Jelf.*) We have adopted, therefore, the ordinary reading, namely, the present participle, as implying a frequency of action, "he who slays," "who is in the habit of slaying."—*ἤ, ὡς ἔτυχε, ζημιοῦσθαι.* "Or is punished lightly." Literally, "is punished as it happens," *i. e.*, in any ordinary way.—*οὕτω.* "By such conduct." This refers to *ταῦτα ποιοῦντα.*

§ 14.

ἐπιτήδευμα. "Object of study."—*εὐπραξίαν.* "Virtuous conduct."—*πᾶν μὲν οὖν τοὐναντίον, κ. τ. λ.* "I, for my part, said he, think fortune and action altogether opposed to one another," *i. e.*, diametrically opposite. Socrates now proceeds to set his inquirer right. For when Socrates answered *εὐπραξίαν*, the other took this term in its ordinary sense of "prosperity," or "success in life," and immediately asked him whether "good fortune," or accidental prosperity, was an object of study. The philosopher now proceeds to lay down clearly the distinction between the two terms.—*τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ζητοῦντα, κ. τ. λ.* "For I think that a person's meeting casually with any one of the things that are needed, without seeking for the

§ 15

CHAPTER X

§ 1

§ 2, 3

"With any one man."—*ὅλα τὰ σώματα καλὰ ποιεῖτε φαίνεσθαι.* "You make your bodies to appear beautiful in all their parts." Compare the explanation of Kühner: "*Corpora in omnibus suis partibus.*"—*ποιοῦμεν γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτως.* "(You are right), for we do so, replied he." Observe the elliptical employment of *γάρ*.—*τὸ πιθανώτατόν τε καὶ ἡδιστον . . . . τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος.* "That character of soul which is most persuasive as well as pleasing."—*πῶς γάρ.* "(Certainly not), for how."—*μήτε ὧν σὺ εἶπας, κ. τ. λ.* "Nor any one of the characteristics which you just mentioned." The allusion is to *τὰ κοῖλα, ὑψηλά*, &c., mentioned in § 1. Observe that *ὧν* is by attraction for *ἅ*.

§ 4.

ἆρ' οὖν, ἔφη, γίγνεται, κ. τ. λ. "Is not then, said he, both the looking in a friendly and in a hostile manner at certain persons accustomed to arise in a man?" *i. e.*, is it not sometimes seen that a man looks on others with a friendly or a hostile look?—*τοῦτό γε.* Thus in some MSS., in place of the common reading *τό γε.*—*καὶ μάλα.* "Undoubtedly."—*ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.* "At the prosperity."—*ὁμοίως ἔχειν τὰ πρόσωπα.* "To wear the same expression of countenance." More literally, "to have their countenances in the same way." The position of *ὁμοίως* here is intended to render it emphatic. The Greeks, in order to call attention to a word whereon an emphasis is to be laid, sometimes place it, as in the present instance, immediately before some word or words on which no stress is to be laid. (*Kühner*, § 904, 5, *Jelf.*)

§ 5.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καί. Compare § 1.—*τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ ἐλευθέριον* "Both what is exalted and liberal," *i. e.*, elevation and liberality of spirit.—*καὶ τὸ σωφρονητικόν τε καὶ φρόνιμον.* "And both what is temperate and prudent," *i. e.*, temperance and prudence of character.—*καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου, κ. τ. λ.* "Display themselves clearly by both the countenance and the gestures of men both standing and in motion." With *διαφαίνει* supply *ἑαυτά*, and observe the employment here of the active with the reflexive pronoun, as more emphatic than the middle would have been.—*πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, νομίζεις, κ. τ. λ* "Whether then, said he, do you suppose that men look with more pleasure upon (those paintings) by which fair, and virtuous, and loveable dispositions appear to the view, or those by which," &c. Schneider thinks that Socrates desired to persuade Parrhasius to imitate the fair and good rather than the vicious and hateful.

§ 6

καὶ τὸ. 'The synthesis in rhythm can be a [illegible]—[illegible]. Who has [illegible] in his hands.' Compl. καὶ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ῥυθμῷ. Diog. Laert. *Il.* 6, xxxv. 8. 17 'The chief of which [illegible] was a sculptor of Smyrna, and resembled in general outline—[illegible]. 'Instead of various forms'—i. e. in various postures. Supply ἐν ἄλλοις. 'We have placed a meaning after words, which makes a more intelligible sense than the ordinary one.' For ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος Cardi. compares Galen, Διαφορῶν κατάλογος ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ μέρει Διοσκορίδου κατὰ τὸ ἄνω μέρος τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνω μέρους τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος. 'Most of all ample matter to the sight of it, the tomb of men, namely, the tent of life.' Lowndes, 'And in the sixteen square centimetres.'

§ 7

ἀναπαύει. 'Doing as a law'—ὡς ὁ νόμος—compare iii. 7, 1—τὸν νόμον ἔχοντα, iv. 1. 1. 'By assimilating your work to the times of living creatures,'—i. e. by assisting and hastening your work according to the powers which these possess.—Συναισθάνεσθαι. 'Mine kin-like'—where we do not find the equation ὁ = ἐ. 'Do you not have, still by by assimilating (to the rests), hold these parts to your musical voice by reason of the particular positions and forms which are given upward, both those that are ever-present and those that are drawn apart, both those that are by a mode of motion and those that are [illegible]'—ἐφαρμόσαι. 'Most assent.'

§ 9.

τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ. 'Still further, does not the [illegible] also of the affections of hearing, when along any thing produce a certain feeling of pleasure for the [illegible]'—ἐκπλήττει. 'As [illegible]'—ἐκπλήττειν. 'The [illegible] to have to [illegible], and persuading'—τοῦ ἐκπλήττειν. 'And should not the circumstance of creating victory be believed?'—τὸ τὴν νίκην. 'To [illegible] in his mind the workings of the soul.'

§ 9, 10.

Ἔστιν ὅτε. 'Many fellow-men [illegible] this [illegible] which [illegible] Ἔστιν ὅτε. Ἀλλοτε μὲν. 'Sometimes' ἀλλοτε μὲν. 'Several opposite here in the parts both an active and passive significance. Compare Μουσικὴ ἐν τῷ, ἐν τῷ—ἐν τῷ Τίμαιος. 'Compare i., 8, 9—ἐν τῷ [illegible]—ἐν τῷ. 'By this, that the [illegible]

let covers those parts of man which require covering," &c.—*οὔτε ἰσχυροτέρους οὔτε πολυτελεστέρους, κ. τ. λ.* "Though you make them neither stronger nor of more precious material than the rest." Compare *Kuhner*: "*neque e pretiosiore materia, ut auro, et variegatos.*" Observe that *τῶν ἀλλων* is for *ἢ οἱ ἀλλοι*, by the operation of what grammarians term the "*comparatio compendiaria*," or shorter form of comparison. (*Kuhner*, § 781, *d.*, *Jelf.*)—*εὐρυθμοτέρους*. "Better proportioned." The *ῥυθμὸς τοῦ ὥρακος* is that concinnity and harmony with which all the parts are exactly suited to each other. In other words, it is "proportion."—*μέτρῳ ἢ σταθμῷ*. "By measure or by weight," *i. e.*, proving it to the purchaser by measure or by weight.—*οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἴσους, κ. τ. λ.* "For certainly I do not think that you make them all of the same size at least," &c.—*ποιῶ*. "I make (them to fit)." Supply *ἁρμόττοντας*.

§ 11, 12.

πως οὖν, ἔφη, τῷ ἀρρύθμῳ σώματι, κ. τ. λ. "How then, said he, do you make that corselet well proportioned, which fits an ill-proportioned body."—*ὥςπερ καὶ ἁρμοττοντα*. "Just as I make them to fit." Supply *ποιῶ*.—*τὸ εὔρυθμον οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὸ λεγειν, κ. τ. λ.* "To mean proportion, not by itself, but with reference to the wearer," *i. e.*, not independently considered, but, &c.—*ὡςπερ ἂν εἰ φαιης*. "As if you were to say." For *ὡςπερ ἂν φαιης, εἰ φαιης*. The particle *ἄν* is sometimes found without a verb, when it can be easily supplied from the context, particularly in the phrase *ὡςπερ ἂν εἰ*, "as if." Compare *Kuhner*, § 430, 1, *Jelf.*—*τῷ σῷ λόγῳ*. "From what you say," *i. e.*, according to the principle which you lay down.

§ 13.

τῷ ἁρμόττειν πρόςεστι. "Is attached to this fitness."—*εἴ τι ἔχεις* "If you know any."—*τὸν αὐτὸν σταθμὸν ἔχοντες*. "Although they have the same weight."—*ἢ ὅλοι ἐκ τῶν ὤμων κρεμάμενοι*. "Either hanging entirely from the shoulders."—*δύςφοροι καὶ χαλεποί*. "Difficult to wear, and annoying."—*διειλημμένοι τὸ βάρος, κ. τ. λ.* "Being distributed as to their weight, (borne) partly by the collar bone and partly by the shoulder blade." The preposition *ὑπό* is here employed because *οερόμενον* is to be supplied by the mind.—*ὀλίγου δεῖν οὐ φορήματι, κ. τ. λ.* "Almost resemble, not a burden, but a (natural) appendage." Observe that *ὀλίγου δεῖν* is elliptical for *ὡς ὀλίγου δεῖν*, and has an adverbial force, arising from its parenthetical nature. (*Kühner*, § 864, 1, *Jelf.*)

§ 14, 15

[illegible] —The very thing, etc. consists of which.'—[illegible] —In preference.'—[illegible] —'Of these sentiments,' i. e., because they are recognised and gained —not slippery [illegible] —'Since the body does not consent to the same [illegible]'—[illegible] —[illegible] —'At last [illegible] —[illegible]' Cyrop. vi. 1. 45, where [illegible] —[illegible] [illegible] —'How could [illegible] —[illegible] —'[illegible] —'Those [illegible] —[illegible] —'Those [illegible] —[illegible] —'Those [illegible] —

Theodota," *i. e.*, to thank her.—*ἀρ' εἰ μεν.* Compare iii., 2, 1.—*ἡ ἐπιδειξις.* "The display."—*ταύτην ἑκτέον.* "Must this woman feel." Observe, again, the accusative with the verbal in *τέον*.—*ἡμᾶς.* Supply *ἑκτέον*.—*οὐκοῦν.* "Accordingly."—*ὠφελήσεται.* So in five MSS. Two others, with Stephens's edition, have *ὠφεληθήσει.* Dindorf reads *ὠφεληθήσεται* with the common text.—*ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰκὸς.* "Hence, therefore, it is natural."—*θεραπεύειν.* "Pay court unto her."—*ὑμῖν τῆς θέας, κ. τ. λ.* "To thank you for this visit." Literally, "for this seeing of me," *i. e.*, for thus coming to see me.

§ 4.

ἐν ἐσθῆτι καὶ θεραπείᾳ, κ. τ. λ. "In no common vesture and ornament." Herbst refers *θεραπείᾳ* here to an array of attendants, but this idea is expressed by *θεραπαίνας πολλάς* immediately following. It is better, therefore, with Bornemann, Sauppe, Finckh, and Kuhner, to regard the term in question as analogous to the Latin *cultus*, or *ornatus muliebris*.—*οὐ τῇ τυχοῦσῃ.* Compare i., 1, 14.—*καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας, κ. τ. λ.* "And not even these negligently attired."—*τοῖς ἄλλοις.* "In other respects."—*ἀγρός.* "A country estate," *i. e.*, a farm.—*ἀλλ' ἄρα.* "Well, then."—*ἀλλὰ μή.* "But yet have you not."—*τἀπιτήδεια.* "The necessary supplies," *i. e.*, for living in this way.—*οὗτός μοι βίος ἐστί.* "He is my means of subsistence."

§ 5, 6.

κρεῖττον οἴων τε, κ. τ. λ. For *κρεῖττόν ἐστι φίλων ἀγέλην κεκτῆσθαι ἢ οἴων ἀγέλην, κ. τ. λ.*—*τῇ τύχῃ ἐπιτρέπεις.* "Do you commit the matter to fortune."—*ἢ καὶ αὐτή τι μηχανᾷ;* "Or do you yourself practice any art (to attract him)?"—*ῥάλαγγες.* The spider is called *ῥάλαγξ* from the long joints of its legs.—*ὅ τι ἂν ἐνταῦθα ἐμπέσῃ.* "Whatever may have fallen into these." The adverbs *ἔνθα, ἐνθάδε, ἐνταῦθα*, are construed with verbs of motion as well as with those signifying rest. Compare *Kühner*, § 605, *Obs.* 5, *Jelf.*—*τροφῆ.* "For food."

§ 7, 8.

τὶ θήρατρον. "A kind of net."—*οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὕτως, κ. τ. λ.* "(Yes), for you ought not truly to suppose that you will thus indeed, without some art, take friends, the most valuable prize of all," *i. e.*, thus, so readily, indeed, without practicing some art for the purpose.—*θηράσειν.* Thus, also, *Anab.*, iv., 5, 24; *Cyrop.*, i., 4, 16. The usual Attic future is *θηράσομαι*.—*τὸ μικροῦ ἄξιον.* "An article of little value."—*νέμονται.* "They feed." Referring to the hares.—*νυκτε-*

§ 9, 10

κ. τ. λ. By *ἴδια πράγματα*, Weiske correctly understands the discussions held by Socrates with his disciples, while *τὰ δημόσια* is to be regarded as ironical, since Socrates *τὰ πολιτικὰ οὐκ ἔπραττε.*—*φίλαι.* "Female friends." Said ironically. The allusion is explained immediately after.—*φίλτρα τε καὶ ἐπῳδάς.* "Both love-charms and incantations."—*καὶ ταῦτα.* "These arts also."

§ 14.

διὰ τί. "On what account," *i. e.*, influenced by what other reasons.—*Ἀπολλόδωρον.* Apollodorus was a disciple and constant companion of Socrates, though unable with all his attachment to understand the real worth of his master. A lively picture of the man is given in Plato's *Symposium*, p. 173, *seqq.*—*τόνδε καὶ Ἀντισθένην.* When demonstrative pronouns are added to proper names, the article is omitted. Antisthenes has been already mentioned, ii., 5, 1.—*Κέβητα καὶ Σιμμίαν.* Compare i., 2, 48.—*ἴυγγων.* "Magic wheels." The term *ἴυγξ* properly denotes a bird called by us the "*wryneck.*" It derived its Greek name from its cry, and its English, as well as Latin one (*torquilla*), from the never-ceasing motion of its little head. From this peculiarity the ancients believed it to be endowed with magic influence, and therefore used it in incantations to excite love. They bound the bird to a wheel having four spokes, and then rapidly turned the wheel while the charm was being chanted. Hence, as in the present instance, the wheel itself was called by the name of the bird, *ἴυγξ.*

§ 15.

χρῆσον τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, κ. τ. λ. "Lend me, then, said she, that magic wheel of yours, that I may set it going against yourself first."—*ἑλκεσθαι πρός σε.* "To be drawn to you."—*ἀλλὰ πορεύσομαι.* "Well, I will go."—*ἐὰν μή τις φιλωτέρα, κ. τ. λ.* "Unless some one dearer than you be within," *i. e.*, right reason and virtue. Compare in explanation the remark of Ruhnken: "*Venuste, ut nihil supra: est enim propria meretricum amatores excludentium formula, ἔνδον ἕτερος.*"

CHAPTER XII.

§ 1.

Ἐπιγένην. Epigenes, son of Antiphon, of the demus of Cephisia, a follower of Socrates. He is mentioned by Plato as one of those who were with the philosopher in his last moments. (*Plat., Phæd.*,

§ 2.

§ 3.

exercise. Some commentators give *ἐπιτιμίων* here the meaning merely of *incommodorum*, "inconveniences," but this wants force. The reference is literally to an assessment of damages, a penalty imposed.—*πολλῷ ῥᾴω καὶ ἡδίω τούτων εἶναι, κ. τ. λ.* "That those things which he should endure who is careful of the healthful condition of his frame are far lighter and more agreeable than these," *i. e.*, than these same penalties.—*τῶν διὰ τὴν εὐεξίαν γιγνομένων.* "The results arising from a good habit of body," *i. e.*, from good muscular training.

§ 4.

καὶ μὴν πάντα γε τἀναντία, κ. τ. λ. "And yet all things happen unto those who have their bodies in good condition directly otherwise than to those who have them in evil condition," *i. e.*, the results to those of an ill condition of frame are directly the reverse of those which befall a good condition. Words signifying difference are regularly construed with a genitive; but the adjective *ἐναντιος*, instead of this genitive, sometimes has the particle *ἢ* after it. Compare iv., 5, 8.—*καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τόν τε λοιπὸν βίον, κ. τ. λ.* "And, in consequence of all this, they live the rest of their lives more agreeably and honorably, and leave behind to their children fairer means for the support of existence." Compare ii., 7, 11.

§ 5.

οὔτοι χρή. . "We by no means ought."—*οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ τὰ προς τὸν πόλεμον.* "Does not publicly require the practice of warlike exercises." More literally, "does not publicly practice the things appertaining to war." The reference is to the toils and exercises of the athletæ, which are also for war. Xenophon here censures the Athenians, with tacit praise of the Lacedæmonians; for though at Athens there were contests of *ὁπλομάχοι*, yet there every citizen was not obliged to practice them as at Lacedæmon.—*ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἧττον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.* "But to attend to them none the less on this account."—*οὐδὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ ἀγῶνι, κ. τ. λ.* "Not even in any other contest, nor in any act whatsoever, will you come off inferior." Observe the construction of *οὐδὲ . . . . οὐδέ*, the former being equivalent to the Latin *ne quidem*, and the latter to *neque*. We must never confound *οὐδὲ . . . . οὐδέ* with *οὔτε . . . . οὔτε*, "neither . . . . nor." Compare *Kühner*, § 776, *Jelf.*—*πολὺ διαφέρει, κ. τ. λ.* "It makes a wide difference to have the body in as good a condition as possible." For a full enunciation of the thought, supply *καὶ ὡς κάκιστα*, "and in as evil a condition as possible." In this formula,

the words mean, how the context and antecedents modified. Compare III., 11, 11.

§ 6, 7

§ 9.

CHAPTER XIII.

§ 1, 2

the friend of Socrates. He was a native of Athens. Many read *ἀκούμενος* as a participle, denying a physician of such a name to have ever existed. But consult *Plat.*, *Phæd.*, 227, *a.*—*παύσασθαι ἐσθίοντα.* "To stop eating (while you still have an appetite)," *i. e.*, before satiety supervenes.

§ 3.

παρ' ἑαυτῷ. "With him," *i. e.*, at his house, at home.—*ἀλλὰ ψυχρόν, ἔφη, κ. τ. λ.* "But, replied he, it is cold for the purpose of bathing," *i. e.*, it is too cold for bathing. Sometimes a positive with *ὥςτε* and an infinitive is used for the comparative with *ἢ ὥςτε* (*Matthiæ*, § 448, *b.*)—*ὡς ἡδέως.* "With what pleasure." Equivalent to *ὅτι οὕτως ἡδέως.*—*ἐν Ἀσκληπιοῦ.* "In the temple of Æsculapius." Supply *νεῷ.* The temple of Æsculapius here referred to was in Athens, on the road from the theatre to the Acropolis. There was a warm spring here, connected, of course, with healing purposes. The great temple of Æsculapius was at Epidaurus, in Argolis.—*ἐν Ἀμφιαράου.* Pausanius states (i., 34, 2) that Amphiaräus had a temple in the Acropolis; but he also speaks of another temple of the same at Orōpus, in Bœotia, near a spring possessing healing properties, and it is more than probable that the latter is here meant.—*ὅτι κινδυνεύεις, κ. τ. λ.* "That you are, very likely, harder to please," &c. Observe the force of *κινδυνεύω.* The verb properly means "to run a risk," and then, as the running a risk implies a probable chance of success, it is used, as in the present case, to express that which seems likely, though uncertain.

§ 4.

τον ἀκόλουθον. "His attendant." The term *ἀκόλουθος* answers to the Latin *pedissequus*, and denotes properly a young slave, whose duty it was to attend upon his master, and accompany him in public; a page or follower.—*ὀψοφαγίστατος.* "A perfect glutton." Adjectives in *ης*, gen. *ου*, of the first declension, add the compound suffix *ίσ-τερος, ίσ-τατος*, to their root. The adjective *ὀψοφάγος*, and some others in *ος*, irregularly drop the *ος*, and follow the same mode of comparing. (*Kühner*, § 133, 2, *b.*, *Jelf.*)—*βλακίστατος.* Thu Schneider, from Athenæus, viii., p. 277, and Eustathius, p. 867 All the MSS. and previous editions have *βλακώτατος.* Buttmann wishes to read here *βλακικώτατος*, from *βλακικός.* (*G. G.*, § 66, *ed Rob.*)—*πότερος.* "Which of the two."

§ 5.

§ 6.

CHAPTER XIV.

§ 1.

τῶν ξυνιόντων ἐπι δεῖπνον. "Of those who came together unto a feast of contribution." The reference is to a feast where each guest brought his own provisions with him; and, as the provisions were brought in baskets, such an entertainment was sometimes called a *δεῖπνον ἀπὸ σπυρίδος.* The object of Socrates was to prevent an unpleasant rivalry in the quality or quantity of the contributed viands. In order to effect this, he directed the attendant either to place the small portions on table, in common for all, or else to distribute to each guest his share of the same. Observe that the reference is to such entertainments taking place at the house of Socrates, and hence the control which he assumed in regulating the same.

φέροιεν. The verbs *φέρειν* and *πορίζειν* are often used where one would rather expect the middle, the speaker not regarding the action in its reflexive relation to the subject. In the next sentence we have *φέροντες*, and, a little after, *φερομένων*. (Compare *Kühner*, § 363, 3, *Jelf.*)—*τὸν παῖδα.* "His slave." Compare the analogous usage of *puer* in Latin.—*τὸ μικρὸν ἢ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, κ. τ. λ.* "Either to place each small contribution on table for the use of all, or else to distribute his share of the same unto each."—*ἠσχύνοντο τό τε μή, κ. τ. λ.* "Were ashamed not to partake of that which was placed for general use, and not, in return, to place on table their own stock." More literally, "were ashamed as regarded the not partaking of," &c. The infinitive with the article is often put for the infinitive alone, because the infinitive is considered as the subject or object of the main action. (*Matthiæ*, § 543, *Obs.* 2.)—*καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν πλέον εἶχον.* "And since they partook of no more."—*πολλοῦ ὠνούμενοι* "Purchasing delicacies at great cost."

§ 2.

τοῦ μὲν σίτου πεπαυμένον. "To have abstained from the bread."—*τὸ ὄψον αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό.* "The meat itself alone." Literally, "the meat itself, by itself."—*λόγου ὄντος περὶ ὀνομάτων, κ. τ. λ.* "A conversation arising about names for things, for what particular act, namely, each might be (a proper appellation)."—*ἐπὶ ποίῳ ποτὲ ἔργῳ, κ. τ. λ.* "For what particular act a man is called carnivorous."—*ἐπὶ τῷ σίτῳ.* "With their bread."—*ὅταν παρῇ.* "Whenever it be present," *i. e.*, whenever bread be laid before them.—*ἐπί γε τούτου.* "On this account, at least."—*οὐ γὰρ οὖν.* "By no means." Compare iii., 6, 12.

§ 2, 4

Compare i. 2, 5.

§ 5

§ 6

they act rightly, and destroys their art."

not be present."

§ 7.

ὡς τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ. "That the verb *εὐωχεῖσθαι*, in the language of the Athenians, meant 'to eat.'" Observe here the peculiar force of *καλέω*.—*τὸ δὲ εὐ προσκεῖσθαι.* "And that the word *εὐ* was added, that we may eat those things which," &c., *i. e.*, in order to express the fancy for what would disorder neither body nor mind, and might be easily procurable. Observe here the force of *ἐπί*, and compare the explanation of Kühner: "*Præpositio ἐπί significat conditionem vel consilium: illud εὐ adhærere ita, ut ea comedamus, quæ*," &c.—*ὥστε καὶ τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ.* "So that he referred the term *εὐωχεῖσθαι* to those who lived moderately."

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

§ 1

§ 2.

§ 3.

cause this word is opposed to the different other arts which Socrates employed. Οὐ and ἀλλά are opposed to each other.—*μαθήσεως δὲ καταφρονοῦντας.* "But slighting instruction." Verbs signifying "to care for," "think much of," or their contraries, are construed with a genitive of the person or thing cared for, or disregarded, &c., and an accusative of the cause of care, disregard, &c. (*Kühner*, § 496, 551, *Jelf.*) — *ἐπιδεικνύων.* "Instancing." — *εὐφυεστάτους.* "Best in breed."—*σφοδρούς.* "Mettlesome."—*ἐκ νέων.* "When young."—*ἀδάμαστοι.* "Not broken in."—*δυςκαθεκτοτάτους.* "Very difficult to hold in."—*τῶν εὐφυεστάτων.* "That are of the best blood."—*καλῶς ἀχθείσας.* "Well trained." The term *ἀχθείσας* is peculiarly used of hounds. The word "untrained," *ἀναγώγους*, here applied to hounds, is applied above to horses, iii., 3, 4.—*μανιώδεις.* "Rabid."

§ 4.

εὐφυεστάτους. "Of the noblest natures."—*ταῖς ψυχαῖς.* The part of any thing affected by the operation of the verb is put in the accusative, but instead of this accusative the dative is sometimes used, as here. (Compare *Matthiæ*, § 424, *Obs.* 1.)—*μεγαλείους καὶ σφοδρούς.* "High souled and energetic."—*κακὰ ἐργάζονται.* Some read *κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι.*

§ 5.

τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ μέγα φρονοῦντας. "Those, however, who thought highly of themselves in consequence of riches."—*ἐφρένου, λέγων.* "He admonished by saying."—*εἴ τις οἴεται.* Observe the employment of the indicative here in the *oratio obliqua*, the object being brought before the mind not as a mere conception, but as something certain, in order to render the narrative more animated. —*διαγνώσεσθαι.* "He will distinguish between." — *εὖ πράττειν.* "That he is acting rightly."

CHAPTER II.

§ 1.

ὡς προσεφέρετο. "How he assailed."—*καὶ μέγα φρονοῦσιν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ.* "And who prided themselves greatly upon their wisdom." Observe that the verb *φρονεῖν* with *ἐπί* and a dative is usually accompanied by the adverb *μέγα*.—*Εὐθύδημον.* Compare i., 2, 29. A different person of this name is mentioned in iv., 3, 2.—*γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον.* "Had collected numerous extracts." Kühner

§ 4.

ἀκούων. "Although I heard."—*οὐδ' ἐπεμελήθην, κ. τ. λ.* "Nor was I ever solicitous of any one of those who were acquainted with these matters becoming an instructor unto me."—*τἀναντία.* Supply *ἐποίησα.*—*διατετέλεκα φεύγων.* "I have always avoided." Compare i., 2, 28; iii., 1, 4.—*τὸ δόξαι.* "The very appearance of it."—*ἂν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ἐπίῃ μοι.* "May occur to me spontaneously."

§ 5.

ἁρμόσειε δ' ἄν, κ. τ. λ. "It might suit, also, those to form their preamble in this way, who wish to obtain a medical appointment from the state." Compare Kühner: "*publici medici munus accipere.*" Weiske supposes that qualified physicians were appointed by the people in assembly. These were of two classes: the free, who attended to the free; and the slaves, who cured the slaves. They received their salary from the public treasury.—*ἐπιτήδειον.* "Advantageous." Ernesti thinks *ἐπιτήδειον* and *ἐντεῦθεν* spurious, since they are not noticed in the translation of Bessario. —*τῶν ἰατρῶν* "Of the physicians of the day." Observe the force of the article.—*τὸ δόξαι μεμαθηκέναι.* "The very appearing to have learned."—*ἐν ὑμῖν ἀποκινδυνεύων.* "By trying experiments upon you." Literally, "among you," *i. e.*, in your case. Schneider aptly compares *Pliny, H. N.*, xxix., 1, "*Discunt (medici) periculis nostris, et experimenta per mortes agunt.*"—*τῷ προοιμίῳ.* "At this form of preamble."

§ 6.

φανερὸς ἦν. Compare i., 2, 16.—*σωφροσύνης δόξαν περιβάλλεσθαι.* "To invest himself with a reputation for modesty." Compare Schneider: "*Tacendo assumere et consequi laudem modestiæ.*" Kühner is guilty of a singular oversight here. "Since Euthydemus," he remarks, "is said, in § 3, to have departed, what is now related must be supposed to have happened on a subsequent occasion." Not so, however, by any means. In § 3, Euthydemus is said to have been *in the act of departing* when Socrates commenced his attack, and he is now represented as having been induced to remain by what he heard fall from the lips of the philosopher.—*θαυμαστὸν γάρ, κ. τ. λ.* "It is strange, then, why in the world they who wish," &c. The particle *γάρ* here serves to draw a conclusion. Socrates forms an inference from the previous conduct of Euthydemus; and hence, for a literal translation of *γάρ* ("for"), we may supply the ellipsis as follows, with Herbst: *οὐκ ὀρθῶς ποιεῖς ὀνλαττόμενος αὐτός τι φθέγγεσθαι.*—*ἀλλο τι ἱκανοί.* Compare i., 2, 46.—*ὡς συνεχεστατα.* "As

§ 7.

§ 8

§ 9

—*ὀρθῶς μετιέναι τὴν σοφίαν.* "To be seeking after wisdom in the right way."

§ 10.

τί δὲ δή; "But in what particular art, pray?"—*διεσώπησεν.* Compare iii., 6, 4.—*ἆρα μὴ ἰατρός;* "Do you wish, then, to become a physician?" Supply *βούλει γενέσθαι.* The difference between *ἆρ' οὐ* and *ἆρα μή* is this, that *ἆρ' οὐ, nonne,* requires an affirmative answer, but *ἆρα μή, num,* a negative, as *ἆρα* does alone; but still *μή* imparts some degree of doubt to the question, and that for the purpose sometimes of irony. Compare *Kühner,* § 873, *Jelf.*—*συγγράμματα.* "Writings."—*γνωμονικοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρός, κ. τ. λ.* "Since there is need of a well-informed person for this also," *i. e.,* a person of judgment, whose mind has been matured by much reading and reflection. Observe that *τοῦτο* is here the accusative of the object.—*Θεόδωρος.* Theodorus was a philosopher and native of Cyrene, and a celebrated geometrician. According to Maximus Tyrius (*Diss.,* 22), he was the preceptor of Socrates. Compare iv., 7, 3.—*ἀστρολόγος.* "An astronomer." This was the original meaning of the word. Subsequently it was used to signify an astrologer. So *ἀστρολογία,* "astronomy," though *ἀστρονομία* was also in use. The case is similar in Latin with *astrologia* and *astronomia.*—*ῥαψῳδός.* "A Rhapsodist." The Rhapsodists were persons who recited, in public, portions of epic poems, especially those of Homer. They at first were held in great esteem; but in the time of Socrates the order had fallen into disrepute.—*τὰ μὲν ἔπη ἀκριβοῦντας.* "Know his verses accurately."—*αὐτοὺς δὲ πάνυ ἠλιθίους ὄντας.* The same contempt for the Rhapsodists was entertained by Plato, as appears from the dialogue entitled *Ion,* § 1, *seqq.* Compare *Stallbaum, ad loc.*

§ 11.

οὐ δήπου ἐρίσαι. "You surely do not desire." Observe that *οὐ δήπου* are here employed ironically. These particles are generally used in Attic writers to express a question to which a denial is confidently expected. (Compare ii., 3, 1.) Socrates, however, in putting the question, knew well that it would be answered in the affirmative.—*ἔστι γὰρ τῶν βασιλέων αὕτη.* "For this is the art of kings." Supply *ἡ τέχνη* from what precedes.—*ἀγαθὸν ταῦτα.* "Good at these things." Adjectives expressing quality, such as *ἀγαθός, καλός, κακός, σοφός,* &c., are construed with an accusative of the end or purpose. (*Kühner,* § 579, 2. *Jelf.*)—*καὶ πάλα.* Compare iii., 3, 9.—*καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τέ γε.* "And it is not possible, indeed." Valck

[illegible] would reject the particle γε. Cf. Demosth. [illegible], *Against Timocrates*, § 1, p. 744.

§ 12

[illegible] "Have you noticed, accordingly, that" [illegible], have you noticed, supposing that [illegible] "Do you see that" [illegible] "I will answer as you do, very clearly." "Now [illegible], "And [illegible] "[illegible] "Any matter of the sort." [illegible] Colloquial, [illegible] "What? am I [illegible] "Where all alarm is [illegible] [illegible] "Why, [illegible] "Why, [illegible] "Happily [illegible]

§ 13

[illegible] Cf. I. i. 1. [illegible] "We are to [illegible] "If you [illegible] "[illegible] "[illegible] "[

§ 15.

ἐξανδραποδίσηται. This verb is often used with respect to cities. Compare *Ages.*, vii., 6. *Conviv.*, iv., 36.—*πρὸς τοὺς φίλους.* "With reference to friends."—*ὑσα πρὸς τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐθήκαμεν, κ. τ. λ.* "Whatsoever things we have placed under the head of injustice, must we place all (of these), likewise, under the head of justice?" Observe that *πρὸς τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐθήκαμεν* is an instance of what grammarians term the pregnant construction, for *πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐθήκαμεν, ὡστε κεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτῇ.* Prepositions with the dative are sometimes joined to verbs of motion, *whither*, and with the accusative to verbs of rest. This is called the pregnant construction. In the former case, the speaker regards the state of rest following on the complete motion; in the latter, the motion which precedes and is implied in the state of rest; so that the two parts, which in other languages require two verbs to express them, are in Greek signified by one. Compare *Kühner*, § 645, *Jelf.*—*ἐθήκαμεν.* This form is rare, for the Attics usually write *ἔθεμεν.* The aorist in *κα* occurs in good authors almost exclusively in the singular and third person plural. In the rest of the persons the second aorist is more used, which, again, hardly ever occurs in the singular. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 210, 211

§ 16.

Βούλει οὖν, ἔφη, κ. τ. λ. "Do you wish, then, said he, that, having placed these things thus, we again proceed to define, namely, that it is just," &c.—*ἀλλὰ δεῖν πρός γε τούτους, κ. τ. λ.* "But that, with reference to the latter, a general must act without the smallest guile." The subject here is *στρατηγόν*, which is to be supplied from the preceding section.

§ 17.

ἀθύμως ἔχον. "Disheartened." Compare ii., 6, 18.—*ψευσάμενος φήσῃ.* Compare ii., 6, 38.—*παύσῃ τὰς ἀθυμίας τοῦ στρατεύματος.* "Shall cause the despondent feelings of his army to cease." Stobæus has, with one MS., *τῆς ἀθυμίας τοὺς στρατιώτας.*—*ποτέρωθι θήσομεν*; "Under which head are we to place this act of deceit?"—*πρὸς τὴν δικαιοσύνην.* "That we must assign it to justice." Supply *θετέον εἶναι ἡμῖν.*—*δεύμενον φαρμακείας, κ. τ. λ.* "Requiring medicine, and yet not liking a particular drug."—*ὡς σιτίον τὸ φάρμακον δῷ.* "Shall give him the drug in question as if it were an article of food." Commentators compare with this the fine lines in *Lucretius*, i., 935, *seqq.*: "*Sed veluti pueris absinthia tetra medentes,*" &c. —*ποῖ.* "Under which head."—*εἰς τὸ αὐτό.* "Under the same."

§ 18

§ 19

§ 20

πως γὰρ οὔ. Affirmatively: "(Yes), for how could it be otherwise?" (*Matthiæ*, § 619, 6.)—*τὰ δίκαια δὲ πότερον.* For the situation of *πότερον*, compare note on ii., 7, 8; iii., 9, 1.—*φαίνομαι.* "I appear to say so." Supply *τοῦτο λέγων.* Observe that *φαίνομαι* is opposed to the following *δοκῶ.*—*δοκῶ δέ μοι καὶ ταῦτα, κ. τ. λ.* "But I think I say so without knowing why."

§ 21.

τί δὲ δή; "What then, pray?"—*φράζων.* "When describing." With regard to *φράζων . . . . φράζῃ*, observe, that by a peculiar Greek idiom, there is attached to the verb of the sentence a participle of the same root and of similar meaning. This is exactly analogous to the constructions *μάχην μάχεσθαι*, &c. Compare *Kühner*, § 705, 3, *Jelf.*—*λογισμὸν ἀποφαινόμενος τὸν αὐτόν.* "When stating the result of the same calculation," *i. e.*, when rendering the same account.—*δῆλος νὴ Δί' εἶναι.* Supply *δοκεῖ*; and on the construction of the whole clause, compare iii., 5, 24.

§ 22.

ἀνδραποδώδεις. Compare i., 1, 16.—*ἆρ' οὖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ χαλκεύειν, κ. τ. λ.* "Pray, then, do they obtain this name on account of their ignorance of working at smith's work?"—*τοῦ τεκταίνεσθαι.* "Of carpentry."—*τοῦ σκυτεύειν.* "Of shoe making."—*οὐδὲ δι' ἓν τούτων.* Since the former interrogation has been denied (*οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτην*), Kühner supposes Euthydemus somewhat irritated at the captious interrogatories of Socrates, and that he answers here pettishly.—*ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον.* That is, *διὰ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων σοφίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος τούτου τυγχάνουσιν.*

§ 23.

φεύγειν, ὅπως μή, κ. τ. λ. "To avoid being low-minded." Literally, "slavish," *i. e.*, in spirit.—*πάνυ ὤμην φιλοσοφεῖν φιλοσοφίαν.* "I altogether thought that I was seeking out a philosophic system," *i. e.*, pursuing a line of study. Compare the explanation of Kühner: "*Sæpe φιλοσοφεῖν est, diligenter meditando aliquid reperire.*" It is used by Isocrates in the signification of "to study," "to investigate by study." The proper meaning of the verb is, "to love knowledge," "to seek to become wise," "to seek after knowledge for its own sake."—*δι' ἧς ἂν, κ. τ. λ.* Construe *ἄν* with *παιδευθῆναι*, and consult *Kühner*, § 429, *Jelf.*—*παιδευθῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα.* Verbs which have two accusatives in the active, retain one of these cases in the passive.—*καλοκἀγαθίας ὀρεγομένῳ.* Compare i., 2, 15.—*πῶς οἴει μὰ*

κ. τ. λ. "How much do you think I am dejected," *i. e.*, can you imagine the despair I am in.—*διὰ μὲν τὰ προπεπονημένα, κ. τ λ.* "After all my previous labor, not even able to answer that which is asked me concerning the things which I ought most of all to know." Literally, "on account of the things previously labored upon." Observe in *ὑπὲρ ὧν* the attraction for *ἅ*, and also that *περί* is more usual in this construction.

§ 24.

Δελφούς. Delphi was situate on the southern side of Mount Parnassus, in Phocis, and was famed for its oracle of Apollo. The more ancient name was Pytho.—*ἤδη πώποτε*. "Ever as yet."—*κατέμαθες οὖν πρὸς τῷ ναῷ, κ. τ. λ.* "Did you observe, then, that sentence, KNOW THYSELF, written somewhere upon the temple (wall)?" Observe here the force of the article *τό*, equivalent, as Sturz remarks, to *dictum illud*. This is said to have been the saying of Chilo. Others, however, ascribe it to Thales. Socrates often recommended it to his followers, for which he is ridiculed by Aristophanes. Compare *Süvern, ad Aristoph., Nub.*, p. 6.—*οὐδέν σοι τοῦ γράμματος ἐμέλησεν*. The impersonal *μέλει, curæ est*, is construed with a dative of the person and a genitive of the thing. (*Kühner*, § 496, *Jelf.*)—*σαυτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν, ὅστις εἶης*. Thus sometimes in Latin, as in Cicero, "*Nosti Marcellum, quam tardus sit.*"—*τοῦτό γε*. "This, at least," *i. e.*, my own self.—*σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τι ᾔδειν* "For I could scarcely have known any thing else."

§ 25.

ὥςπερ οἱ τοὺς ἵππους . . . . ὅπως ἔχει. These words form a parenthesis.—*γιγνώσκειν*. "That they know (the animal)."—*πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἵππου χρείαν*. "As regards the proper use of the steed," *i. e.*, the proper services required of him.—*πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν*. "With reference to human uses."

§ 26.

πάσχουσιν. "Experience."—*διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐψεῦσθαι ἑαυτῶν*. "But, by having been deceived with respect to themselves," *i. e.*, by reason of not knowing themselves.—*διαγιγνώσκουσιν*. "Thoroughly distinguish."—*πράττοντες*. "By attempting."—*εὖ πράττουσι*. "Enjoy success."—*διαφεύγουσι τὸ κακῶς πράττειν*. "Escape ill success."—*τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους δοκιμάζειν*. "To form an estimate regarding the rest of men."—*διὰ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων χρείας*. "By means of their use of the rest of men," *i. e.*, by their dealings with others

§ 27.

οἱ δὲ μὴ εἰδοτες. Supply *ἑαυτούς*, or *τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν.*—*πρός τε τοὺς ἄλλους, κ. τ. λ.* "Are similarly affected as regards both the rest of men," &c. Inasmuch as they do not know themselves, they are equally ignorant of other men, and of all human affairs.—*οὔτε οἷς χρῶνται.* "Nor those with whom they have dealings."—*τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἀποτυγχάνουσι, κ. τ. λ.* "They both fail of obtaining the things that are good, and fall into those that are evil."

§ 28.

ἐπιτυγχάνοντες ὧν πράττουσιν. "Succeeding in the things which they do." Observe that *ὧν* is by attraction for *ἃ.*—*καὶ οἳ τε ὁμοιοι τούτοις, κ. τ. λ.* "And they who are like to them gladly make use of their assistance," *i. e.*, men of similar prudence; men who resemble them in character and conduct.—*ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν βουλεύεσθαι.* "To counsel for them."—*καὶ προϊστασθαί τε ἑαυτῶν τούτους.* "And to place these before themselves." We have here, as Kühner remarks, a species of anacoluthon. The more regular form of expression would have been, *καὶ προϊστασθαί τε βούλονται ἑαυτῶν τούτους, καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας . . . . ἔχουσι.*

§ 29.

κακῶς δὲ αἱρούμενοι. "And making an unfortunate choice," *i. e.*, in consequence of not knowing their own abilities. Weiske takes it passively: "*Infeliciter ad aliquod negotium vel munus delecti.*"—*ζημιοῦνταί τε καὶ κολάζονται.* "Are both fined and punished." Compare *Kuhner: "Mulctantur et castigantur."*—*ἀδοξοῦσι.* "Incur disrepute."—*τῶν πόλεων ὅτι.* In order to give greater force to the opposition, the genitive is thus placed before the conjunction. So sometimes in Latin, as in Cicero, *Divin.*, i., 40: "*Deus ut haberetur*," &c.

§ 30.

ὡς πάνυ μοι δοκοῦν. Here *δοκοῦν* is an accusative after *ἴσθι*, equivalent to *ἴσθι δοκεῖν μοι.* In place of this construction the genitive absolute is more frequently employed. The common text has *δοκεῖ.*—*περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον.* Compare ii., 3, 10.—*πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπω, κ. τ. λ.* "I look to you (for aid), if haply you might feel inclined to explain it unto me." The optative with *εἰ* is used with respect to present actions, when the doubtfulness of the result is to be strongly marked; and sometimes, as in the present instance, *ἄν* is added, for the purpose of making that doubtfulness still stronger. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 526.

§ 31

[illegible] "The fully born," I suppose, "[illegible]
[illegible] "For if I did not even know them, I would
be more worthless even than a slave." Literally, "like slaves."
The genitive is to be taken with this substantive, and to the speakers,
the relative with an indicative [illegible] [illegible]
expressed [illegible], and the speakers relate as a circumstance which is
merely possible or probable. "[illegible] like the [illegible]
[illegible]." "The real nobleness of being an [illegible]"—[illegible]
[illegible] "It has been [illegible] an [illegible] has
[illegible] such as these, namely, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
which [illegible] [illegible] as [illegible]." &c. [illegible] from the
previous clause; and [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] are [illegible]
"drinkables" and "eatables."

§ 32

[illegible] "[illegible] and [illegible]"
[illegible] [illegible] "The [illegible] of the
[illegible] [illegible] "[illegible] having by [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] by [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] "While others, having been left behind on
account of [illegible] [illegible] have been saved." These parts [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] "having caused [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] by [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

τὸν Μίνω, κ. τ. λ.—μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ. An allusion to the fabled flight of Dædalus, along with his son Icarus, from the island of Crete, after the affair of Pasiphaë.—τόν τε παῖδα ἀπόλεσε. In the Icarian Sea, as it was afterward called.—εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους. Dædalus fled to Sicily after the loss of his son, where he was protected by Cocalus, king of the Sicani, and where he executed for the monarch many great works of art. This Socrates ironically calls a second enslaving.—τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδους, κ. τ. λ. Palamedes exposed the pretended madness of Ulysses, and thus incurred his hatred. Ulysses accused him of treason, and succeeded by his artifices in having him stoned to death. Herbst aptly compares Philostratus (*Heroic.*, p. 707): Παλαμήδην δὲ οὐδεὶς ἡ σοφία ὤνησε τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖν διαβληθέντα. —ὑμνοῦσιν. "Celebrate in song."—ὡς. "How that."—ἀνηπασ-τους πρὸς βασιλέα γεγονέναι. "To have been carried off to the great king." The King of Persia is meant, and the reference being a well-known one, the article is, as usual, omitted.

§ 34.

κινδυνεύει. "Appears." Compare ii., 3, 17; iii., 13, 3.—εἰγε μή τις αὐτό, κ. τ. λ. "(Yes), if at least one do not seek to compose it, said he, O Euthydemus, of questionable goods," *i. e.*, if he do not consider any questionable good as one of its ingredients.—τι δ' ἄν, ἔοη, κ. τ. λ. "But what one, said he, of the things tending to happiness, could be questionable in its nature?" *i. e.*, could be a questionable good.—εἰγε μὴ προσθήσομεν αὐτῷ. "Unless, indeed, we shall attach to it (as its elements)."

§ 35, 36.

νὴ Δί', ἔφη, προσθήσομεν ὄντα. "Ay, indeed, said Socrates, we will then be adding those things."—πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπά. Compare i., 2, 24.—μείζοσιν ἔργοις ἐπιχειροῦντες. "Undertaking works too great for them."—διαβρωττόμενοί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλευόμενοι. "Being enervated and plotted against."—ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔοη, εἰγε μηδέ, κ. τ. λ. "Why in very truth, replied Euthydemus, if I do not speak rightly even in praising happiness, I confess that I do not even know what I ought to pray for from the gods." Literally, "with reference to the gods." Compare i., 2, 10.—οὐδ' ἐσκεψαι. "You have never even examined."—τί ἐστι. "What kind of a thing it is." Compare i., 2, 13.—πάντως δήπου. "Assuredly, if I mistake not, (I know this)."

§ 37.

εἰδέναι. "For one to know." Supply τινά.—μὴ εἰδότα δῆμον. "If he know not the people themselves." Literally, "the *demus*."

of his pursuits." Literally, "some of the things which he pursued." Observe the attraction in *ὧν* for *ἃ*.—*διετάραττεν*. "Confounded him."—*ἐξηγεῖτο*. "Explained to him."

CHAPTER III.

§ 1.

τὸ μὲν οὖν λεκτικούς, κ. τ. λ. "Socrates, then, was not urgent that those who associated with him should rapidly become able in speech, or in action, or of inventive skill." More literally, "did not hasten onward this circumstance, that those who associated with him should become," &c. How Socrates taught his pupils to be *πρακτικοί* will be related in chapter v.; how to be *διαλεκτικοί*, in chapter vi.; and how to be *μηχανικοί*, in chapter vii.—*σωφροσύνην*. "A spirit of self-control."—*τοὺς ταῦτα δυναμένους*. "That those who were powerful in these qualities," *i. e.*, in speaking, acting, &c.

§ 2.

περὶ θεοὺς σώφρονας. "Sound in their notions respecting the gods."—*ἄλλοι μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.* "Others, then, who were present with him when conversing on this topic with other persons, related (his words unto me)." Heindorf conjectured *διηγοῖντο*, *i. e.*, *narrent;* Herbst, *διηγοῦνται*. We have followed the common text, and have given the explanation of Bornemann, as approved of by Kühner.

§ 3.

ἤδη ποτέ σοι ἐπῆλθεν. "Did it ever hitherto occur to you." Compare iv., 2, 4.—*κατεσκευάκασι*. "Have provided."—*καὶ ὅς*. Compare i., 4, 2.—*ἡμῖν παρέχουσιν*. "Afford us."—*ὅ γ' εἰ μὴ εἴχομεν* "And if we had not this, at least."—*ἑνεκά γε τῶν ἡμετέρων ὀφθαλμῶν*. "As far, at least, as our eyes are concerned."—*ἀλλὰ μὴν καί*. "But, moreover."—*κάλλιστον ἀναπαυτήριον*. "A most excellent time for taking repose." According to the analogy of the language, *ἀναπαυτήριον* should properly signify "a place for taking repose." Some read *ἀναπαυστήριον*, with regard to which form, consult the remarks of Lobeck, *ad Soph., Aj.*, 704, p. 321.

§ 4.

φωτεινὸς ὤν. "Being luminous," *i. e.*, light-imparting.—*τάς τε ὥρας τῆς ἡμέρας*. "Both the divisions of the day," *i. e.*, *ὄρθρον, μεσημβρίαν, δείλην, ἑσπέραν*, or "dawn, midday, afternoon, even

§ 5

§ 6

enumerated

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

This whole passage, down to *ἀνέκφραστον* inclusive, is preserved only in one MS., that of Meermann. It is suspected by most critics of being spurious. The following reasons have been advanced for this opinion. 1. The use of the adverb *ἀσθενῶς*, where we would expect *ἀρθόνον*. 2. The suspicious form of the aorist *διαχῖσαι*. 3. The affected form of the expression *πρόμαχον ζωῆς*, which does not suit the simple style of Xenophon. 4. The words *ἀλλὰ καὶ πελάγη περᾶν* but ill agree with the preceding sentences. 5. The form *ἀλλαχόθι* is met with in no other passage. In many MSS., moreover, there is an hiatus between *τὸ δὲ καὶ ἀέρα* and *τὸ δὲ τὸν ἥλιον*, and it has been supposed that some scribe attempted to fill up the vacuum with the present passage.—*πρόμαχον καὶ σύντροφον*. "A defense and support."—*ἀλλὰ καὶ πελάγη περᾶν δι' αὐτοῦ*. "But that we even cross over seas by means of it," *i. e.*, by the action of the air on the canvass of the sails.—*καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἄλλους, κ. τ. λ.* "And that some men in one quarter and in one land, and other men in another quarter and in a different land, by sending to each other, procure for themselves what they require, how is not this beyond all calculation? It is unutterably so."

ἐπειδὰν τράπηται. "Whenever he turns." Observe the force of the middle. The allusion is to the apparent motion of the sun after the shortest day, or the winter solstice.—*προσιέναι*. "Approaches toward us."—*ὧν καιρὸς διελήλυθεν*. "Whose season (for ripening) has gone by."—*μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος θερμαίνων*. "By imparting unto us more of his heat than is needful."—*καὶ ὅταν αὖ πάλιν ἀπιὼν γένηται ἐνθα, κ. τ. λ.* "And when, in the course of his departure, he may have come back again (to that quarter of the heavens) where," &c. Supply *ἐνταῦθα* before *ἐνθα*. The order *αὖ πάλιν* is very rare, *πάλιν αὖ*, which occurs immediately after, is much more usual. Compare *Schæfer. Melet. Crit.*, p. 39.—*εἰ ἀπεισιν*. "If he shall depart." Observe the employment of the present *ἀπεισιν*, according to Attic usage, in a future sense.—*καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, κ. τ. λ.* "And keeps revolving in that part of the heavens, by being in which he might benefit us most."—*παντάπασιν ἔοικεν*. "Altogether resemble."

§ 9.

εἰ ἐξαπίνης γίγνοιτο. "If either should come upon us suddenly."—*κατὰ μικρόν*. "Gradually."—*ὥστε λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς, κ. τ. λ.* "That we escape our own observation while we are coming toward, and getting placed in, either most powerful extreme." More freely, "that we are imperceptibly placed in either extreme." Observe

self —PHRYNE. The benefits mentioned above

τ. λ. "Giving instruction, by means of which we both impart all blessings unto one another, and share these in common."—*νόμους τιθέμεθα.* Compare iv., 4, 19.—*πολιτευόμεθα.* "Enjoy constitutional government."—*πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι.* "To take, in their goodness, great care." Observe the force of the middle, literally, "to make for themselves," *i. e.*, in their own spontaneous goodness. Stronger, therefore, than the simple *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* would have been.

§ 12.

εἰ ἀδυνατοῦμεν, κ. τ. λ. "Since we are unable to foresee what things will be advantageous with regard to the future. The preposition *ὑπέρ* has here somewhat of the force of the Latin *de*, with the accessory idea of an intention to regulate or arrange. Hence the explanation which Matthiæ here gives to *ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων*, namely, "*ad res futuras bene constituendas.*" Observe that *εἰ* has here, with the indicative, the force of *ἐπεί*, and compare i., 5, 1. Schneider, Schütz, and Dindorf read *ᾗ*, a mere conjecture of Reiske's.—*τοῖς πυνθανομένοις.* "Unto those who inquire of them."—*γίγνοιντο.* Three Paris MSS. have *γίγνοιτο*, but the plural is right, because several distinct events are referred to. Compare *Kühner*, § 385, *b.*, *Jelf.*—*σοὶ δ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, κ. τ. λ.* Consult on this passage, page xxviii. of the *Prolegomena*.

§ 13.

ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, κ. τ. λ. "And that I speak the truth (in saying that the gods assist us in uncertain circumstances), you also will discover," &c. From this passage it would appear that Socrates did not consider that the *δαιμόνιον* was given specially to himself alone, as a peculiar gift, but was common to him with other men. Compare i., 1, 19: *Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖτο, κ. τ. λ.*, and *Prolegomena*, *l. c.*—*τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν.* Compare ii., 1, 19.—*οὕτως ὑποδεικνύουσιν.* "Thus secretly manifest themselves unto us." Observe the force of *ὑπό*. The idea is, that we are not to look, in divination, for the very forms of the gods, but that they merely give us on those occasions some secret manifestations of their will."—*οἵ τε γὰρ ἄλλοι, κ. τ. λ.* "For both the other gods." Supply *θεοί*, which is omitted because *αὐτοὶ οἱ θεοί* went before. Socrates, Plato, and Cicero, besides believing in one supreme God, supposed that there were several other inferior, but immortal gods, whom the great God employed in the administration of the universe.—*οὐδὲν τούτων.* The idea is, that they do not present themselves to our view in giving any of the good things which they bestow.

ton.—*μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων.* "Not to despise invisible things." —*ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων.* "From their results."

§ 15.

ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲ μικρόν, κ. τ. λ. "That I will not neglect the deity even in a slight degree." Verbs which express the notion of *caring for, thinking much of*, or their contraries, and which necessarily imply an antecedent notion of the cause, person, or thing whence the case arises, are construed with a genitive. (*Kühner*, § 496, *Self.*)—*ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀθυμῶ.* Many neuter verbs, which express an emotion, not having any direct object, are followed by an accusative of the thing which causes the emotion. Thus, in the following section, *μὴ τοῦτο ἀθύμει.* So, also, in Latin, "*Id dolemus*" (*Cic., Brut.*, 1); "*Id lacrymat virgo*" (*Ter., Eun.*, v., 1, 13).—*οὐδ' ἂν εἷς.* Compare i., 6, 2; iv., 2, 22.—*ἀξίαις χάρισιν ἀμείβεσθαι.* The verb *ἀμείβεσθαι*, in the signification of "to remunerate," is construed with an accusative of the person or thing remunerated, and with a dative of the means of remuneration. (*Matthiæ*, § 411, 5.)

§ 16.

ὁρᾷς γάρ. The verb *ὁράω* refers here to mental vision, and has, therefore, a force very like that of "to know."—*νόμῳ πόλεως.* "In accordance with the ritual of the state." Compare the explanation of Cicero, *De Leg.*, ii., 16: "*In lege est, ut de ritibus patriis colantur optimi: de quo cum consulerent Athenienses Apollinem Pythium, quas potissimum religiones tenerent, oraculum editum est, eas, quæ essent in more majorum.*"—*κατὰ δύναμιν.* "According to one's means."—*ἱεροῖς θεοὺς ἀρέσκεσθαι.* For the construction of *ἀρέσκεσθαι*, consult *Matthiæ*, § 398, 412, and *Carmichael's* Greek verbs, p. 41. Xenophon here follows the construction of Homer, *Od.*, viii., 396.

§ 17, 18.

τῆς μὲν δυνάμεως μηδὲν ὑφίεσθαι. "That we abate no portion of our means."—*φανερὸς δήπου ἐστί.* Compare i., 1, 2; iv., 1, 2.—*μηδὲν ἐλλείποντα τιμᾶν.* "Failing in no respect to honor." Observe that *ἐλλείπω* is here construed with an infinitive. The more usual construction, however, of this verb is with a participle.—*οὐ γὰρ παρ' ἄλλων, κ. τ. λ.* The order is, *οὐ γὰρ ἂν τις σωφρονείη, ἐλπίζων (i. e., εἰ ἐλπίζοι) μείζω παρ' ἄλλων, κ. τ. λ.*—*οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον.* Supply *σωφρονοίη.*—*καὶ αὐτὸς ποιῶν.* "And by personally acting in this way."—*παρεσκεύαζεν.* "He rendered." This verb occurs again, iv., 6, 14, in this same sense of "to render, effect, make."

CHAPTER IV

§ 1.

§ 2, 3

§ 4.

καὶ ὅτε τὴν ὑπὸ Μελήτου, *κ. τ. λ.* "And when he was defendant in the accusation brought by Meletus." Concerning the accusers of Socrates, consult *Wiggers' Life of Socrates*, p. 406 of this volume. The verb *φεύγω* is frequently employed as an Attic law-term, "to be accused, or prosecuted at law;" hence *ὁ φυγών*, "the accused," "the defendant," opposed to *ὁ διώκων*, "the accuser," "the prosecutor." Hence, too, *φεύγειν γραφήν* or *δίκην* means "to be put on one's trial for something," the crime being usually added in the genitive, and the accuser being expressed by the same case with *ὑπό*.—*πρὸς χάριν*. "In order to gain their favor." There was a regular law at Athens, forbidding defendants having recourse to prayers, entreaties, or any other means for exciting the compassion of their judges. Compare *Pollux*, viii., 117. Hence the addition of the words *παρὰ τοὺς νόμους* after *δεῖσθαι*.—*τῶν εἰωθότων*. Supply *ποιεῖσθαι*.—*ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀφεθείς*. "But, although he would easily have been acquitted." Equivalent to *ὃς ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀφείθη, εἰ, κ. τ. λ.* Observe the employment of *ἄν* with the participle, and consult *Matthiæ*, § 598, *b*.—*ἐμμένων*. "Abiding by."

§ 5.

Ἱππίαν τὸν Ἠλεῖον. "Hippias the Elean." Hippias, a native of Elis, was one of the most celebrated Sophists of the age. His vanity and boastful arrogance are well described in two of the dialogues of Plato (the Ἱππίας *μείζων* and the Ἱππίας *ἐλάττων*, *Hippias major* and *Hippias minor*). It can not be denied, however, that he was a man of very extensive knowledge. To a certain extent, too, he had a practical skill in the ordinary arts of life, for he used to boast of wearing on his body nothing that he had not made with his own hands, such as his seal-ring, his cloak, and shoes.—*διὰ χρόνου*. "After an interval of time." Hippias, as the succeeding passages prove, had then arrived for the second time at Athens. His powers of oratory had caused him to be employed on various embassies, and in this occupation he had arrived at Athens.—*παρεγενετο τῷ Σωκράτει λέγοντι*. "Was by when Socrates remarked."—*ὡς θαυμαστὸν εἰη τό*. Construe *τό* with *μὴ ἀπορεῖν*, and compare also i., 6, 15. The optative indicates the opinion of Socrates.—*σκυτέα διδάξασθαί τινα*. "To have any person instructed as a shoemaker." The middle voice of *διδάσκω* may be employed two ways, as signifying either "to have a person instructed for one's self by another," or "to instruct a person one's self, for one's self." It may therefore be said either of a father who sends his son to a teacher for instruc-

§ 6. 7

§ 9.

πριν γ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποσήνῃ. "Until, at least, you yourself shall declare."—*ἀρκεῖ γάρ, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷς.* "For it is quite enough that you deride others." Schneider supplies at the end of this sentence after *οὐδενός* the following, *ἐμοῦ δὲ οὐ καταγελάσεις, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων, i. e.*, but you shall not have an opportunity of laughing at me, as at the rest. On the usual mode of disputation adopted by Socrates, consult Prolegomena.—*ὑπέχειν λόγον.* "To submit a statement."—*γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι.* "To declare your own opinion" Observe the force of the middle.

§ 10.

οὐδέν. "In no respect."—*καὶ ποῖος δή σοι, κ. τ. λ.* "And what, pray, said Hippias, is this definition of yours?" *i. e.*, your definition of justice (*τὰ δικαια*).—*ἀξιοτεκμαρτότερον.* "A stronger proof." The epithet *ἀξιοτέκμαρτος* properly means "worthy to be brought in proof," "credible."—*οὐδ' ἂν εἷς.* Compare i., 6, 2.

§ 11.

ἤσθησαι οὖν πώποτέ μου; "Have you, then, ever as yet perceived me?" A participle is put after a verb when the object of that verb is to be expressed, and, if the participle refer to the same person or thing as the object, it is put in the same case. Verbs of sense, "to hear, see," &c., as also "to perceive, discern," &c., are thus followed by a participle.—*εἰς στάσιν ἐμβάλλοντος.* "Involving in sedition."—*τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀπέχεσθαι, κ. τ. λ.* "And do you not consider the refraining from injustice to be justice?"—*διαφεύγειν τὸ ἀποδείκνυσθαι γνώμην.* "To avoid the declaring of your own opinion."—*ταῦτα λέγεις.* "You call thus."

§ 12.

τὸ μὴ θέλειν ἀδικεῖν, κ. τ. λ. "That the being unwilling to commit injustice was a sufficient proof of justice."—*ἰὰν τόδε.* "Whether the following."—*τὸ νόμιμον δικαιον εἶναι.* "That what is conformable to law is just."—*ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεις, κ. τ. λ.* "Do you, then, assert, Socrates, that both what is legal and what is just are the same thing," *i. e.*, are identical in their natures.

§ 13.

οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνομαί σου, κ. τ. λ. "(You talk very strangely), for I do not understand you what you call legal, namely, or what just," *i. e.*, what you mean by legal, or what by just. Observe the ellipti-

§ 16.

ὁμόνοια. "Unanimity." The reasoning is this: Concord, when is acknowledged to be the greatest preservative of a state, consists in nothing else but the observance of the laws.—*αἵ τε γερουσίαι καὶ οἱ ἄριστοι ἀνδρες, κ. τ. λ.* "Both the councils of elders and the leading men exhort their fellow-citizens to harmony." The word *γερουσία* is properly a Spartan term, but is characteristic generally of Doric states. It was an aristocratic element in the constitutions of these states, just as the *βουλή* was a democratic element in most Ionian constitutions.—*νόμος κεῖται.* "A law is in force."—*οἶμαι δ' ἐγὼ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι, κ. τ. λ.* "And yet I think that all this is done, not that the citizens may (all) pick out (and adjudge the victory to) the same band of singers and dancers," *i. e.*, may pick them out from the others that are competing for the same prize. Observe the zeugma in *κρίνωσιν*, or the double signification to be assigned to the verb, of both selecting and approving. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*τοὺς αὐτοὺς ποιητάς.* "The same poets," *i. e.*, the same scenic poets, at the dramatic contests, sacred to Bacchus.—*τούτοις γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐμμενόντων.* "For while the citizens persevere in this course," *i. e.*, in preserving unanimity.—*οὔτ' οἶκος.* Supply *ἂν* from the foregoing clause.

§ 17.

ἰδίᾳ δέ. "And in a private capacity," *i. e.*, and with respect to private individuals.—*πῶς δ' ἂν ἧττον ἡττῷτο, κ. τ. λ.* "And how could he less frequently be defeated in courts of law, or how could he more frequently gain a suit?" Many of the forensic terms of the ancients were borrowed, like our own, from the language of real encounters in the field.—*τίνι δ' ἂν τις μᾶλλον πιστεύσειε, κ. τ. λ.* "And with whom would one believe that he could more safely deposit," &c. Construe *τίνι* with *παρακαταθέσθαι.*—*τῶν δικαίων τύχοιεν.* "Obtain justice."—*τίνι δ' ἂν μᾶλλον πολέμιοι, κ. τ. λ.* "In whom, too, would the enemy repose greater confidence as regarded either truces," &c. Observe here the construction of *πιστεύω* with the accusative and dative. The phrase *πιστεύειν ἀνοχάς* follows in some respects the analogy of *πιστεύειν πίστιν.* A more marked instance, however, of the accusative with *πιστεύω*, occurs in the case of *πιστεύσειαν ἢ ἡγεμονίαν, κ. τ. λ.*, where the verb must be rendered by "to intrust" or "confide."—*ἐθέλοιεν.* "Would men wish."—*φρουραρχίαν.* "The command of a fortress." Compare Schneider: "*praefectura praesidiorum.*"—*χάριν κομιεῖσθαι.* "That he will meet with gratitude." More literally, "will bear off gratitude for him-

§ 18, 19

§ 20, 21

§ 22

characters of gods rather than those of human beings.— *κρείττονος ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον, κ. τ. λ.* "Appears to me to be indicative of a far better legislator than accords with the character of a human being," *i. e.*, than any human being. The words *ἢ κατά*, with an accusative, are sometimes used to express similitude or comparison. The Latin *pro* is used in the same manner, "*quam pro sorte humana*," *i. e.*, than may be expected from the ordinary lot of human nature.

§ 23.

τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ δίκαια νομοθετεῖν, κ. τ. λ. "That the gods enact by these laws justice, or what is different from justice." Observe that *ἄλλος*, expressing difference, is construed with a genitive. So *alius*, in Latin, with the ablative.—*καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἄρα, κ. τ. λ.* "And therefore, Hippias, it pleases the gods, that what is just and what is legal should be regarded as the same thing." Lange lays down the following as the connexion of the argument. "The gods give just laws; whatever is in accordance with these laws is *νόμιμον*; therefore, every act, which is *νόμιμον* in the divine laws, is *δίκαιον*; therefore, also, in this definition the gods agree with men or with me." For above, § 12, Socrates had said, that, even in human laws, *νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι*, and rightly too, if human laws were understood to be, such as they ought in fact to be, namely, wholly in accordance with natural or divine laws. (*Kühner, ad loc. Wheeler, ad loc.*)

CHAPTER V.

§ 1.

πρακτικωτέρους. "More fit for the business of life." Compare iv., 3, 1.—*νομίζων γάρ, κ. τ. λ.* "For, considering it to be an advantage that self-control exist in him who is likely to perform any thing excellent." The order is, *νομίζων γὰρ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν, ἐγκράτειαν ὑπάρχειν τῷ μέλλοντι, κ. τ. λ.*—*διαλεγόμενος.* "By his conversations."

§ 2.

ἀεὶ μὲν οὖν, κ. τ. λ. "He always, therefore, continued both to be mindful himself of the things that were conducive to virtue, and to remind all his followers of them." As the verb *διατελεῖν* implies continuance, the particle *ἀει* seems to be somewhat redundant here. —*μεγαλεῖον.* "Noble."

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5, 6

§ 7

τὰ ἐναντία (the predicate).—*ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ ἐναντία.* "Are the very opposite (to one another)." Consult *Kuhner*, § 656, *Obs. Jelf*, where the present passage is cited.—*κωλυτικώτερον εἶναι.* "Is more calculated to impede."—*τοῦ δὲ αντὶ τῶν ὠφελούντων, κ. τ. λ.* "And do you think that there is any greater evil for man than that which makes him prefer the things that injure to those that are useful," &c.—*καὶ τοῖς σωφρονοῦσι, κ. τ. λ.* "And that compels him to do the things directly opposite to those which they who practice self-control do?" Observe the brachiology or conciseness of expression in *τοῖς σωφρονοῦσι*. The plain form of expression would be *τοῖς ἃ οἱ σωφρονοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.*

§ 8.

οὐκουν τὴν ἐγκράτειαν, κ. τ. λ. "Is it not natural, then, for temperance to be a cause unto men of the things opposite to those which intemperance produces?" Compare the explanation of Weiske: "*Nonne igitur consentaneum est, continentiam efficere contraria iis, quæ incontinentia efficit?*"—*τῶν ἐναντιων τὸ αἴτιον ἄριστον εἶναι.* "That the cause of these opposites be the best." We have here followed Heindenburg's emendation. The common text has *τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ αἴτιον.* Ernesti reads with Castalio, *τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων αἴτιον — ἄριστον ἡ ἐγκράτεια.* Compare ii., 3, 1.

§ 9.

ἐφ' ἅπερ μόνα. "To which only," *i. e.*, to pleasures, and pleasures only.—*αὐτή.* Referring to *ἀκρασία*, which is opposed to *ἐγκράτεια.*—*ἡδεσθαι ποιεῖ.* "Causes us to have pleasures."—*πῶς, ἔφη· Ὡς-περ, κ. τ. λ.* "How so! said he: why, because intemperance," &c. Observe here the peculiar force of *ὥσπερ.*—*δι' ὧν μόνων ἔστιν.* "By means of which (deprivations) alone, it is possible." Observe the employment of the emphatic *ἔστιν*, in the sense of *ἐξεστιν.*—*ἀναπαύσασθαί τε καὶ κοιμηθῆναι.* "Both to cease from toil and indulge in sleep."—*καὶ περιμείναντας καὶ ἀνασχομένους.* "Both waiting and holding out."—*κωλύει τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις, κ. τ. λ.* "Prevents our having any enjoyment worth mentioning in pleasures that are both most necessary and most habitual," *i. e.*, pleasures which are necessary, as being natural, and constantly recurring, as the desire of food, drink, sleep, &c.—*ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις.* "In the case of things that have been stated."

§ 10.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦ μαθεῖν τι, κ. τ. λ. "Nay, moreover, the temperate, by carrying them out into practice, enjoy (the greatest advantages

nearest at hand and easily attainable

§ 11

§ 12

CHAPTER VI

§ 1

err." Observe the difference between the active and middle voices —*οὐδέποτ' ἔληγε*. The common text has *οὐδεπώποτ' ἔληγε*, which has been retained by Bornemann.—*ἡ διωρίζετο*. "As he defined them." Literally, "in the way in which he defined them."—*πολὺ ἔργον ἂν εἴη*. "Would be a tedious task."—*τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως*. "The method of his investigation."

§ 2, 3.

ὡδέ πως. "Somehow thus," *i. e.*, nearly as follows. The Latin *sic fere*.—*ποῖόν τι*. "What kind of thing," *i. e.*, what sort of feeling. —*ὁποῖός τις*. "What sort of person."—*οὐκ · ἀλλά*. Compare ii., 6, 11.—*ὡς δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν*. "In what way one ought," &c.—*οὐ γὰρ οὖν*. "Doubtless not."

§ 4.

τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα. "The conduct that is legitimate toward the gods," *i. e.*, enjoined by the laws and usages of the state.—*νομίμως*. "Legitimately."—*ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡμῖν εὐσεβὴς ὡρισμένος εἴη*. "Would, in our opinion, be correctly defined to be a pious man." Observe that *ἡμῖν* is here, as Kühner remarks, equivalent to "*nostro judicio*."

§ 5.

ἀνθρωποις χρῆσθαι. "To conduct one's self toward men."—*καθ' ἃ δεῖ πως, κ. τ. λ.* "In accordance with which, men ought, in a certain manner, to conduct themselves toward one another." In rendering *πως*, we have adopted the explanation of Kühner: "*πως explicamus per* certo quodam modo, *idque ad varias vitæ humanæ conditiones referimus*." Five Paris MSS. have *καθ' ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, whence Bornemann would read *προσαλλήλοις* as one word, of which Schneider, in his *Addenda et corrigenda* to *Xen., de Re Eq.*, iv, 3, p. 474, thinks he has discovered traces. Or else Bornemann would refer *πως* to *ὃν ἂν τρόπον* in the signification of *ratione nescio qua*.—*δίκαια οὗτοι ποιοῦσι*. As regards the emphatic employment of *οὗτοι* here, consult ii., 1, 19.

§ 6.

δίκαια δὲ οἶσθα, κ. τ. λ. "And do you know, said he, what kind of acts are called just?"—*οὔκουν οἵ γε τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦντες, κ. τ. λ.* Weiske and Schneider reject these words, down to *ἐσῃ*, as preposterous. They can not, however, be omitted, for two reasons: first, because they appear in all the MSS. and early editions; and, sec-

§ 7

§ 8, 9

pulchrum aliter definire (intellige ac antecedens *ἀγαθόν*, et vide iii., 8, ubi demonstratum est, *καλόν, ἀγαθον* et *χρήσιμον* idem esse), *an pulchrum vocas, si quid pulchrum est* (*εἰ ἐστιν*), *vel corpus, vel vas, vel aliud quid, quod ad quamcunque rem* (*πρὸς πάντα*) *pulchrum est?* His respondet Euthydemus, *μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε*, repete *ἔχοιμι ἄλλως πως εἰπεῖν, equidem aliter definire nequeo.*"—*καλὸν πρὸς ἄλλο τι.* "Beautiful with regard to any thing else."—*οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕν.* Compare i., 6, 2

§ 10.

τῶν καλῶν εἶναι. "To be one of the things that are beautiful." More freely, "to be numbered among the beautiful."—*κάλλιστον.* "A very beautiful thing."—*οὐ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάχιστα.* "For not the least important matters."—*τὸ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτά.* "The being ignorant of their real nature."—*τί εστιν.* "What each one of them really is."—*νὴ Δί'.* This affirms the negation, *οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι.* Compare ii., 7, 4; iv., 2, 8.—*τί δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ μὴ δεινὰ δεδοικότες;* "What, then, of those who even fear things not terrible in their nature?"—*ἧττον.* Supply *ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν.*

§ 11.

αὐτοῖς καλῶς χρῆσθαι. "To manage them well."—*τοὺς οἴους χρησθαι.* "Those accustomed to manage these things badly." More literally, "those (who are) such as to manage," &c. Compare *Matthiæ*, § 479, *a.*—*οὐ δήπου γε.* "Doubtless not."—*οἱ ἄρα εἰδότες* Compare ii., 1, 19.—*οἱ μὴ διημαρτηκότες, κ. τ. λ.* "Do they who fail not in their attempts manage such things as these badly?"

§ 12.

Βασιλείαν καὶ τυραννίδα. "Monarchy and tyranny."—*ἀρχάς.* "Species of command."—*τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἑκόντων, κ. τ. λ.* "For he considered monarchy to be the command over men both with their free consent, and according to the laws of the several free states." Thus, in the opinion of Socrates, Athens, under the rule of Aristides and Themistocles, was a kingdom, since these statesmen were invested with full authority, and yet held rule by the consent of their fellow-citizens, and in accordance with the laws. On the other hand, in the time of Pericles or Alcibiades, Athens was under a tyranny.—*ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελούντων, κ. τ. λ.* "The magistrates are appointed from among those who comply with the injunctions of the laws." More literally, "who perform the things enjoined by law." Xenophon or Socrates had Sparta probably in view when giving this definition.—*ὅπου δ' ἐκ τιμημάτων, πλουτοκρατιαν* "But

§ 13

§ 14

§ 15

stability of reasoning," *i. e.*, the surest mode of reasoning.—*ὁτε λεγοι* "Whenever he discoursed." The optative again marking repetition. —*ὁμολογοῦντας.* "Of the same opinion with himself."—*τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἀναθεῖναι, κ. τ. λ.* "Assigned to Ulysses the character of a cautious orator, since he was able to conduct his arguments (to the desired end) by means of those things that appear right unto men," *i. e.*, to shape his discourses so as to prove effectual, by adducing points well acknowledged among men. Compare *Hom., Od.*, viii., 171, and *Dion. Hal., Art. Rhet.*, xi., 8.—*ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν ὀντα.* We would expect here *ὡς ἱκανῷ ὀντι*, since *τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ* precedes; but an absolute case is often put, where the participle agreeing in case with the noun going before ought naturally to have followed. (*Kühner, ad loc.*)—*διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.* The same, in effect, as *διὰ τῶ μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων* just preceding.

CHAPTER VII.

§ 1.

ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφαίνετο. Observe the employment of the reflexive pronoun with the middle voice to add strength to the meaning. —*αὐτάρκεις ἐν ταῖς προςηκούσαις πράξεσιν.* "Of sufficient ability in themselves for the actions that properly belonged to them," *i. e.*, for discharging the duties of their respective situations. Not needing, therefore, in such cases, the assistance of others.—*αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπεμελεῖτο.* This construction of *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* with the accusative and infinitive is of rare occurrence. The more common usage is to have this verb take a genitive of the object of care or concern.—*πάντων μὲν γὰρ ὢν, κ. τ. λ.* "For of all men whom," &c. We have here the masculine, not the neuter.—*ἔμελεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι.* The impersonal *μέλει* is construed usually with a dative of the subject, and a genitive of the object of care. It is construed with an infinitive in Thucydides, i., 5, as in the present passage. This construction is also found in Latin: "*Erit mihi curæ explorare provinciæ voluntatem.*" (*Plin., Epist.*, vii., 10.)—*ὅτι μὲν αὐτὸς εἰδείη.* The optative here expresses an indefinite frequency of action. Compare iii., 1, 1.—*ἦγεν αὐτούς.* "He used to bring them."

§ 2.

ἐδίδασκε δέ, κ. τ. λ. "He used to teach, also, to what degree a well-educated man should be acquainted with each branch of scientific knowledge." As regards the force of *πράγματος* here, compare the explanation of Schneider: "*Negotii ex doctrina et scientia pendeu-*

§ 2

§ 3

§ 4

§ 5

de Plac. Phil., iii., 2, and some of the Pythagoreans had an idea of their periodic return; *διά τινος ὡρισμένου χρόνου περιοδικῶς ἀνατέλλειν.* (*Plut., l. c.* Compare *Ukert, Geogr. Gr. et Rom.*, vol. i., pt. 2, p. 94.)—*τὰς περιόδους.* "The periods of their orbits," *i. e.*, the period of time occupied in making their circuits, not the mere orbits or paths themselves.—*ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέτρεπεν.* "He used strongly to dissuade (from all these)."—*οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκοος ἦν.* "He was not unacquainted even with these, indeed." Archelaus, a follower of Anaxagoras, had been the instructor of Socrates in astronomy. Compare Cicero, *Acad.*, i., 15.

§ 6.

τῶν οὐρανίων. Compare i., 1, 11.—*φροντιστήν.* "A subtle speculator."—*χαρίζεσθαι ἂν.* "Would gratify."—*κινδυνεῦσαι δ' ἂν ἐφη, κ. τ. λ.* "He said, moreover, that the one who scrutinized these things would run a risk even of becoming mad."—*Ἀναξαγόρας.* Anaxagoras, a native of Clazomenæ in Ionia, was born about B.C. 499. He was one of the leading philosophers of the Ionic school, and the preceptor of Pericles and Euripides. His peculiar doctrines exposed him to the charge of impiety, and being sentenced to pay a fine and quit Athens, he retired to Lampsacus, where he died in the seventy-second year of his age. The term *παρεφρόνησεν*, here applied to him, refers merely to the visionary nature of many of his speculations, and not to any actual loss of reason.—*ὁ μέγιστον φρονήσας, κ. τ. λ.* "Who prided himself very greatly on his explaining the plans of the gods," *i. e.*, on unfolding by the powers of reason the secret causes that called into being, as well as the laws that govern the universe.

§ 7.

ἐκεῖνος γάρ. Anaxagoras is meant.—*τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον.* Anaxagoras maintained that the sun was a red-hot mass of metal, larger than the Peloponnesus. (*Diog. Laert.*, ii., 8.)—*καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου, κ. τ. λ.* "And that men, when shone upon by the sun, have their complexions of a darker hue."—*θερμαινόμενα.* "If heated."—*λίθον διάπυρον.* Diogenes Laertius says that Anaxagoras made the sun to be *μύδρον διάπυρον*, but Socrates here chooses, not very fairly, to understand the words in question as meaning a "red-hot *stone*."—*ἀντέχει* "Lasts."

§ 8.

λογισμούς. "Accounts," *i. e.*, by which we calculate income and expenditure. Ernesti and Weiske understand the term to mean

§ 9

§ 10

CHAPTER VIII.

§ 1

to *πολλῷ ὕστερον*.—*τὸ ἀχθεινότατον τοῦ βίου*. "The most burdensome period of life."—*τὴν διάνοιαν μειοῦνται*. "Become enfeebled in intellect." Literally, "become worse or weaker."—*τήν τε δίκην εἰπών*. "By having both pleaded his cause."

§ 2.

τῶν μνημονευομένων ἀνθρώπων. "Of men that are held in memory."—*μετὰ τὴν κρίσιν τριάκοντα ἡμέρας βιῶναι*. In relation to this subject, and the Delian festival, consult *Wiggers' Life of Socrates*, page 437 of this volume.—*διὰ τὸ Δήλια μὲν εἶναι*. "*Because the Delian festival took place*." With *Δήλια* supply *ἱερά*.—*τὸν δὲ νόμον*. Supply *διὰ τό* from the preceding clause, so that the full form of expression will be *διά τε τὸ τὸν νόμον ἐᾶν*.—*ἡ θεωρία*. "The sacred embassy." The persons employed in the deputation to Delos were called *θεωροί*, and their office, &c., *θεωρία*. The ship in which they went and returned was termed *θεωρίς*.—*τὸν ἔμπροσθεν*. Supply *χρόνον*. This is the reading of Weiske and Schneider, adopted by Kühner and others. It is from a correction of Brodæus. The common text has *καὶ τῶν*.—*ἐπὶ τῷ εὐθύμως τε, κ. τ. λ*. "For the cheerfulness and tranquillity of his life."

§ 3.

καὶ πῶς ἄν τις, κ. τ. λ. Many critics think that from the third to the eleventh section has been inserted by some transcriber, in a patched up way, from the Apology or Defence. Weiske, however, regards the whole as genuine, and is of opinion that Xenophon employs a *sorites* to prove that the death of Socrates was *θεοφιλής*. In his view, the premises are, 1. The death of Socrates was glorious: 2. His death was also happy: 3. His death was *θεοφιλής*, since the gods give a happy death only to those whom they love.—*εὐδαιμονέστερος*. Thus Castalio, from a correction by Brodæus, in place of *εὐδαιμονέστατος*, which is found in four MSS., and in the early editions. Bornemann prefers the superlative, referring to Hermann, *ad Eurip., Med.*, 67.—*θεοφιλέστερος*. "More acceptable to heaven"

§ 4.

Ἑρμογένους. Compare ii., 10, 3. Xenophon was not at Athens when Socrates was condemned and put to death. He had gone in the previous year into Asia, to join the army of Cyrus. Compare *Apol.*, c. 2, *seqq*.—*ἤδη Μελήτου γεγραμμένου αὐτὸν τὴν γραφήν*. "That, when Meletus had now brought his accusation against him." Observe that *γράφεσθαι γραφήν*, "to impeach or accuse," is followed by

§ 5

§ 6

§ 7

§ 8

§ 9

liveable." Compare *Cic., de Am.*, vi., 22: "Qui potest esse *vita vitalis*," &c., where Ennius is quoted.

§ 9.

ἀλλὰ μήν. "But assuredly."—*εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, κ. τ. λ.* Bornemann conjectures *τοῦτο, εἰγε τὸ ἀδικεῖν*, putting the words *πῶς οὐκ . . . . ποιεῖν* in brackets. Schneider rejects the whole passage *εἰ γάρ . . . . ποιεῖν*. Sauppe defends it.

§ 10.

ορῶ δ' ἔγωγε, κ. τ. λ. "I, for my part, also see that the estimation of men, who have gone before, that is left behind among posterity, is not similar in its character as regards both those who have injured and those who have been injured."—*ἐπιμελείας τεύξονται.* "Shall meet with regard." Compare Sturz: "*ἐπιμέλεια, gloria, laus post mortem.*"—*καὶ ἐάν.* "Even if."—*μαρτυρήσεσθαί μοι.* "Will bear testimony unto me." Compare i., 1, 8

§ 11.

Σωκράτην γιγνωσκόντων, οἷος ἦν. The usual idiom for *γιγνωσκόντων οἷος Σωκράτης ἦν.*—*πάντων μάλιστα.* Compare iv., 5, 1.—*εὐσεβὴς μέν, κ. τ. λ.* These words, down to *καὶ καλοκἀγαθίαν*, form a parenthesis.—*ὥστε μηδέν.* Compare ii., 7, 2.—*τῆς γνώμης.* "The concurrence."—*τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ.* "Those who enjoyed his society."—*τὸ ἡδιον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίονος.* Compare iv., 5, 6.—*κρίνων.* "In judging of."—*προσδέεσθαι.* Thus in four MSS., and in the early editions, for the common reading *προσδεῖσθαι.*—*ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλους δοκιμάσαι τε, κ. τ. λ.* "Able, also, both to prove the character of others, and to convict those who were in error."—*οἷος ἂν εἴη ἀριστός τε ἀνήρ, κ. τ. λ.* "As a most excellent and most happy man would be."—*τῳ.* For *τινί.*—*παραβάλλων τὸ ἄλλων ἦθος, κ. τ. λ.* "Let him compare with these things the moral characters of others, and then form his opinion." Observe that *οὕτως* is here equivalent to the Latin "*hoc facto.*"

LIFE OF SOCRATES.

FROM

THE GERMAN OF DR. WIGGERS.

LIFE OF SOCRATES.

CHAPTER I.

received instruction in the art of his father; and if we may credit the report of Pausanias, who says that the three Graces made by Socrates had found a place on the walls of the Acropolis of Athens, close behind the Minerva of Phidias, he must have made considerable progress in the art.[1]

Crito, a wealthy Athenian, who subsequently became an intimate friend and disciple of our philosopher, having discovered the eminent talents of Socrates, induced him to give up the profession of his father.[2] Various anecdotes preserved in Plutarch and Porphyry rest on too feeble historical evidence to throw any light on the history of Socrates. To this class belongs probably the following story in Porphyry,[3] who, being attached to the new Platonic system which formed such a contrast to the sobriety of the Attic sage, was an adversary of the latter. Socrates, we are told by him, was in his youth compelled by his father to follow the art of a sculptor against his inclination, was very disobedient, and often withdrew himself from the paternal roof. In the same manner, Plutarch,[4] among other things, relates, that the father of Socrates had been warned not to compel his son to follow any particular pursuit, as he had a guardian spirit who would lead him in the right way.

Thus Crito was the first who raised Socrates into a higher sphere. Whether he had before this time enjoyed the instructions of Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras, can not be decided by historical evidence, although it is asserted by Porphyry that he was a disciple of Archelaus as early as his seventeenth year. The first study that engaged the attention of Socrates, and to which he applied with

1. Paus., i., 22, and ix., 35. Compare Diog., ii., § 19, and the scholiast to the Clouds of Aristoph., p. 170. Timon, therefore, in Diogenes, calls him, with a sneer of contempt, λιθοξόος.

2. Diog., ii., 20. "Demetrius of Byzantium says that Crito, attracted by the charms of his mind, withdrew him from the workshop and instructed him."—Suidas, tom. ii., under Crito, p. 377. I do not think that there is any reason for disbelieving this account. Meiners, indeed (*Geschichte der Wissenschaften*, &c., vol. ii., p. 354), considers this to be a mere calumny of Aristoxenus; but it is Demetrius, and not Aristoxenus, who is mentioned by Diogenes as his authority.

3. His charges against Socrates he derived from Aristoxenus, a disciple of Aristotle. Aristoxenus himself could not deny that Socrates had been obedient to the laws, and had always been just, yet he accuses our philosopher of being guilty of violent anger and shameful dissoluteness. The most unobjectionable evidence of the most credible contemporaries sufficiently refutes such calumnies. A detailed examination and refutation of the charges of Aristoxenus will be found in Luzac's *Lectt. Att.*, edited by Sluiter, Leyden, 1809, p. 27, foll. But why Aristoxenus brought *these* charges against Socrates, will be seen from our subsequent description of the character of the latter.

4. De genio Socratis. Francfort ed. 1620, tom. ii., p. 889.

[illegible]

1. Page 96. A.

[illegible]

ed all things, and was the cause of them. With this cause I was much delighted, and in some manner it appeared to me quite correct that reason should be the cause of all things. If it be true, I thought, that reason arranges all things, it arranges and places every thing in the place where it is best. Now if any body wanted to find the cause by which every thing arises, perishes, or exists, he must find the manner in which a thing exists, suffers, or acts best. For this reason, I thought only that investigation, the object of which is the most excellent and the best, to be adapted for man both for himself as well as other things; and he, who succeeded in this, must at the same time know that which is bad, for both are objects of the same science. Reflecting upon this subject, I was delighted, as I thought I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher after my own heart, who could open my eyes to the causes of things. Now he will first tell thee, I thought, whether the earth is flat or round; and after he has done this, he will also show thee the cause and the necessity of it, and whichever is the better, he will prove that this quality is the better one for the earth. If he tell thee the earth is in the centre, he will, at the same time, show thee that it is better for it to be in the centre. I was willing, if he would show me this, not to suppose any other kind of causes, and hoped soon to receive information about the sun, the moon, and other stars, pointing out the mutual relation of their rapidity, their rotation and other changes, and how it was better that each should act as it acts, and suffer as it suffers; for as he said that they were arranged by reason, I did not think that he would assign any other cause to things than that their actual qualities were the best. As he assigned to all things their causes, and ascertained them in all things in the same manner, I thought he would represent that which is the best for earth, as the good common to all. I would not have given up my hopes for any thing; with great avidity I took up his books, and read them as soon as I found it possible, in order that I might quickly learn the good and the bad. But, my friend,[1] I was soon disappointed in this hope; for in the progress of my reading, I discovered that the man no longer applied his principle of reason, and mentioned no causes by which to classify things; but declared air, ether, water, and many other strange things to be causes. This appeared to me just as absurd as if somebody should say, Socrates does every thing which he does with reason; and afterward endeavoring to point out the motive of every single action, he should

1. He is speaking to Cebes.

[illegible] on the first place, that I was now acting here because the [illegible] a conquered [illegible] of slavery,' &c. I should have liked very much to have obtained some explanation, how a democracy might have proceeded, respecting the nature of this reason. But as I did not answer, and as I was unable to find it out by myself, or to learn if there was one, I set out on a second voyage in search of the same.[1] The first was Plato's own treatise.

Besides this, Socrates was greatly attached to the [illegible] of women or slaves, and praised their society for the higher relations of his own mind and heart. So, the first [illegible] might be found in the [illegible] between the highest relation like the power to his companion, was narrated in the act of speaking for Aspasia;[2] and Diotima of Mantinea taught him love for [illegible], as Pythagoras, [illegible] observed,[3] we must not underrate [illegible] the pure kindness of an accomplished mind; a circumstance which is of importance in forming a proper estimate of many particulars in the Socratic and method of Socrates.

CHAPTER II

Thomas Sumner was unable to obtain any satisfactory knowledge [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] of his time. Dissatisfied with the personal virtues of the Cosmologists and Physicists he

1. Πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνα ἦν τὰ τοιαῦτα λεγόμενα. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπεθύμουν ἀκοῦσαι τὴν αἰτίαν δι' ἣν ἄμεινον ἡ ἐκείνη ἡ πόλις ἐβουλεύσατο, ἐπειδὴ ἐβουλεύσατο ἀνδρὸς ἀρχὴν ποιήσασθαι. Ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ ἀκοῦσαι τῆς αἰτίας δι' ἣν ἄμεινον ἐβουλεύσαντο ἐκεῖνοι ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες. Ἐπεθύμουν δὲ καὶ ἐμαυτὸν ἐξετάσαι εἰ οἷός τε εἴην μαθεῖν παρ' ἐμαυτοῦ· ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ ἄλλου τινὸς ἀκοῦσαι εἰ ἄρα τι ἔχει περὶ τούτου λέγειν

entirely abandoned all speculative subjects,[1] and devoted his attention to human affairs, according to his own expression,[2] *i. e.*, to researches in practical philosophy. He therefore, in Plato, calls his wisdom a human wisdom.[3] Socrates, according to Cicero's expression,[4] called philosophy down from heaven to the earth, *i. e.*, he gave it a practical tendency, whereas before it had taken a direction completely speculative. Previous to Socrates, philosophers were for the most part occupied in cosmological researches: morals were entirely uncultivated; and although the Pythagorean institution, a moral and politico-religious order, had devoted very great care to morals, yet its doctrines had already fallen very much into oblivion; and besides, as an order, it had a direct influence only on its own members. But the greatest shock that morality had received came from the Sophists, a class of men who flourished shortly before and at the time of Socrates, and who boasted of being in the possession of every kind of knowledge, but were, however, not concerned about truth, but merely about the appearance of it; who, by their eloquence, knew how to give to a bad cause the appearance of a good one,[5] and from a love of money gave instruction to every one in this art.[6] These men, descendants of the Eleatic school, exert-

1. Diog., ii., 21. "When he saw that the science of physics (*φυσικὴ θεωρία*) was not adapted for us, he began to philosophize on moral subjects in the workshops and in the markets, and said he was seeking

"Οττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται."

The latter is a verse of Homer (Od., iv., 392), which, as we are told by Sextus Empiricus *contra Mathemat.*, vii., 21, Socrates was constantly in the habit of quoting.

2. Ἀνθρώπεια, *res humanæ*, are here opposed to δαιμόνια, *rebus divinis* (Xenoph., *Mem.*, i., 1, 12 and 16), which he also calls οὐράνια (*Mem.*, iv., 7, 6). Ἀνθρώπεια are things which directly relate to man as such, as questions on the destination of man, his duties, hopes, and, in short, all moral subjects; δαιμόνια, *res divinæ*, are of a speculative nature, and comprehend either physical or metaphysical questions, and have no direct relation to man as such. This distinction must be well borne in mind, as otherwise many assertions of Socrates might appear very paradoxical. Cicero, *Acad.*, i., 15: "ut—cœlestia vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene (morally) vivendum conferre."

3. Ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία comprehends either the wisdom of which men are in the possession, or the wisdom relating to human affairs, such as the destination, duties, relations, &c., of man. In the former sense it is used in Plat., *Apol.*, c. v., where Socrates says, "It appears that the god means to say by the oracle that human wisdom is of little or no value at all." In the latter sense Socrates ascribes human wisdom to himself.

4. *Tuscul.*, v., 10. Socrates primus philosophiam devocavit e cœlo et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quærere.

5. τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.

6. It is well known that the word σοφιστής at first had an honorable meaning,

rious, since, by their defending what was wrong, those moral principles, which are the supports of public peace and happiness, were artificially undermined. Socrates, therefore, firmly resolved to devote his life to the moral improvement of his fellow-citizens, and at the age of about thirty[1] he made it his sacred duty to counteract the Sophists, who perplexed good sense, corrupted public morality, and brought down upon philosophy the reputation of being the art of disputing, nay, of being dangerous and injurious. He endeavored to exhibit them in their naked deformity, and thus directly as well as indirectly, by the doctrines and example of solid virtue, to contribute as much as lay in his power to the moral improvement of mankind.

This noble resolution he faithfully maintained throughout his life, until in his seventieth year he met his higher destination in the manner so generally known. Moreover, Socrates, during his pursuit of the high objects of his existence, followed a course in which he sought *within* himself what other philosophers had been accustomed to seek *without*, and thus directed attention to the operations of the mind. The cause of his pursuing this mode of thought not only arose from his practical mode of thinking, and from the high

1. I say *about* thirty. It is, indeed, generally believed that the public teaching of Socrates commenced precisely at his thirtieth year. But I do not believe that any passage of the ancients can be pointed out in support of this belief. However, that Socrates, even when a young man, had chosen the office of a general teacher, has been proved with great sagacity from several historical facts by Meiners, in his *Geschichte der Wissenschaften*, &c., ii., p. 353.

[Ritter, however, remarks, in his *History of Ancient Philosophy* (vol. ii., p. 20, Engl. trans.), that "from the constitution of the mind of Socrates, which, proceeding through many attempts in the discovery of truth, could only, at a late period, have attained to certainty, it is not improbable that he had arrived at a ripe age before he began to incite others to the study of philosophy. In the more detailed accounts, he is almost without exception depicted as an old man. There are other reasons, also, which scarcely admit of a supposition that he devoted himself suddenly and all at once to this vocation; for though it be true that his observation of man, with a view to the science of humanity, has been referred to an oracle for its occasion, even the oracle itself implies his having previously pursued philosophical studies in common with Chærephon; and it is quite consistent with the nature of the case to suppose that a sense of his peculiar fitness for the education of youth gradually opened upon his mind, as he observed the improvement and instruction which others derived from his society." In a note on this passage, Ritter observes, "The assumption of Wiggers that Socrates commenced teaching in his thirtieth year is wholly unfounded. That of Delbrück (*Socrates*, § 34), that he had openly philosophized five or six years before he was brought upon the stage by Aristophanes (B.C. 423), which would make him about forty at his first appearance as a teacher, is not improbable, although the anecdote of Eucleides (Gell., *Noct. Att.*, vi., 10) is apparently inconsistent with it."—Tr.]

nians, as he expresses himself in the Apology of Plato, to instruct and improve them.[1] "But that I was sent," says he,[2] "as a divine messenger to the state, you may see from what I will tell you. Assuredly it is not a human feature in me that I have neglected all my own interests, and for a great number of years have not concerned myself about my domestic affairs, and am only anxious for your welfare, going to every one of you and admonishing you, like a father or elder brother, to follow the path of virtue."[3] The same oracle had, perhaps, some influence on his belief in a dæmon, which restrained him in doubtful cases; of the existence of which, he himself, as well as his friends, were firmly convinced, and whose nature we shall now proceed to examine more closely.

CHAPTER III.

The dæmon of Socrates has at all times caused great trouble to the commentators, at which we can not be astonished, since even the friends and disciples of Socrates were ignorant of its real nature. Timarchus, having consulted the oracle of Trophonius about it, received no satisfactory answer. Simmias asked Socrates about the nature of his dæmon, but received no answer at all, perhaps

1. [Delbrück, in his *Sokrates*, laments that there should be many even among the admirers of Socrates in the present day, who, like some of his contemporaries and his judges, take the oracle for a fiction, and his appeal to it for irony. With as much reason, Mr. D. thinks, might Thomas à Kempis, or Pascal, or Fenelon, be suspected of an affectation of humility when they confirm their convictions on sacred subjects by quotations from the Bible. Like them, Socrates was, in the best sense of the word, a Mystic; and the answers of the Delphic oracle exercised an influence on the weal and woe of Greece, similar to that which the Bible exerts on the destinies and proceedings of Christendom. But Mr. Thirlwall remarks, in the sixth number of the "Philological Museum" (p. 587), from which the preceding quotations from Delbrück's work have been taken, "that it may be readily conceived, and seems to be confirmed by several authentic accounts, that Socrates really considered himself as fulfilling a divine mission by his life and labors; but that this idea was first suggested to him by the Delpic oracle is, to say the least, extremely improbable, though such an accidental occurrence (for who but a sincere pagan can believe it to have been more?) may have contributed to confirm the impression, and may have given it a definite form in his mind. But surely his character and pursuits had been already fixed, before Chærephon could have ventured to inquire whether any man better deserved the title of wise. No additional dignity is imparted to his self-devotion by considering it as the effect of such a casual inspiration. It was the spontaneous, necessary result of his moral and intellectual constitution, and needed not to be connected with the eternal order of Providence by a tie so frail as a perishable superstition."—Tr.]

2. Plato, *Apolog.*, c. xviii. 3. Compare Plat., *Alcib.*, ii., and *De Republ.*, vi.

dertakings. This hypothesis seems to be fully confirmed, not only by the universal belief of ancient Greece and Rome in guardian spirits, who attended men from their birth, but also by the manner in which Socrates himself speaks of this dæmon, and by the examples which are recorded of its influence. The principal passages which refer to this dæmon are in the Theages[1] and Apology[2] of Plato, and in the Memorabilia of Xenophon.[3] Plato and Xenophon seem to contradict each other on this point; for Plato states that the dæmon only used to restrain him, but Xenophon represents the genius as disclosing to him the future in general, what should not be done as well as what should be done. But both statements, though apparently contradictory, can, as Charpentier[4] and Tennemann[5] observe, be very well reconciled; for Plato only expresses himself more decidedly in saying that the voice had only restrained, and never impelled him. Actions from which he was not restrained were lawful to him, and unattended with danger. In the Apology of Plato,[6] he concludes, from the silence of the voice during the latter period of his life, that whatever then happened to him was for his good. But Xenophon does not draw a precise distinction between that which the voice directly commanded, and that which Socrates concluded from its silence.[7]

Our view of the nature of the dæmon of Socrates is thus confirmed by the manner in which he himself is represented as expressing himself upon it, by both Xenophon and Plato. But the probability is still more increased by the examples which Socrates gives as the

---

1. In the *Theages* he says: "Εστι γάρ τι θεία μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἥ, ὅταν γένηται, ἀεί μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε, p. 128, D. Compare Cicero, *De Divinat.*, i., 54. Ast indeed (in the *Journ. Philol.* by Hauff, Stuttgard, 1803, p. 260) asserts that the *Theages* is spurious; but—even if we could admit this—we must yet confess that, considering the agreement with the other passages of Plato, Platonic thoughts, at least, constitute its basis.

2. In the *Apology* he speaks almost in the same manner: Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἥ, ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε, c. xix. Compare Plat., *Phædr.*, p. 242, B.

3. Σωκράτης, says Xenophon, ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε. τὸ δαιμόνιον γάρ, ἔφη, σημαίνειν. καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προηγόρευε, τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος. Καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε.—*Memorab.*, i., 1. 4. 4. *La Vie de Socrate*, p. 104.

5. *Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. ii., p. 33. 6. C. xxxi.

7. [Mr. Thirlwall, in the "Philological Museum," No. vi., p. 583, also remarks, "that there is really no inconsistency between the passage in Xenophon and the assertion in the Apology and in the Phædrus; for it is evident that a sign which only forbade might, by its absence, show what was permitted, and thus a positive kind of guidance might not improperly be ascribed to it."—Tr.]

forms of the suggestions of the demon. "The person advised him not to take any part in public affairs," and at first did not allow him to receive into his intimate connexions with Aristides.[1] Socrates, on the night after the defeat of Delium, was rescued by his person, and, in consequence of it, would not take the credit away on the subject.[2] He also dissuaded his friends from undertaking apparently unfavourable actions—Crito from visiting the Thessian prince; Theaetetus from joining Plato his friend—and he also opposed the expedition to Sicily.[3] All this he could have known, without any intervention by an external knowledge or communication, by which, in most cases, events and occurrences would have been, and were known, on the other hand, could be ascribed to chance. It is not likely that the voice of other human agents should have been a more figurative expression. So was, indeed, overruled all the reasons which he deliberately announced for his several acquisitions. This conversion of decisions was moreover facilitated by the belief of the instinct in the Divine existence in the Deity as such, and in guardian spirits who accompanied men from the birth; and more especially by the vivid belief in the close connection between the human race and the Deity, as well as by the ignorance of mental philosophy.[4]

---

1. Xenophon [illegible] an instance of selected experience. "Among others" the man with the wrong investment exercised... "Socrates on hearing [illegible] would [illegible] and [illegible] without reason, must be necessary to come a station to the business."

2. Ibid., i. p. 342 E. "Now, are [illegible] made [illegible] Socrates [illegible] to the battle which took place [illegible] with proper attention, and he therefore should have spoken of him."

3 Crito, 44 (Oxford, i. 2). "Most [illegible] must [illegible] Plato must [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

It thus appears that the dæmon of Socrates merely related to things the consequence of which was uncertain; but, whenever the morality of an action was discussed, Socrates never referred to his dæmon. He was perfectly convinced that, in order to know what is right and wrong, reason is the only unerring principle.[1] Among

not, however, be supposed that we seek thereby to screen Socrates from the imputation of superstition; for his opinion of demoniacal intimations was in unison with his veneration, not merely of the Deity, but of the gods. This is apparent from his recommendation of divination as a remedy for the deficiency of our knowledge of the future and of contingent events, his advice to Xenophon that he should consult the Delphic god as to his Asiatic expedition, his disposition to pay attention to dreams, and, lastly, his constant sacrifices, and his command to make all due offerings to the gods of house and state. Now in this superstition there are two points to be distinguished: that which he derived from the common opinion of his nation, and that which was founded on his own experience. In both phases it is equally superstitious, but venial, if not commendable; for, in respect to the former, he who, brought up in the olden creeds and traditions of his country, adheres to them so long as nothing better is offered for his adoption, and so far as they are not opposed to his own reason and enlightenment, is, to our minds, a better and a wiser man than he who lightly or hastily turns into ridicule the objects of public veneration. As to the demoniacal intimations of Socrates, they were, in common with his other superstitions, the good foundation of his belief, that the gods afford assistance to the good, but imperfect endeavors of virtuous men, and prove the scrupulous attention he paid to the emotions and suggestions of his conscience. Among the various thoughts and feelings which successively filled and occupied his mind, he must have noticed much that presented itself involuntarily, and which, habituated, as he was, to reflect upon every subject, and yet unable to derive it from any agency of his own, he referred to a divine source. This is particularly confirmed by the exhortation he gives, in Xenophon, to Euthydemus, to renounce all idle desire to become acquainted with the forms of the gods, and to rest satisfied with knowing and adoring their works, for then he would acknowledge that it was not idly and without a cause that he himself spoke of demoniacal intimations. By this Socrates evidently gave him to understand that this demoniacal sign would be manifest to every pious soul who would renounce all idle longing for a visible appearance of the Deity. Still, in spite of all this, he cautiously guarded against the danger of that weak and credulous reliance upon the assistance of the Deity which necessarily proves subversive or obstructive of a rational direction of life; for he taught that those who consult the oracles in matters within the compass of human powers, are no less insane than those who maintain the all-sufficiency of human reason."—TR.]

1. Plutarch, *De Genio Socratis*, tom. iii., p. 482, says, the dæmon of Socrates only enlightened him on obscure subjects into which human prudence could not penetrate. But it is surprising that Socrates did not make use of this genius in all doubtful cases. When Xenophon had received letters from his friend Proxenus, persuading him to go into Asia, and to enter into the service of Cyrus the Younger, he communicated them to Socrates, and asked for his advice. Socrates referred him to the oracle of Delphi. See Xenoph., *Anab.*, iii., 1. 5. Cicero, *De Divinat.*, i., 54, says: Xenophonti consulenti, sequereturne Cyrum, posteaquam exposuit, quæ sibi videbantur, Et nostrum quidem, inquit, humanum est consilium·

CHAPTER IV

had no disciples; hence he asserts in the Apology,[1] he had taught none; yet a circle of inquisitive men and youths were soon assembled around him, and, charmed with his conversation and instruction, were attached to him with incredible affection. Such were Plato, Xenophon, Aristippus, Cebes, Simmias, Euclides, and others; and it was, properly speaking, from his school, *i. e.*, from the instructions which he had occasionally given, that all the distinguished Greek philosophers subsequently proceeded. He gave his instructions gratis, a disinterestedness which formed the most striking contrast to the covetousness of the Sophists.[2]

Socrates never delivered any complete discourse, but conversed with his hearers in a friendly manner on topics just as they were suggested by the occasion.[3]

His method of teaching, however, had something peculiar to himself, which will be more fully developed in the following remarks.

The peculiarity of his method consisted in questions, the nature of which, however, was different, according to the persons with whom he conversed.

Whenever Socrates had to deal with Sophists, who were puffed up with their pretended wisdom, he used that admirable kind of *irony* which Cicero translates by "*dissimulatio*"[4]—a translation

1. *Apolog.*, xxi.: Ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην. Compare Plutarch, *An Seni sit gerenda respubl.*, tom. ii., p. 796.

2. Xenoph., *Mem.*, i., 2, § 6, *seqq.*, and chap. vi.

3. Οὐ γάρ ἐστι, he says to Alcibiades, τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμόν: viz., εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρόν. —(Plat., *Alcib.*, i., p. 106, B.) To Antiphon, the Sophist, he says: Ἴσθι τι σχῶ ἀγαθὸν, διδάσκω· καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι, παρ' ὧν ἂν ἡγῶμαι ὠφελήσεσθαί τι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀρετήν. Καὶ τοὺς ὑησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίττων, κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι· καὶ ἄν τι ὁρῶμεν ἀγαθόν, ἐκλεγόμεθα, καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι γιγνώμεθα.—Xenoph., *Mem.*, i., 6, § 14.

4. *Academ.*, ii., 5: Socrates de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita quum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione quam Græci εἰρωνείαν vocant. Quintil., *Institut. Orat.*, ix., 2, says: Ironia est totius voluntatis fictio apparens magis, quam confessa, ut illinc verba sint verbis diversa, hic sensus sermonis, et joci, et tota interim causæ confirmatio, tum etiam vita universa ironiam habere videatur. C. 20: Dum enim vita universa ironiam habere videatur; qualis est vita Socratis. Nam ideo dictus est εἴρων, *i. e.*, agens imperitum et admirator aliorum tamquam sapientum. The later academicians understood this irony of Socrates in a wrong way, and therefore represented him as the founder of their skepticism.—*Acad.*, iv., 23. They also endeavored to imitate the form of the Socratic method of disputing.—*Tuscul.*, i., 10. I need hardly remind the reader that we are here only speaking of that kind of irony which is peculiar to Socrates; for on other occasions he often employed that kind of ridicule which we usually call irony, and which was peculiar to the Athenians in general, viz., that contrast between the literal meaning of the

B 789

which questions did not appear at—and which is among even these the mixture of the half ridiculous and half solemn reminds of the harmony with the teachings of which was thought themselves to be true. In this second comical judge was supposed by some, and for distinguishing characteristic of the animals, reminded of a fortune pervading that he could not deal as citizen to his other passions; and that I conceive to be the principal difference between this Socrates and Platonic hero.[1] That of Socrates, which is described by Xenophon to be plainly, the ending of Plato's life-history, for gentleness only uncertain, but active energies. A more minute comparison of the conversations of Socrates with Hippias, as it is described both by Plato and Xenophon,[2] to which the latter was present, may serve to show this difference more strikingly.

This Socrates could have extensively understood to place each one, called persons as the inquirer to their true light. At any rate he showed here a distinction with those for that we could even wonder with a sort of philosophical terror and confidence, that any point in question was entirely lost sight of. Socrates played the part of an attentive hearer, who was earnestly desirous of comprehending their sublime wisdom, and now and then asked a short question which was apparently quite insignificant, and did not at all belong to the point at issue;[3] and which being answered by the Sophists with a smile, he triumphantly asked us, and completed them; at last, what being produced to contradictions, he acknowledges their ignorance. Examples of such circumstances are found in all the writings of the disciples of Socrates; but here, too, we have chiefly regard unto Xenophon. The most brilliant instrument of the manner in which Socrates thought and acted. Besides the above mentioned conversation with Hippias, Xenophon refers to this with Euthydemus,[4] and in other places.

But when Socrates met with the peculiar manner of argumentation,

---

1. Memorab. Socr., iv., 6. 3. Memorab., iv., 6.

2. Memorab., iv., 6. 4. Memorab., iv., 2.

his instructions, again, were not given in a didactic form; but he applied the same method of asking which is called after him the Socratic method, and which owes to Socrates, if not its origin, at least its cultivation and perfection. He himself called this method the τέχνη μαιευτική (*ars obstetricia*), and on that account compared himself to his mother Phænarete, who, though not fruitful herself, was yet admirably skilled in bringing to light the children of others. "I am an accoucheur of the mind," says he, in the Theætetes of Plato, "just as my mother is an accoucheur of the body." By this comparison Socrates sufficiently characterizes the nature of his method. It is nothing else but an analytical development of the undigested materials existing in the minds of his hearers, and as such it is applicable only as far as the materials are already in the possession of the pupil, or previously communicated to him by synthesis. As regards the form, we have an example of this Socratic method of asking in the Meno of Plato, where Plato makes Socrates apply his method in order to prove his own (Plato's) doctrine of ideas. Socrates there asks quite an ignorant boy some geometrical questions, to which the boy gives correct answers. From this, Plato draws the conclusion that the boy could not have answered in that manner if his soul had not acquired, in a state previous to its being united to its body, a knowledge of the nature of things; but he seems to have overlooked one important fact, that this knowledge had been previously communicated to the lad by Socrates, in the way of synthesis.

This method of asking, which is usually called the Socratic method in a limited sense of the word, is in its character often similar to irony, but is different in its object and effect. It differs from our catechetical method in as much as it was confined almost exclusively to adult persons, in whom a tolerable share of knowledge might be supposed to exist, so that they not only answered, but also asked, and thus carried on a lively conversation. But what formed its characteristic feature was its aiming at leading men to knowledge by reflecting upon themselves, and not upon external objects. This line of demarkation must not be overlooked, and it would be rashness to introduce the Socratic method into our elementary schools.[1]

Socrates applied this method with great skill,[2] and in modern

1. See Steuber's dissertation: *Kann die Katechese über moralisch-religiöse Wahrheiten zu einer freien Unterredung zwischen dem Lehrer und den Katechumenen erhoben werden?*—in Löffler's *Magazin für Prediger*, vol. v., part i., p. 220, *seqq.*

2 Cicero, *De Finib.*, ii., 1. Socrates percontando atque interrogando elicere so-

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

as in the conversation with Thrasymachus, in the first book of the Republic, where the expression ἀμεινον ᾖ gives rise to a sophistical dispute; and in all the passages in which the word καλός is sometimes interpreted by *beautiful* and sometimes by *good*.[1] To these passages it might be objected that Plato made Socrates speak sophistically; but the same arguments are also found in Xenophon; and even in the writings of this most faithful disciple of Socrates, we find that he confounds the ideas of the beautiful and useful, which are both implied in the Greek word καλος; and also the ideas of virtue and happiness, the *bene beateque vivere* of Cicero, which the Greek expressed by the word εὐπραξια. In this manner he attributed to the expressions of those with whom he conversed a meaning which was not intended.[2]

A second peculiarity of the Socratic method of teaching is, that Socrates himself never gives a definition of the subject in dispute, but merely refutes the opinion of the person with whom he converses. Thus he awakened the true philosophical spirit; and by throwing out doubts, stimulated the mind of his hearer to further examination. In the Meno of Plato, Socrates does not, properly speaking, define what virtue is, but only what it is not, and thus merely refutes the definition given by Meno; and the conclusion that it is a θεια μοιρα is rather ironical:[3] Meno therefore compares Socrates to a cramp-fish,[4] which paralyzes every one that comes in

---

tion in the text: for with what justice can we find fault with the Greek language, because some Sophist avails himself of a word which, according to his opinion, has two different meanings, while Plato himself certainly does not attribute two distinct meanings to it? According to Plato, nothing is useful which is not good, and nothing is good which is not at the same time useful. If we wish to account for the sophistries of Socrates, of which there are, indeed, several instances, it should be recollected that Socrates was in his youth instructed by Sophists, and subsequently came very often in contact with them, and therefore can not have been entirely free from their influence: every man partakes, more or less, of the character of the age in which he lives. On the other hand, Socrates sometimes used the weapons of the Sophists themselves to expose their ignorance.—Tr.]

1. As in the Gorgias, p. 462, D.

2. Xenoph., *Mem.*, iii., 8; iv., 2, 26. The Socratic manner of asking questions is, however, a dangerous instrument in the hands of a Sophist, as it is so very easy to take words in different senses, and thus to oblige the person who answers to make assertions which, but for the application of those sophisms, he would never acknowledge as his own. Protagoras, who perceived this, combined the Socratic method with that of the Sophists.—Diog., ix., 8, 4.

3. I should at least not like to infer with Carus (*Geschichte der Psychologie*, p 254) from this passage that Socrates had looked at virtuous men as inspired by the deity. Besides, it would be incompatible with the assertion of Socrates that virtue can be taught.

4. P. 80, A.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

structions, leading his hearers from the abstract to the concrete by similes, allegories, fables, apophthegms, passages from poets, and sayings of wise men. A peculiar talent of Socrates was the power he possessed of demonstrating the correctness or incorrectness of general assertions by applying them to individual cases. It is evident that a distinctness of conception must have been promoted by such a popular method of reasoning, especially among a people thinking as practically as the Greeks. It was also best adapted for exposing the absurdity of many assertions of the Sophists, who principally delighted in general propositions. If the Sophists expressed themselves in dazzling theses and antitheses, Socrates directly applied them to individual cases taken from common life, and thus demonstrated in a palpable manner the inapplicability of their assertions. His similes were taken from the immediate circle of his hearers — a circumstance for which, it is well known, Socrates has often been ridiculed.

A great many passages from the Socratic philosophers might be quoted in proof of the manner in which he rendered abstract ideas palpable; but it will be sufficient here to give the classical passage from the Symposium of Plato, in which Alcibiades, the favorite of Socrates, gives his opinion on the method of teaching pursued by Socrates.[1]

The ironical character of the method of Socrates was principally directed against the Sophists, whom he combated very successfully with this weapon; and, indeed, sharp weapons were necessary to humble these men, who undeservedly enjoyed so great an authority among the Greeks. There were, however, among the Sophists some very superior men, who only wanted the true spirit of philosophy, the love of truth and science, in order to accomplish great things. We can not, therefore, rank all the Sophists in the same class, and must carefully distinguish a Protagoras or a Gorgias, who deserve our sincere respect for their talents, and who were celebrated as orators, and made the first researches into the nature

1. P. 221, E. Εἰ ἐθέλει τις τῶν Σωκράτους ἀκοῦσαι λόγων, φαιεῖεν ἂν πάνυ γελοῖοι τὸ πρῶτον· τοιαῦτα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ἔξωθεν περιαμπέχονται Σατύρου ἀν τινα ὑβριστοῦ δοράν· ὄνους γὰρ καυθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τινὰς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ταῦτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν, ὥστε ἀπειρος καὶ ἀνηιρος ἀνθρωπος πᾶς ἂν τῶν λόγων καταγελάσειε· διοιγομενος δὲ ἔσων ἂν τις καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γιγνόμενος πρῶτον μὲν νοῦν ἔχοντας ἔυδὶ μόνους εὑρήσει τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα δι[illegible] τους καὶ πλεῖστα ἀγάλματα ἀρετῆς ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχοντας καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τείνοντας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπὶ παν ὅ τι προσήκει σκοπεῖν τ[illegible] καλῶ κἀγαθῶ ἐσεσθαι. A great power in speaking is attributed to him even by his enemies, Aristoxenus and Porphyry. Theodoret. ad Græcos infideles, Serm. iv., p. 56.

CHAPTER V.

[illegible]

Socrates deserved well of the state as a father and a husband. Xanthippe, his wife, is sufficiently known to posterity as a woman of violent passions, and her name has even passed into a proverb. In modern times, some scholars, as Heumann and Mendelssohn,[1] have endeavored to defend her, but with little success. That she possessed many good qualities, and, notwithstanding her passionate character, may have had a great deal of goodness of heart, can be easily admitted; but that she was of a very quarrelsome disposition, and made Socrates feel its effects, we may easily believe, without giving credit to the anecdotes recorded by Plutarch, Diogenes, and Ælian, from the manner in which Antisthenes, and even Socrates himself, in a playful manner, express themselves concerning her.[2] "But," says Antisthenes, "what is the reason, Socrates, that, convinced as thou art of the capacity of the female sex for education, thou dost not educate Xanthippe, for she is the worst woman of all that exist, nay, I believe of all that ever have existed or ever will exist?" "Because," replies he, "I see that those who wish to become best skilled in horsemanship do not select the most obedient, but the most spirited horses; for they believe that after being enabled to bridle these, they will easily know how to manage others. Now, as it was my wish to converse and to live with men, I have married this woman, being firmly convinced that in case I should be able to endure her, I should be able to endure all others."[3] By Xanthippe Socrates had several sons; on the eldest of whom, called Lamprocles, he enjoins, in Xenophon's Memorabilia,[4] obedience to his mother. At his death he left behind him three sons, one of whom was a youth, but the other two were still children.[5]

---

1. Heumann, in the *Acta Philosoph.*, vol. i., p. 103. Mendelssohn, in his *Phædon*, p. 23. 2. Xenophon, *Sympos.*, ii., 10.

3. [Ritter remarks (*History of Philosophy*, ii., p. 33, 34), "Socrates was a perfect Greek in his faults and his virtues; hence he always regarded morals under a political aspect. In such a political view of virtue, the relations of domestic life fell naturally enough far into the back ground; the notorious bad feeling of his wife Xanthippe to her husband and child prevents the supposition of a very happy home; and when we remark the degree to which, in his devotion to philosophy, he neglected his family duties, and the little attention he paid his wife and child, we are justified in ascribing to him, together with his countrymen, little respect for domestic life in comparison with public duties."—Tr.] 4. ii., 2, 7.

5. Plat., *Apolog.*, c. xxiii. Whether Socrates, as some think, had also been married to Myrto, can not be decided with historical certainty. The contrary opinion, however, is far more probable, as appears from Meiners' examination (*Geschichte der Wissenschaften*, vol. ii., p. 522). Even Panætius Rhodius in Athenæus (xiii. init., p. 555) was of this opinion, which is also adopted by Bentley in his Dissertat *de Epistolis Socratis*, § 13. Luzac, in his discourse *De Socrate Cive*, p. 7, suppose

once stood for twenty-four hours on the same spot before the camp, absorbed in deep thought, with his eyes fixed on an object, as if his soul were absent from his body.[1]

In his second campaign we find Socrates at Delium, a town in Bœotia, where the Athenians were defeated by the Bœotians.[2] This battle was fought 424 B.C., when Socrates was at the age of forty-five, in the same year in which the Clouds of Aristophanes were performed. Although the issue was unfavorable to the Athenians, Laches, the Athenian general, whom Socrates afterward accompanied in his flight, declared, that if all the Athenians had fought as bravely as Socrates, the Bœotians would have erected no trophies.[3]

Soon after this battle, Socrates was engaged in military service for the third time at Amphipolis, a city of Thrace or Macedonia, which was a colony of Athens, and a town of great commercial importance. It had been seized by Brasidas, a Lacedæmonian general, 424 B.C.; and the Athenians, with a view to its recovery, sent an army, 422 B.C., under Cleon to Thrace, which did not succeed in its undertaking. In this expedition Socrates was present; but we do not find him engaged afterward in any other military duties, since he was now approaching the fiftieth year of his age.

Socrates was particularly attached to his native city. "I love my countrymen more than thine," he remarks in the Theætetus of Plato to Theodorus, a mathematician of Cyrene, who taught at Athens.[4] This partiality for Athens, which at that time presented a picture of the great world on a small scale, combined with a feeling of independence, were perhaps the principal reasons which determined him not to accept the flattering invitations of Archelaus,

1. Aul. Gellius, *Noct. Att.*, ii., 1. Diog., ii., § 25. Ælian. *Nat. Hist.*, xiii., 27.

2. Thucyd., iv., 96.

3. I pass over the ridiculous anecdote of Diogenes (ii., 23), who says that Socrates, when all had taken to flight, retreated step by step, and often turned round to oppose any enemy that might attack him. This circumstance is mentioned by no other ancient writer. It finds a severe censor in Athenæus, who also doubts the fact that Socrates had given up the prize of bravery to Alcibiades at Potidæa, since Alcibiades had taken no part in that war. The latter circumstance, however, is sufficiently established on the authority of Plato (*Sympos.*, p. 219, E.). Simplicius (*ad Epictet.*, c. 31) tells us that the Bœotians had been deterred by the bravery of Socrates from pursuing the fugitives. Thus every thing is exaggerated, and often to a monstrous degree, by later writers.

4. Compare Plato, *Apol.*, xvii. These expressions of Socrates seem to raise a doubt as to the statement of Cicero (*Tusc.*, v., 37) and Plutarch (*De Exilio*, vol. viii., p. 371), that Socrates had said he was no Athenian, no Greek, but a citizen of the world. Compare Meiners' *Geschichte der Wissenschaften*, vol. ii., p. 361.

contented with what he possessed.'

1 Diog. L. ii. 34. 2 Cic. Tusc. v. 37.

3 Senec. de Benef. v. 6. Epictet. Diatr. iii. 26. Stobæus, Flor. 91.

4 Diog. Laert. ii. 34.

5 Plut. de Exil. p. 604 C.

6 Cic. Tusc. v. 37. The dialog to Senec is continued in Chapter I. to the subject of the present. Diogenes had clearly taken (ill) confused.

with the name of ἐπιστάτης. His authority was of the greatest extent: he laid every thing before the assembly of the people, put the question to the vote, examined the votes, and, in fact, conducted the whole business of the assembly. A senator was only elected for one year; and a man could only be epistates once, and only for one day.[1] He who was invested with this office had the keys of the citadel and the treasury of the republic intrusted to his care

Socrates was epistates[2] on the day when the unjust sentence was to be passed on the unfortunate admirals who had neglected to take up the bodies of the dead after the battle of Arginusæ. How did Socrates behave on that occasion? This is an event which shows Socrates to us in such an active, and, indeed, important office, that it is of the greatest importance, in forming a proper estimate of his character, to observe his conduct on this occasion with the greatest attention.

In the battle off the islands of Arginusæ (B.C. 404), the Athenians had obtained a complete victory, under the command of ten[3] admirals, among whom Pericles, a natural son of the celebrated statesman of that name, and Diomedon, possessed considerable reputation. To take care of the burial of the dead was regarded by the Athenian laws as a sacred duty, since the shades of the unburied dead, said the Greek superstition, restlessly wander a hundred years on the banks of the Styx. But after the battle there arose a violent storm, which prevented the ten generals from obtaining the bodies of the slain; yet, in order to effect every thing in their power, they left behind them some inferior officers, ταξιάρχαι, to attend to the burial of the dead. Among these taxiarchs we find Thrasybulus, who expelled the thirty tyrants, and Theramenes, who afterward became so well known as one of these tyrants, and was at last executed. But the violent storm opposed insurmountable obstacles to the execution of their orders.

It then became necessary to give to the senate and the people of Athens a full report of what had taken place. Although the admirals might have thrown the whole blame on the taxiarchs, yet, chiefly induced by Pericles and Diomedon, they stated in their report that the storm had prevented them from fulfilling this sacred duty. But Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who had arrived at Athens before the ten admirals, brought such heavy charges against them, that six who had already returned were, at the command of

1. Pollux, viii., 9.

2. Xenoph., *Mem.*, i., 1, 18. See Luzac, *De Socrate Cive*, p. 91, *seqq.*

3. [For a more correct view of this statement, vid. note on *Mem.*, i., 1, 18. Am. Ed.]

the senate, shewed him the public grave. They were summoned before the tribunal of the people (the Heliæa). Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus accusing Socrates among their accusers, and were assisted as right powerful. They pitched on these persons, by the advice of some pious men, that the simplest had confidence in absolutely impeaching the most to fulfill their duty; besides which, they had been approved Thrasybulus and Clitophon as favourable, and therefore, if it were necessary to use force to inflict punishment, it should be followed on them. This measure produced the desired effect on the people, and they would probably have been acquitted as many of the questions had been put to the vote. But if even so evil the design of their enemies would have been frustrated. They therefore managed to adjourn the assembly till another day, alleging that it was too late to proceed that day to ballot.

In the mean while, the enemies of the philosophers set their wits at work to inflame the people against them. The consideration, and the unmerited appearance of the contrary of the talk, that had been done to Diagoras and Clitophon for this reason, during the festival of the Epidauria,[1] which happened in fact on the day on which the assembly was held, were provided to be found fault with by the people against the unfortunate philosophers. The votes were to be given on the pretext against the philosophers that they were wrong in not taking up the bodies of those who had been left in the water after the battle; and it had already been condemned by the assembly on the accusation preferred. They were to be put to death, and their property to be confiscated.[2] But to accomplish all by one vote was contrary to an ancient law of Clisthenes, according to which the vote ought to have been given upon each individual separately. Under the pretence and fraudulence of their friend, inclined to put the illegal question to the vote of the people. Yet, when the latter, incensed against the pretence, loudly complained that those who praised their pleasure should be brought to such base conduct to the present time, the temperance of Socrates, who alone remained constant

---

1. The festival was celebrated in their days. The word epidauria is a corruption of the word epidauria, which is the name of the festival in honour of Asclepius, which was celebrated at Epidaurus. The festival was held in the month of Thargelion, which corresponds to the month of March.

2. Socrates, Memorabilia, iii. 5. 4. The word epidauria is a corruption of the word epidauria, which is the name of the festival in honour of Asclepius, which was celebrated at Epidaurus. The festival was held in the month of Thargelion, which corresponds to the month of March.

he could not be induced to desist from his resolution, but boldly declared he would do nothing which he considered contrary to his duty. In consequence of this refusal, the question could not be put to the vote, and the assembly was therefore adjourned; another epistates and other *πρόεδροι* were chosen, and the enemies of the admirals obtained what they had wished for. The admirals were condemned to death, and the six who were in Athens were executed.[1]

This was the only civil office that Socrates ever held; and we can not be surprised, when so many acts of injustice were committed, which he alone could not possibly have prevented, that he entirely withdrew from public business. He mentions this himself as the reason of his living a private man. "Be assured, men of Athens, if in former times I had wished to engage in public affairs, I should have perished long ago, without being either useful to you or myself."[2]

Socrates himself lived to see the injurious consequences which the unjust condemnation of those admirals brought down upon Greece, in the mournful issue of the Peloponnesian war. The very year after their condemnation (405 B.C.), the Athenians, for want of abler generals, were entirely defeated by the Lacedæmonians under Lysander; their fleet was destroyed, Athens besieged, and reduced to the necessity of surrendering at discretion to the victors. Lysander, after this, established the government of the Thirty Tyrants, whose memory is branded in history; and Socrates was one among the many who had to struggle with their injustice. Freret, indeed, has endeavored[3] to prove that Socrates supported these hateful oligarchs, and that by this circumstance we must account for his condemnation immediately after their fall. But this assertion is at variance with every thing recorded respecting the history and opinions of Socrates. He was, indeed, favorably disposed toward an aristocratical government, but in the old Attic sense of the word, viz, to a form of government in which the supreme power is lodged in the hands of the best and wisest; but he could never have approved of an oligarchy, and least of all of a des-

1. They were sentenced to death B.C. 404. Luzac, in his *Disquisitio de Epistatis et Proedris Atheniensium*, p. 114, which is added to his discourse *De Socrate Cive*, has considered the subject very carefully. The principal passages of the ancients are: Xenoph., *Hist. Gr.*, i., 7, and Æsch., *Axiochus*, c. 12. Though Æschines may not be author of this dialogue, yet the agreement existing between him and Xenophon proves its authenticity with regard to historical facts.

2. Plato, *Apolog.*, c. xix.

3 Magazin Encyclopédique, Seconde Année, tom. v., p. 474, *seqq.*

ered his duty. Entertaining no fear of them, he did not leave Athens, which is duly appreciated by Cicero.[1] The Thirty summoned him, with four others, to the Tholos, the place in which the prytanes used to take their meals; and commanded him to bring Leon of Salamis to Athens, who had obtained the right of citizenship at Athens, but had chosen a voluntary exile, fearing that the tyrants might execute him, as he was a wealthy and distinguished man.[2] "Then indeed," says Socrates, in Plato's Apology, "I showed by my actions, and not merely by my words, that I did not care (if it be not too coarse an expression) one jot for death; but it was an object of the greatest care to me to do nothing unjust or unholy; for that government, though it was so powerful, did not frighten me into doing any thing unjust; but when we came out of the Tholos, the four went to Salamis and took Leon, but I went away home. And perhaps I should have suffered death on account of this, if the government had not soon been broken up."

In this manner Socrates most effectually refused taking any part in the unjust acts of the Thirty,[3] who were very anxious to gain him over to their interest, as they wished in general to have as many of the citizens as possible accessary to their crimes. When he declared that he would never assist them in any unjust act, Charicles said, "Dost thou indeed wish to be at liberty to say what thou pleasest, and not suffer any thing at all for it?" "I am willing to suffer any calamity," said Socrates, "but I will not do wrong to any one." Charicles was silent, and his associates looked at each other.

According to Diodorus, Socrates undertook the defence of Theramenes, a man of a very equivocal character.[4] This account has

---

1. *Ad Attic.*, viii., 2: "Socrates, quum triginta tyranni essent, pedem porta non extulit."

2. Τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐτεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦι εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν, κ. τ. λ., c. xx. Οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν seems to be an expression which only people of the lower classes made use of; hence the addition of Socrates: εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, "quamvis forte rudior loqui videar." Libanius, the imitator of the Attic idiom, on this account, adds before οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν the softening ὡς εἰπεῖν.—*Apol.*, p. 8. The courage and intrepidity of Socrates before the Thirty is often mentioned. Seneca, *Epist.*, 28: "Triginta tyranni Socratem circumsteterunt, nec potuerunt animum ejus infringere." Diog., ii. 24: Ἦν δὲ (Σωκρατους) ἀνηκρατικός, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις ἐκ τε τοῦ μὴ εἶξαι τοῖς περὶ Κριτίαν, κ. τ. λ.

3. Plat., *Epist.*, vii., ad Dionis propinquos.

4. Diod. Sic., xiv., 5. Aristotle, Cicero, and Diodorus speak of Theramenes in the highest terms. Aristotle (in Plutarch, iii., p. 337) and Cicero, who seem to have been prejudiced in his favor by the constancy with which he suffered death, declare him to have been the best citizen of Athens. Cicero (*Tuscul.*, i., 40

been copied by other writers, but to the entertainment or confusion [illegible] mentioned neither by Plato, by Xenophon, nor any other contemporary writer.[1]

Theramenes was himself one of the Thirty Tyrants. Plato in one recital of an incident in the fallen citizens, who had given great confidence in him, to assist him [illegible] Lysander, he should [illegible] and was the first, was prepared to change the democracy to an oligarchy. He himself became one of the Thirty, but [illegible] to assume [illegible] with Critias, the great chief of those tyrants. But the characters of these men were too different to allow their friendship to be of long duration. Critias, a man of energetic character, acted [illegible] object which his imagination represented to him as desirable, and of the means most expedient were never to the point which might enable him to put it in act. Theramenes [illegible] to foresight himself, but to the choice of his means, though little concerned about morality, he displayed great anxiety for his personal safety. The violent measures of Critias put an unhappy opponent to [illegible] and he proposed to [illegible] a number of citizens, who might take a part in the business of the government, and check the intention of the Thirty. But the Thirty were little disposed to relinquish the power which they had obtained with [illegible], and had possessed with so many cruelty and avoidance, and [illegible] to all themselves of [illegible] who might prove a powerful enemy to their designs. Critias accordingly accused Theramenes before the council, and Theramenes defended himself in a manner which made a very favorable impression on the council; but Critias, seeing that he could not depend upon the assistance of his council, endeavored like to [illegible], with the assistance of his colleagues, without [illegible] putting the question to the vote [illegible] condemnation to perpetual [illegible]. Theramenes flew to the altar of Theseus, and [illegible] the [illegible] his defence. [illegible] he used every exertion to save [illegible]. Theramenes answered that he [illegible] knew an [illegible] which, [illegible]

[illegible] in terms of the highest admiration of the [illegible] during his [illegible], and [illegible] with [illegible]; [illegible] p. 281 was [illegible] Xenophon [illegible] as a [illegible] [illegible] that the [illegible] of [illegible] are [illegible] [illegible] as a [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

as it was useless to himself. Theramenes, after this, drank the poisoned cup with great composure and serenity.

If Socrates actually undertook the defence of Theramenes, it was unquestionably a noble action, as the reason for which the Thirty punished their colleague, and the manner in which it was done, were equally detestable. Plato's silence respecting this occurrence may be accounted for, as in his seventh letter he evidently avoids every opportunity of speaking of Critias, who was his kinsman[1] on his mother's side. But perhaps Plato as well as Xenophon may have considered Theramenes unworthy of the defence of Socrates, and on that account passed over it in silence. However, the works from which Diodorus compiled his history, especially where he does not mention his authorities, are not entitled to so much confidence as to justify us in having recourse to these hypotheses. It seems also contrary to the character of Socrates that he should have been deterred by the representations of Theramenes, that his exertions would be fruitless and dangerous to himself; for Socrates did not easily desist from a resolution once taken up, as he cared little about personal danger, unless he was restrained by his genius.

CHAPTER VI.

We now come to the most interesting period in the life of Socrates—his accusation, defence, condemnation, and execution. We know that all this took place a few years after the abolition of the oligarchy by Thrasybulus, in the year 400, or, according to others, 399 B.C. Anytus, Lycon, and Meletus brought the accusation in a writ (*ἀντωμοσία*) before the tribunal of the people,[2] charging him with introducing new divinities and corrupting the young; Anytus on behalf of the demagogues, Lycon on behalf of the orators, and

1. Diogenes, iii., 2.

2. That it was the tribunal of the people, or the court of the Heliastæ (*ἡλιασταί*), or Dicastæ (*δικασταί*), by which Socrates was condemned, has been proved by Bougainville in his essay "On the Priests of Athens," in the *Memoires de l'Academie des Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres*, and by Meiners in his *Gesch. d. Wiss.*, vol. ii., p. 482, against Meursius, who thought that Socrates had been condemned by the Areopagus. This usual supposition is also advocated by Patter and Stollberg in the remarks on the Apology. But Bougainville's arguments for substituting the Heliastæ seem to be convincing. The Heliastæ were elected from the whole body of the people, without any regard to the different classes, and received a pay for their services. Their appellation was derived from Ἡλαία, the name of the place where the Ἡλιασταί assembled. Ἡλαία is another form of ἄλη (*an assembly*) a word which frequently occurs in Herodotus. It is also connected with ἀλής and ἀλίζομαι

gratifying his desire for revenge To this, however, another reason may be added: Meletus had been one of the four who had, at the command of the Thirty, brought Leon of Salamis to Athens.[1] Socrates having refused obedience to this command, and declared it an act of injustice to which he could not be accessary, must have increased the enmity of Meletus. Libanius,[2] besides, describes him as a venal accuser, who for a drachma would accuse any one, whether he knew him or not. To this report, however, we can not attach any great importance, as we are ignorant of the source from which it was derived.

Lycon was a public orator. We know that, according to a law of Solon, ten persons were elected to this office, whose duty was to advise the people and to maintain public justice. But these orators were very often individuals who entirely neglected their high calling, and merely attended to their own private interests, and persecuted the most honest persons, whenever their personal advantage required it. Can we wonder that the name of an orator should be despised by every honest man? Can we wonder that a man like Socrates, whose whole heart was benevolence toward mankind, should hate these corrupters of morality, and often censure their conduct in the strongest terms, when they hurried the people into the most unjust and revolting actions? On the other hand, what was more natural than that Socrates should render these men his bitterest enemies, who became the more dangerous as they scrupled not to employ any means to get rid of such a troublesome censor of their conduct?[3]

Anytus was the most powerful among the accusers of Socrates, whence the latter, in an expressive manner, is called by Horace[4] *Anyti reus*. Plato, in his seventh letter, ranks him, with Lycon, among the most influential citizens. He had been driven into exile by the Thirty, and from this circumstance alone he would have been an interesting personage to his fellow-citizens, after the restoration of the democratical government. But his influence as a demagogue and a statesman must have been still more increased, since he himself had co-operated with Thrasybulus in expelling the Thirty.[5] He carried on the business of a tanner, whereby he acquired great importance; for, after the changes introduced by Cleisthenes into the Constitution of Solon, every tradesman or artisan

1. Andocides, *De Myster.*, p. 12 and 34, edit. Steph.
2. *Apolog.*, edit. Reiske, p. 11 and 51.
3. Προητοίμασε δὲ πάντα Λύκων ὁ δημαγωγός, says Diogenes, ii., 38.
4. *Sat.*, ii. 4, 3. 5. Xenoph., *Hist. Gr.*, ii., 3.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

for at first sight it is surprising that so many other Greek philosophers, though they gave much greater offence to the popular religion, were yet allowed to live at Athens free from persecution, and that such a violent accusation should have been raised against Socrates alone. Epicurus, for instance, died in the seventy-first year of his age, highly lamented by his disciples, without having ever been accused on account of his religious opinions.[1] The causes which led to the accusation of Socrates may be fairly classed under four divisions, which will form the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER VII.

1. Every great man, especially under a democratical government and in a period of moral corruption, excites the envy of others; for it is the fate of the truly great to be envied by those who feel their own comparative inferiority. Even a superficial knowledge of the human heart shows how much we are inclined to envy those we can not equal. Who does not remember the answer which that citizen of Athens gave to Aristides, when the latter asked him why he voted against him! If such a man be distinguished by his talents, others endeavor to degrade him, or, if they do justice to his genius, speak in a derogatory manner of his feelings. But should he be a man distinguished by unusual moral goodness, by rare qualities of heart, and by a high enthusiasm for virtue and morality, he is still more in danger of being misunderstood by his contemporaries; for there are always persons mean enough to suppose, because their own hearts can not comprehend such virtues, that the low objects of vanity and selfishness influence the actions, and the noble, philanthropic views of the man of superior morality, and

1. [The assertion of Wiggers that Greek philosophers, who gave offence to the popular religion, were allowed to live at Athens free from persecution, is contrary to all historical evidence. Although skeptical opinions on religion had for many years previous to the death of Socrates made considerable progress among the upper classes at Athens, it is nevertheless certain that the lower orders were strongly attached to the popular religion, and highly resented any attempts which were made to question its truth. Anaxagoras was compelled to leave Athens, notwithstanding the powerful support of Pericles, on account of his religious opinions; and Diagoras of Melos was proscribed at Athens on account of his impiety, and a reward offered to any one who should either kill him or bring him to justice. Protagoras, also, was accused and condemned to death for having read a work at Athens on the nature of the gods, in which he declared that he was unable to determine whether the gods existed or not. He escaped, however; but the book was publicly burned, and all who possessed copies were ordered to give them up.—Tr.]

properly speaking, of Aspasia, who had, it is true, done very much to diffuse a taste for the fine arts, vices of every description had gained the ascendency. During the Peloponnesian war, the neglect of all moral and religious cultivation had kept pace with the decay of external worship; the spirit of the times had taken a sophistical tendency, and selfishness had so evidently become the motive to action, that even Athenian embassadors unblushingly declared to the Spartans and Melians that it was lawful and right for the better and stronger to oppress and rule over the weak and helpless, asserting that not only all tribes of animals, but whole cities and nations, acted according to this principle.[1] It was a very common opinion that after death the soul ceased to exist; the religious phantoms of a future state were laughed at by an age so full of conceit, that nothing but a conscience disturbed in the last moments of life could excite an apprehension lest those ridiculed phantoms might still not be wholly fictitious.[2] But it is obvious how completely every seed of virtue must have been crushed by the government of such corrupt men as the thirty tyrants.[3]

---

far from beneficial to the Athenians. He was an ambitious man, and by this disposition he was hurried into many acts injurious to his country. The diminution of the power of the Areopagus, to which Solon had wisely assigned an extensive sphere of action, is wholly unpardonable. On the other hand, we should undoubtedly be going too far if we should credit all the assertions of the comic poets, which are partly repeated by Diodorus and Plutarch, and attribute the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war to the intrigues by which Pericles endeavored to escape the necessity of accounting for the treasure of the allies, which he had lavished on magnificent buildings. This opinion, though very generally maintained, and usually adopted in historical manuals, can not be supported by any authentic testimony. Diodorus (xii., p. 503–505) and Plutarch (*Pericles*, i., p. 647, *seqq.*) might be mentioned as authorities, but it is evident that they have only copied the comic poets, without being much concerned about historical truth. Besides, their authority is little, compared with that of Thucydides, the impartial adversary of Pericles, who declares the desire to extend the power of Athens, and to humble the Spartans, to have been the true causes of the war (i., 23, 24, 56, and 88, and ii., 1. Compare Wyttenbach's review of the *Lectiones Andocidæ* of Sluiter in the *Bibloth. Crit.*, vol. iii., P. iii., p. 79). 1. Thucyd., i., 76; v., 105.

2. Plat., *Phæd.*, and *De Republ.*, vi. That free-thinking at that time generally prevailed, is evident from the tenth book *De Legibus*. Those principles were chiefly and eagerly adopted by young people, who made such an application of the astronomical hypotheses of Anaxagoras, that they not only denied the divinity of the stars, but, at the same time, hazarded the assertion that the gods, being changed into the dust of the earth, were unconcerned about human affairs.

3. [Those persons, however, who are disposed to join in the common declamations against the vices of the Athenian Constitution, would do well to weigh the following just and eloquent remarks of Niebuhr before they pronounce an opinion. "Evil without end may be spoken of the Athenian Constitution, and with truth,

volting must it have been to a man of correct habits of thinking, that persons assuming the venerable appellation of the wise should have aimed at confounding the fundamental ideas of right and wrong, of virtue and vice! The Sophists were most dangerous men, not only on account of their theoretical unbelief, which they indiscreetly preached, but also on account of their moral doctrines, which were founded on egotism and selfishness. Disinterested virtue, they declared, was folly, and the civil laws were at variance with the laws of nature; moderation and temperance were enemies to pleasure, and contrary to the precepts of good sense.[1] Socrates too deeply felt the corruption of his age not to oppose its authors in every way, and to express his indignation as loudly as possible Their dazzling sophistries he opposed with weapons, which must have been very painful to conceited people, who loved any thing better than the truth. Pretending to be a disciple, anxious to learn something, he attentively listened to the wisdom which flowed from the lips of the Sophists; and perhaps praised it exceedingly, while he lamented his own dullness, and, at the same time, will

out asking whether they were provoking the resentment of the conqueror—the people who, when Alexander, fresh from the ashes of Thebes, demanded the patriots, refused to give them up, and chose rather to await his appearance before their walls—who, while all who flattered or feared Philip warned them not to irritate him, condemned citizens to death for buying slaves that had fallen into the hands of the Macedonians by the capture of Greek cities which had been hostile to Athens—the people whose needy citizens, though predominant in the assembly, renounced the largess which alone afforded them the luxury of flesh on a few festivals, though on all other days throughout the year they ate nothing but olives, herbs, and onions, with dry bread and salt fish—who made this sacrifice to raise the means of arming for the national honor—this people commands my whole heart and my deepest reverence. And when a great man* turned away from this noble and pliable people, though certainly it did not appear every day in its holiday clothes, and was not free from sins and frailties, he incurred a just punishment in the delusion which led him to attempt to wash a blackamoor white: to convert an incorrigible bad subject like Dionysius, and through his means to place philosophy on the throne in the sink of Syracusan luxury and licentiousness: and in the scarcely less flagrant folly of taking an adventurer so deeply tainted with tyranny as Dion, for a hero and an ideal. A man who could hope for success in this undertaking, and despaired of a people like the Athenians, had certainly gone great lengths in straining at gnats and swallowing camels."—Translated by Mr. Thirlwall in the *Philological Museum*, No. iii., p. 494–496.—Tr.]

1. Compare Plato in the *Gorgias* and *De Republ.*, ii. The beautiful allegory of Prodicus, "Hercules at the Cross-way," which has acquired such celebrity, and perhaps owes its perfection to Xenophon, at least so far as its form is concerned, was only a declamation, and probably belonged to those show-speeches which this Sophist delivered in the cities of Greece.—Philostr., *De Vit. Sophist.*, p. 482, *seqq.*

* Plato.

titude at the expense of morality; and bad poets and sophistical orators felt the sting of his irony. The demagogues hated him because he was the opponent of their teachers, the Sophists, from whom many among them had learned the art of deceiving the people. What could, indeed, be more absurd in the eyes of reason, than that persons totally ignorant of the Constitution and public business, such as artisans, tanners, shoemakers, &c., should have an influence on the conduct of public affairs? These he made the objects of his satire, and exposed the absurdity of their pretensions. Socrates had, besides, a prejudice against mechanical arts, which he sometimes expressed too indiscreetly and offensively. Thus he says to Critobulus:[1] "Mechanical arts are despised, and, indeed, it is not with injustice that they are little valued by states; for they are injurious to the bodies of the workmen as well as to the superintendents, since they render it necessary for them to sit, and to remain constantly in-doors; and many of them pass all the day near the fire. And whenever the body is languid, the mind loses its energy. Besides, those arts allow us no time to devote to our friends and to the state, so that such people are little useful to their friends, and bad protectors of their country. Nay, in some, principally in warlike states, no citizen is allowed to pursue mechanical arts."

Even the tyranny of the Thirty, as we have seen, did not escape the satire of Socrates. The priests too, as we know from the Euthyphron of Plato, were obliged to hear from his lips the truth that their ideas of divine worship were totally erroneous.[2] It is natural enough that Socrates should have made a number of individuals

1. Xenophon, *Œconom.*, iv., 2.

2. That poets were allowed to express themselves freely on religious subjects, and that philosophers were deprived of this privilege, may be accounted for in the following way. Poets wrote for the sake of amusement; a little freedom was easily granted to them, provided they made the people laugh: but the words of a philosopher had a more serious tendency. Besides, we know that dramatic representations originated in the festival of Dionysus, which was solemnized as licentiously as the Bacchanalia of the Romans. On the other hand, a distinction must be drawn between political religion, *i. e.*, that which, being intimately connected with the Constitution, was observed in public festivals and ceremonies, and the monstrous mass of fables concerning the origin and history of the gods: for at Athens religious belief was unconnected with public worship. With regard to mythological stories, the Greeks were allowed to express themselves as freely as they liked, provided they did not attack the mysteries, or doubt the existence of the gods. Proofs of this we find not only in the comic writers, but in the most celebrated tragic poets, as Æschylus and Euripides, and in the history of Alcibiades. But it is surprising that Xenophanes in Magna Græcia was allowed to express himself so freely on the state religion, while philosophical opinions much less connected with religion proved so dangerous to Anaxagoras at Athens.

[illegible]

1. *Par. Mar.* c. 12.

2. The Clouds was performed 423 B.C., on the festival of Dionysus.

external causes. How many truly comical scenes might be derived from Socrates gazing at one object for twenty-four hours, and from the many anecdotes which were told of him; in addition to which, we must not forget his resemblance to a Silenus, and the many peculiarities in his conduct.[1] On the other hand, however, it would be going too far to assert that the ridiculous representation of Socrates had no influence on his fate. Even a cursory perusal of the Clouds of Aristophanes must convince the reader that every thing is calculated to exhibit Socrates in an odious light, as seducing the young, introducing new gods, and, consequently, as highly injurious to the Commonwealth; and it is surprising to see these charges, twenty-three years afterward, repeated by Meletus. Socrates himself, in the Apology, says that Aristophanes and his party were enemies far more dangerous to him than his accusers, and that Meletus, in reality, had only repeated the charges of the former.[2] Aris-

1. Plat., *Sympos.*, p. 220, C. "Meditating on some subject, he once stopped somewhere early in the morning (viz., during the expedition against Potidæa), and as he did not succeed in his search, he remained in deep thought, standing on the same spot. When it had become noon-time, he attracted the attention of the people, and one said to another, 'Socrates has been standing there, on the same spot, thinking about something, from an early hour in the morning.' In the evening, when he was still standing there, some of the Ionian soldiers, after supper, took out their carpets, partly to repose on them in the refreshing evening air (for it was a summer night), partly to watch whether Socrates would actually pass the night in that position. And he actually remained standing till daybreak, and then addressed his prayers to the rising sun, and hastened away."—Aul. Gellius, *Noct. Att.*, ii., 1.

2. Ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, says he, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες· οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἳ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστής, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκώς, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν· οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτην φήμην κατα-

* A man who investigates all things above and below the earth (*μετεωροφροντιστής* is the expression of Aristophanes) was an Atheist, according to the ideas of the Athenian people, for a natural philosopher and an Atheist were synonymous appellations. These natural philosophers were also called *μετεωρολέσχαι*. A Sophist is a person who gives to a bad cause the appearance of a good one, by means of eloquence. This proves that Aristophanes did not distinguish Socrates from the Sophists; and, indeed, proofs of this are met with throughout the Clouds. Thus Socrates invokes the Clouds, the protecting deities of the Sophists; Socrates teaches how the *λόγος δίκαιος* may be conquered by the *λόγος ἄδικος*; he makes astronomical researches (to this must be referred his soaring in the air in a basket, v. 184, *seqq.*); and he receives money for his instructions (v. 98, 99, 113–115, 245, 246), &c. A slight allusion to the sophistry of Socrates we find also in the answer of Ischomachus (in Xenoph., *Œconom.*, c. 11, § 25) to the question how Ischomachus was getting on with his lawsuit: "When it is sufficient," he says, "for

ment: this must also have contributed to his accusation. Socrates, like the sages of antiquity in general, approved of an aristocracy in the original sense of the word, viz., a constitution which intrusted the supreme power to the hands of the best in a moral point of view.[1] Socrates was aware how dangerous it is to intrust the supreme power to the hands of an uneducated populace; his own experience taught him how easy it was for selfish demagogues to gain favor with an inconstant multitude, and to carry plans into execution which were often highly injurious to the whole nation. Hence he frequently spoke in a sarcastic manner of the Athenian Constitution, and satirized their bean-archons.[2] Socrates said to Charmides, an able young man, who, however, was too timid to speak in the public assembly,[3] "Is it the fullers that thou art afraid of, or the shoemakers? the carpenters, or the smiths? the peas-

1. An aristocracy, according to the conceptions of the Athenians before the time of Alexander the Great, was not opposed to democracy, but to oligarchy. In an aristocracy the people always had great influence, but in an oligarchy they were entirely deprived of it. One of the principal passages relating to this point is in the *Menexenus* of Plato, p. 238, C. Plato there represents Socrates as repeating a funeral discourse of Aspasia in honor of those who had died for their country. Πολιτεία γὰρ τροφὴ ἀνθρώπων ἐστί, says Aspasia, καλὴ μὲν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐναντία κακῶν. Ὡς οὖν ἐν καλῇ πολιτείᾳ ἐτράφησαν οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν, ἀνὴρ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἄριστος, ἐπὶ τῆς δὴ κἀκείνοι ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ νῦν εἰσίν, ὧν οὗτοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες οἱ τετελευτηκότες. Ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολιτεία καὶ τότε ἦν καὶ νῦν, ἀριστοκρατία, ἐν ᾗ νῦν τε πολιτεύόμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ χρόνοις ἐξ ἐκείνου ὡς τὰ πολλά. Καλεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν αὐτὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο, ὦ ἂν χαίρῃ. ἔστι δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μετ' εὐδοξίας πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία. βασιλεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡμῖν εἶσιν· οὗτοι δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἐκ γένους, τοτὲ δὲ αἱρετοί· ἐγκρατὲς δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πολλὰ τὸ πλῆθος, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἐνίοτε καὶ τὸ κράτος τοῖς ἀεὶ δοξάσι ἀρίστοις εἶναι, καὶ οὔτε ἀσθενείᾳ, οὔτε πενίᾳ, οὔτε ἀγνωσίᾳ πατέρων ἀπελήλαται οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τετίμηται ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσι, ἀλλ' εἷς ὅρος, ὁ δόξας σοφὸς ἢ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι κρατεῖ καὶ ἄρχει. Compare with this Xenoph., *Mem.*, iv., 6, § 12: "When ever public offices were held by persons who executed the will of the law, Socrates considered the government to be an aristocracy." More arguments in support of this opinion are given by Luzac, *l. c.*, p. 67.

2. Xenoph., *Mem.*, i., 2, § 9. The archons were elected by beans: white beans were used in voting *for* a candidate, black ones in voting *against* him. The names of the candidates for the βουλή were put into one vase, and into another an equal number of beans, fifty of which were white, the remainder black. Simultaneously with the name of a candidate drawn from one vase, a bean was drawn from the other. A white bean accompanying the name made the candidate a senator. Hence the expression κυαμευτοὶ ἄρχοντες for senators. That Socrates was averse to the democratical Constitution of the Athenians, is also stated by Ælian, *Var. Hist.*, iii., 17: Σωκράτης ἐν τῇ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ οὐκ ἤρέσκετο· τυραννικὴν γὰρ καὶ μοναρχικὴν εὕρα τὴν δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν. This sentiment was also maintained by his successors. Plato and Xenophon, although differing in their principles and opinions on other subjects, agree with each other on this point.

3. Xenoph., *Mem.*, iii., 7, § 6

The account of Xenophon strongly confirms the supposition that the connection between Socrates and Critias, whose cruelties were still well remembered by the democratical party, must have contributed to his accusation, and is indeed very probable, when we only consider the state of affairs. A passage of Æschines, the orator, might also be adduced to confirm this opinion, but we have reason to doubt the veracity of Æschines whenever it is his object to bring charges against his adversary, Demosthenes. This passage occurs in the speech against Timarchus,[1] which Æschines delivered before the assembly of the people. "You who have put to death Socrates, the Sophist, whom you knew to have educated Critias, one of the Thirty Tyrants who abolished your democracy, will you allow yourselves to be moved by the private interest of an orator like Demosthenes?" The name of Sophist, which Æschines must surely have known not to have belonged to Socrates, but which orators frequently applied to philosophers to express their contempt of them, and the mention of Critias, are sufficient to prove the intention of Æschines, who wished by these sentiments to hurt the feelings of Demosthenes, a disciple of Plato, and a kinsman of Critias.

[THE CLOUDS OF ARISTOPHANES.

In the clouds of Aristophanes, which was exhibited B.C. 423, Socrates is introduced as the great master of the school of the Sophists. A plain, simple citizen of Athens, named Strepsiades, engaged in husbandry, having married into a family of distinction, and having contracted debts through the extravagance of his wife (v. 49, *seq.*, 437, *seq.*, ed. Dindorf) and his son's (Pheidippides) fashionable love of horses, in order to defeat the impending suits of his creditors, wishes to place his son in a school of philosophy and rhetoric, where he may learn the arts of oratory, and of turning right into wrong, in order thereby to repair the ills which he had chiefly brought upon himself. On the son's refusal, the father applies in person to the master of the school, who is named Socrates; by him he is solemnly initiated, instructed, and examined, but, being found too old and stupid to learn, he is dismissed; upon which, after he has given his son some samples of the new philosophy, he forces him, much against his will, into the school: here the young man makes such great and rapid progress in learning that he is able to teach his father,

1. In the third volume of Reiske's edition of the *Oratores Græci*, p. 168.

whence, according to his view, the new-fangled and pernicious system of education took its rise, namely, the school of sophistical eloquence. He represents the Phrontisterion, or subtlety shop, as its seat and centre of union, this being necessary in a dramatic point of view; and he concentrates in the schoolmaster those essential properties of the school which are to explain his purpose, interwoven as they are with others, which belong to the real Socrates, under whose name and mask he clothed the dramatic personage. This individual centralization was indispensably requisite for the conduct of the drama; and this is the poet's only excuse for representing Socrates within the walls of a school, as the philosopher himself was continually moving about in public, a contradiction which has been considered as a convincing proof that the whole exhibition, as we have it, could not have been intended really for him. Aristophanes lays open to us, with the coloring, indeed, of a caricature, the whole interior sayings and doings of the school; he draws a sketch of the methods and means of instruction peculiar to it; and he shows the extent to which the mischief has already gone, since the λόγος δίκαιος is unable to defend himself; he points out, likewise, what results we are to expect from the school, what immediate calamities threaten not merely the parents themselves, who were blind enough to encourage such a system of education, but the common-weal also; and, finally, what the people ought to do to annihilate the evil at its source.

The Socrates in "The Clouds" must not, therefore, be considered as an individual, or as the copy of an individual; but as the principal personages in Aristophanes are for the most part symbolical, he too must be viewed as symbolical, that is, as the representative of the school and of its principle. And as we see in him a good deal which answers to the individual whose name and mask he bears, and much, too, which is heterogeneal to him, although, by means of certain allusions, and the ingenuity of dramatic combination, these two are amalgamated together, so, also, in the characters of Strepsiades and Pheidippides, many traits which are perfectly apposite to the objects which they are intended to typify, are combined with many which are extravagantly caricatured, and the creatures of poetic fiction. Strepsiades, for example, whose name is explained by his tendency to evil (v. 1455, comp. v. 88), and by the pleasure he takes in distorting right (v. 434), is the representative of the good old time, working out its own destruction by the abandonment of the laborious, frugal peasant's life, by illustrious marriages, and female influence, by the extravagant life which his son leads in con-

of those schools, will make your sons the instruments of your ruin! The younger population he tries to deter from the same fate by a display of the manners of the school, and of the pale faces and enervated limbs which come out of it (v. 102, 504, 1012, 1171).

We can not, therefore, say that the play of "The Clouds" is pointed at any one definite individual; but it reproves one general and dangerous symptom of the times, in the whole habits and life, political and domestic, of the Athenians, developing it in its source, in every thing which fostered it and made it attractive, in the instruments by which it was established, and which gave to it its pernicious efficiency; and thus, while he strictly and logically deduces real effects from real causes, as far as this development is concerned, the personages which bear a part in the action are consequently one and all historical. Hence we can very well understand the striking references in particular characters to certain individuals; and I think it more than probable that such reference is intended, not merely in the personage which bears the name of Socrates, but also in that of Pheidippides, while in the character of Strepsiades the poet only meant to point to the people in general.

The excessive love of horses exhibited in Pheidippides, and the extravagance consequent upon it; the rapid strides, too, which he makes in readiness of speech, in debauchery, and in selfish arrogance, and the relation in which he stands to Socrates, evidently point, without further search, to Alcibiades, in whom we find all these features united, on whom all the young men of the higher classes of his time pinned their faith, and whom they assisted a few years afterward in carrying through his political projects.

In "The Clouds," Aristophanes introduces Alcibiades as a ready orator and a debauchée; as the fruit of that school, from which, as the favorite pupil of Socrates, he seems to have issued; in short, as the type of Pheidippides, although all the traits attributed to the latter are not to be looked for individually in Alcibiades, and although his name does not occur in the course of the drama. Moreover, the supposed lineage of Pheidippides, whose mother (v. 46) was the niece of a Megacles, the frequent mention of that uncle (v. 70, 124, 825), and that of his descent from a celebrated ancient lady of the name of Κοισύρα,[1] distinctly point to Alcibiades, whose mother, Deinomache, was herself a daughter of Megacles,[2] and from whose family the Alcmæonidæ, to which Κοισύρα belonged, he had inherited his strong passion for a well-furnished stable.[3] This passion is, in-

1. V. 48 and 800. 2. Plut., *Alcib.*, c. 1. 3. Herodot., vi., 121.

is confirmed also by the second argument prefixed to the play, and by the notice it contains that Alcibiades and his party had prevented the first prize being awarded to Aristophanes; from which it is evident, even were the fact not probable in itself, that a tendency hostile to Alcibiades and his friends was perceived even by the ancients in this drama.

It was also about this time that the intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates was at its height, as the flight from Delion took place in the winter of the first year of the 89th Olympiad, that is, in the year in which "The Clouds" was represented; and the share they both had in this engagement, and the assistance which Alcibiades gave to Socrates, were manifest proofs of that intimacy. Alcibiades also, about this time, must have been deeply engaged in public affairs

But the question arises, Why did Aristophanes, when he gave a name and mask to the master of the school of subtlety, which was so foreign to the real Socrates, select the name and mask of that very individual?

Aristophanes selected Socrates, not only because his whole exterior and his mode of life offered a most appropriate mask for comic representation, but also (and this was his chief reason) because, in these circumstances as well as in many other points, the occupations of Socrates and his mode of instruction bore a great resemblance to those of the natural philosophers and of the Sophists. The poet thus found abundance of subject-matter, which composed a picture suited to his views, namely, to exhibit to the public a master of the school whence the mischief he strove to put down was working its way into the hearts of the Athenian youths. We must also take into our consideration the important fact, that several individuals, such as Euripides, Pericles, Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Critias, who supported the modern system of education, were in close habits of intimacy with Socrates, and in part, too, with the natural philosophers and Sophists: and this helped to give additional relief and light to the portrait of the man who was the centre around which they moved.

It should be recollected that it was not the object of Aristophanes to represent Socrates as he appeared to his confidential pupils, to Xenophon, to Plato, to Phædo, to Cebes, and others, but how he might be represented to the great mass of the Athenian people, that is, how they comprehended and judged him from his outward and visible signs, and how they understood and appreciated the usual extravagances of the comic poets; in short, how it was to be managed, that while his name and his mask, caricatured to the ut-

yond doubt. It may be considered as certain that he was not animated by any personal malevolence toward Socrates, but only attacked him as an enemy and corrupter of religion and morals; but, on the other hand, it is equally well established that he did not merely borrow the name of Socrates for the representative of the sophistical school, but designed to point the attention and to excite the feelings of his audience against the real individual. The only question which seems to be still open to controversy on this subject concerns the degree in which Aristophanes was acquainted with the real character and aims of Socrates, as they are known to us from the uniform testimony of his intimate friends and disciples. We find it difficult to adopt the opinion of some modern writers, who contend that Aristophanes, notwithstanding a perfect knowledge of the difference between Socrates and the Sophists, might still have looked upon him as standing so completely on the same ground with them, that one description was applicable to them and him. It is true, as we have already observed, that the poet would have willingly suppressed all reflection and inquiry on many of the subjects which were discussed both by the Sophists and by Socrates, as a presumptuous encroachment on the province of authority. But it seems incredible, that if he had known all that makes Socrates so admirable and amiable in our eyes, he would have assailed him with such vehement bitterness, and that he should never have qualified his satire by a single word indicative of the respect which he must then have felt to be due at least to his character and his intentions. But if we suppose, what is in itself much more consistent with the opinions and pursuits of the comic poet, that he observed the philosopher attentively indeed, but from a distance which permitted no more than a superficial acquaintance, we are then at no loss to understand how he might have confounded him with a class of men with which he had so little in common, and why he singled him out to represent them. He probably first formed his judgment of Socrates by the society in which he usually saw him. He may have known that his early studies had been directed by Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras; that he had both himself received the instruction of the most eminent Sophists, and had induced others to become their hearers; that Euripides, who had introduced the sophistical spirit into the drama, and Alcibiades, who illustrated it most completely in his life, were in the number of his most intimate friends. Socrates, who never willingly stirred beyond the walls of the city, lived almost wholly in public places, which he seldom entered without forming a circle round him, and opening some discus-

[illegible] vol. iv., p. 567, 568.—Tr.]

CHAPTER VIII

accusers of Socrates actually chose. After the recovery of democratical liberty, the Athenians, still feeling the consequences of the unfortunate issue of the Peloponnesian war, which their superstition ascribed to the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermes-busts by Alcibiades, and remembering the horrors with which the government of the Thirty Tyrants was branded, became more jealous of their Constitution than ever, and more inclined to punish persons against whom such plausible charges could be brought as those against Socrates, the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades.

But the old charge, so often repeated against philosophers,[1] that they introduced new gods and corrupted the young, and which was also employed against Socrates, was not followed by his immediate condemnation. We know from the Apology of Plato[2] that Meletus requested the assistance of the party of Anytus and Lycon, in order to induce the judges to pronounce the preliminary[3] sentence of guilty.

Hippias, honored Hipparchus, and called that period the happiest of the Athenians," &c. These are the charges against which Socrates is defended by Libanius.

1. The accusation of impiety was so comprehensive, that the greatest and best men, on whom not a shadow of any other crime could fall, were charged with it. The tribunal before which they were tried was not the same at all times, as the cause might be pleaded before the Areopagus, the Senate, or the Heliæa.

2. C. xxv.

3. *A preliminary sentence*; for a proper condemnation in matters which were not considered criminal only took place after a counter-estimate had been made by the defendant; and wherever a punishment was stated by the law, it was inflicted according to the law, and not left to the discretion of the judges. We find one irregularity in the trial of Socrates, for which we can only account by supposing that some expressions of Socrates were considered by the judges as personally insulting to themselves. But, although the accuser thought the matter criminal (*τίμημα θανάτου*, he added, according to Diog., ii., 40), yet it was not treated as such by the judges. The first estimate of the punishment was made by the plaintiff, and this kind of estimating was called *τιμᾶν*; the counter-estimate was made by the defendant, and the terms for it were *ἀντιτιμᾶν*, *ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι* (Plat., *Apol.*, c. xxvi. Compare Pollux, viii., 150), or *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι* (Xenoph., *Apol.*, § 23). The positive decision of the punishment was the privilege of the judges, and to fix the punishment was called *προστιμᾶν*. The calculation of votes which Fischer has made, in a remark on the passage of Plato, is too artificial; a more simple interpretation, which is adopted by Schleiermacher and others, is that the union of the party of Anytus and Lycon was required in order to obtain, in combination with that of Meletus, a fifth part of the votes. The number of the judges in the trial of Socrates is said to have been 556. 281 voted against him, 275 for him. If Socrates had had three votes more in his favor, the numbers would have been equal on both sides, and in this case he would have been acquitted. Tychsen, by correcting Diogenes, endeavors to reconcile him with Plato, for they contradict each other with regard to the number of votes. He accordingly increases the number of judges to 559, of whom 281 condemned, and 278 acquitted him. [For an account of the number of

[illegible] Meletus had been supported by them, he would, as [illegible] himself were, have [illegible] his accusation, and have [illegible] and abandoned; but as matters [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

the highest honor, and was conferred on the prytanes, *i. e.*, the fifty senators belonging to the presiding tribe, on the conquerors at the Olympian games, on youths whose fathers had died in defence of their country, on foreign embassadors, &c., and at the end of his speech he ironically adds, "If I had had money, I would have estimated myself at as high a sum as I should have been able to pay, for that would not have injured me; but now I can not do so, for I have nothing, unless you will fine me in such a sum as I can pay. But perhaps I might be able to pay a mina of silver: that shall therefore be my estimate. But Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito, and Critobulus, and Apollodorus, are persuading me to fine myself thirty minæ, and they themselves are ready to answer for me: that, therefore, shall be my estimate, and they will be satisfactory guarantees for this sum."[1] Such a proud answer, and the language in general which Socrates used,[2] inflamed all the judges against him, and eighty of those who at first had been favorably disposed toward him now voted for his death.[3] The real cause of his condemnation was, therefore, the noble pride, the "libera contumacia," as Cicero[4] calls it, which he displayed during his trial. He

1. *Apolog.*, c. xxviii. The account in the Apology ascribed to Xenophon (§ 23), that Socrates did not fine himself, nor allow his friends to do so, because this would have been acknowledging his crimes, may be reconciled with the statement of Plato quoted above; for the estimate mentioned by the latter, as appears from the whole context, is pronounced in quite an ironical tone; it is, in reality, no estimate. Tychsen doubts the authority of Plato, thinking that it was only the intention of Plato to immortalize the offer which he and his friends had made to Socrates. But for this supposition we have no reason whatever. Tychsen, in his account of this affair, follows Diogenes, who differs from Plato inasmuch as he states that the estimate of the thirty minæ preceded the proud assertion that he deserved to be maintained in the prytaneum. But the authority of Plato is surely more important. The source from which Diogenes derived his account is unknown.

2. Cic., *De Orat.*, i., 54: Socrates in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum.

3. Cic., *Ibid.*: Cujus responso sic judices exarserunt ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.

4. Cic., *Tuscul.*, i., 24: Socrates nec patronum quæsivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus supplex fuit, adhibuitque *liberam contumaciam*, a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbia. This *libera contumacia* is expressed by the author of the Apology ascribed to Xenophon by *μεγαλη ρημα*. Diog., ii., 24, also says of him, *τὸ δὲ ἰαγρογιώμων* (*contumax*). We see from the Apology of Plato (see also Xenoph., *Apol.*, § 14) that the judges had taken it very ill of Socrates that he mentioned the declaration of the Delphic god, and that he spoke of a genius by whom he was guided. But they were most bitterly enraged by the manner in which he estimated his punishment. The author of the Xenoph. Apology attributes to Socrates one other expression, which must have excited the indignation of the Athe-

calmest judge could not help being prejudiced against him by his pride. He appeared as a man who was in no way willing to own his errors, and who was, consequently, incapable of improvement. Death is, indeed, a very severe punishment according to our ideas, but it was not so among the Athenians, with whom it was considered equal to perpetual exile, and was inflicted for crimes of a less serious nature.[1]

Socrates was thus condemned to drink the poisoned cup. A guarantee was demanded that he might not escape from punishment by flight, and Crito became answerable for him. According to the form then customary, as it is expressed in Plutarch's life of Antiphon, the sentence must have run thus: "Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, of the tribe of Antiochis and the deme of Alopece, has been condemned to be surrendered to the Eleven." *To be surrendered to the Eleven* was a euphemism of the Attic language instead of *to be condemned to death*, since the Athenians wished to avoid the word death, which was considered ominous. The Eleven formed a commission, which consisted of the executioner and ten individuals, named respectively by each of the ten tribes. The superintendence of the prisons was intrusted to them, and they carried into execution the sentence of the courts. After the sentence had been pronounced and made publicly known by the herald, they seized the condemned person, and, after putting him in fetters, accompanied him to his prison. We must suppose that these formalities were likewise observed with regard to Socrates.

After the sentence had been pronounced, Socrates once more addressed the judges who had condemned him, and with great resignation and intrepidity spoke of the evil which they inflicted upon themselves by his punishment; and to those who had voted for his acquittal, he spoke upon subjects which at that moment were of the greatest interest—death and immortality. The last words of this address are particularly beautiful, and have found in Cicero[2] an enthusiastic admirer. "However, it is time for us to go—for me to die, for you to live; which is the better, is unknown to all except to God."

---

1. The Athenian laws in this respect were very much like the English. Xenoph., *Mem.*, i., 2. 62. says: "If a man proves to be a thief, to have stolen clothings from a bath, to be a pickpocket, to have broken through a wall, to have enslaved free citizens, or robbed a temple, he is punished with death according to the laws." If the value of the things stolen in a bath exceeded ten drachmas, death was inflicted, as is observed by Hindenburg (on this passage) from Demosthenes *in Timocr*

2. *Tuscul.*, i., 41.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

life was most admired on account of his present calmness and cheerfulness of mind." Among the conversations with his friends, two are particularly interesting, which are preserved by Plato in his Crito and Phædo—in the latter not without a considerable addition of Plato's own thoughts. In the Crito he treats of the duties of a citizen. Crito, a wealthy Athenian and powerful friend of Socrates, came to him early one morning, but, finding him asleep, waited till he awoke. When he awoke, Crito discovered to him a plan of escaping from prison, which he had formed in common with his other friends, and informed him that every thing was prepared for his escape, and that an asylum was provided for him in Thessaly. A lively conversation then arose between them, in which Socrates proved to Crito that a citizen is not justified, under any circumstances, in escaping from prison.

On the day of his death, Socrates had a conversation with his friends on the immortality of the soul. The arguments adduced in the Phædo of Plato are for the most part invented by Plato; but the real arguments of Socrates are probably preserved by Xenophon in the Cyropædia, in the dying speech of Cyrus.

The exercises which Socrates made in poetry were versifications of a hymn to Apollo, and of some fables of Æsop. Socrates undertook these on account of an admonition given him in a dream. But the reason for his choosing fables of Æsop was probably that this kind of poetry, which has such a decided moral tendency, particularly agreed with his own inclinations.[1]

The vessel returned from Delos; the Eleven announced to Socrates the hour of his death, and one of their executioners was ready to prepare the poisoned cup, which Socrates was obliged to empty after the sun had set. At a very early hour of the day his friends had assembled around him in great numbers, and Xanthippe, with her children, was also present. His friends were in the deepest distress, which, according to their different characters, was more or less loudly expressed. Apollodorus wept aloud, and moved all to tears except Socrates. Xanthippe, the violent and passionate

1. Πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον, he says (*Phædo*, p. 60, E., *seqq.*), ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου· καὶ ἐγὼ ἓν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτῷ μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἥ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν, κ. τ. λ.

woman, was inconsolable at the prospect of the death of her husband. Without fortune, without support, without any consolation, she saw herself and her children, of whom two were still at a tender age, left in want and misery. Socrates, probably with the intention of sparing her the distressing sight of her dying husband, requested Crito to send her home.

The executioner entered the prison, and offered the poisoned cup to Socrates: he took and emptied it with the intrepidity of a sage who is conscious of his virtuous life; and even at the moment when he held it in his hand, he spoke, according to Cicero's expression,[1] in such a manner that he appeared not to die, but to ascend into heaven. The lower part of his body had already grown cold; he then uncovered himself (for he had before been covered), and spoke his last words: "Crito," said he, "I owe a cock to Æsculapius. Offer one to him as a sacrifice; do not forget it." Socrates alluded in these words to the happiness he should enjoy after being delivered from the chains of his body. Crito asked whether he wished any thing else to be done. To this question Socrates made no reply, and a short time afterward became convulsed. His eyes became dim—and he expired.[2] He died in the year 400, or,

1. *Tuscul.*, i., 29.

2. All this is more circumstantially related in the Phædo of Plato. The above interpretation of the words at the end of the Phædo, "Crito, I owe a cock to Æsculapius," &c., which is also adopted by Olympiodorus, appears to be the most suitable. It is well known how many undeserved reproaches have been inflicted upon Socrates for this expression. The ecclesiastical fathers Origen, Eusebius, Chrysostom, and others, pretended to discover in it the real belief of Socrates in polytheism. ["It is extremely difficult to determine the precise relation in which the opinions of Socrates stood to the Greek polytheism. He not only spoke of the gods with reverence, and conformed to the rites of the national worship, but testified his respect for the oracles in a manner which seems to imply that he believed their pretensions to have some real ground. On the other hand, he acknowledged one Supreme Being as the framer and preserver of the universe;* used the singular and the plural number indiscriminately concerning the object of his adoration;† and when he endeavored to reclaim one of his friends, who scoffed at sacrifices and divination, it was, according to Xenophon, by an argument drawn exclusively from the works of the one Creator.‡ We are thus tempted to

* *Mem.*, iv., 3, § 13: ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων.

† οἱ θεοί, ὁ θεός, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον.

‡ *Mem.*, i., 4. If the conversation has been faithfully reported by Xenophon, Aristodemus shifted his ground in the course of the argument. But he suggests no objection to the inference drawn by Socrates from the being and providence of God, as to the propriety of conforming to the rites of the state religion, and Xenophon himself seems not to have been aware that it might be disputed. He thinks that he has sufficiently refuted the indictment which charged Socrates

according to others, 399 B.C., under the archon Laches,[1] or Aristocrates.

imagine that he treated many points, to which the vulgar attached great importance, as matters of indifference, on which it was neither possible nor very desirable to arrive at any certain conclusion: that he was only careful to exclude from his notion of the gods all attributes which were inconsistent with the moral qualities of the Supreme Being; and that, with this restriction, he considered the popular mythology as so harmless, that its language and rites might be innocently adopted. The observation attributed to him in one of Plato's early works* seems to throw great light on the nature and extent of his conformity to the state religion. Being asked whether he believed the Attic legend of Boreas and Orithyia, he replied that he should indeed only be following the example of many ingenious men if he rejected it, and attempted to explain it away; † but that such speculations, however fine, appeared to him to betoken a mind not very happily constituted; for the subjects furnished for them by the marvelous beings of the Greek mythology were endless, and to reduce all such stories to a probable form was a task which required much leisure. This he could not give to it, for he was fully occupied with the study of his own nature. He therefore let those stories alone, and acquiesced in the common belief about them."—*Thirlwall's History of Greece*, vol. iv., p. 268, *segq.*—TR.]

1. Diog., ii., 55 and 56. Marmor. Oxon., 57. Sachse places his death in Ol. 95, 1; Fabricius and Hamberger, Ol. 94, 2. [According to Diogenes, ii., 43 (c. xxiii.), the Athenians immediately repented of the death of Socrates, and manifested their sorrow by closing the palæstras and gymnasia. They are said to have condemned Meletus to death, and to have banished the other accusers, and also to have erected a bronze statue of Socrates. It is also said, in the lives of the Ten Orators, that Isocrates appeared in mourning for Socrates the day after his execution.—TR.]

with disbelieving the existence of the gods acknowledged by the state, when he has proved that he believed in a deity. * *Phædrus*, p. 229.

† I should say that she had been carried by the north wind over the cliffs, near which she had been playing with Pharmacea.

SCHLEIERMACHER

ON THE

WORTH OF SOCRATES AS A PHILOSOPHER.

SCHLEIERMACHER

ON THE

WORTH OF SOCRATES AS A PHILOSOPHER.

mild philanthropy with which it is always associated in an uncorrupted mind; all this, however, tinged with a slight air of enthusiasm. These are, no doubt, excellent qualities; but yet they are not such as fit a man to play a brilliant part in history, but rather, unless where peculiar circumstances intervene, to lead a life of enviable tranquillity, so that it would be necessary to ascribe the general reputation of Socrates, and the almost unexampled homage which has been paid to him, by so many generations, less to himself than to such peculiar circumstances. But least of all are these qualities which could have produced conspicuous and permanent effects on the philosophical exertions of a people already far advanced in intellectual culture. And this is confirmed when we consider what sort of doctrines and opinions are attributed to Socrates in conformity with this view; for, in spite of the pains taken to trick them out with a show of philosophy, it is impossible, after all, to give them any scientific solidity whatever: the farthest point we come to is, that they are thoughts well suited to warm the hearts of men in favor of goodness, but such as a healthy understanding, fully awakened to reflection, can not fail to light upon of itself. What effect, then, can they have wrought on the progress, or the transformation of philosophy? If we would confine ourselves to the well-known statement that Socrates called philosophy down from heaven to earth, that is, to houses and market-places, in other words, that he proposed social life as the object of research in the room of nature, still the influence thus ascribed to him is far from salutary in itself, for philosophy consists not in a partial cultivation either of morals or physics, but in the coexistence and intercommunion of both; and there is, moreover, no historical evidence that he really exerted it. The foundations of ethical philosophy had been laid before the time of Socrates in the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, and after him it only kept its place by the side of physics, in the philosophical systems of the Greeks. In those of Plato, of Aristotle, and of the Stoics, that is, of all the genuine Socratic schools of any importance, we again meet with physical investigations, and ethics were exclusively cultivated only by those followers of Socrates who themselves never attained to any eminence in philosophy. And if we consider the general tendency of the above-named schools, and review the whole range of their tenets, nothing can be pointed out that could have proceeded from a Socrates, endowed with such qualities of mind and character as the one described to us, unless it be where their theories have been reduced to a familiar practical application. And even with regard to the elder Socratics, we find

their only merit was that of having propagated and diffused Socratic doctrines, while the doctrines themselves do not appear to him worth making the beginning of a new period. Ast had previously arrived at the same result by a road in some respects opposite.[1] With him Plato is the full bloom of that which he terms the Athenian form of philosophy; and as no plant begins with its bloom, he feels himself constrained to place Socrates at the head of this philosophy, but yet not strictly as a philosopher. He says that the operation of philosophy in Socrates was confined to the exercise of qualities that may belong to any virtuous man, that is to say, it was properly no philosophy at all; and makes the essence of his character to consist in enthusiasm and irony. Now he feels that he can not place a man endowed with no other qualities than these at the head of a new period, and therefore he ranges the Sophists by his side, not, indeed, without some inconsistency, for he himself sees in them the perverse tendency which was to be counteracted by the spirit of the new age; but yet he prefers this to recognizing the germ of a new gradation in Socrates alone, whose highest philosophical worth he makes to consist in his martyrdom, which, however, can not by any means be deemed of equal moment in the sphere of science, as in that of religion or politics. Though in form this course of Ast's is opposite to Krug's, in substance it is the same: its result is likewise to begin a new period of philosophy with Plato; for Ast perceives nothing new or peculiar in the struggle Socrates made against the Sophists, only virtue and the thirst after truth, which had undoubtedly animated all the preceding philosophers; what he represents as characteristic in the Athenian philosophy, is the union of the elements which had been previously separate and opposed to each other; and since he does not, in fact, show the existence of this union in Socrates himself, and distinctly recognizes their separation in his immediate disciples, Plato is, after all, the point at which, according to him, that union begins.

But if we choose really to consider Plato as the true beginner of a new period, not to mention that he is far too perfect for a first beginning, we fall into two difficulties: first, as to his relation to Aristotle. In all that is most peculiar to Plato, Aristotle appears as directly opposite to him as possible; but the main division of philosophy, notwithstanding the wide difference between their modes of treating it, he has in common with Plato, and the Stoics with both; it fits as closely and sits as easily on one as the other, so that one

1. Grundriss einer Gesch. der Philos.

a variance exists, and where it lies. Plato nowhere professes himself the historian of Socrates, with the exception, perhaps, of the Apology, and of insulated passages, such as the speech of Alcibiades in the Banquet; for it would certainly have been in bad taste, if here, where Plato is making contemporaries of Socrates speak of him in his presence, he had exhibited him in a manner that was not substantially faithful, though even here many of the details may have been introduced for the sake of playful exaggeration. On the other hand, Plato himself does not warrant any one to consider all that he makes Socrates say in his dialogues, as his real thoughts and language; and it would be rendering him but a poor service to confine his merit to that of having given a correct and skillful report of the doctrines of Socrates. On the contrary, he undoubtedly means his philosophy to be considered as his own, and not Socrates's. And, accordingly, every intelligent reader is probably convinced by his own reflections that none but original thoughts can appear in such a dress; whereas a work of mere narrative—and such these dialogues would be, if the whole of the matter belonged to Socrates—would necessarily show a fainter tone of coloring, such as Xenophon's conversations really present. But as, on the one hand, it would be too much to assert that Socrates actually thought and knew all that Plato makes him say, so, on the other hand, it would certainly be too little to say of him that he was nothing more than the Socrates whom Xenophon represents. Xenophon, it is true, in the Memorabilia, professes himself a narrator; but, in the first place, a man of sense can only relate what he understands, and a disciple of Socrates, who must have been well acquainted with his master's habit of disclaiming knowledge, would of all men adhere most strictly to this rule. We know, however, and this may be admitted without being harshly pressed, that Xenophon was a statesman, but no philosopher, and that, besides the purity of his character and the good sense of his political principles; besides his admirable power of rousing the intellect and checking presumption, which Xenophon loved and respected in Socrates, the latter may have possessed some really philosophical elements which Xenophon was unable to appropriate to himself, and which he suffered to pass unnoticed; which, indeed, he can have felt no temptation to exhibit, for fear of betraying defects such as those which his Socrates was wont to expose. On the other hand, Xenophon was an apologetic narrator, and had, no doubt, selected this form for the very purpose that his readers might not expect him to exhibit Socrates entire, but only that part of his character which belonged to the sphere of the affec-

the lost poetry, but yet a reader of moderate capacity soon observes what has been done, and can even point it out in several passages, where the decomposing hand has grown tired of its work, so it is in the other case with the philosophical basis. One finds some parallels with Plato, other fragments are detected in other ways; and the only inference to be drawn from the scarcity of these passages is, that Xenophon understood his business; unless we choose to say, that as Aristotle is supposed to have held his philosophical discourses in the forenoon, and the exoteric in the afternoon (*Gellius, N. A.*, xx., 5), Socrates reversed this order, and in the morning held conversations in the market-place with the artisans, and others who were less familiar with him, which Xenophon found it easier to divest of their philosophical aspect; but that of an evening, in the walks and wrestling-schools, he engaged in those subtler, deeper, and wittier dialogues with his favorites, which it was reserved for Plato to imitate, embellish, and expand, while he connected his own investigations with them.

And thus, to fill up the blank which Xenophon has manifestly left, we are still driven back to the Socrates of Plato, and the shortest way of releasing ourselves from the difficulty would be to find a rule by which we could determine what is the reflex and the property of Socrates in Plato, and what his own invention and addition. Only the problem is not to be solved by a process such as that adopted by Meiners, whose critical talent is of a kind to which this subject in general was not very well suited; for if, in all that Plato has left, we are to select only what is least speculative, least artificial, least poetical, and hence, for so we are taught, least enthusiastic, we shall, indeed, still retain much matter for this more refined and pregnant species of dialogue, to season Xenophon's tediousness, but it will be impossible in this way to discover any properly philosophical basis in the constitution of Socrates: for if we exclude all depth of speculation, nothing is left but results, without the grounds and methodical principles on which they depend, and which, therefore, Socrates can only have possessed instinctively, that is, without the aid of philosophy. The only safe method seems to be, to inquire: What may Socrates have been, over and above what Xenophon has described, without, however, contradicting the strokes of character and the practical maxims which Xenophon distinctly delivers as those of Socrates; and what must he have been to give Plato a right and an inducement to exhibit him as he has done in his dialogues? Now the latter branch of this question inevitably leads us back to the historical position from

inant in the whole sphere of intellectual exertion. But as soon as the need of the connection and co-ordinate growth of all the branches of knowledge has become so distinctly felt as to express itself by the form in which they are treated and described, in a manner which can never again be lost, so far as this is the case, it is no longer particular talents and instincts, but the general scientific talent of speculation, that has the ascendant. In the former of these cases, it must be confessed that the idea of science, as such, is not yet matured, perhaps has not even become the subject of consciousness; for science, as such, can only be conceived as a whole, in which every division is merely subordinate, just as the real world to which it ought to correspond. In the latter case, on the contrary, this idea has become a subject of consciousness; for it can have been only by its force that the particular inclinations which confine each thinker to a certain object, and split science into insulated parts, have been mastered: and this is, unquestionably, a simpler criterion to distinguish the two periods of Greek philosophy. In the earlier period, the idea of science, as such, was not the governing idea, and had not even become a distinct subject of consciousness; and this it is that gives rise to the obscurity which we perceive in all the philosophical productions of that period, through the appearance of caprice which results from the want of consciousness, and through the imperfection of the scientific language, which is gradually forming itself out of the poetical and historical vocabulary. In the second period, on the other hand, the idea of science has become a subject of consciousness. Hence the main business every where is to distinguish knowledge from opinion; hence the precision of scientific language; hence the peculiar prominence of dialectics, which have no other object than the idea of science: things which were not comprehended even by the Eleatics in the same way as by the Socratic schools, since the former still make the idea of *being* their starting-point, rather than that of *knowledge*.

Now this waking of the idea of science, and its earliest manifestations, must have been, in the first instance, what constituted the philosophical basis in Socrates; and for this reason he is justly regarded as the founder of that later Greek philosophy, which in its whole essential form, together with its several variations, was determined by that idea. This is proved clearly enough by the historical statements in Plato, and this, too, is what must be supplied in Xenophon's conversations, in order to make them worthy of Socrates, and Socrates of his admirers; for if he went about in the

of these conversations; for this was the field that supplied the most generally admitted conceptions and propositions, the fate of which interested all men alike. But this mode of proceeding becomes inexplicable if it is supposed that Socrates attached the chief importance to the subject of these conversations. That must have been quite a secondary point. For when the object is to elucidate any subject, it is necessary to pay attention to the less familiar and more disputed views of it, and how meagre most of those discussions in Xenophon are in this respect, is evident enough. From the same point of view we must also consider the controversy of Socrates with the Sophists. So far as it was directed against their maxims, it does not belong to our present question; it is merely the opposition of a good citizen to the corrupters of government and of youth. But, even looking at it from the purely theoretical side, it would be idle to represent this contrast as the germ of a new period of philosophy, if Socrates had only impugned opinions which were the monstrous shapes into which the doctrines of an earlier school had degenerated, without having established any in their stead, which nobody supposes him to have done. But, for the purpose of awakening the true idea of science, the Sophists must have been the most welcome of all disputants to him, since they had reduced their opinions into the most perfect form, and hence were proud of them themselves, and were peculiarly admired by others. If, therefore, he could succeed in exposing their weakness, the value of a principle so triumphantly applied would be rendered most conspicuous.

But, in order to show the imperfections of the current conceptions both in the theories of the Sophists and in common life, if the issue was not to be left to chance, some certain *method* was requisite; for it was often necessary, in the course of the process, to lay down intermediate notions, which it was necessary to define to the satisfaction of both parties, otherwise all that was done would afterward have looked like a paltry surprise, and the contradiction between the proposition in question and one that was admitted could never be detected without ascertaining what notions might or might not be connected with a given one. Now this method is laid down in the two problems which Plato states in the Phædrus, as the two main elements in the art of dialectics, that is, to first know how correctly to combine multiplicity in unity, and again to divide a complex unity according to its nature into a multiplicity, and next to know what notions may or may not be connected together. It is by this means that Socrates became the real founder of dialec-

ever after retained among the Greeks: what now took place was not, indeed, what Socrates did, or perhaps could have done, but yet it was undoubtedly his will. To this it may indeed be objected, that Xenophon expressly says (*Mem.*, i., 1, 11), that Socrates in his riper years not only himself gave up all application to natural philosophy, but endeavored to withhold all others from it, and directed them to the consideration of human affairs; and hence many hold those only to be genuine Socratics who did not include physics in their system. But this statement must manifestly be taken in a sense much less general, and quite different from that which is usually given to it. This is clearly evinced by the reasons which Socrates alleges. For how could he have said so generally, that the things which depend on God ought not to be made the subject of inquiry, before those which depend on man have been dispatched, since not only are the latter connected in a variety of ways with the former, but even among things human there must be some of greater moment, others of less, some of nearer, others of more remote concern, and the proposition would lead to the conclusion that before one was brought to its completion, not even the investigation of another ought to be begun. This might have been not unfairly turned by a Sophist against Socrates himself, if he had dragged in a notion apparently less familiar, in order to illustrate another; and certainly this proposition, taken in a general sense, would not only have endangered the conduct of life, but would also have altogether destroyed the Socratic idea of science, that nothing can be known except together with the rest, and along with its relation to all things besides. The real case is simply this. It is clear that Socrates had no peculiar talent for any single science, and least of all for that of physics. Now it is true that a merely metaphysical thinker may feel himself attracted toward all sciences, as was the case with Kant; but then this happens under different circumstances, and a different mental constitution from that of Socrates. He, on the contrary, made no excursions to points remote from this centre, but devoted his whole life to the task of exciting his leading idea as extensively and as vividly as possible in others; his whole aim was, that whatever form man's wishes and hopes might take, according to individual character and accidental circumstances, this foundation might be securely laid before he proceeded further; but, till then, his advice was, not to accumulate fresh masses of opinions; this he, for his part, would permit only so far as it was demanded by the wants of active life, and for this reason he might say, that if those who investigated meteoric phenomena had any hope of producing them at their

But, whether much or little of this and other doctrines belonged to Socrates himself, the general idea already described can not fail to suggest a more correct mode of conceiving in what light it is that Plato brings forward his master in his works, and in what sense his Socrates is to be termed a real or a fictitious personage. Fictitious, in the proper sense, I hold he is not, and his reality is not a merely mimic one, nor is Socrates in those works merely a convenient person who affords room for much mimic art and much cheerful pleasantry, in order to temper the abstruse investigations with this agreeable addition. It is because the spirit and the method of Socrates are every where predominant, and because it is not merely a subordinate point with Plato to adopt the manner of Socrates, but is as truly his highest aim, that Plato has not hesitated to put into his mouth what he believed to be no more than deductions from his fundamental ideas. The only material exceptions we find to this (passing over several more minute which come under the same head with the anachronisms) occur in later works, as the Statesman and the Republic ; I mean doctrines of Plato foreign to the real views of Socrates, perhaps, indeed, virtually contradicting them, and which are nevertheless put into his mouth. On this head we must let Plato appeal to the privilege conferred by custom. But, on the whole, we are forced to say, that in giving Socrates a living share in the propagation of that philosophical movement which took its rise from him, Plato has immortalized him in the noblest manner that a disciple can perpetuate the glory of his master ; in a manner not only more beautiful, but more just, than he could have done it by a literal narrative.

THE END.

BOOKS FOR SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES,

AT GREATLY REDUCED PRICES,

PUBLISHED BY

HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK.

Abbott's Illustrated Histories.

Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers.

Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings.

Alison's Essay on Taste.

Andrews's Latin-English Lexicon.

Anthon's Classical Dictionary.

Anthon's Latin-English Dictionary.

Anthon's Classical Series.

Latin Lessons. Latin Grammar, Part I. Containing the most important Parts of the Grammar of the Latin Language, together with appropriate Exercises in the Translating and Writing of Latin. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

Latin Prose Composition. Latin Grammar, Part II. An Introduction to Latin Prose Composition, with a complete Course of Exercises, illustrative of all the important Principles of Latin Syntax. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

A KEY to the Above is published, which may be obtained by Teachers. 12mo, Half Sheep, 50 cents.

Zumpt's Latin Grammar. From the ninth Edition of the Original, adapted to the use of English Students. By LEONHARD SCHMITZ, Ph.D. Corrected and enlarged. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

AN ABRIDGMENT of the Above. 12mo, Sheep extra, 50 cents.

Latin Prosody and Metre. From the best Authorities, Ancient and Modern. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

Latin Versification. In a Series of Progressive Exercises, including Specimens of Translation from English and German Poetry into Latin Verse. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

A KEY to the Above is published, which may be obtained by Teachers. 12mo, Half Sheep, 50 cents.

Cæsar's Commentaries on the Gallic War, and the First Book of the Greek Paraphrase; with English Notes, Critical and Explanatory, Plans of Battles, Sieges, &c., and Historical, Geographical, and Archæological Indexes. Map, Portrait, &c. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

The Æneid of Virgil. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory, a Metrical Clavis, and an Historical, Geographical, and Mythological Index. Portrait and many Illustrations. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 25.

Eclogues and Georgics of Virgil. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 25.

Sallust's Jugurthine War and Conspiracy of Catiline. With an English Commentary, and Geographical and Historical Indexes. New Edition, corrected and enlarged. Portrait. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

The Works of Horace. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory. A new Edition, corrected and enlarged, with Excursions relative to the Vines and Vineyards of the Ancients; a Life of Horace, &c. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 25.

Cicero's Select Orations. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory, and Historical, Geographical, and Legal Indexes. An improved Edition. Portrait. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00

Anthon's Classical Series, continued.

Sancti Sir Somerville, Dr. Ancestor, and Freeborn with the Life of Johnson by Boswell. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Cæsar's Gallic Expedition. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

The Germania and Agricola, and Life Selections from the Annals of Tacitus. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Cornelius Nepos. Carefully Edited, With Improvements Emendations. With English Notes, &c. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Terence. Literally Corrected, with English Notes, Metrical Tables, and an Essay on the Measures of Terence, &c. 12mo, Sheep extra. [In press.]

First Greek Lessons. Containing the most important Parts of the Grammar of the Greek Language, together with appropriate Exercises in the Translating and Writing of Greek. For the use of Beginners. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

Greek Prose Composition. Greek Lessons, Part II. An Introduction to Greek Prose Composition, with a complete System of Idiomatic Illustrations of all the important Principles of Greek Syntax. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Grammar of the Greek Language. For the use of Schools and Universities. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

A New Greek Grammar. From the German of Kühner. Revised, Enlarged, and Thoroughly Remodelled according to the Present State of Philological Science, and Adapted to the Use of Schools and Universities in this Country. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Greek Reader and Manual. For the use of Schools and Colleges. Together with the Greek Grammar of the Universities Council of Zurich, and Gottfried Hermann, of Leipsic, carefully prepared. Remarks on the Intercommunication of Languages. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

A Greek Reader. Translated from the German of Jacobs. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory, a Metrical Index to Homer and Hesiod, and a Copious Lexicon. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Homer. The First Six Books of Homer's Iliad, to which are appended English Notes, Critical and Explanatory, a Metrical Index, and Homeric Glossary. New and enlarged Edition. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

The Orations of Demosthenes. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory, a Map arranged according to the latest and best Authorities, and a View of the Battle of Chæronea. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Anthon's Classical Series, continued.

Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates. From the Text of Kühner. With Explanatory Notes, &c., by D. B. Hickie, LL.D. First American Edition, corrected and enlarged. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Manual of Roman Antiquities. From the most recent German Works. With a Description of the City of Rome, &c. 12mo, Sheep extra, 87½ cents.

Manual of Greek Literature. With a Critical History of the Greek Language. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Manual of Greek Antiquities. From the best and most recent Sources. 12mo, Sheep extra, 87½ cents.

Manual of Greek and Roman Mythology. 12mo, Sheep extra.

Latin Syntax. Latin Lessons, Part II. Containing Latin Syntax, with Reading Lessons, and Exercises in double translation, on the basis of Kühner's. 12mo, Sheep extra. (Uniform with Latin Lessons, Part I.)

Ovid. Selections from the Metamorphoses of Ovid. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory. 12mo. (*In press.*)

Euripides. The Hecuba, Hippolytus, Medea, and Bacchæ of Euripides. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory. 12mo. (*In press.*)

Juvenal. The Satires of Juvenal. With English Notes, Critical and Explanatory. (*In press.*)

Bigelow on the Useful Arts,

considered in Connection with the Applications of Science. With numerous Engravings. 2 vols. 12mo, Muslin, $1 50.

Boucharlat's Mechanics.

An Elementary Treatise on Mechanics. Translated from the French, with Additions and Emendations, by Prof. Edward H. Courtenay. Plates. 8vo, Sheep extra, $2 25.

Boyd's Eclectic Moral Philosophy;

prepared for Literary Institutions and general Use. 12mo. Muslin, 75 cents.

Boyd's Rhetoric and Criticism.

Elements of Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, with copious Practical Exercises and Examples. Including, also, a succinct History of the English Language, and of British and American Literature, from the earliest to the present Times. On the Basis of the recent Works of Alexander Reid and R. Cunnell; with large Additions from other Sources. 12mo, Half Bound, 60 cents.

Brande's Encyclopedia.

A Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art, comprising the History, Description, and Scientific Principles of every Branch of Human Knowledge; with the Derivation and Definition of all the Terms in general use. Illustrated by numerous Engravings on Wood. 8vo. Sheep extra, $4 00.

Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful.

Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful. With an Introductory Discourse concerning Taste. Edited by [illegible]. 12mo. Muslin, 75 cents.

Buttmann's Greek Grammar.

A Greek Grammar for the use of High Schools and Universities, revised and enlarged by Additional Matter. Translated from the Fifteenth Edition by Edward Robinson, D.D., LL.D. 12mo. Sheep extra, $1 00.

Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric.

[illegible]. 12mo. Muslin, $1 25.

Cicero's Orator.

Cicero's Three Dialogues on the Orator. Translated into English, by W. Guthrie. Revised and corrected, with Notes. 12mo. Muslin, 75 cents.

Clark's Elements of Algebra.

Containing, also, the Theory and Application of Logarithms; together with an appendix containing Infinite Series, the General Theory of Equations, and the most approved Methods of resolving the higher Equations. 12mo. Sheep extra, $1 00.

Comte's Philosophy of Mathematics.

Translated from the System of Philosophy Positive, by W. M. Gillespie. 8vo. Muslin, $1 50.

Crabb's Synonyms.

English Synonyms explained. With numerous Illustrations and Engravings, drawn from the best Writers. 12mo. Sheep extra, $1 00.

Dickens's Child's History of England.

[illegible]. 12mo. Muslin, $1 00.

Docharty's Arithmetic.

[illegible]. 12mo. Sheep extra. (In press.)

Docharty's Institutes of Algebra.

Being the First Part of a Course of Mathematics designed for the use of Schools, Academies, and Colleges. 12mo. Sheep extra, $1 00.

Draper's Text-book on Chemistry.

For the use of Schools and Colleges. Illustrated by numerous Additions. With [illegible]. 12mo. Sheep extra, $1 00.

Draper's Text-book on Natural Philosophy,
for the use of Schools and Colleges. Containing the most recent Discoveries and Facts, compiled from the best Authorities. With nearly 400 Illustrations. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

Draper's Chemical Organization of Plants.
A Treatise on the Forces which produce the Organization of Plants. With an Appendix, containing several Memoirs on Capillary Attraction, Electricity, and the Chemical Action of Light. Engravings. 4to, Muslin, $2 50.

Duff's Book-keeping.
The North American Accountant: embracing Single and Double Entry Book-keeping, practically adapted to the Inland and Maritime Commerce of the United States. Exemplifying all Modern Improvements in the Science, with a new and certain Method of detecting Errors and proving the Ledger. Embracing an improved Plan of Instruction. Complete in Two Parts. 8vo, School Edition, Half Sheep, 75 cents; Mercantile Edition, Muslin, $1 50.

Findlay's Classical Atlas,
to Illustrate Ancient Geography. Comprised in 25 Maps, showing the various Divisions of the World as known to the Ancients. With an Index of the Ancient and Modern Names. 8vo, Half Bound, $3 25.

Fowler's English Language,
in its Elements and Forms. With a History of its Origin and Development, and a full Grammar. Designed for use in Colleges and Schools. 8vo, Muslin, $1 50; Sheep extra, $1 75.

Goldsmith's History of Greece.
Abridged by the Author. Edited by the Author of "American Popular Lessons." 18mo, Half Sheep, 45 cents.

Goldsmith's History of Rome.
Abridged by the Author. Edited by H. W. HERBERT. 18mo, Half Sheep, 45 cents.

Gray's and Adams's Elements of Geology.
Engravings. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

Gray's Elements of Natural Philosophy.
Designed as a Text-book for Academies, High Schools, and Colleges. Illustrated by 360 Wood-cuts. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

Griscom's Animal Mechanism
and Physiology; being a plain and familiar Exposition of the Structure and Functions of the Human System. Designed for Families and Schools. Engravings. 18mo, Muslin, 45 cents; Half Sheep, 50 cents.

Hackley's Algebra.

A Treatise on Algebra. 8vo, Sheep extra, $1 50. A School and College Edition, 8vo, Muslin, $1 00.

Hackley's Geometry.

An Elementary Course of Geometry, for the use of Schools and Colleges. 8vo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

Hale's History of the United States.

From their First Settlement as Colonies to the Close of the Administration of Mr. Buchanan in 1857. 1 vol. 12mo, Muslin, 75 cents.

Harper's Statistical Gazetteer of the World.

In preparation. Containing the United States of America, Texas, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia. By J. H. Gibbon, Esq. To be issued in Seven Parts. 8vo, $1 00 each.

Harper's Map of the United States and Canada.

Showing the Canals, Railroads, and principal Water Routes. By Samuel Mitchell, LL.D. The Eastern Sheet, 42 by 30 inches, $1 50; Western Sheet, $1 50; Whole sheet, $2 50; Whole sheet, mounted and handsomely varnished, $4 50; Canadian sheet, $1 00.

Harper's New York Class-book.

Containing Outlines of the Geography and History of New York; Biographical Sketches of Eminent Inventors; Sketches of Science and Nature; History, Resources, and Public Institutions of each County; Arranged as a Reading Book for Schools. By Thomas Gamble. 12mo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Harrison's Latin Grammar.

An Exposition of some of the Laws of the Latin Grammar. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

Haswell's Engineering.

Mechanics' and Engineers' Pocket-book, containing Tables and Formulæ useful in Measuring and Weighing Timber and Logs, Scantling and Boards, Strength of Timber, Beams, Girders, Arches, Trusses, Domes, Roofs, Gutters, Conductors, Pipes, Cisterns, Tanks, Pumps, Wells, &c. Steam and its Uses, Explosive Force, Evaporative Power, Consumption of Fuel, Water Wheels, Wind Mills, Gunnery, Gearing, Shafts, Bearings, Hangers, Couplings, Governors, Belts, Pulleys, &c. Iron and its Uses, Specific Gravity, Strength, Tables of Weights of Iron, Pipes, &c. Miscellaneous Tables, Memoranda, Items, &c. Illustrated with numerous Engravings. By Charles H. Haswell, Civil and Mechanical Engineer. Fifteenth Edition, revised and enlarged. 1 vol. 12mo, Pocket-book form, $1 25.

Hatch's Powder Tables.

In preparation. Designed for the Use of Engineers, Artillerists, and Others. By Lieutenant Colonel Hatch, U.S. Army. 1 vol. 12mo. Nearly ready.

Henry's History of Philosophy.

Epitome of the History of Philosophy. Being the Work adopted by the University of France for Instruction in the Colleges and High Schools. Translated from the French, with Additions, and a Continuation of the History. 2 vols. 18mo, Muslin, 90 cents.

Herschel's Natural Philosophy.

A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. 12mo, Muslin, 60 cents.

Kane's Elements of Chemistry;

including the most recent Discoveries, and Applications of the Science to Medicine and Pharmacy, and to the Arts. Edited by JOHN W. DRAPER, M.D. With about 250 Woodcuts. 8vo, Muslin, $1 50; Sheep extra, $1 75.

Keightley's History of England,

from the earliest Period to 1839. With Notes, &c., by an American. 5 vols. 18mo, Muslin, $2 25.

Lee's Elements of Geology,

for Popular Use; containing a Description of the Geological Formations and Mineral Resources of the United States. Engravings. 18mo, Half Sheep, 50 cents.

Lewis's Platonic Theology.

Plato contra Atheos. Plato against the Atheists; or, the Tenth Book of the Dialogue on Laws, accompanied with Critical Notes, and followed by extended Dissertations on some of the main Points of the Platonic Philosophy and Theology, especially as compared with the Holy Scriptures. 12mo, Muslin, $1 50.

Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon,

based on the German Work of FRANCIS PASSOW. With Corrections and Additions, and the Insertion, in Alphabetical Order, of the Proper Names occurring in the principal Greek Authors, by HENRY DRISLER, M.A. Royal 8vo, Sheep extra, $5 00.

Loomis's Mathematical Series.

Elements of Algebra. For the use of Beginners. 12mo, Sheep extra, 62½ cents.

Treatise on Algebra. 8vo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Elements of Geometry and Conic Sections. 8vo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

Introduction to Practical Astronomy. 8vo, Sheep extra. (*In press.*)

The Recent Progress of Astronomy, especially in the United States. 12mo, Muslin, $1 00.

Elements of Plane and Spherical Trigonometry. 8vo, Sheep extra, $1 00.

Loomis's Mathematical Series, continued.

Tables of Logarithms of Numbers, and of Sines and Tangents for every Ten Seconds of the Quadrant. 8vo, Sheep extra, $1 50.

☞ The Trigonometry and Tables bound together, may be had for $2 00.

Analytical Geometry and Calculus. 8vo, Sheep extra, $2 50.

Lowry's Universal Atlas.

Constructed and Engraved from the most recent Authorities. Quarto, Half Bound, $2 00.

Mahan's System of Intellectual Philosophy.

12mo, Muslin, $1 00.

Mrs. Markham's History of France.

From the Conquest of Gaul by Julius Cæsar to the Reign of Louis Philippe. With Conversations at the End of each Chapter. For the use of Young Persons. Edited by Jacob Abbott. 12mo, Muslin, $1 00.

Maury's Principles of Eloquence.

With an Introduction, by Rodney Parker. 18mo. Muslin, 63 cents.

McClintock's Classical Series.

A First Book in Latin. Containing Grammar Exercises, and Vocabularies, on the Model of easiest Lessons, and Reading Lessons. With Illustrations of Etymology and Syntax. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

A Second Book in Latin. Containing Syntax, and Reading Lessons selected from Cæsar, Nepos, and Ovid, with Introductory Exercises, Notes, and a full Vocabulary. Forming a sufficient Text-Book. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

A First Book in Greek. Containing a full View of the Forms of Words, with Translations and copious Exercises on the Rules of Common Inflection and Syntax. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

A Second Book in Greek. Containing a Grammar with Reading Lessons in Prose, Poetry, and Dorific Dialect in Verse. Forming a sufficient Text-Book. With Notes and copious Vocabulary. 12mo, Sheep extra, 75 cents.

McQueen's The Orator's Touchstone;

or, Eloquence Simplified. Embracing a comprehensive System of Instruction for the Improvement of the Voice, and for all Exercises in the general Art of Public Speaking. 12mo, Muslin, 75 cents.

Mill's Logic,

Ratiocinative and Inductive; being a connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation. 2 vols. 8vo, Muslin, $3 00.

71 2009 435